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1  Economics and power
The volume starts from the idea that economics as academic discipline and 
profession has enhanced influence and power during recent decades in many 
countries and in several social spheres. The forms of power, domination and 
authority that open up different channels of influence for economics are com-
plex and diverse. But economics is not only a source of power, it is also product 
of power and domination through discourses, fields, networks and other means 
and tools. These discourses, fields and networks are controlled by different 
governmentalities and rules and they span different sectors of society. Thus, 
the study of economists, economics and economic expert discourse cannot 
be restricted to academia, as it involves a variety of domains of investigation 
(Maesse, 2015).
Accordingly, economists occupy positions at the top of institutional hierar-
chies in different sectors, such as banks and large firms, the state and the media, 
as well as within academia. They serve as consultants and advisors in several 
policy fields, ranging from fiscal to health and social security policy. Econo-
mists are appointed to the boards of big corporations, as governance experts, 
senior civil servants and central bankers. Economists are also members of con-
sulting teams for newspapers and other media, regularly publish op-eds and 
leads, while acting as economic experts and translating their symbolic capital 
into policy by coining core “economic imaginaries” (Jessop, 2010). Actually, 
leading newspapers in the German-speaking area have started to establish their 
own economists’ rankings based on their impact in several social spheres. Addi-
tionally, economists have become a dominant professional group, compared to 
traditional professions and other social science disciplines. At the international 
level, economists work in various influential organisations, such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and the European Central Bank (ECB) (Dezalay & Garth, 1998).
Furthermore, economists cannot act within society without a strong base 
in academia and science. Accordingly, economists constitute one of the most 
advanced examples of an international scientific field, resulting from a long pro-
cess of standardisation of practices, careers and curricula, as well as the adoption 
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of external technical tools from mathematics and physics (Fourcade, 2006). Yet, 
economists do not form a homogeneous group, and their power is unequally 
distributed amongst members of the group. Strong hierarchies, compared to 
other academic disciplines and professions, characterise economics. There are 
only a few expressions for alternative approaches compared to the dominant 
orthodoxy in the field. This hierarchy, combined with a strong insularity in 
the field, helps to define a sentiment of self-confidence and superiority among 
group members (Fourcade et al., 2015). Economists face strong imbalances in 
the distribution of related capitals, and this stratification of the profession has 
implications for some features of their profiles. Economists are clearly under-
feminised, and it can be hypothesised that, for the most part, they come from 
high social backgrounds. Women, individuals with a working-class background 
or with a particularly local profile are more or less excluded from resources in 
terms of chairs, research funds, grants and editorial board positions (Bayer & 
Rouse, 2016). Nonetheless, such individuals are sometimes able to offer real 
challenges to dominant actors in the field.
To sum up, several channels exist through which economists influence pub-
lic policy issues; aside from analysing the traditional role of economic experts 
as policy advisors, there is also a strand of research focusing on the political 
power of economic ideas, as well as more recent literature on the performativ-
ity of economic models and the role of economists as “public intellectuals” (i.e. 
economists who are engaged and highly visible in political and public debates) 
(Mata & Medema, 2013). Consequently, aside from direct channels through 
which economic knowledge enters the political arena, there are also several 
indirect channels of impact that are mediated by intermediaries such as think 
tanks or media outlets (Hirschman  & Berman, 2014; Plehwe et  al., 2018). 
These institutions play a crucial role in the transmission of economic ideas.
Our volume reflects on these complex interrelationships between science 
and society, where economic experts act and have an impact on several levels. 
In this way, we present 13 contributions from four different methodological 
and theoretical domains. Each chapter takes a particular view on the multiple 
dimensions of power, action and impact. To sum up, this volume offers com-
plex insights into the forms of power in economics and provides a broad over-
view of recent developments in the evolving field of social studies of economics 
(henceforth SSE).
2  Power as a complex phenomenon
SSE developed as a field for the analysis on the role of economists in society. 
The groundbreaking works of Coats, Hall, Mirowski, Morgan, Fourcade and 
Lebaron opened up a research field that is hardly manageable today (Coats, 
1993; Fourcade, 2009; Hall, 1989; Lebaron, 2001; Mirowski, 1991; Morgan, 
1990). Especially in recent decades, a huge array of young researchers started 
the endeavour to form a research field out of the canonical classics (Schmidt-
Wellenburg & Lebaron, 2018a; Maesse et al., 2017; Mata & Medema, 2013; 
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Montecinos  & Markoff, 2009; Hirschman  & Popp Berman, 2014; Aistleit-
ner et al., 2018). This work has developed in many national and disciplinary 
contexts, and it has shown how questions on the interrelation of power, dis-
course and knowledge have become important in this field. The contributions 
of this volume analyse the complex and widespread channels of influence as 
well as the mutual roles of economic experts in and on society from different 
disciplinary approaches and national contexts. It provides an overview of the 
diversity of perspectives and paradigms. Four different analytical views on the 
role of power and economics will be taken: first, the role of economic expert 
discourses as power devices for the formation of influential expertise; second, 
the logics and modalities of governmentality that produce power/knowledge 
apparatuses between science and society; third, economists as they are involved 
in networks between academia, politics and the media; and fourth, economics 
considered as a social field, including questions of legitimacy and unequal rela-
tions between economists based on the accumulation of various capitals.
In order to study economic expert knowledge, discourse analytical approaches 
became popular within SSE. Economic expert knowledge is mainly analysed 
from three perspectives. First, the production of economics knowledge is stud-
ied by economic historians and cultural sociologists (Coats, 1993; Morgan, 
1990). In particular, different paradigms, hegemonic theories and marginalised 
forms of knowledge were analysed in order to understand how power rela-
tions influence the production of economic truths (Dobusch & Kapeller, 2009; 
Mirowski, 1991; Ötsch et al., 2017). In addition to this production-oriented 
research, the influence of economic expert knowledge on society became a 
major research field. Here, performativity studies have shown how economics 
as discursive tool impacts on the formation of markets and firms (Callon, 1998; 
MacKenzie et al., 2007; and critically Sparsam & Pahl in this volume). Other 
studies have taken into account the formation of legitimacy, argumentation 
strategies and speaker positions via economic expert discourses (Fitzgerald & 
O’Rourke, 2015; Maesse, 2015; Pühringer & Griesser, 2020; and Bäuerle in 
this volume). Both approaches – production and impact orientation – mostly 
interact by focusing on diverse forms of the circulation of knowledge and the 
various types of interpretative adoption by experts, professionals, politicians 
and the media (Maesse, 2017, and in this volume). Here, economic expertise is 
seen as a tool for exercising power through hegemonic discourses in different 
social contexts, such as politics, the business world and the media (Schmidt-
Wellenburg, 2018). Finally, a third form of discourse analytical perspective 
considers diverse forms of informal knowledge (Maesse, 2018; Rossier & Büh-
lmann, 2018). This knowledge accounts for informal social rules in organi-
sations, tacit knowledge in professional fields, institutional norms and values 
of politics and academia, as well as the social networks that control access to 
certain institutions and regulate official and unofficial membership categories.
Closely related to discourse approaches, governmentality studies analyse eco-
nomics and economic expertise as a form of “soft power”. Starting form Fou-
cault’s work on governmentality and “neoliberalisation” studies (Dean, 1999; 
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Foucault, 2008; Miller, 2001), economics is seen as a governance tool for the 
creation of various forms of subjectivities. As Psyllakou shows in this volume, 
TV shows and certain forms of economic language can be analysed as mecha-
nisms for producing and controlling the emotions of people. In addition to 
that, Nicoletta analyses in this volume how an economic governance apparatus 
in Italy emerged. Other studies have shown how neoliberal ideologies and 
economic theories interact in order to create certain political perceptions and 
interpretative frames (Zuidhof, 2012; and Gürkan in this volume). In addition, 
many studies have analysed how neoliberalism recruits economic experts and 
ideas in order to implement certain political programmes serving the interests 
of the ruling classes. In this volume, Bjerke shows how this works in the case of 
market theory. However, various other study areas have analysed the govern-
mentality of neoliberalism, for example financialisation studies (Erturk et al., 
2008). The main contribution of governmentality approaches to SSE can be 
seen in their ability to bring together critical views of knowledge use, connect-
ing them to new approaches to power and domination and offering a new field 
for discourse analytical methods. Additionally, network and field approaches to 
economics are closely connected to the role of power/knowledge apparatuses 
considered by governmentality studies.
Another trend within SSE is the analysis of network structures in economics, 
either to investigate the transmission of economic knowledge into politics or 
to unveil social power structures inside academic economics. In the first case, a 
social network perspective enables highlighting the connections of economists 
to powerful elites and their involvement in policymaking processes, as well as 
the role of networks in spreading economic ideas in general. In this respect, 
recent approaches in SSE are related to critical policy studies (Mirowski  & 
Plehwe, 2009) and the evolving field of think-tank network research (Salas-
Porras & Murray, 2017). Thus, scholars are explicitly focusing on a sample of 
politically engaged economists and investigating personal (e.g. co-authorships, 
collaborations) and institutional (e.g. memberships, positions) networks 
between economic experts and advice bodies, as well as economic think tanks 
or initiatives (Grimm et al., 2018; Flickenschild & Afonso, 2019; Pühringer, 
2020; and Theine and Pühringer & Beyer, in this volume). In this way, they are 
able to show the formative role of such personal-institutional networks in the 
process of the transmission of economic knowledge into policymaking (Hel-
gadóttir, 2016; Plehwe et al., 2018; and Gautier Morin in this volume). In the 
second case, researchers are typically interested in hierarchies, stratification log-
ics, path dependencies and network effects inside academia, and thus they often 
combine social network analysis (SNA) with bibliometric and/or biographical 
analyses (Beyer & Pühringer, 2019; Coman, 2019). While SNA as applied in 
SSE is rooted in early economic sociology (e.g. Granovetter, 1983), current 
approaches make use of the availability of huge databases and advanced analyti-
cal tools. In this vein, recent studies have investigated “citation cartels” between 
economic journals (Anauati et al., 2018) and authors (Önder & Terviö, 2015). 
On a more individual level, scholars also show that established social networks 
between economists and actors outside academic economics play a crucial role 
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in shaping the prospects for successful academic careers (Rossier, 2020; and 
Rossier & Benz in this volume). This volume contributes to the debate on the 
public and political impact of economics by providing novel empirical analyses 
of social networks of economists both inside and outside academia.
A final approach conceptualises economics as a field (Bourdieu, 2005). Within 
this more or less autonomous social space, economists compete for the defini-
tion of both the field’s boundaries and what (good) economics is (Lebaron, 
2000). The distribution of capital, defined as a group of powerful resources 
involved in systemic processes allowing their garnering by those who possess 
them (Savage et al., 2005), and economists’ individual dispositions shape their 
position in the field’s structure and their scientific and political position-takings 
(Lebaron, 2001). This approach focuses on two particularities characterising 
this field. First, economics as a scientific discipline is subject to transnational 
processes of scientific recognition with, at the top of the hierarchy, a few US 
departments and scientific journals, as well as the Nobel and the “Nobel” prize, 
which shape academic careers and citations (Korom, 2020, and in this volume). 
The import of resources acquired in those departments provides economists 
with advantageous positions in their home countries (Dezalay & Garth, 2002; 
Gautier Morin & Rossier, 2021). Second, economics occupies a particularly 
central place within the field of power, i.e. the field of dominant individuals 
from all other fields (Bourdieu, 1996). Neoclassical economic theory contrib-
utes to spreading an “economic belief ” that consolidates the production of a 
“dominant ideology”, which reflects the interests of a capitalist class and legiti-
mises the social order (Gautier Morin in this volume). Economists are not just a 
social group with increasing importance in the academic context but also most 
certainly the producers of some of the most important tools and perceptions 
to govern today’s societies (Schmidt-Wellenburg & Lebaron, 2018b: 20). Con-
sequently, they have a strong influence on policymaking and occupy positions 
among the public administration and private sector elites (Rossier et al., 2017; 
Klüger, 2018, and in this volume), whereas their internal debates often take 
place well beyond the field’s borders, such as in the political arena (Schmidt-
Wellenburg, 2018) and the media (Gautier Morin, 2019). More generally, 
when studying economics as part of a field-analytical strategy (Bourdieu & Wac-
quant, 1992), three interrelated dimensions are highlighted. First, economics 
is considered in relation to the field of power by stressing where economists 
are situated within this powerful space. Second, the objective structure of rela-
tions through the distribution of specific capital in economics is highlighted. 
This also includes a focus on economists’ biographical and network-related 
resources. Third, processes related to economists’ field-specific habitus, defined 
as a set of embodied dispositions that organise their ways of acting, thinking, 
feeling and perceiving (Lenger, 2018), are uncovered. Studying economists’ 
habitus allows us to understand the relations between their position in the field 
and their theoretical, methodological and political position-takings. The chap-
ters in this volume contribute, each in its own way, to the study of economics 
at those three levels, by focusing on original cases through the lens of different 
quantitative and qualitative descriptive methodologies.
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3  Fields of investigation
This book, through its four analytical dimensions, addresses the changes that 
economics underwent during recent decades, gaining influence and power in 
many countries and in several social contexts. The chapters of this book will 
help us to understand economics as it is involved in many power games. The 
relationship of power and knowledge production is complex and accounts for 
the special role of economics in current societies. This volume collects 13 
contributions from different (qualitative and quantitative) methodological and 
theoretical fields. Each contribution takes a particular view on the multiple 
dimensions of power, knowledge and influence. The authors discuss various 
aspects related to economics as an academic discipline and profession from four 
main perspectives in SSE: discourse analysis, governmentality studies, network 
studies and field theory. Via these approaches we can understand several forms 
of power related to the profession, as well as various challenges that need to be 
analysed from a critical and interdisciplinary perspective. In order to represent 
different disciplines, the authors have backgrounds in sociology, history, politi-
cal science, linguistics and economics. These studies cover a large historical 
period, mainly the second part of the 20th century, and focus on a variety 
of national cases (including the USA, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Greece, 
Mexico, Brazil) and international institutions, such as the IMF. In addition, 
various qualitative and quantitative methodologies and research strategies are 
applied, such as interviews, content and documentary analyses, prosopography, 
historical and archival research, discourse analysis, text statistics, social network 
analysis, sequence analysis and geometric data analysis (multiple correspond-
ence analysis). The main idea of the volume is to bring together different but 
interrelated analytical strategies in relation to a highly important phenomenon 
that is central to the formation of current globalised societies. The volume 
contributes to the formation and consolidation of SSE as a growing research 
field. It will help to make visible the diversity of research approaches that make 
this field attractive to scholars in political economy, economic sociology and 
beyond. Due to its methodologically and theoretically interdisciplinary per-
spective, this volume will serve furthermore as a reference point for future 
research avenues in the field of SSE. The book is organised into four sections. 
The first section deals with the relationship of discourse and power in eco-
nomic expert knowledge production; the contributions of section two analyse 
practices of economic governmentality; section three will take into account 
networks of economic experts; and the final section analyses economics from 
a field angle.
4  Contributions to the social studies of economics
The chapters of the first part, Economic Knowledge and Discursive Power, analyse 
economic discourses from different methodological viewpoints. Jens Maesse’s 
chapter, “Performative, imaginary and symbolic power: how economic expert 
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discourses influence society”, stresses different forms of discursive power. 
According to him, when economic experts start to speak, they do not simply 
enter into equal and non-coercive communications with other actors in the 
political economy. On the contrary, economic expert discourses have various 
impacts on the formation of societies. These discourses produce different forms 
of power and subjectivation. Starting from a Foucauldian approach to power 
and discourse, his contribution shows how economic expert discourses operate 
as power devices. Three different forms of discursive power are presented and 
illustrated, taking examples from the Brexit discourse and previous research 
on economics departments. First, he shows how the “performative power” 
of economic expert discourses contributes to the construction of institutional 
positions in European politico-economic relations. In a second step, he dem-
onstrates how the polyphonic structure of controversies over the economic 
rationality of Brexit produces speaker positions. These positions are analysed 
as “imaginary power” that contributes to the formation of social identities. In 
a third step, his contribution analyses the role and logic of academic excel-
lence discourses as “symbolic power” for the formation of superiority myths 
of expert positions in public discourses. By sketching out the complex field of 
discourse and power in economic expert communication, this contribution 
helps to understand the various forms and mechanisms of power that are at 
work beyond hierarchies, interests and domination practices.
The chapter by Jan Sparsam and Hanno Pahl, “Macroeconomics and mone-
tary policy as autonomous domains of knowledge and power: rational expecta-
tions, monetarism and the Federal Reserve”, investigates central bank policies. 
They start from the idea that academic macroeconomics and monetary policy 
in central banks share a strong connection. However, the practical needs and 
epistemic cultures in both domains differ significantly, so there is no straight-
forward dissemination of macroeconomic ideas into practical monetary poli-
cymaking. Instead, academic macroeconomics and central banks have to be 
understood as autonomous domains of knowledge and power. They refer to 
two case studies concerning the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the USA, 
to reveal the context conditions of action in the respective domains that are 
responsible for the transition of knowledge between them. The first case shows 
the imminent failure of the project to popularise rational expectations in the 
Federal Open Market Committee. Indeed, rational expectations revolutionised 
academic macroeconomics but not monetary policymaking. The second case 
shows how pragmatic needs when facing a crisis led the Federal Open Market 
Committee to selectively adopt monetarist ideas. Both case studies draw on 
verbatim transcripts of meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee.
Lukas Bäuerle, in “The power of economics textbooks: shaping meaning 
and identity”, shows how textbook knowledge influences students of eco-
nomics. By conducting a discourse analysis (SKAD) in the field of academic 
economics textbooks, this chapter aims to reconstruct the frames and iden-
tity options offered to undergraduate students relating to the questions of 
“Why study economics?” and “Who do I become by studying economics?” 
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The analysis shows three major frames and respective identity offerings, all of 
which are contextualised theoretically. While a first frame promises that stu-
dents will learn “eternal truths”, thereby becoming “specialised knowers”, a 
second frame encourages students to capitalise on their education by becoming 
self-entrepreneurs. A third frame combines the “Why?” of economic educa-
tion directly with identity options by granting students insights into their “real” 
and “true” inner state. Taken together, economics textbooks appear as a total 
structure of actions brought to bear upon possible action, thus being a genuine 
example of Foucauldian power structures.
The second part, Economic Governmentalities, analyses economics as a govern-
ance tool. Ceyhun Gürkan, in “The constitution of neoliberal governmentality 
from early neoclassical economics to public choice theory”, shows how neo-
liberalism emerged and changed over time. Drawing on Foucault, this chapter 
demonstrates the particular role of early neoclassical economics between the 
1870s and the 1920s, and public choice theory throughout the second half of 
the 20th century in the constitution of neoliberal governmentality. Foucault 
examines how classical political economy and neoliberal economics developed 
two versions of liberalism. However, he mentions early neoclassical economics 
in a scattered and sparse manner and does not touch upon public choice theory 
as part of the developing neoliberal governmentality at all. The main argument 
is that an overall historical understanding of neoliberal governmentality can 
be achieved by pondering the radical modifications of classical liberalism by 
early neoclassical economics moving towards neoliberal governmentality and, 
by extension, the subsequent comprehensive modifications carried out based 
on public choice theory. The methodology of the chapter relies on Foucault’s 
analytics of power/government, the nominalist method and the genealogical 
history of ideas. It concludes that governmentality-based analysis of early neo-
classical economics and public choice theory concerning their related theoreti-
cal and discursive tools, and political reason, prove to complement the new 
lines of Foucauldian critique of neoliberal governmentality.
Flemming Bjerke, in “Competitive power: elements of Foucauldian eco-
nomics”, reflects on Foucauldian market theory. Economics generally excludes 
empirical analyses of how the soft power of marketing is exercised. Applying 
Foucault’s concepts of power offers a fruitful way of analysing marketing as an 
exercise of power, which implies that competition must be defined in terms of power. 
In Foucauldian economics, business economists not only observe markets but 
also have to exercise power and must therefore acquire the rationalising skills of 
professional power technologies. Competitive firms participate in a competition 
dispositive which constitutes general principles for integrating a competing firm 
within its environment. Competition does not only spur differentiation and 
growth, it also expands throughout society, tending to become the dominant 
way of exercising power. This implies that the economy is basically irreversible 
and usually not in equilibrium.
In “Feelings in crisis: the emotional and affective dimension of neoliberal 
economics in Greek crisis prone society”, Elena Psyllakou investigates the 
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role of emotions in economic discourses. According to her, what is referred 
to as “neoliberalism” is often understood as a regime of emotional govern-
ance restricting, controlling and excluding emotions. Building a comparative 
framework between fragments of early “neoliberal” philosophical thought and 
critical work on current manifestations of neoliberal governance, the aim of 
this chapter is to track how interdiscursivities between neoliberal economics 
and socio-political practices largely rely on emotional and affective articula-
tions that cannot be theorised in a singular way. She focuses on the neoliberal 
project pursued in Greece, as partly reflected in Greek bank advertising dur-
ing the crucial years of imposed austerity policies and resistance (2009–2016). 
Employing critical discourse analysis, her chapter problematises the “negative” 
hypothesis of emotional exclusion and critically approaches the emotional and 
affective strategies of a specific form of culturally neoliberal governmentality.
In his chapter entitled “Laboratories for economic expertise: lay perspectives 
on Italian disciplinary economics”, Gerardo Costabile Nicoletta analyses three 
Italian historical experiences as laboratories of transnational networks of dis-
ciplinary economics and deals with the contingent and (con)textual character 
of the power of economics, starting from its relationship with the object of its 
discursive and practical interventions: laypeople. This fundamental relational 
dimension, the source of economists’ power in the global political economy, 
is often underestimated by current social studies on economics, which implic-
itly assume a self-referential and autopoietic foundation of this power. Con-
versely, combining discursive political economy, sociologies of expertise and 
transnational historical sociology, his contribution analyses economic expertise 
as a complex network of practices, discourses and institutions constantly and 
strategically deployed to deal with socio-political contingencies. His lay per-
spective on the Italian experience proposes a socio-historical understanding 
of economists’ apparently neutral set of governmental practices. In this light, 
measurements, operative tools and conceptual apparatuses can be interpreted 
as practical and discursive interventions shaping strategically specific epistemic 
regimes and relational fields aiming to separate organisational and material 
issues from popular control and marginalising possible alternatives to get popu-
lation and territories in line with socio-technical divisions of labour.
The third part, Economists in Networks, focuses on the circulation and net-
work ties of economists and economic ideas in academia, national and transna-
tional politics, the media and public discourses. In “Who are these economists 
Germany listens to? The social structure of influential German economists”, 
Stephan Pühringer and Karl Beyer build on recent work on the political and 
societal impact of economics and distinct economists, respectively, to examine 
individual, research and institutional characteristics, as well as existing pro-
fessional networks of what are considered to be “influential economists” in 
Germany. Through biographical research and the application of social net-
work analysis, they show that most influential economists are involved in 
co-authorship and/or institutional networks, and that there are substantial 
connections to different levels of public governance. They find a tremendous 
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gender bias within the sample as well as some hints for internationalisation and 
the division of labour. Their analysis, moreover, indicates a much less hierarchi-
cal structure of the German-speaking economics profession when compared to 
the US. However, they find that while a striking majority of media and policy 
advice economists have connections to (inter)national public governance bod-
ies, only a minority of research economists have such connections. Further-
more, the ordoliberal bias, which is a crucial feature of the German economics 
profession, is mainly restricted to media and policy advice economists. Finally, 
their analysis indicates the central role of (also partly geographically organised) 
research hubs among influential research economists.
In her chapter “Global production and circulation of dominant ideologies: 
Mexico from the default debt crisis to the Brady Plan (1982–1989)”, Johanna 
Gautier Morin provides a renewed understanding of multilateral financial 
cooperation and the role of economists in the ideological convergence that 
accompanied capital flows in the case of the Mexican default on external debt. 
According to this chapter, the core-periphery model has long distorted the 
study of multilateral cooperation. The 1970s–1980s marked a turning point in 
the transnational experimentation of economic policies, converting the Latin 
American sub-continent into a social laboratory. Most studies on the topic 
focused on the IMF’s and the World Bank’s methods, hegemonic business prac-
tices, or the international circulation of economic ideas. Few have explored the 
agency of the countries involved in such unbalanced situations and the central 
role they have played in the global financial revolution that has transformed 
markets over these two decades. In this chapter, she explores how negotiations 
were conducted in a context of financial dependency and transposes the theo-
retical proposals of Bourdieu and Boltanski on the production of the dominant 
ideology to the Mexican default on external debt in 1982. She analyses the 
crisis as a proxy for revealing the structural mechanisms of Mexican economic 
policies. This allows her to examine the global circulation of economic ideas 
at the heart of the negotiations between the Mexican government, the IMF, 
the US Treasury and investment banks involved in managing the crisis. The 
failures of the structural adjustment programmes tested the technocratic theo-
ries applied to the Mexican case and revealed the function of economic policy 
rhetoric in supporting the circulation of capital flows in the changing world of 
the 1980s.
In the final chapter of this part, entitled “Economists in public discourses: 
the case of wealth and inheritance taxation in the German press”, Hendrik 
Theine investigates the role of economists in public discourses. Conceptually, 
he draws on the recent “cultural turns” in regulation theory and post-Marxist 
thinking, and in particular on the work of Bob Jessop and Antonio Gram-
sci in their discussion of intellectuals and their role in society. Empirically, 
the role of economists is investigated by drawing on the example of wealth 
and inheritance taxation in the German press at the beginning of the 21st 
century. The empirical analysis shows that well-known economists frequently 
occur in newspaper coverage. Furthermore, the stark dominance of economists 
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associated with mainstream economics and ordoliberalism over post-Keynesian 
and other heterodox economists is revealed. Given the role of economists as 
organic intellectuals in the political economy, this points to a continuing legiti-
mation and normalisation of the structural power of the capital class to assert 
their interests regarding low wealth and inheritance taxation.
The fourth part, Economics as a Scientific Field, centres on the social structure 
of the discipline, according to the distribution of its specific and external capi-
tals among economists, along biographical and network dimensions. The chap-
ter by Philipp Korom, “Are there institutionalized pathways to the Nobel Prize 
in economics?”, proposes an empirical study of scientific careers in the field of 
economics. It focuses on the Nobel Prize, the single ne plus ultra award in eco-
nomics, which has been awarded for half a century. Indeed, the preconditions 
for receiving the highest consecration of achievement are understudied. While 
the consideration of a few single cases, such as the life and work of Herbert 
Simon or John Nash, might suggest that the most successful scholars in eco-
nomics are a rather varied collection of individuals, a prosopographical study 
of 81 Laureates reveals institutionalised pathways to the prize: The academic 
careers of Laureates nearly always lead to professorships in the top five depart-
ments of the discipline. Visiting professorships at the “big five” are another 
common characteristic. Similarly, publications of Laureates are concentrated in 
the top five journals. The academic profile of Laureates in economics mirrors 
the unitary macrostructure of the discipline, which is dominated by an elite 
subset of American universities, rather than by departments across the world.
Thierry Rossier and Pierre Benz, in “Forms of social capital in econom-
ics: the importance of heteronomous networks in the Swiss field of econo-
mists (1980–2000)”, focus on the structure and evolution of social capital in 
the Swiss field of economists. They start from the fact that economists often 
argue that economics is a “pure” and “autonomous” discipline. In contrast, the 
relatively dense institutional and interpersonal networks owned by economists 
show how the discipline stands at the edge of several social fields, and thus can 
be particularly heteronomous. These networks provide a certain volume and 
form of social capital which strengthens the discipline, but they highlight its 
important porousness toward extra-academic powers. Very few studies have 
focused on the importance of social capital in fields and, according to Rossier 
and Benz, even less have systematically investigated the role of intra-disciplinary 
and extra-disciplinary social capital in economics. This chapter therefore aims 
to focus on the structure and evolution of social capital in the Swiss field of 
economists. It relies on an original prosopographical database of all economics 
professors at Swiss universities between 1980 and 2000 (n = 200). The authors 
exploit the data in two ways: First, through multiple correspondence analysis 
(MCA), they identify two structuring forces among economists. The main 
opposition is marked by the volume of extra-disciplinary social capital, and the 
volume of intra-disciplinarity capital only comes in second place. Second, they 
show, through class-specific MCA, that, despite the fact that intra-disciplinary 
social capital has gained in importance in the recent period, extra-disciplinary 
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social capital remains the prime structuring logic across time. Despite the par-
ticularly strong cohesion and autonomy that characterise the discipline, this 
chapter points to the importance of heteronomous networks, which attest that 
economics is and remains much less autonomous than economists would argue.
Finally, in “Paths of international circulation: how do economists and eco-
nomic knowledge flow?”, Elisa Klüger investigates international circulation as 
a source of legitimacy and power for economists that distinguishes, technically 
and socially, those who have access to foreign institutions and cosmopolitan 
assets. These resources are particularly prized in peripheral nations, where con-
nections with central areas are valuable capital for those aiming for promi-
nent political/administrative positions. Moreover, going abroad has effects on 
the type of economic ideas diffused through peripheral areas. The questions 
addressed in this chapter are How do economists and economic ideas flow? and 
How do dissimilar ideas spread and (re)shape a structured space of economists? 
Klüger focuses on the Brazilian case, in which the space of economists is deeply 
amalgamated with external influences. After describing how international ties 
helped to shape the Brazilian space of economists, social network analysis is 
used to depict a polarised social space and reveal patterns of connections with 
foreign agents and institutions. The network illustrates that circulations towards 
the US, Europe and Latin America lie in dissimilar areas of the Brazilian space 
of economists, and that different streams of economic knowledge spread from 
each of these sources.
To conclude, this book addresses a large array of subjects and offers a variety 
of disciplinary perspectives. It contributes to study economics as an academic 
discipline and a professional occupation by extending conceptual and meth-
odological frameworks for better understanding how economics, economic 
expert discourse and economists influence societies. Finally, this book provides 
important empirical data by focusing on discourses and networks in economics 
and considering economics as a governance tool and field. It therefore aims to 
consolidate SSE as a comprehensive and diversified research agenda rooted in 
various disciplines of the social sciences and humanities.
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Economic knowledge and 
discursive power    

2  Performative, imaginary and 
symbolic power




Economic knowledge, ideas and concepts have a huge influence on society. The 
impact of economists extends across many institutions, realms and areas, such 
as banks and businesses, politics and administration, and it reaches (mediated 
by media and guidebooks) into people’s daily lifestyles. However, to under-
stand how the dissemination of expertise from science to society works is one 
of the main tasks of the social studies of economics. Whereas action-oriented 
approaches in the tradition of Max Weber highlight processes of persuasion, 
actors’ interests and consensus among groups, as well as norms and values as 
devices for the transmission of economic expertise into society, structurally 
oriented approaches in the tradition of Marx and Bourdieu put their analytical 
focus on power, especially as it is represented by hierarchies, class structures, 
elite positions and other material constraints.
However, in order to understand the practical logic of power in economic 
expert discourses, a theory is needed that brings together the cultural as well as 
the structural dimension in these processes. Approaches in the vein of Michel 
Foucault and so-called performativity studies (inspired by the work of Callon, 
MacKenzie and others) took this challenge as a starting point for analysing how 
cultural and structural dynamics interact. Taking the Marxian and Bourdieusian 
traditions as a starting point and combining these with a Foucauldian approach, 
this chapter will ask how processes of discursive power can be analysed in eco-
nomic expert communications as a way to overcome the culture/structure 
opposition. To this end, discursive power will be subdivided into performative, 
imaginary and symbolic power. In particular, I will show how and why performa-
tive, imaginary and symbolic power make visible different aspects of economic 
expert discourses. They are the key elements for analysing and understanding 
the different forms of an economic expert’s impact on society.
The contribution is structured as follows. The first section (section 2) explains 
the idea of discursive power in the context of social studies of economics. Sec-
tion 3 offers a definition of performative, imaginary and symbolic power in 
light of a Foucauldian conceptual framework. Section 4 takes examples from 
the Brexit discourse in order to illustrate each form of power. In addition, it 
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will be indicated how these different forms might interact. The general aim of 
this chapter is not only to sketch out how discursive power operates in the case 
of economic expert discourses, but also to present a methodological framework 
that can be used in further analyses to study the impact of economic expertise.
2  Forms of power in social studies of economics
The influence of economic expert knowledge is analysed at different levels of 
society. According to Hall, economic ideas become powerful when they are 
promoted by professional economists, adopted and implemented by certain 
actors within the administration, or find support among a majority of poli-
ticians and civil society (Hall, 1989). Hirschman and Popp Berman identify 
three different channels of influence, from the economics profession to state 
and politics: professional authority, the institutional position of economists in 
policymaking and the general cognitive infrastructure of polity (Hirschman & 
Popp Berman, 2014).
A deeper look at these three channels reveals that the first and third channels 
seem to be interlinked, because the authority of economists presupposes a cer-
tain cognitive infrastructure within society, politics and administration; and a 
preference for economics within the latter field will increase the probability of 
recruiting economic expertise as problem-solving knowledge. But, a distance 
between the economics profession and the state and society should be main-
tained. Otherwise, economists would directly rule society and the political 
economy. Against this backdrop, an open question in social studies of econom-
ics is how economic expertise is “transferred” through these channels.
One possible answer to grasp how the gap between economics knowledge 
and governance institutions can be bridged is “power”. Many analyses, espe-
cially in the varieties of capitalism tradition, draw on Max Weber’s theory of 
power and authority (Weber, 1972). Here, power (as authority) is analysed 
on the level of the formation of political values and norms through the con-
struction of consent among actors. Accordingly, actors believe in the solution 
of social and political problems by applying certain economic concepts. The 
cultural sphere is of central importance here, because the influence of eco-
nomic knowledge operates on the level of actors’ opinions and perceptions. In 
contrast, Marxian and Bourdieusian approaches highlight the role of material 
power relations, hierarchies, political struggle and ideologies (Bourdieu, 1989). 
Here, power is understood as a means to move people’s minds in a certain 
direction through symbolic coercion. In social studies of economics, many 
studies have analysed the impact of economics at the level of symbolic capital 
(Dezalay & Garth, 2009; Lebaron, 2008; Rossier, Bühlmann, & Mach, 2017; 
Schmidt-Wellenburg, 2017a). Symbolic capital does not operate on the level 
of actors’ consciousness. Rather, it exercises different forms of coercion in the 
formation of governance institutions, policy programmes and worldviews, and 
it defines certain styles of thinking among ruling elites. Here, academic, admin-
istrative and political hierarchies and the role of certain elite actors within the 
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field of economic power relations are much more influential when it comes to 
explaining why certain economic ideas take hold and others do not (Fitzger-
ald & O’Rourke, 2015; Maesse, 2015; Pühringer & Hirte, 2015).
Next to action-oriented (Weber) and structural (Marx/Bourdieu) theories, 
performativity theory has become established as a third type of approach to ana-
lyse the influence and power of economic expert knowledge (Callon, 2007). 
The original idea was to study economics as a meaning-making machine that 
does not analyse markets but reconstructs the economy according to a neo-
classical worldview (MacKenzie  & Millo, 2003). Initially, this approach was 
criticised for promoting naïve neoliberal worldviews and ignoring economic 
realities (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2008). Today, performativity studies no longer 
believe that economic theory is transformed into economic reality on a one-to-
one basis. Rather, processes of performation are analysed as a complex process 
of adoption, translation, implementation and critique, taking place between 
economic science and society, politics and the political economy. Thus, when 
economic concepts are used to solve political and economic problems, the 
concepts will be transformed and translated into different contexts (Boldyrev & 
Svetlova, 2016). Performativity approaches have a deep relationship with the 
discursive character of the political economy (Maesse, 2018a).
Whereas action-oriented theories overestimate the interpretative capacity 
and cognitive sovereignty of actors in the course of the adoption of economic 
concepts, structural theories underestimate the interpretative and translational 
dynamics that are at work when economic ideas influence society. Further-
more, Weberian approaches reduce structural constraints, hierarchies and dom-
ination to merely institutional obstacles that can easily be overcome. They have 
a structural deficit. Marxian and Bourdieusian approaches pay too much attention 
to the rigidity of the structural level when analysing the influence of eco-
nomic ideas. They very often have a translational deficit. Finally, performativity 
approaches can take into consideration the complex translational and discursive 
dynamics taking place between different social fields (such as science, poli-
tics, the economy and so forth). But they have a conceptual deficit since notions 
such as “power”, “legitimacy” and “authority” are used very randomly and 
unsystematically.
An appropriate theory of power that is able to understand how economic 
expert knowledge influences society should keep the advantages of the afore-
mentioned theories in mind but simultaneously find a solution for the disad-
vantages. It should meet the following criteria: first, it must take into account 
the structural constraints of heterogeneous social fields; second, it must be able 
to account for the translational and discursive logics that take place between 
various fields; third, it will analyse the diverse forms of use and adoption of 
economic concepts in non-academic and non-scientific contexts. Drawing 
on ideas inspired by the Foucauldian concept of dispositif (Foucault, 1980), 
the following chapter will outline a discourse-theoretical approach that is 
able to grasp processes of power in both its productive and coercive dimen-
sions (Hamann, Maesse, Scholz, & Angermuller, 2019). According to such a 
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dispositif analytical understanding, power is always analysed according to its 
heterogeneous, transversal and heteroglossical character (Maesse, 2018b). The 
following chapter will explain in detail the scope and limitations of such a dis-
positif analytical approach for analysing economic expert discourses by sketch-
ing out three forms of discursive power.
3  Three forms of discursive power: performative, 
imaginary and symbolic power
Foucault’s theory of power (Foucault, 2008) made important contributions to 
understanding what is going on in the formation of social and discursive rela-
tions based on structural constraints. Whereas Max Weber’s sociology intro-
duced the category of meaningful social action in order to analyse individuals’ 
intentions and goals as forms of authority and legitimacy in contrast to Marxian 
and other structural approaches, Foucault’s theory is still part of the structural 
camp in the social sciences. But in contrast to classical structuralism, Foucault’s 
theory of power highlighted two important aspects of structural power dynam-
ics: first, the fissures and fractures within structures that open up structured 
terrains for discursive conflicts over meaning; and second, the productive char-
acter of power which informs our view of social reality vis-à-vis oppressive as 
well as formative rules. Especially, the notion of governmentality has shown 
that exercising power is a decentralised phenomenon that cannot be reduced 
to one single mind (Weber’s intention) and singular actors (Bourdieu’s ruling 
classes). Rather, the discursive aspect of power always points to diverse modali-
ties in the formation of power relations. It highlights the productive character 
of power and the biopolitical dimension of it, by showing how power strategies 
make things possible.
How can we grasp this often abstract and opaque poststructuralist theory 
with clear analytical units? I propose three different analytical categories that 
can help to understand how economic expert discourses influence societies 
as power devices: performative power, imaginary power and symbolic power.
Performative power can be defined as the possibility of economic expert dis-
courses to create institutional infrastructures. Institutions will be understood, 
in a very broad sense, as often legally codified, but always socially fixed, fields 
of social action. These fields are hierarchically organised, as Bourdieu would 
claim, but they are at the same time open to other fields and in constant 
exchange with them. Networks and institutions usually fix these fields of eco-
nomic expert action (Pühringer & Hirte, 2015; Rossier & Bühlmann, 2018). 
There is no single field logic, but each empirical field can be fixed in different 
ways. Despite this heterogeneity, fields are always the sedimented background 
for every discourse production, and they are themselves, simultaneously, a 
result of historical discourse formation. As Callon and others have shown for 
social studies of economics, and Bourdieu and his fellows have fully elabo-
rated, fields are the manifestation and materialisation of language forms result-
ing from social struggles. Here, power is the possibility of discourses to produce 
Performative, imaginary and symbolic power 23
sedimented categories that are present in the background to future social action 
on the imaginary and symbolic levels.
Imaginary power is the ability of every discourse to create images of the speaker, 
the interlocutor and many other social roles. Actors never exist only for them-
selves. Rather, they always speak and act in the name of a certain image (the 
image of the mother and father in family discourse; the image of socialism, 
environmental sustainability, conservativism etc. in political discourse; and so 
forth). These images are important because they define how speakers present 
themselves and how they see others according to the knowledge attached to 
the images. Lacanian discourse theory calls this aspect of discourse the “imagi-
nary level”, because it defines the fundamental categories for the formation of 
subjectivities (Lacan, 1991). What we are to other people and how we see oth-
ers depends on our active and passive position within this imaginary register. 
Whereas Foucault presented the idea of discursive subject positions, Lacan fully 
elaborated this dimension of discourse (Žižek, 1989). Power, in the imaginary 
register, is the possibility to define others and to be defined in a certain way.
Symbolic power is the ability of discourses to attribute respect, prestige, author-
ity, fear and excitement to (an image of) a person, an institution or an object. 
In economic expert discourses, the prestige of certain institutions is often used 
to equip certain speakers with powerful discourse positions. Symbolic capi-
tal is an important category in Bourdieu’s sociology because it introduces a 
form of hierarchisation in the field that is not based on typical forms of exclu-
sion, such as economic, cultural and social capital. It is important because this 
form of power is always misrecognised by actors involved in the production 
of symbolic capital (Rossier & Bühlmann, 2018). The “Nobel Prize Award” 
is a classic example (Lebaron, 2006). But the production and distribution of 
symbolic power cannot be detached from certain morphologies of social fields. 
In economic expert discourse, fields are always trans-epistemic and polycen-
tric (Maesse, 2017b; Schmidt-Wellenburg, 2017b) because different fields and 
Table 2.1 Performative, imaginary and symbolic power
Type Performative power Imaginary power Symbolic power
Definition The possibility of The ability of every The ability of discourses 
discourses to produce discourse to create to attribute respect, 
sedimented categories images of the speaker, prestige, authority, fear 
that are present in the interlocutor and and excitement to (an 
the background to many other social image of) a person, an 
future social action roles institution or an object
on the imaginary and 
symbolic levels
Example Institutional Images such as “expert”, Status positions such 
infrastructures such “racist”, “Brexiteer”, as “scientific elite”, 
as contracts, money, “Londoner”, “Nobel Prize Award 
offices, organisations, “neoclassic”, winner”, “excellence”
hierarchies “Keynesian”
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field logics interact and transgress each other. For this reason, prestige can be 
produced in one field and must be transmitted to another one, where it can be 
attached to certain imaginary speaker positions (Fitzgerald & O’Rourke, 2015). 
Symbolic power is, therefore, the possibility of economic expert discourse to 
introduce hierarchies of perception in one field by importing “mythical capital” 
from another (Maesse, 2016).
4  Three cases from the Brexit discourse
This section will illustrate these three forms of discursive power with exam-
ples from the Brexit discourse. The empirical results are based on my socio-
logical research on economic expert discourse. The data are collected by a 
multi-method research design consisting of capital analyses of academic fields 
(positions, publications, research grants based on economists’ CV and home-
page studies, analysis of data banks such as DFG and other sources), narrative-
biographical interviews with economists, and discourse analyses of journal 
papers, policy papers, reports and media statements (see Maesse, 2015).
Brexit discourse is very much influenced by economic expert knowledge 
on very different levels. On the one hand, it is a discourse of critique of eco-
nomic experts and the European Union (EU). On the other hand, “remainers” 
(people against the UK exiting the EU) as well as “leavers” (Brexit propo-
nents) mobilise economic theory in order to support their position. Whereas 
remainers use a variety of new Keynesian, Keynesian, institutional and other 
economic arguments, the leavers align themselves with more or less classical 
and neoclassical free trade economics. Furthermore, even three years after the 
Brexit referendum in 2016, it is still not clear what it means to “leave” the EU. 
Thus, as this chapter will show, the UK is, with or without a deal, more or 
less part of the EU field that is highly influenced by economic expertise. This 
obscure situation is an interesting starting point for analysing what performa-
tive power means. This first subsection will illustrate the idea of performa-
tive power, taking the EU field and the British position in it as an example. 
The second subsection takes a conflict over economic policy to illustrate how 
imaginary power works. The third subsection will show how symbolic power 
is formed by examples from previous studies.
4.1  Performative power: the economic formation of institutional relations 
and the place of the UK in the EU field
Today, value chains, labour relations and economic services are no longer reg-
ulated by sovereign nation-states. They are rather organised on the basis of 
international agreements and rules. The European field is, for both internal and 
external relations, the most important playground for all the economic actors 
in Europe (EU, European Economic Area, European Free trade Association) 
( Jessop, 2012; Sweet, Sandholtz, & Fligstein, 2001). The European Union as 
an institutional field has been formed in a long historical process by translating 
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economic language into governmentality apparatuses (Schmidt-Wellenburg, 
2017a). As Mudge and Vauchez (2012) have demonstrated, language from the 
field of economics (and law) is used to make Europe calculable and manage-
able, even if (or because of) the original academic meaning of economic con-
cepts changes in contexts of governance, finance, business and trade.
Against this backdrop, words from the economics discipline have always had 
a metaphorical character (Maesse, 2017a), otherwise they would not be trans-
ferable in non-academic contexts. In the course of the formation of the EU, 
starting with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and leading to the never-ending 
reform of EU treaties, the so-called Four Freedoms have been established: the 
customs union, the common market, the capital union and the free movement 
of persons. But these Four Freedoms are not simply neoliberal concepts set in 
stone and functioning as authoritarian dogmas (Bruff, 2014). Most European 
policies are neoliberal, but the institutions and contracts as such are not. Rather, 
they regularly become an object of reform, interpretation and adoption to the 
diverse problems in the history of Europe (Miró, 2017). Performative power 
does not mean that content (as meaning) from economics is implemented in 
social reality. Rather, economic language, as discourse, can be used and applied 
in diverse contexts only if meaning changes. Therefore, the Four Freedoms 
have no singular content. On the contrary, their content was always subject to 
conflicting interpretations (see Nicoletta in this volume).
The studies by Seikel and Costantini demonstrate this interpretative flex-
ibility and discursivity of economic language in the course of the ongoing 
institutionalisation of Europe as a field (Costantini, 2017; Seikel, 2016). Cos-
tantini shows how the most important institutional framework of the EU, the 
Stability and Growth Pact, was constantly changed after 1992. Furthermore, it 
was not only the legal framework that was reformed. The ways to implement 
this framework in different countries and in different historical and economic 
circumstances, by calculating national budgets through macro-economic valu-
ations, have also constantly changed. For example, to qualify a certain measure, 
such as expenses for infrastructure or a tool for “increasing competitiveness”, 
or to disqualify it as “budgetary expenses” results from expert interpretations 
by the EU administration. The meaning of a contract is not manifested in the 
paragraphs. Meaning results from the way these contracts are interpreted and 
applied. In line with this view, Seikel shows how austerity measures during the 
crisis were implemented completely differently in different crisis-ridden coun-
tries. Similar phenomena can be observed in the crisis policy of the European 
Central Bank. The statutes of the ECB do not determine social action. As an 
institution they rather provide actors (members of the board, staff members, 
other experts) with discursive material open to interpretation.
What we learn from these examples is that institutions, in light of performa-
tive power, are not closed entities, neither legally fixed contracts nor socially 
habitualised routines. They are rather material background and raw material for 
further discourses. This property becomes particularly important in the Brexit 
discourse. The UK became a member of the EEC/EU in 1973. Even if the UK 
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did not adopt the euro currency and did not sign the Schengen Agreement, 
almost all the activities on the state and economic levels take place within the 
European field. The UK is furthermore as deeply integrated as the average EU 
country into this field: 50% of all exports from and imports to the UK take 
place within the EU; the UK has a trade-balance deficit and does therefore 
depend on industrial production and services in other EU member states; and 
the economic heart of the UK, the City of London, depends on trading part-
ners in the EU. The financial sector in the City of London is not an average 
sector of the national economy. It is rather a highly specialised sector that only 
can exist as part of the EU-wide division of labour. And even if the UK is not 
part of the Schengen Area, it nevertheless recruits approximately three million 
workers from other EU countries, appointed at all levels of income and quali-
fications. In exchange for that, British pensioners spend their sunset years in 
Spain. It is an illusion to believe that the UK stands outside the EU; it is rather 
part of the EU field produced by performative power.
However, what does “Brexit” mean against the backdrop of this deep 
involvement of the UK in the EU? Brexit means that old discursive-economic 
categories will be suspended and detached from diverse persons and economic 
activities. Capital transfers from the UK to the EU will no longer be easy; 
lorries will not easily cross the border to EU; aeroplanes may not take off and 
land. In order to avoid disruption, chaos and civil-war-like scenarios, a new 
contract must ensure that future social action is possible (within the UK and 
between UK and the rest of the world). An agreement between the EU and 
the UK was negotiated in 2018 for that reason: “the deal”. In order to illustrate 
what I mean by the performative power of economics, I will briefly show how 
economics language can be used to create new institutional terrains. The fol-
lowing paragraph is part of the “deal” between the UK and the EU, ratified by 
EU institutions and member states and the UK.
Article 24 of the Brexit agreement regulates the rights and duties of people 
who fall under the category of “workers”.
Subject to the limitations set out in Article 45(3) and (4) TFEU, workers 
in the host State and frontier workers in the State or States of work shall 
enjoy the rights guaranteed by Article 45 TFEU and the rights granted 
by Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council. These rights include:
(a) the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of nationality 
as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work 
and employment;
(b) the right to take up and pursue an activity in accordance with the 
rules applicable to the nationals of the host State or the State of 
work;
(c) the right to assistance afforded by the employment offices of the 
host State or the State of work as offered to own nationals;
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(d) the right to equal treatment in respect of conditions of employment 
and work, in particular as regards remuneration, dismissal and in 
case of unemployment, reinstatement or re-employment;
(e) the right to social and tax advantages;
(f) collective rights;
(g) the rights and benefits accorded to national workers in matters of 
housing;
(h) the right for their children to be admitted to the general educa-
tional, apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the 
same conditions as the nationals of the host State or the State of 
work, if such children are residing in the territory where the worker 
works.
Some people may doubt the underlying hypothesis that the category “worker” 
is a category from economic science. But, as studies on the history of scien-
tific knowledge have shown, diverse labour-related categories such as “worker” 
became part of the economics discourse, especially in the 19th and 20th centu-
ries, and from there they entered the political and administrative discourses of 
the emerging nation-state order (Desrosières, 1998; Wagner, 2001). Therefore, 
we follow those studies that presuppose that all categories related to the for-
mation of the Four Freedoms, such as “worker”, are somehow related to eco-
nomics as a special realm of knowledge and language production. In the case 
of the worker category, this seems to be quite obvious, since alternatives for 
categorising persons come quickly to hand: “citizen”, “human being”, “per-
son” etc. And all of them would probably impact on performative possibilities 
in a certain direction.
What makes an economic category such as “worker” performative is the fact 
that this category is not only used for a pure designation and description of 
people or other entities. It is also a category to be used as a legal entity. Special 
legal organisations are allowed and obliged to confer particular rights and duties 
on persons according to well-defined criteria. On the other hand, people can 
claim certain rights and duties when they rely on the category of “worker”. 
For example, when a European citizen has a contract with a British organisa-
tion that is allowed to act as an employer, s/he can claim to be a “worker” and 
is now allowed to live in the UK, to bring his/her family to the UK, to use the 
British health system (NHS) and so forth. Generally speaking, the performative 
power of economic categories is only occasionally related to the original con-
ceptual meaning of a word (in economic science). Rather, performative power 
implies that people can speak and act in the name of this category and start to 
produce further discourses, actions and artefacts.
Performative power provides human beings with a special status. In the pro-
duction of this status, many people, institutions and organisations are involved 
because institutionalisation in the course of performative power formation is an 
ongoing process of permanent formulation, transformation and reformulation 
of that status. For example, what a “worker” is or can be is not only defined 
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by European acts, contracts and agreements. When such agreements are made, 
many other institutions start to interpret the diverse paragraphs and apply them 
to many different cases. In these processes of what I  would call secondary 
institutionalisation/performations, European institutions will be changed and 
reformed, as we have seen in the aforementioned cases of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, austerity programmes and ECB policy. In the course of these 
permanent performations and transmutations, a European field constellation 
emerges as a contested and never fixed background for further discursive actions 
in all realms of European societies. The EU field cannot be reduced to the 
“Eurocracy” (Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013) in Brussels; rather it reaches across 
many levels of all European societies (Delanty & Rumford, 2005). Therefore, 
the performative power of economics means that social realities are produced 
by metaphorical uses of economic language.
Particularly interesting is what happens when certain performative categories 
are detached from people. This necessarily leads to the dissolution of diverse 
field belongings and can open up social fields to chaos and anarchy. The alter-
native to being a member of the EU (exiting the EU) is therefore not another 
positive state or another field belonging. It is probably furthermore a state of 
“pure negativity”, the negation of institutional existence. This threat is at work 
during the ongoing Brexit discourse where an exit agreement is negotiated but 
a final deal not yet reached by EU and UK officials. This limbo leads to insecu-
rity, anxiety, discursive chaos, hysteria and all the other psychotic states that can 
be observed in the UK since 2016. The next subsection will take this situation 
of psychotic field limbo that rules the UK discourse to look at the imaginary 
level of discourse production.
4.2  Imaginary power: the discursive formation of expert positions as 
political identities
To illustrate imaginary power, an example from economic expert discourses on 
the possible economic effects of Brexit on the UK economy will be selected. 
The following excerpt is taken from a response by one group of economists 
to another group called “Economists for Brexit”. Patrick Minford, professor at 
Cardiff University and one of the “Economists for Brexit”, predicts a welfare 
gain from Brexit of 4% GDP growth, provided by a “British Alone” strategy 
that would mean removing all barriers to world trade. The authors of the 
response, from which the following excerpt is taken, are appointed by the 
Centre for Economic Performance (a research centre at the London School of 
Economics) and reject Minford’s expertise as follows:
Minford’s results stem from assuming that small changes in trade costs have 
tremendously large effects on trade volumes: according to his model, the 
falls in tariffs become enormously magnified because each country pur-
chases only from the lowest cost supplier.
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In reality, everyone does not simply buy from the cheapest supplier
Products are different when made by different countries and trade is affected 
by the distance between countries, their size, history and wealth (the ‘grav-
ity relationship’). Trade costs are not just government-created trade barri-
ers. Product differentiation and gravity is incorporated into modern trade 
models – these predict that after Brexit the UK will continue to trade more 
with the EU than other countries as it remains our geographically closest 
neighbour. Consequently, we will be worse off because we will face higher 
trade costs with the EU.
(Economists for Brexit: A Critique by Sampson et al., 2016)
In the following discourse analysis of the excerpt I want to show how enun-
ciative markers form speaker positions which are a discursive precondition for 
social role and identity formation (Angermuller, 2014; Fløttum, 2005; Zien-
kowski, 2016). Enunciative markers evoke linguistic speaker roles that can be 
adopted by diverse social actors in order to create identity images. The image 
of “me” and the images of “others” are important parts of an actor’s identity/
image. They are created as discursive roles. The idea of this approach is that 
such discursive roles always operate with diverse images of the speaker and 
the other (Goffman, 1974). Based on Lacan’s and Foucault’s discourse theory 
(Foucault, 1972; Lacan, 1991), the following analysis shows how such images 
are formed by the textual use of deixis, negation, booster and hedges in the 
aforementioned discourse.
For illustrative reasons, I only take one sentence (in italics) which is of cen-
tral importance in this process of identity and image formation. Whereas the 
first part presents Minford’s thesis very quickly, the authors use this sentence 
to bridge the argumentation from Minford’s argument to their own stand-
point. The linguistic modalities that are at work in this sentence have noth-
ing to do with the conceptual content of either expert statement (Minford’s 
and their own). Rather, it works as a discursive-cognitive tool that directs the 
consciousness of any potential reader to certain images of opponent (Minford) 
and proponent (authors). Those discursive markers produce a certain ethos, 
as Maingueneau would put it (Maingueneau, 1999), and they introduce the 
dimension of political struggle into expert discourses (Maesse, 2017a; Püh-
ringer & Hirte, 2015). Therefore, economic expert discourses are not simply 
representing ideas, concepts and arguments; they are also a tool in social con-
flicts over hegemony (O’Rourke & Hogan, 2014).
In reality, everyone does not simply buy from the cheapest supplier
In a first step, let’s take a look at the formal level of this short utterance. 
The speaker’s position is basically produced by antagonism to Minford’s eco-
nomic view. This antagonism is evoked by an operator of negation (“not”), 
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a presupposition booster (“in reality”) and a hedger (“simply”). What does 
it mean for the production of certain images? In a first move, the authors 
create their own image by opposing Minford’s position. In order to reject 
that image, an image of “Minford” (the other) must be produced first. Two 
discursive perspectives (points of view: pov) represent this image of the other 




(a): “small changes in trade costs have tremendously large effects on 
trade volumes (since) the falls in tariffs become enormously magnified 
because each country purchases only from the lowest cost supplier” (pre-
supposed here, taken from the aforementioned statement [in italics])
Point of view
1
 introduces the voice of Minford in this sentence via implication 





, BECAUSE = “not real” (presupposition: true statements 
must be “real”, evoked by “in reality”)
Therefore, the formulation “in reality” evokes a two-step cognitive process: in a 
first step, the initial statement is reintroduced; and in a second step, the speaker 
goes on to distance themselves from it. But this second step is only made pos-
sible by making a positive reference to something that is “real”. This comes 
in the statement: “everyone does not simply buy from the cheapest supplier”. 
Thus, the solidarity with speaker 2 is represented by the (l) in pov
2
, whereas 
opposition to the image of the opponent is indicated by the (a) in pov
1
. Now, 




(a): “everyone does buy from the cheapest supplier”
But before the speaker comes to their argument (“Products are different when 
made by different countries and trade is affected by the distance between coun-
tries, their size, history and wealth (the ‘gravity relationship’)”) the opponent is 










 IS OBVIOUSLY CORRECT BECAUSE pov
3
 IS SO 
RIDICULOUS (implicit comment on pov
4
, evoked by “simply”)
What we can learn from this discourse is that the “me” image (all pov with 
(1)) cannot be produced without permanently repeating and reintroducing the 
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image of the “other” (Minford, all pov with (a)). Furthermore, both discursive 
images are obviously the result of a certain polemical rhetoric. The other is 
not only presented twice (pov
1,3
) but is three times rejected (pov
2,4,5
). Strictly 
speaking, it can be said that the other has five images: two positive images and 
three rejections of them.
Depending on the emotional contexts in which those statements are read 
and used for further discourses, polemical modalities create huge gaps between 
political and professional counterparties. In this example, it is easily imaginable 
how “rational people” with “obvious and simple economic arguments” enter 
into strict opposition to a group of economists who have “lost contact with 
reality”. On the other hand, in a situation where the institutional infrastructure 
of the UK reality becomes more and more precarious, people such as Minford 
can easily present “old-fashioned” economic arguments that are, in the eyes of 
many other experts, far away from the data and the current economic discus-
sion. The moment of institutional disintegration might be when “zombies” 
(Zizek) enter the scene, because the Lacanian “real” suspends the “symbolic 
reality” (guaranteed by the institutional order).
However one reads this situation, depending on the standpoint and possible 
contexts of controversy, economic expert discourses can produce strong images 
of social actors. And these images can have a huge influence on how certain 
economic arguments are presented and perceived. This is basically the idea of 
imaginary power. Imaginary power cannot make certain things true or false. It 
is, rather, a way of producing images of real actors, and the potential reputation 
of these real social actors highly depends on the image that we have in mind 
when we listen to a speech, argumentation or an economic expert proposal. 
Discursive markers such as deixis, negation, boosters and hedges (and many 
more) can contribute to creating those identity images.
4.3  Symbolic power: how economic experts get reputation and  
legitimacy
In processes of formation and attribution of reputation, the image is only 
one aspect, even if this aspect is fundamentally important to construct social 
individuals as professional actors. In addition, symbolic power can support 
(or hinder) the formation of power connected to certain actors in discourses. 
Whereas the linguistic dimension forms images as power devices, symbolic 
power is not solely produced by ordinary speech acts. It rather presupposes 
the existence and operation of an institutionalised field that is not immediately 
involved in these politico-economic struggles. According to the sociology of 
professions, experts are always recognised by non-experts. For this reason, 
symbolic power must be produced in a place where it is not used, and it must 
be used in a place where it is not directly produced. The fields of production (the 
“factories of symbolic goods” as places of value creation) are not the fields 
of consumption (“the markets” as sites of price realisation). The structural 
condition for the possibility of legitimacy of expertise as such is based on the 
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existence of a constellation of different sub-fields between academia and soci-
ety (Hirschfeld & Gengnagel, 2017). The formation of reputation is finally the 
product of various discourses taking place at the interface of these sub-fields 
between academia and society.
Therefore, the world of economic experts is embedded in a trans-epistemic 
field that reaches across academia, politics, media and the economy (Maesse, 
2015), and it produces diverse sources of legitimacy (Schmidt-Wellenburg, 
2017b). Symbolic power is the product of discursive interplay between the 
academic field, the political field, the economic field and public discourses 
in the media. The possibility to confer respect, prestige and legitimacy on 
an economic expert in public political discourse is based on the production 
of “excellence” and “elite” labels as “mythical capital” in academia (Maesse, 
2017b). According to this model, almost all economists who are involved in 
societal discourses on economic policy – such as the Minford debate presented 
earlier – can profit from “discourses of excellence” produced within academic 
daily life. Academia is like a “political production facility” for manufacturing 
symbolic capital to be used in political and media discourses.
In economics, discourses of excellence emerge within strong academic hier-
archies that are formed by diverse concentric networks. The most important 
mechanism at work in these hierarchisations and elitisations is the mutual inter-
action of research rankings, excellence-oriented funding from the Research 
Excellence Framework (REF), the de facto dominance of only a few econom-
ics departments in the UK (such as the London School of Economics (LSE), 
Oxford, University College London, Warwick and a few others) and the 
role of exclusive clubs and networks such as the Centre for Economic Policy 
Research (CEPR) and other informal settings (Lee, Pham, & Gu, 2013; Maesse, 
2018b). The detailed interplay of these technologies cannot be analysed here, 
but what can be said is that those elite networks do not simply produce aca-
demic elite positions. What they actually form is the idea of excellence, i.e. the 
material exemplification of the possibility that academic exceptionalism – as 
“excellence” – can exist.
Many economists from these elite networks obtain powerful positions within 
academia, and many of them move on to work in banks, international organi-
sations, governments and central banks. Symbolic power is not attached to 
a single position in these kinds of networks. It is rather a structural effect of 
the entire network, and in discourses it can be easily attached to any sort of 
economic statement. For example, Patrick Minford is an economics professor 
at Cardiff University and simultaneously a Fellow of the CEPR network. The 
authors of the “response” to Minford’s Brexit position are appointed by the 
LSE, which has a highly prestigious economics department. Therefore, both 
opponents and proponents of the previously analysed discourse may benefit 
from the institutional reputation of the very same elite structure. Symbolic 
power is therefore not connected to “true concepts” or “functioning ideas”. 
Rather, it privileges, authorises and legitimises economic experts’ speaker posi-
tions in discourses.
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5  Conclusion
To conclude, all the different sorts of discursive power presented here interact 
with each other. Each form of power always presupposes all the other forms. 
There is no constitutive hierarchy between them. Rather, they are linked to 
each other like Lacan’s rings. One sort builds on another, forming a network of 
power and knowledge that stretches across various fields in academia, politics, 
the economy and media. As this chapter argues, performative, imaginary and 
symbolic forms of power are key elements to understand the impact of eco-
nomic expert knowledge on society. As discursive forms of power, these three 
forms can deal with certain problems in social studies of economics: first, we 
can understand how certain linguistic forms meld with socio-material relations 
on different levels resulting in structural constraints; second, we can grasp the 
translational character of economic experts’ impact occurring between distinct 
social fields and mediated by discourses; third, we can analyse power on vari-
ous levels and take into account the complexity of economic expert discourses.
This discourse analytical perspective on power opens up our analytical focus 
for the heterogeneity of the social that is evolving in the course of globalisation. 
With such an approach to hand, we are not obliged to assume a mysterious 
“global structure of meaning”, as world polity approaches do (Meyer, Boli, 
Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997), and neither are we expected to reduce everything 
to the micro level of social interaction due to a lack of structuring terrains 
(Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, 2002). On the contrary, we can now grasp and 
analyse the diverse forms of social struggle taking place at various levels of glo-
balised societies in-between the local and the global.
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3  Macroeconomics and 
monetary policy as 
autonomous domains  
of knowledge and power
Rational expectations, monetarism 
and the Federal Reserve
Jan Sparsam and Hanno Pahl
1  Introduction: economic knowledge on planet academia 
and in central banks
In this chapter,1 we argue that although practical monetary policy is strongly 
influenced by academic macroeconomics, this does not imply that developments 
in both domains run in parallel. As has been shown in numerous sociological 
works on the fabrication and application of scientific knowledge, especially 
in the so-called laboratory studies, knowledge production is always situated 
in social contexts that have an impact on the respective forms of knowledge 
(Knorr Cetina, 1981). Knowledge production in academic macroeconomics 
is also structured by a rather different social context than monetary policy. 
The main area of application of macroeconomics is supposed to be central 
banks. The power structure as well as the practical needs in both domains dif-
fer significantly, resulting in distinct epistemic cultures. Therefore, we pose the 
questions of what attempts to influence monetary policy with macroeconomic 
knowledge would actually look like and how macroeconomic ideas are con-
ceived by practitioners.
The relevance of the questions stems not least from recent criticisms of main-
stream macroeconomics as articulated by heterodox economists, the media, 
but also by central bankers themselves: Many different commentators have 
explained the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 as well as the initial helplessness of 
central banks at least partially with deficits of current mainstream macroeco-
nomics. In particular, they criticized the merely rudimentary role of financial 
markets in the standard models of new Keynesian economics – currently the 
leading school of macroeconomics and the new mainstream (Leijonhufvud, 
2009; Borio, 2012).
Focusing on the Federal Reserve, we argue that this diagnosis is not wrong 
but simplistic. Even though decision making in the Fed has been influenced 
by mainstream macroeconomics all along, the knowledge culture of the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC), the Fed’s highest decision-making 
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body, consists of more ingredients and actions than simply applying the actual 
standards of academic macroeconomics.2 The existing literature tends to down-
play the frictions that go along with knowledge transitioning from academia 
to practice. This is especially true for mainstream accounts of macroeconom-
ics (e.g. Woodford, 2009), but also for their critical counterparts from global 
political economy (e.g. Grabel, 2000). Both assume a much too straightforward 
impact – praised by mainstream economists (suggesting monetary policy has 
become better due to technical expertise offered by academic macroeconom-
ics), criticized by critical political economists (monetary policy as captured by 
neoliberal academic schools, c.f. Sparsam & Pahl, 2018). We argue that it is not 
predominantly the cognitive aspects of scientific knowledge and the criteria of 
success in academia that convince the practitioners to adopt macroeconomic 
concepts. In our opinion the context conditions of action in the respective 
domains are to a greater degree responsible for a – successful or failed – transi-
tion between them.
For our argument, we chose an episode that was historically crucial for the 
Fed and led to a paradigm change in monetary policy making. The transcripts 
of the meetings of the FOMC around 1978 and 1979 show that the politically 
critical situation for the Fed opened the deliberations of the FOMC for dis-
cursive interventions from its members that promoted specific macroeconomic 
ideas. The two cases we refer to are the absent impact of the so-called rational 
expectations revolution or, as it was labelled later, the rise of new classical 
macroeconomics and the adaption of monetarism in a practical way by the Fed 
under the chairmanship of Paul Volcker. Rational expectations macroeconom-
ics emerged in the mid-1970s and led to a paradigm shift in academic macro-
economics within a few years (Mishkin, 1995; Hoover, 1992), with devastating 
effects for the credibility of the Keynesian mainstream. The influence of new 
classical macroeconomics on the Fed, however, remained rather modest for 
a long time. The reasons for this lag are quite opaque. In contrast, monetar-
ism was allegedly adopted by the Fed with the debut of Volcker as chairman 
of the FOMC. The paradigm itself, however, did not revolutionize academic 
macroeconomics, and its main protagonist, Milton Friedman, is considered to 
be more of a political figure. But the history of macroeconomic thought is still 
struggling to answer the question in which way monetarism actually made an 
impact on the Fed’s monetary policy.
Course of argument: The following section is divided into two subsections: 
We begin with sketching the broad support rational expectations macroeco-
nomics received at one specific district of the Federal Reserve System, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, as early as from the mid-1970s onwards 
(2.1). In the next subsection, we present empirical evidence to answer the 
question of why this support did not lead to a broader influence of new clas-
sical macroeconomics in the Fed, referring to the verbatim transcripts of the 
meetings of the FOMC. We discuss several examples from the late 1970s that 
shed some light on why the paradigm shift in academia did not have the same 
immediate impact on monetary policy (2.2). The following section deals with 
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the so-called practical monetarism of Paul Volcker’s chairmanship. We will 
show how impulses from academic macroeconomics were picked up by the 
Fed in a selective and pragmatic way (3). In the discussion, we argue that both 
academic macroeconomics and monetary policy making encounter fundamen-
tally different problems and therefore need distinct solutions that require trans-
lations between both domains. Because of that, they have to be understood 
as autonomous domains of knowledge and power (4). Our contribution thus 
combines empirical findings with insights from the relevant literature, spanning 
the history of economic ideas and the history of central banking.3
2  Why new classical macroeconomics has not taken the 
FOMC by storm
2.1  The Minneapolis Fed as a breeding ground for rational expectations 
macroeconomics in the 1970s
The Federal Reserve System consists of twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks 
that are jointly responsible for planning and implementing monetary policy 
measures in their respective districts (Hafer, 2005). The huge degree of inde-
pendence of the districts supports quite some diversity within the Federal 
Reserve System, especially with regard to their research activities and monetary 
policy positions. For example, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis is con-
sidered to have been a stronghold of monetarism from the late 1960s onwards 
(see Hafer & Wheelock, 2001). The same is true with respect to new classical 
macroeconomics for the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis from the mid-
1970s onwards.
Monetarism, especially represented by Friedman, renewed the quantity 
theory of money. The main argument concerning monetary policy was that 
central banks have to directly control the money supply. Even though Fried-
man challenged the Keynesian mainstream (of the so-called old neoclassical 
synthesis), the impact of monetarist thought on the academic profession was 
rather limited (De Vroey, 2016, p.  85). Instead, its influence is mainly sup-
posed to be a political one, promoting the market against the Keynesian statism 
(c.f. Accocella et al., 2016, p. 51). The success of monetarism, therefore, can 
mainly be seen in the establishment of politico-economical tenets like inflation 
fighting as the main goal of monetary policy (c.f. De Long, 2000). In contrast, 
new classical macroeconomics, opposing monetarism but being not a bit less 
market-oriented than Friedman, radically changed the research landscape of 
macroeconomics. Initiated by Robert E. Lucas, it set a new theoretical standard 
for econometric modelling. The so-called Lucas Critique conveys that Keynes-
ian models are not able to reproduce economic actors adjusting their prefer-
ences when they encounter changes in policy. As a solution, Lucas proposed 
basing models on rational expectations, which means that economic actors 
are able to anticipate the effects of policy changes. In such models, economic 
actors behave as if they knew the parameters of the model (Snowdon & Vane, 
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2005, p.  228; De Vroey, 2016, p.  167). Lucas’s solution provided a micro-
foundation for macroeconomic modelling and made it compatible with the 
microeconomic standard of general equilibrium theory (Sparsam et al., 2017). 
It also sparked the development towards building models as the main activity of 
macroeconomists and therefore providing new career opportunities (Colander, 
1989, p. 33).4
At the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, during the directorships of 
Bruce MacLaury (1971–1977) and Mark H. Willes (1977–1980) the research 
focus shifted to the then brand-new theory of rational expectations, including 
an offensive proclamation of the market-affirmative and anti-Keynesian policy 
recommendations associated with this program. Regarding the propagation 
and popularization of this new theory and worldview, Willes stood out promi-
nently. His predecessor remembers him in the following way:
Mark Willes, who came in as president after I left, was very intrigued with 
this line of reasoning [rational expectations] within the research depart-
ment at the Federal Reserve in Minneapolis and made it more of an official 
policy line of this bank, a symbol, if you will, of this bank within the Fed-
eral Reserve System. So there became a voice for the rational expectation 
school coming out of Minneapolis. That grew out of work that was going 
on here while I was here, but I thought that it was a very interesting intel-
lectual exercise, not a direct policy-related exercise while I was here.
(MacLaury, 1992, n.p.)5
Economist Neil Wallace (in Hoover & Young, 2011, p. 27), one of the major 
contributors to new classical macroeconomics, who at that time belonged to 
the Bank’s research staff, made similar comments:
When Mark Willes came to the Minneapolis Federal Reserve as president, 
he decided to publicize some of the research on rational expectations. In 
particular, Mark had the view that some of the policy-ineffectiveness stuff 
was something that deserved a hearing within the system.6
The Bank’s new research agenda, which quickly led to relevant publica-
tions (such as Muench & Wallace, 1974; Sargent & Wallace, 1976), served as 
a multiplier effect that helped to spread Lucas’s fundamental critique of the 
Keynesian paradigm in academic macroeconomics and stimulated research to 
make it more relevant for policy. Thomas Sargent (1995, p. 4), who also counts 
as a main protagonist of new classical macroeconomics today and worked in 
the research department of the Minneapolis Fed at the time, wrote about the 
influence of these interventions as follows:
Neil Wallace and I had already written several papers about rational expec-
tations in 1969–1972, and had read drafts of Lucas’s JET paper [1972] as 
well as two key papers by Lucas and Prescott [1971, 1974]. But we didn’t 
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understand what was going on until, upon reading Lucas’s ‘Econometric 
Policy Evaluation’ in Spring of 1973,7 we were stunned into terminating 
our long standing Minneapolis Fed research project to design, estimate and 
optimally control a Keynesian macroeconometric model.
Here, Sargent classifies Lucas’s ideas as a crucial experience that radically redi-
rected monetary policy research in Minneapolis. At the same time, the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, launched in 1977, created a 
new series of publications at the intersection of academic discourse, monetary 
policy, and public relations, in which numerous articles proclaiming “radically 
different new directions” in theorizing as well as monetary policy (Lucas & 
Sargent, 1979, p. 15) were subsequently published.
Willes himself used his position as president8 not only to readjust bank-
internal research in Minneapolis but to attempt to popularize the new school 
of thought in the political field. In an interview he highlights this attempt as a 
main aspect of his presidential work:
I spent an enormous amount of time trying to help people be interested 
in public policy, help explain what public economic policy was, what 
kinds of effects it would have, what was possible, was what not possi-
ble. You take this last election discussion, and you could cry, because the 
general notion about what is possible is so far off the mark that people 
make really important decisions and then clamor for action, when often, 
if they get what they really ask for, they’re going to be worse off, rather 
than better off.
(Willes, 1992, n.p.)9
These quotes show that Willes acted not only as a strong supporter of early 
new classical macroeconomics but also as a chaperone of its development. How-
ever, as will be subsequently shown, he was not able to establish the agenda of 
rational expectations at the power centre of the Fed, the FOMC, and we will 
examine some of the reasons of this failure.
2.2  Failed interventions: Mark Willes’s efforts at persuading the FOMC 
to adopt rational expectations macroeconomics
The FOMC deliberates about and sets monetary policy and financial regula-
tions. It comprises twelve voting members: seven members of the Board of 
Governors (BoG), nominated by the president of the USA and appointed by 
the Senate for a maximum term of fourteen years. Among these members are 
the respective chairs of the committee who, however, can only be appointed 
for consecutive four-year legislatures. The other five members of the FOMC 
are the presidents from the twelve Federal Reserve districts. The FOMC usu-
ally meets eight times a year to discuss and decide on the monetary policy 
stance of the Fed (see Meulendyke, 1998, pp. 121–138).
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As president of the Minneapolis Fed, Willes also participated in the FOMC, 
first as a non-voting member and since March 1978 as a voting member. Dur-
ing this time, he firmly positioned himself as radical proponent of tight mon-
etary policy: “Mark Willes . . . wanted to use a sledgehammer rather than a 
scalpel in tightening credit” (Silber, 2012, p. 138). A  statistical evaluation of 
the voting behaviour of the members of the FOMC ranks him “among the 
most tightness-oriented members” (Chappell et al., 2005, p. 44). At the same 
time, his voting behaviour showed an unusually high degree of dissent, bring-
ing some turmoil to this rather consensus-oriented committee.10 Reminiscing, 
Willes (1992, n.p.) made the following remarks about his time at the FOMC:
That was, of course, a time when there were some fairly sharply divergent 
views about how to manage things domestically. Even though I was presi-
dent a relatively short period of time, I tended to get more than my share 
of attention, because I disagreed often with what the System was doing 
and how it was dealing with what I  thought was a policy that was not 
going to deal with inflation as effectively as we ought to.
Willes did not only carry himself as a deviationist,11 but he has also offen-
sively brought the ideas of rational expectations macroeconomics into the 
FOMC. Surprisingly, he has not succeeded in arousing any interest of the other 
members of the FOMC for the policy-relevant implications of this new variety 
of academic macroeconomics. In his extensive history of the Federal Reserve, 
Meltzer (2010, p. 1017) concludes for the period of the late 1970s to the early 
1980s: “Academic literature at the time was dominated by models with rational 
expectations. . . . President Mark Willes (Minneapolis) mentioned this work 
at times, but he did not get a response.” It is instructive to take a closer look at 
some sequences of the verbatim transcripts of the meetings of the FOMC to 
investigate the main reasons for this failure.12
In the meetings of June and July 1978, Willes argued that the economet-
ric models used by the Fed’s scientific staff to inform the members of the 
FOMC fall short of properly including the expectations of economic actors 
(see June 20, 1978, p. 10; July 18, 1978, p. 16). In the September meeting 
of the same year, Willes refused to be regarded as an outsider concerning his 
preference for tight policy measures. He quoted a letter from the Fed to Con-
gress that assures a long-run neutrality of monetary policy, criticizing that the 
Fed does not act the way it claims to do (September 8, 1978, p. 29). This did 
not lead to any kind of discussion, however. The first intervention by Willes 
that sparked a brief debate took place in the October meeting of 1978. He 
again emphasized the importance of including rational expectations, referring 
to the work done at the Minneapolis Fed. Incorporating rational expectations, 
he argued, could substantially change the perceived impacts of various policy 
alternatives. Since the voting members based their decisions to set the funds rate 
at least partially on models and econometric analyses offered by the Fed’s sci-
entific staff, using alternative model specifications or alternative models might 
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alter their perception of the economic situation. Staff member James L. Kich-
line admitted to Willes the need to improve the integration of expectations 
into their models,13 demonstrating that he is fully aware of the methodological 
problems coming along with this missing variable. But he was also cautious to 
align himself with the work done at the Minneapolis Fed by emphasizing that 
the outputs of the models might be different:
MR. KICHLINE. Yes. We have work going on now to try to incorporate in the 
various parts of the model a better expression of expectations than is now 
captured in the model. It’s clearly a weak point of the model now. I guess my 
own judgment would be that perhaps we wouldn’t get as strong a response 
as the results of your work in this area just looking at some of the early 
things we’ve done. But I think it’s a quite valid comment that our model 
does not have in it as much of an “expectations” phenomenon throughout 
as [*your model] apparently. You’re quite correct; I have no problem in 
saying that we have not progressed very far in putting that in the model.
(October 17, 1978, p. 13)
However, as the further discussion reveals, Willes’s colleagues at the FOMC 
were not that much convinced of the importance of his objections. J. Charles 
Partee, member of the Board of Governors, asked Kichline if the model incor-
porating expectations the staff is working on is “based on some new theory” or 
“on historical experience” which Kichline affirmed (October 17, 1978, p. 13). 
With this statement he, on the one side, emphasized the methodological differ-
ence between Willes’s and the staff’s approaches. On the other side, he thereby 
proclaimed a hierarchy in the validity of different forms of knowledge for the 
FOMC’s concerns, valuating pure theoretical insights as inferior to more data-
saturated information. This claim that was also supported by chairman G. Wil-
liam Miller, who stressed that rational expectations models still were not able 
to adequately reproduce time series data:
MR. PARTEE [*Board of Governors]. But I still think, Mark, the test of the pud-
ding is in the replication of the past. Again, no matter what your theory is, 
it has to be a model that –
CHAIRMAN MILLER It’s got to be proved throughout the cycle.
MR. PARTEE To show it works, and this one is based on the past.
(October 17, 1978, p. 13)
Although Willes tried to make clear that he was aiming at a qualitatively dif-
ferent “perception of policy impacts,” (October 17, 1978, p. 13) the discussion 
quickly terminated because another member was called upon to comment on 
the economic situation.
This short episode is highly typical for Willes’s failed interventions. The 
following meetings show similar sequences whenever Willes tried to bring his 
view to attention again. For instance, in the November meeting of the same 
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year, he repeated his claim about expectations, but nobody even picked up on 
his points (November 21, 1978, p. 17). In the December meeting, a somewhat 
humorous but also polemical verbal exchange took place. Willes tried to distin-
guish the rational expectations research agenda from monetarism, while Partee 
regards both schools of thought as mere variations of the same paradigm:
MR. WILLES I would like first to make a commercial, Mr. Chairman, and disa-
vow that I am a monetarist. We hold a balanced portfolio in Minneapolis.
MR. PARTEE He’s like an Episcopalian not being a Catholic.
MR. WILLES Someday when we have more time we will explain the substantive 
differences between the monetarist and what’s even worse, I might say, and 
that’s a rational expectations-ist. But that’s another story.
(December 19, 1978, p. 28)
It is evident that Willes acted with the intention to single out the rational 
expectations school of thought as a new and independent stream of research in 
contrast to monetarism. His playful description of his intervention as advertis-
ing already shows that he was quite aware of the promotional character of his 
objections (and maybe their futility). His opponent played down his claim, by 
cracking a sarcastic joke, stealing Willes’s thunder.
Later in the same meeting when the committee openly discussed the una-
vailability of different policy scenarios, Willes pointed out weaknesses in the 
models used by the Fed’s staff again, arguing
that there is no way we can say on the basis of those exercises [*simulations 
with the existing models] whether our proposed policy is consistent or 
inconsistent with the President’s [*economic] programs. My fear is that we 
are going to mislead ourselves into thinking that we can determine with 
more precision than we can exactly what the options are that we face.
(December 19, 1978, p. 58)
At this point, Willes seemed to be aware of the importance to not base his 
criticism only on general theoretical objections stemming from the rational 
expectations approach but to offer more data-saturated econometrical work 
to the committee and thereby a practical solution to the problems the FOMC 
identified in their mode of knowledge production. He continues:
We hope to have for the Committee, in a few months, some simulation 
views in the MTS [*multivariate time series] model to indicate that there is 
really nothing we can say about the breakdown in nominal GNP between 
prices and real output, with any degree of confidence at all, based on the 
way that model is currently working. And that’s not a criticism of that 
model any more than any other. It’s just a fundamental difficulty we are 
having [in] how these things are being done.
(December 19, 1978, p. 58)
44 Jan Sparsam and Hanno Pahl
Yet, it took Willes and his economic staff at Minneapolis much longer than 
expected to come up with econometric models (based on rational expecta-
tions) that would meet the needs of the FOMC. The first working models 
to adequately operationalize the Lucas Critique were the real business cycle 
models of the early 1980s (Kydland & Prescott, 1982). But these models left no 
place for monetary policy whatsoever (beneath keeping inflation low) because 
they explained business cycles exclusively as results of technology shocks or 
other real factors (c.f. Hoover, 2007, p. 423). This characteristic rendered them 
very unattractive for the needs of the FOMC and the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem in general. Willes’s objections in the FOMC that monetary policy may 
be completely futile as a means of affecting the economy that were based on 
the “policy ineffectiveness proposition” (Sargent & Wallace, 1976) were also 
received as “very, very [specific],” (Partee, January 9, 1980, p. 59) but “very 
imprecise in terms of the numbers we come out with” (Schultz, vice chair 
Board of Governors, January 9, 1980, p. 59).
This interaction concerning rational expectations that took place between 
Willes and the FOMC almost like a ritual shows that the new paradigm that 
revolutionized macroeconomics did the very opposite in the FOMC. The 
transcripts reveal that in the committee it was conceived as a mere idiosyncrasy 
of one person. This also happened because the then crisis-ridden Fed referred 
to another academic paradigm to change its course: monetarism.
3  Muddling through: practical monetarism at the Fed as 
a pragmatic choice
Interestingly, in the beginning monetarism showed a similar fate in the Fed 
as rational expectations did. Before gaining influence in the FOMC, it was 
adopted in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. As Johnson shows (1998, 
p. 158), monetarism was explored by the staff at St. Louis concerning research 
and forecasts and had a significant impact on the respective president. However, 
similar to new classical macroeconomics in Minneapolis, the paradigm did not 
gain any influence in the FOMC’s decisions in the early 1970s. According to 
Johnson (1998, p. 158), this was due to the pecking order that placed the staff 
of the FOMC above those of the districts. He also stresses that the presidents of 
St. Louis were ignored in the meetings.
But it was to turn out completely different: In August 1979 Paul Volcker 
became chairman of the FOMC.14 When he took office, the economic situ-
ation in the US was quite precarious because the economy was ridden by a 
severe “stagflation” – high inflation and low growth – for a few years by then, 
for which the Fed took a lot of public and political blame. This made it nec-
essary for the FOMC to finally come up with a solution. With Volcker, the 
period of so-called practical monetarism began. Although Volcker’s rigid anti-
inflation policy undoubtedly had greater common ground with Willes’s policy 
preferences than with 1970s Keynesian economics, this rebuilding phase did 
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not lead to a breakthrough for rational expectations theory at the Fed either. 
To quote Meltzer again,
Volcker did not take seriously the rational expectations claim that expecta-
tions would adjust quickly to his policy actions. . . . Both money growth 
and interest rates were highly variable, so it was difficult to hold firm 
expectations about future policy.
(Meltzer, 2010, p. 1063)
Volcker acted as a technocrat as well as a pragmatist: “At the Fed, Volcker 
wasn’t worrying about models. He was exercising the Fed’s monetary muscle, 
raising interest rates to double-digit levels to bring down inflation at the cost of 
a severe recession” (Wessel, 2009, p. 72f.).
To get as much public attention as possible, Volcker chose not only to tighten 
monetary policy, but also to announce a fundamental change in policy. He used 
the label “monetarism” (targeting the money supply), which Friedman as one 
of the most prominent public critics invoked against the Fed, as a powerful 
signifier for the policy shift: Instead of halting inflation just by raising interest 
rates aggressively, “Volcker decreed that the Fed would henceforth target the 
supply of money in the banking system – he would switch from manipulating 
the price of credit to policing the quantity of it” (Mallaby, 2016, p. 232). The 
choice to announce a shift to an allegedly monetarist strategy reflects what the 
FOMC thought it had as room for maneuver under the given political circum-
stances and the power structure in the committee itself, not a confession to the 
academic paradigm. As Lindsey et al. (2013, p. 536) declare,
The available record does not suggest that the FOMC was converted to 
monetarist ideology. The monetarist experiment of October 1979 was not 
really monetarist! Rather, the new techniques were conditionally adopted 
for pragmatic reasons – there was a good chance that they would succeed 
in restoring stability.
The decision to target the money supply in the October meeting was certainly 
not challenged by the Keynesians in the committee – they were just as helpless 
confronted with the phenomenon of stagflation, an occurrence that should 
have been impossible according to Keynesian thought.
This pragmatic turn to practical monetarism can be understood as a strategy 
to signal to public that the Fed was finally taking radical measures against soar-
ing inflation (c.f. Mallaby, 2016, p. 232). Volcker represented to the outside that 
the new strategy was a long-term one (Axilrod, 2013, p. 79). On the inside, he 
urged the suspension of adverse inflation expectations to justify the policy shift 
(c.f. Hetzel, 2008, p. 150). He and the other members often used the term in 
the meetings of the FOMC. Practical monetarism was aimed at changing the 
“explosive inflationary psychology” (Balles, president Federal Reserve Bank 
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of San Francisco, October 6, 1979, p. 16) that high inflation was a permanent 
feature of the economy: “We’re going to have to break that psychology” (Tee-
ters, Board of Governors, November 20, 1979, p. 24). It can be assumed that 
Volcker’s emphasis on inflation expectations was less inspired by new classical 
macroeconomics than by an everyday philosophy of “market psychology” of 
economic actors, based on his experience at the trading desk at the New York 
Fed (see Volcker in Mehrling, 2007, p. 171). Therefore, practical monetarism 
did not follow the expectations of economic actors as new classical macroeco-
nomics suggested but tried to shape the perception of what monetary policy is 
doing – with a highly uncertain outcome:
There has been a great deal of discussion about the money supply and the 
feeling that so much of this psychology is related to the fact that the money 
supply is out of control. That’s the comment we hear all the time. The 
virtue of a new approach, if it has one, is that we are accepting – with all 
its risks and dangers – more of a focus on the money supply.
(Volcker, October 6, 1979, p. 15)15
Practical monetarism led to ambivalent results: On technical terms, the FOMC 
did not succeed in estimating the correct growth of the money supply. There-
fore, it terminated the experiment in 1982 (c.f. Meltzer, 2010, p. 1229). How-
ever, on ideological terms, it was part of the broader shift to neoliberal politics 
that began in the late 1970s:
[T]here is no doubt that the global ideological climate changed signifi-
cantly, the Fed being part of these developments: For instance, from 
August 1979 onwards, until December 2008, the FOMC made no longer 
any references to employment in its policy directives, focusing exclusively 
on price-level stability.
(Thornton, 2012, p. 117)
Ultimately, it was not a choice that followed academic recommendations and 
certainly not a technical precision coming along targeting the money supply 
that justified pursuing the overarching goal of monetarism – fighting inflation – 
but the economic and discursive success of monetary policy under Volcker.16 
It spread the impression that central banks can successfully intervene if they 
are independent and can fight inflation without instigating a recession (c.f. 
Goodfriend, 2007, p. 53). The new agenda, later supported by the conserva-
tive Reagan administration, “tipped America’s balance of power much more 
in favor of those with dollars and against those with only votes” (Johnson, 
1998, p. 147). Central banking – as it was framed from now on – should stay 
away from any attempts to support aggregate demand and a global manage-
ment of the economy and should only care about keeping inflation low. Ironi-
cally, the success of the policy experiment that was called practical monetarism 
opened the doors for the successive paradigm of new classical macroeconomics 
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that placed greater emphasis on the possible effects of monetary policy: new 
Keynesian economics.
4  Discussion: monetary policy making and academic 
macroeconomics as autonomous domains of knowledge 
and power
Our case studies show that the dissemination of academic macroeconomic 
ideas did not work in a straightforward way. What is convincing on planet 
academia does not have to be necessarily cogent for the practitioners in central 
banks. The failed intervention of Mark Willes reveals that even thorough local 
research and an aggressive propagation of the superiority of the paradigm did 
not nudge the committee into acknowledging its alleged benefits. The case 
reveals that new classical macroeconomics at that time was not prepared to ful-
fill the practical needs of the FOMC to work with models that suit and support 
the deliberation and decision-making process in the committee. In contrast, 
the implementation of practical monetarism demonstrates that the economic 
paradigm was used only in a pragmatic and selective manner by central bankers 
as part of their communication strategies as well as their operating procedures. 
It did not imply that central bankers necessarily stuck to the technical and ideo-
logical details of the respective paradigm.
The cases principally show that, even though academic macroeconomics 
and monetary policy have a strong connection, they have to be character-
ized as autonomous domains of knowledge and power. This is foremost due 
to the different problems the actors have to solve in both domains and the 
related distinct epistemic cultures. To put it bluntly: Macroeconomists have 
to construct parsimonious models as artificial worlds that can claim scientific 
validity regarding the rigid rules in the academic domain (see Morgan, 2012). 
Solutions for monetary policy coming from macroeconomists, therefore, can 
be quite monocausal and reductionist. A crucial point is that macroeconomists 
do not have to care about the practical implementation of monetary policy. In 
contrast, central bankers in the Fed have to make decisions about monetary 
policy that can be realized with the available instruments and legitimized to the 
public and Congress. Therefore, they draw on a plethora of different kinds of 
information and knowledge – the more, the better, not on models and their 
outcomes alone. Also, macroeconomic knowledge has to be translated into 
a practicable format the FOMC can use to make a decision confronting the 
complexity of the real-world economy. The transformations of knowledge in 
the FOMC proceed more incrementally than the scientific revolutions in mac-
roeconomics (c.f. Sparsam & Pahl, forthcoming).
The cases suggest that the organizational structure of the Fed permits it 
to focus on specific macroeconomic paradigms in the districts, but that the 
FOMC is hierarchically superior in its routine as well as its rationale for deci-
sion making. It holds the prerogative of interpretation of the economic situa-
tion and the adequacy of actions the Fed can take, and this is interestingly based 
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in the tenet that macroeconomic paradigms must not override the autonomy 
of the deliberations in the FOMC (c.f. Blinder, 1998, p. 7). This autonomy 
is partially based on the role of the chair “as an agenda setter and as a consen-
sus builder” (McGregor & Young, 2014, p. 169). They have to channel the 
individual preferences and lead the meetings to a decision, with the relative 
freedom to divert the agenda of the meeting (and possibly taking the blame for 
a bad decision). But it is also established in a persistent organizational routine: 
The structure of the meetings of the FOMC has not substantially changed from 
the 1970s to today. The meetings guarantee that every participant has the free-
dom to say whatever they think is important, but that a decision can be made 
even if preferences diverge substantially.
The autonomy of monetary policy even stays intact in times of a tighter 
relation between both domains. As is well known today, some of the theoreti-
cal standards as well as some of the policy recommendations from new classical 
macroeconomics were established since the 1990s. This influence occurred 
mainly through the mediation of new Keynesian economics, a paradigm that 
merged some ideas of new classical macroeconomics with features of the older 
Keynesian economics. Leading figures in the Fed, most notably Ben Bernanke 
and Janet Yellen, had some affinity for new Keynesian economics. Before 
becoming chairs, both already had significant influence on the Federal Reserve 
System: Bernanke as member of the Academic Advisory Panel of the New 
York Fed, and Yellen as member of the Board of Governors. Since 1995, the 
FOMC has increasingly discussed inflation targeting, the new Keynesian vari-
ant of a rule-based monetary policy that explicitly includes the formation of 
expectations by market actors in order to achieve monetary policy goals (cf. 
Gavin, 1996). Concerning models, new Keynesian discourse first enters the 
FOMC in 1996, when the FRB/US model was introduced. Although still in 
the tradition of older Keynesian models, it is already altered by new Keynesian 
specifications. But the aforementioned also applies in these cases: The extreme 
approach of the new classical economists has not fully removed Keynesian sta-
bilization policies from the agenda of the central banks and presumably never 
will in an absolute fashion. To blame new Keynesian economics for the crisis 
denies the autonomy of the domains of knowledge and power that central 
banks are. Instead of searching for technical similarities between both domains, 
it would be more fruitful to see if their modes of operation are different  – 
maybe even opposed – variants of a pro-market belief system.
Notes
 1 This chapter is based on the research project “From Modelling to Governance.” In 
the project we analyzed the verbatim transcripts of the meetings of the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC). The meetings of the FOMC are taped and transcribed 
afterwards. Since 1994 the transcripts are available to the public with a lag of five years 
(online: www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc_historical_year.htm). The trans -
cripts document the entire official proceedings of each of the FOMC’s eight annual 
meetings and comprise around 60 to 120 pages. Our main focus was the problem of 
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how the committee refers to macroeconomic ideas and econometric models for delib-
erating and deciding on monetary policy. Our approach is based on grounded theory 
analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). It was chosen because our analysis does not aim at 
the mere identification of economics terms or aspects of knowledge from academic 
macroeconomics but at the specific utilization of this knowledge in the FOMC, also 
considering ambivalences, translations, or the like. We explicitly do not offer a rational 
reconstruction of the FOMC’s decision-making process (as most economic analyses do, 
e.g. Romer & Romer, 2002; Chappell et al., 2005) but an interpretative reconstruc-
tion of knowledge production in the committee. The project was supported by the 
Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung [Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research] of Germany under Grant 01UF1503.
 2 See the extensive case study in Sparsam and Pahl (forthcoming) for an in-depth micro-
sociological analysis of the FOMC’s knowledge culture.
 3 Two qualifications have to be made: First, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
introduce the respective economic schools of thought that are of relevance for the devel-
opment of macroeconomics in detail. One may refer here to the pertinent nontechni-
cal literature (e.g. Snowdon & Vane, 2005; De Vroey, 2016). Second, as we focus on 
knowledge utilization in central banks, we limit our discussion to aspects that can be 
shown empirically, avoiding too much guesswork. It is our aim to contest accounts that 
suggest causal and too straightforward linkages between academic economic ideas and 
practical monetary policy without looking at the level of concrete deliberations.
 4 “Funding for rational expectations research rose rapidly in the late seventies as support 
for large-scale macromodels declined” (Newlon, 1989, p. 207).
 5 See also Mishkin’s (1995, p.  3) assessment: “The rational expectations paradigm was 
then wholeheartedly adopted by the research staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis, who then became the most active advocates for rational expectations within 
the Federal Reserve System.”
 6 Wallace, together with Thomas Sargent (1976), proposed that considering rational 
expectations in Lucas’s sense, policy can have no systematic effect on the economy.
 7 This paper was only published in 1976 but was made available earlier as a draft.
 8 “Federal Reserve Bank presidents give many speeches and author policy-oriented arti-
cles that receive wide attention and sometimes advocate policy positions opposed by the 
Fed chairman and/or a majority of FOMC members” (Wheelock, 2000, p. 267).
 9 See Willes (1979) as an example for promoting the policy assumptions of rational expec-
tations, including a very polemical stance towards Keynesian economics.
 10 Chappell et al. (2005, p. 82f.) offer the following details: “[H]e did vote at eleven meet-
ings and cast dissenting votes six times. As we have noted, a dissent frequency of this 
magnitude is unusual.”
 11 Willes often played the role of the dissenter in the committee quite dramatically: “My 
wife made me promise that I would be more agreeable in the new year, so I would like 
to say that I agree with everything that has been said. I’d like to say it, but the fact is that 
I don’t agree” (January 8, 1980).
 12 The following discussion is limited to selected empirical evidence. It is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to present a full-fledged account of the style and procedure of FOMC 
deliberations. See the aforementioned paper by Sparsam and Pahl (forthcoming) for 
such an account. We are citing from the transcripts of the FOMC stating name, position 
first time the name occurs, date of the meeting, and page of the transcript. Remarks in 
square brackets are in the original; our own additions are denoted with [*].
 13 Interpreting this passage requires keeping in mind that the staff usually replies approba-
tively to inquiries of the members of the FOMC.
 14 In early 1979, under chairman Miller, the FOMC showed serious signs of disunity, 
ultimately leading to the chairman’s dismissal (see Bailey & Schonhardt-Bailey, 2008).
 15 The necessary operations coming along with practical monetarism were very vague for 
the FOMC. The staff of the FOMC had to answer a lot of technical questions in the 
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beginning (see especially the transcript of January 8 and 9, 1980). Quite uncommon, 
the meetings turned into events to acquire basic knowledge in technical terms.
 16 After a peak in the rate of inflation in 1980, it steadily declined (see Goodfriend & King, 
2005, pp. 982–983).
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4  The power of economics 
textbooks
Shaping meaning and identity
Lukas Bäuerle
1  Introduction
According to Gregory Mankiw, Mark Taylor and other important textbook 
authors in economics, any economic question can be subsumed under one of 
the following questions: (a) What is being produced? (b) How? (c) For whom? 
(Mankiw/Taylor 2014, 1; Samuelson/Nordhaus 2010, 7–8; Schiller 2008, 2, 
12). Irrespective of the further elaboration upon these key economic problems, 
it seems remarkable that the ‘Why?’ of economic production is ignored within 
this set of questions. Hence, the specific meaning of economic production has 
to remain disregarded in the mentioned textbook literature.
Against this background, it becomes plausible that economic science does 
not foster a reflection upon its own existence and meaning either. At least in the 
context of higher education, future economists do not typically become con-
fronted with reflexive subjects, such as the philosophy, history or methodology 
of their discipline. That is to say that although students become highly involved 
with the curriculums’ requirements, the reason and deeper meaning of these 
requirements remain unquestioned. This void certainly leaves open self-reflex-
ive questions concerning the identity of future economists themselves as well. 
In other words, the question ‘Why study economics?’ bears a strong connection 
to a second question, ‘Who do I become by studying economics?’ and both 
typically remain unaddressed.
This chapter aims at making sense of economics, concentrating on eco-
nomic education and more specifically on economics textbooks. As will be 
shown, the discipline’s most important textbooks do contain answers to both 
questions – although in most cases only posed implicitly and generally without 
any further elaborations. The explication of these answers is the main task of 
this chapter. I did not ask for possible meanings and identity offerings but rather 
collected, typified and elaborated upon fragments of economics textbook lit-
erature that correspond to the questions posed.
To this end I worked with means of the sociology of knowledge approach 
to discourse (SKAD) (Keller 2011a, 2011b). The specific subjects of analysis 
were (1) fundamental frames (Deutungsmuster) of economics textbooks relating 
to the question ‘Why study economics?’ and furthermore (2) subject positions 
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or identity offerings that bear answers to the question of ‘Who do I become 
by studying economics?’ By focusing on the deep layers producing meaning in 
the economics textbooks discourse I  strike up with sociology of knowledge 
and linguistic research of economics (see a review of the literature in Maesse 
2013, chap. 4). Pioneering but rare contributions to a discourse analysis of 
economics textbook literature do exist with Klamer (1990), Pahl (2011), Zuid-
hof (2014), Graupe (2019), Graupe/Steffestun (2018), and Maesse (2019), but 
none address the fundamental motivational frame (‘Why study economics?’) 
and related identity offerings as analyzed in this chapter.
The analysis showed that the textbook discourse offers three different ration-
ales in order to cope with the discipline’s meaning, all of them bringing along 
subject positions, offering concepts to the students to identify with. Every 
frame and identity offering could be found in at least three of the overall eight 
cases taken into account. Alongside a scientifically orientated frame centered 
on the term ‘truth’ (section  3), there could also be reconstructed a second 
frame focusing on the pecuniary return of studying economics (section  4). 
A  last frame offers a sense of self-empowerment for the student, integrating 
the former cases to a coherent and obligatory identity option (section 5). After 
having reconstructed frames and identity offerings from the empirical material, 
I will contextualize each of them theoretically. To begin, I will sketch out the 
economics textbook discourse and the dimensions of the analysis.
2  The economics textbook discourse
2.1 Overview
Academic economic education reveals an enormous degree of standardization 
in form and content across institutional and national borders (Graupe 2019). 
Regarding content, economics textbooks almost exclusively introduce students 
to a fixed and narrow corpus of theoretical and methodological considerations, 
mostly identified with neoclassical theory (Fullbrook 2009, 18 f.). Hence, the 
textbook discourse normally does not contain any discourse coalitions, insofar 
as it presents itself as a univocal discourse lacking any opposition. Furthermore, 
the structural and didactical design of economics textbooks rarely differs from 
one another (Smith 2000, 42–44). Nevertheless, for my analysis I chose the fol-
lowing eight international textbooks that could be identified as most influential 
in terms of market shares (Lopus/Paringer 2012), sales probability on amazon.
com (Zuidhof 2014, 159), historical impact and number of editions.
The heavily standardized aspect of economics textbooks can be linked to 
the fact that the genre itself was developed around the ‘archetype’ of Paul A. 
Samuelson’s Economics (first published in 1948) during the course of the second 
half of the 20th century (Klamer 1990, 130; Gottesman/Ramrattan/Szenberg 
2005, 98, 101). Following its subsequent translation into over 40 languages 
(Skousen 1997, 137), it became the self-declared “international benchmark 
of macro- and microeconomics”. Concerning market shares, it was topped 
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by Campbell McConnell’s Economics during the 1970s (Elzinga 1992, 874). 
A  third and today predominant textbook author is Gregory Mankiw (2015: 
Principles of Economics1). By 2012 the textbooks by McConnell (now publishing 
together with Stanley Brue and Sean Flynn) and Mankiw together held 40% 
of the market share for English language introductory economics textbook 
literature (Lopus/Paringer 2012, 298). For these reasons the three textbooks 
may qualify as ‘key documents’ within the discourse of introductory economics 
textbooks.2 Based on the aforementioned criteria, the following five textbooks 
could also be identified as dominant: Miller (2012): Economics Today; Schiller 
(2008): The Economy Today; Gwartney et al. (2006): Economics: Private and Pub-
lic Choice; Krugman/Wells (2015): Economics; and Frank/Bernanke/Johnston 
(2013): Principles of Economics.
2.2  Introduction of the economics textbook discourse
Two aspects of the economics textbook discourse shall be pointed out here 
regarding its context and reach: firstly, it can be identified as a specialized sci-
entific discourse that not only addresses beginners but furthermore lays out a 
paradigmatic ground on which subsequent levels of training and finally the 
discipline as a whole relies on. In the context of a typical Kuhnian ‘textbook 
science’, the economics textbook discourse can be attributed to a fundamental 
function for the discipline’s coherent development. So while first-year students 
can be called its narrow academic audience, the discipline as a whole can be 
called as the discourse’s wider academic audience.
Secondly, it can be labelled a semi-public if not public discourse insofar as it 
not only addresses future or present economists but a wide range of all kinds 
of academics. Pahl (2011, 369) estimates that other-than-economics students 
in academic US introductory economics courses outnumber ‘purely’ econom-
ics students by a factor of 50. Hence, the discourse reaches an audience far 
beyond the discipline’s borders. This also accounts for economics graduates, 
who exert a significant impact on non-scientific discourses, e.g. in politics 
or media (Christensen 2017). Taken together, the reach of fundamentals in 
economics clearly goes beyond the discipline’s borders, insofar as “theoretical 
ideas or models, expert interpretations of reality respectively seep into com-
mon knowledge of individuals, thereby shaping their actions more or less prag-
matically” (Keller 2011a, 183; transl. by the author). The knowledge resources 
of this highly standardized and institutionalized discourse can be assumed at 
least in present public economy-related discourses. In this sense, the economics 
textbook could be labelled as public mass media.
Despite this reach of the economics textbook discourse, the modes and 
means of its production remain widely uncertain. This can partly be explained 
by referring to the powerful position of only four major remaining publishers 
that do not publish any detailed information regarding the history and pro-
duction of their textbooks.3 Furthermore, economics textbook research so 
far mostly concentrates on its contents (e.g. Aslanbeigui/Naples 1996), thereby 
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leaving (political, institutional or economical) questions of discourse production 
uncovered. Recent network analysis (Giraud 2014) and a brief review of the 
acknowledgements of the textbook literature mentioned indicate that this dis-
course is not being established merely by textbook authors alone but by a rather 
large network of actors from within and outside the academic sphere.
2.3  Method and research strategy
This chapter continues to ignore the “personnel of discourse production” (Kel-
ler 2013, 38; transl. by the author) and its “institutional infrastructures” (ibid.) 
but focuses on rarely analyzed frames that relate to either of the central ques-
tions of this discourse analysis: ‘Why study economics?’ and ‘Who do I become 
by studying economics?’4 These questions were addressed in the introductory 
chapters5 of the selected textbooks.
A frame is a discursive element that “depicts fundamental meaning and 
action-generating schemata, which are circulated through discourses and make 
it possible to understand what a phenomenon is all about” (Keller 2011b, 
57). The German term Deutungsmuster points out that frames refer to typical 
and constitutive layers of a discourse. The analysis pursued in this article at 
first focused on the frame giving meaning to the entire context of econom-
ics textbooks – hence, economics education – as such. Why would this study 
program be of any interest? What do the textbooks promise their readers in 
terms of meaningful ends of studying them? Secondly, the analysis aimed at 
reconstructing subject positions or identity offerings presented to textbook 
readers. They “depict positioning processes and ‘patterns of subjectivation’ 
which are generated in discourses and which refer to (fields of) addressees. 
Technologies of the self are understood as exemplary elaborated, applicable 
and available instructions for subjectivation” (Keller 2011b, 55). Hence, iden-
tity offerings may introduce and guide a transformation of self-understanding 
of the addressees. As will be shown, frames and identity offerings bear a close 
relationship within this sample: with every frame there goes along a certain 
subject position that corresponds to a meaningful study of economics. The 
link between frames and identity offerings therefore is always being elaborated 
conjunctively.
My analysis consisted of a continuous questioning on a sentence-to-sentence 
basis of the sample given with the two questions at hand. What could one learn 
about the aim of studying economics (or the self one could become) from 
every single sentence of the sample? In doing so, not only the ‘What?’ of given 
answers but also the characteristics of the ‘How?’ of their introduction were 
noted. For instance, where frames and identity options alike were introduced 
in antagonistic ways, the analysis also considered the relatedness of ‘positive’ 
frames to their ‘negative’ counterparts (as indicated in both sections 3 and 5). 
Where no connection at all could be established between sentences and ques-
tions, these non-answers were not further progressed in the analysis. All of the 
reconstructed answers were subsequently subjected to a comparative analysis, 
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aiming at typifiable ‘meta-answers’ bearing fundamental similarities in terms of 
addressing the two questions posed (as reflected in the headings of the three 
following sections). It was only after this empirical part of the research that 
possible theoretical interpretation schemes were taken into account in order to 
saturate and contextualize the findings.
2.4  The power of economics textbooks
It is precisely the already mentioned interrelatedness of meaningful frames and 
identity options offered where I  locate the specific power and influence of 
economists in the given example. By classifying the ‘Why?’ and ‘Who?’ (along 
with other questions concerning the ‘What?’ or ‘How?’, for instance) of eco-
nomic reasoning and practice, introductory textbooks set the field of relevant 
knowledge that possibly becomes the ‘intellectual infrastructure’ of students. 
The magnitude of this power grows with the opaqueness or even absence of 
the explicit formulation of the aforementioned questions and answers to the 
questions alike. If overtaken and embodied uncritically by students, frames and 
identity options gain an influence that reaches, as mentioned, presumably far 
beyond the academic field (for the theoretical foundations of this understand-
ing of power see section 5).
3  First frame: learn the truth!
Why study economics? In the seventh edition of his Principles of Economics, 
Gregory Mankiw devotes the entire preface to this question of a possible mean-
ing of studying the subject:
Why should you, as a student at the beginning of the 21st century, embark 
on the study of economics? There are three reasons.
The first reason to study economics is that it will help you understand 
the world in which you live.  . . . The second reason to study economics is 
that it will make you a more astute participant in the economy. . . . The third 
reason to study economics is that it will give you a better understanding of 
both the potential and the limits of economic policy. Economic questions are 
always on the minds of policymakers in mayors’ offices, governors’ mansions, and 
the White House.
(Mankiw 2015, xi; emphasis added)
The discussion of ‘economics principles’ is being introduced as inevitable for 
someone who (1) wants to understand ‘the world’, (2) is an active participant 
of the economy and finally (3) is a policymaker in this (economic) world. 
Although Mankiw introduces a plurality of identities to which the study of 
economics seems suitable,6 he limits the reason for this manifold suitability to 
only one: “principles of economics can be applied in many of life’s situations” 
(ibid.). In other words, ‘principles of economics’ take effect on any level of 
58 Lukas Bäuerle
human engagement. Therefore knowing them will be relevant for any partici-
pant of society irrespective of her special purpose.
Samuelson/Nordhaus consistently and most clearly limit the reasons to 
engage with their textbook to only one: “as we have come to realize, there is 
one overriding reason to learn the basic lessons of economics: All your life – 
from cradle to grave and beyond – you will run up against the brutal truths of 
economics” (Samuelson/Nordhaus 2010, 3). And furthermore: “Of course, 
studying economics will not make you a genius. But without economics the 
dice of life are loaded against you” (ibid.). Irrespective of time and space, ‘brutal 
truths of economics’ constitute the inevitable foundation of human action. In 
the most distinctive situations of their lives, people find themselves confronted 
with a sphere of truths they can ignore or forget but which under any cir-
cumstances will never cease to exist. Paralleled by the natural laws known to 
natural scientists, the social domain is controlled by economic laws known to 
the economist (Frank/Bernanke/Johnston 2013, 7). Any decision we take in 
life is in fact a “calculation of costs and benefits” (ibid.). Knowing the laws that 
govern these calculations will therefore yield a significant advantage in tackling 
daily life. By referring to another natural science (biology) a few pages later, 
Frank/Bernanke/Johnston introduce a specific subject that possesses this kind 
of knowledge about the fundamental aspects of ‘human existence’:
Learning a few simple economic principles . . . enables us to see the mun-
dane details of ordinary human existence in a new light. Whereas the 
uninitiated often fail even to notice these details, the economic naturalist 
not only sees them, but becomes actively engaged in the attempt to under-
stand them.
(ibid., 17)
The ‘economic naturalist’ is a figure that knows about economic principles or 
at least tries to ‘understand’ them. This figure is to be sharply contrasted to the 
‘uninitiated’, who is not able to notice the ‘mundane details of human exist-
ence’. Along with the introduction of a sphere of economic laws or principles, 
all of the cited textbooks introduce specific subject positions that correspond to 
these laws. The genuine feature of these figures consists in knowing economic 
laws or principles. As seen in the last quotation, this knowledge constitutes a 
figure or even a group: it is the economist or the discipline of economics that 
governs and preserves the specific type of knowledge. This figure and group 
are, as in this case, often sharply separated from the non-knowers, the ‘uniniti-
ated’. In obtaining the decisive knowledge and thereby becoming an economist 
consists the first meaning of studying economics.
In his lectures on the ‘Birth of Biopolitics’ (1978–79), Michel Foucault 
carved out that a hidden world of laws governing human action served as 
the ultimate legitimizing foundation of a science called ‘political economy’. In 
the early stages of this new science in late 18th century, economists suggested 
themselves as advisers to and constrainers of governments. Their actions and 
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decisions, the former claimed, were limited by laws, binding and undeceiv-
able in character. Upon these laws economists developed a field of knowledge 
that – from then on – came to be the primary domain and resource of eco-
nomic science (Foucault 2010 [1978–79], 15–16).
Political economy knows a second sphere behind or underneath anything 
called ‘governmental action’ by which the latter is determined. One cannot see 
or touch this second sphere, but one can grasp it by the means and tools devel-
oped by economic scientists. In being able to grasp economic truth, econo-
mists were soon endowed with the capacity to distinguish right from wrong 
and, most precisely, right action from wrong action; ‘right action’ meaning that 
it corresponded to the fundamental laws it was bound up to (ibid.). Hence, 
truth became the central criterion of governmental action and the specific 
domain where this truth was continuously uncovered was the science of politi-
cal economy.
Having developed to a state of textbook science, present economics still lives 
within this powerful and long-lasting self-conception. Today not only govern-
ments are offered economic knowledge and advice but, according to text-
book authors, anyone seeking a fundamental understanding of human action 
can approach the laws of economics: “Generations of students, often to their 
surprise, have discovered how stimulating it is to look beneath the surface and 
understand the fundamental laws of economics” (Samuelson/Nordhaus 2010, 
3; emphasis added).
The specific meaning of economic education, according to this frame, origi-
nates from the existence of economic laws that govern daily human action. It 
is a strong classificatory frame that discursively produces a sphere of phenom-
ena. It profoundly changes the experience (and research) of reality: any daily 
experience is now predominated by a causal, law-like reason, which is valid 
independently from space and time (in China or the US, yesterday or tomor-
row). Economists have discovered and studied these laws in a tradition lasting 
250 years. The distilled core of this alleged knowledge is now being presented 
to students of the subject in the form of textbooks. Studying the textbook and 
the subject is meaningful since it promises insights into this knowledge. In the 
end, only ‘the knowing’ will be able to live a conscious and truthful life. And 
‘the knowing’ are identified with the economists: only they possess this knowl-
edge, whose acquisition marks the target of economic education.
4  Second frame: capitalize your education!
The second frame does not refer merely to the contents of economics textbooks 
but is also mirrored in their forms (their composition, design, etc.). In this 
respect it demonstrates a structural familiarity with other formal elements of 
contemporary economic education (curricular design, assessment modalities, 
etc.). In the following section, this dual character of the frame (content and 
form) will be elaborated upon by referring to explicit textbook quotes (and 
not, for example, by means of a structural analysis of the considered textbooks). 
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To better understand the institutional roots of formal elements, this section also 
contains an excursus about the Bologna reform and its intellectual underpin-
ning: human capital theory.
The textbook of Gwartney et al. contains a separate chapter called ‘Econom-
ics as a Career’ that nourishes the expectation of an annual income between 
US $75,000 and $90,000 for economics graduates (Gwartney et al. 2006, 2; see 
also Miller 2012, 2). According to this chapter, studying economics becomes 
meaningful due to its potentially high reimbursement measured in monetary 
income. The twin thought to this income-orientated perspective is more fre-
quently found in textbooks: studying economics prevents negative income, 
that is costs. Schiller introduces this thought by closely referring to the daily 
decisions (and its omnipresent opportunity costs) of students:
The more time you spend reading this book, the less time you have avail-
able for that alternative use of your time. The opportunity cost of reading 
this text is the best alternative use of your scarce time. . . . Hopefully, the 
benefits you get from studying will outweigh that cost. Otherwise this 
wouldn’t be the best way to use your scarce time.
(Schiller 2008, 6)
According to Schiller, in educational affairs, as well as in any other affairs, there 
exists the possibility to decide rationally7 and unambiguously. This stems from 
the fact that educational decisions are governed by the same laws and truths 
that govern any other activity (see section 2). Since rational decisions are pos-
sible, and the economics curriculum is offering tools to thoughtfully realize 
such decisions, studying the subject will yield its payoff. Even more than that, 
anyone not applying economic tools and knowledge properly will not be using 
her time in ‘the best way’. Hence, maximizing behavior is being elevated to 
the rank of a norm. According to this frame, the meaning of studying econom-
ics does not exhaust itself in the apprehension or understanding of economic 
knowledge, but in its profitable application. What is true for the engineering sci-
ences is also true for economics: if the world is governed by (economic) laws 
that cannot be changed in space and time, one can at least work with them 
profitably.
But reading the textbook is not only profitable due to the valuable knowl-
edge offered by it. In a broader sense it is profitable because textbooks them-
selves have been designed according to maximizing principles in the first place:
Our textbook grew out of our conviction that students will learn far more 
if we attempt to cover much less. Our basic premise is that a small number 
of basic principles do most of the heavy lifting in economics, and that if 
we focus narrowly and repeatedly on those principles, students can actually 
master them in just a single semester.
(Frank/Bernanke/Johnston 2013, vii)
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The textbook of Frank/Bernanke/Johnston is efficient because it sticks to the 
most important lessons, therefore being able to convey the essential in less time. 
The field of economic education itself is being structured by a specific economic 
reasoning way beyond the contents of economics textbooks. For example, the 
production process of textbooks itself can be described as efficient (Pinto 2007, 
108 ff.). Furthermore, the transfer of their knowledge is being supported by 
the supply of ready-to-use slide sets that do not have to be developed by the 
teachers, therefore gaining valuable time for research (Grimes 2009, 98). The 
economic order of the field also applies to its assessment modalities. The reason 
why economic education traditionally sticks to written multiple-choice exams 
is found in “cost considerations” (Becker 2000, 116). Consequentially, the cost 
factor – the magnitude of introductory courses – has itself been determined 
efficiently in the first place (Frank/Bernanke/Johnston 2013, 3–4). Students 
of economics learn that the educational setting they live and study in is being 
designed by the very same principles they get to know about in economics 
lectures. The study contents are being taught to the audience by referring to 
their own experiences in the educational context. The mode of discursive 
production, hence, conforms to the experiences made within the discursive 
setting and finally to the discursive contents. Forms and contents of economic 
education seem identical in character. Even more than that: the experiences of 
its form seem to proof the legitimacy of its contents.
This harmonization of economic forms and contents can certainly be con-
textualized if not explained by referring to the most popular economic theory 
about education: human capital theory.8 The approach conceptualizes indi-
viduals as carriers and caretakers of their proper capital, which is formed by 
investing time and money in education, health, skills, etc. Do I opt for this or 
that study program? Does a bachelor’s degree actually yield more income than 
a job training? Does it outweigh the costs to educate our child bilingually? 
Any decision individuals face on a daily basis can be brought down to only 
one single question: does the decision outcome yield an increase in income? 
Hence, human capital theory subsumes any educational consideration under 
the end of economic profitability. Thereby, human capital theorists implicitly 
state this one norm and imperative: ‘Capitalize your education!’ To put it in 
terms of this article: (economic) education is only meaningful if the educa-
tional process actually leads to increased future income. (Economic) educa-
tion gains its legitimation in the economic profitability of the acquainted 
competences.
Human capital theory nowadays forms a core part of introductory eco-
nomics literature.9 Krugman/Wells describe the theory in a nutshell as fol-
lows: “Human capital is the improvement in labor created by education and 
knowledge that is embodied in the workforce” (Krugman/Wells 2015, 544). 
Gwartney et al. honor Gary Becker with an informational box (“outstanding 
economist”) that highlights Becker’s pioneering work in human capital theo-
rizing (Gwartney et al. 2006, 532). Mankiw introduces the concept with direct 
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reference to the educational context in which the student of economics gets 
to know about it:
Education, training, and experience are less tangible than lathes, bull-
dozers, and buildings, but human capital is like physical capital in many 
ways. . . . Producing human capital requires inputs in the form of teachers, 
libraries, and student time. Indeed, students can be viewed as ‘workers’ 
who have the important job of producing the human capital that will be 
used in future production.
(Mankiw 2015, 530)
Students are addressed as ‘workers’ or ‘producers’ of their own capital stock, 
as human capitalists. Gwartney et al. explicitly remind their students of their 
being rational actors that face a cost/benefit trade-off when opting for different 
careers by stating, “A rational person will attend college only if the expected 
future benefits outweigh the current costs” (Gwartney et al. 2006, 532; see also 
Frank/Bernanke/Johnston 2013, 510).
The reconstruction of a second frame introduced by economics textbooks 
led us to a recapitulation of the structural context of contemporary higher edu-
cation in Europe. From there, we came back to the economics profession and 
finally to economics textbooks by looking deeper into the theoretical back-
ground of the Bologna reform: human capital theory. What combines all of the 
considered discursive fragments is the subsumption of (economic) education 
under economic ends, understood as the maximization of pecuniary payoffs. 
Students of economics become acquainted with the frame of profitable studies 
not just through contents, but also by the forms of their training. Taking this 
correspondence of content and form seriously, the field could adequately be 
termed economized economic education. The corresponding identity offering to 
this frame is the ‘entrepreneurial self ’ (Bröckling 2016), a rational subject that 
uses the economic rationale to invest in itself in order to finally capitalize these 
investments in terms of money. That this rationalizing is not just a possible (and 
indeed clever) way of thinking but actually the naturally embedded rationale of 
any subject is the final lesson of a third frame.
5  Third frame: become who you are!
Searching for the foundations of a capitalizing rationality in educational matters 
in section 4, we ended up in the very same science we started with: economics. 
From its beginning in the late 1950s onward, the theory carries along a decisive 
problem that shall finally lead to the clarification of a third frame found within 
the material.
The problem starts with the following early statement of human capital the-
orists: “Since it [human capital] becomes an integral part of a person, it cannot 
be bought or sold or treated as property under our institutions” (Schultz 1960, 
571). An investment in this new sort of capital becomes inseparably ‘embedded’ 
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in a person. Hence, the investment is ‘locked up’ in that person and cannot 
be removed and sold again like physical capital (e.g. a machine). Third parties 
only dispose of this investment when living in a society that allows for slavery 
(this diagnosis is handed on in the textbook of Gwartney et  al. 2006, 532). 
Ignoring the ethical implications of this problem, the main question for human 
capital theorizing can now be stated: Why should human beings invest in other 
human beings (or the youth of an entire country) if the legal context of this 
investment prohibits a direct disposition of it? This question is of enormous 
economic or, more specifically, entrepreneurial importance. The institutional 
constellation bears a gap of control for the investor (if he chooses not only to 
invest in himself). It is precisely this kind of gap – a lack of control – where 
Foucault locates questions of power. In the following section, I want to stress 
upon a frame found in economics textbooks that can be interpreted as ‘text-
book examples’ of Foucauldian techniques and technologies of power.10
According to Foucault, power is foremost a productive phenomenon. It does 
not repress, exclude or censor, but it establishes spaces and rituals in which 
one can start living (see Foucault 1995 [1975], 194). For Foucault the most 
important of these spaces is the modern subject itself. The consideration of 
modern power phenomena for him is always constituted by the dispositif of 
selfhood: “Thus it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme 
of my research” (Foucault 1983, 209). More specifically, Foucault’s perspec-
tive focuses on the question of production of subjectivity (subjectivation). As he 
points out, this process starts with and relies upon a true knowledge of subjec-
tivity: a knowledge of one’s own truth, one’s ‘true character’, ‘true core’, ‘true 
nature’, ‘true self-image’, ‘true preferences’ etc.
In section 3, we got to know economics as a science that presents itself as 
dedicated to eternal economic laws and truths. These truths and respective 
identity options now gain a productive character: they allow for specific and 
directive reference of subjects to themselves and the world around them. Pow-
erful action is precisely the preconfiguration of these production processes of 
selfhood; it is ‘action upon action’. An individual adopting given subject posi-
tions believes he is developing a genuine identity. Actually, she starts to govern 
herself on the basis of given options. Nevertheless, thereby the subject gains a 
feeling of certainty and self-consciousness. Therein lies the specific strength of 
modern power relations.
Now it is the science of political economy that Foucault identifies as the pri-
mary source of knowledge that developed this kind of power relations in mod-
ern times, simultaneously laying ground for the predominant identity offerings 
of modernity (Foucault 1991 [1978], 92, 102 f.). With reference to Friedrich 
A. Hayek, Foucault underlines a genuine facet of US-American (actually: Chi-
cago) neoliberalism to have established economic reasoning as “general style 
of thought, analysis and imagination” within society (Foucault 2010 [1978–9], 
219). Apart from the institutional preconditions of such claim, this develop-
ment is intellectually grounded in a severe expansion of the scope of economic 
thinking. Taking into account this intellectual heritage, it seems plausible that 
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common economics textbook literature today offers a purely economic, socially 
unbounded identity offering that – willingly or not – bears the possibility to 
influence its readers’ actions. In this specific sense, economics textbooks can be 
looked at and analyzed as means of political communication.11
One precondition when aiming at governing them (gouverner) is the foun-
dation of a specific mindset (mentalité) within the led or governed individuals. 
Mankiw/Taylor explicitly prepare their readers for such a shift of mindset:
Many of the concepts you will come across in this book are abstract. 
Abstract concepts are ones which are not concrete or real – they have no 
tangible qualities. . . . – if you master these concepts they act as a portal 
which enables you to think like an economist. Once you have mastered 
these concepts you will never think in the same way again and you will 
never look at an issue in the same way.
(Mankiw/Taylor 2014, 17)
According to Mankiw/Taylor, the world of economic knowledge is presented 
in ‘abstract concepts’ that trigger the experience of passing through a ‘portal’. 
Going through this portal will fundamentally change the readers’ perception 
of the world around them. A little bit further, Mankiw/Taylor underline that 
this shifting experience may if not must lead to serious conflicts with common 
beliefs or experiences (ibid.). This conflict is a ‘normal’ part of the learning 
experience since students get to know a world that they cannot see ‘physically’. 
It has to irritate them. Students here become prepared to open themselves to 
a new world through the acquaintance of tools of abstract reasoning. Neces-
sarily they need to neglect or even set aside common sense frames for social 
interaction gained through life experience: “The challenge, therefore, is to set 
aside that everyday understanding and think of the term or concept as econo-
mists do” (ibid.). We find this imperative again in the textbook of Samuelson/
Nordhaus (2010, xx) or in the textbook of Gwartney et al. (2006, 5).
Taking seriously these quotes, economic education is successful when the 
student has learned to think differently, that is, to think with the abstract tools 
of economists. This also means that, in order to graduate, one needs to over-
come thinking like the one who has opted for the economics curriculum in 
the first place. But how do you actually think as an economist? What kind of 
abstraction does it imply? And finally, what kind of subjectivity do students 
have to adopt in order to see ‘how the world really works’?
Students are led to see the world through the eyes of an entrepreneurial self, 
a subject position originating in the archetype of homo oeconomicus (Foucault 
2010 [1978–9], lecture 9; Bröckling 2016, xiv). Although none of the analyzed 
textbooks explicitly introduces this economic anthropology, its specific ration-
ale can be described as the omnipresent key tone of the genre, found on almost 
every single page. As we have seen in section  4, Frank/Bernanke/Johnston 
create the figure of an ‘economic naturalist’ in order to illustrate this rationale: 
“Our ultimate goal is to produce economic naturalists – people who see each 
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human action as the result of an implicit or explicit cost-benefit calculation” 
(Frank/Bernanke/Johnston 2013, viii).
The educational process is here accordingly to governmental techniques 
introduced by Foucault restated as a production process: a production pro-
cess of an economic subjectivity through its inner and free adoption by living 
individuals. Students themselves become the primary actors of this production 
process. What they learn to do as economic subjects is to calculate. In the 
most distinguished situations of daily life, this subject continuously balances 
costs and benefits – always searching for an individually optimal outcome of 
her decisions. Miller points out that the universality of this economic rationale 
does not only expand to different life situations but also to different feelings 
and motivations bound to individual decisions, hence, to the most interior 
and private parts of human existence (Miller 2012, 6; see also Gwartney et al. 
2006, 5).
In the given data sample, students of economic introductory courses receive 
a constant flow of examples, end-of-chapter questions, quizzes and pictorial 
information. Through these didactical features, students are appealed to con-
ceive their lives as an economic enterprise and their life experiences as gov-
erned by economic laws: “Economics touches every aspect of our lives and the 
fundamental concepts which are introduced can be applied across a whole 
range of life experiences” (Mankiw/Taylor 2014, x; emphasis added). Rang-
ing from questions of love and power to art, health and education, economics 
textbook knowledge allows for definite and true decisions in daily life. To apply 
a calculating rationale in a whole range of daily examples therefore becomes 
a decisive didactical feature of standard economic education. In the end, the 
educational subject shall have learned to lead and govern itself on the basis of 
given identity and action options. In this sense, subjectivational processes and 
techniques may unleash a feeling of powerfulness or even superiority.
The paradox and clue of this economic subjectivation is the fact that the 
subject being produced already exists. In the performative compliance with the 
identity option offered, the subject realizes and incorporates a truth that before 
was not tangible, an abstract and conceptual truth (section 3). In this sense, the 
subjectivational process introduced by economics textbooks produces subjects 
that had always existed before – but up to this point only as “real fictions” 
(Bröckling 2016, 10 ff.).
The frame “Become who you are!” offers an identity option that reveals 
itself as true in the very moment of compliance. Hence, it is a productive frame. 
In a similar sense, Zuidhof speaks of standard economic education in sharp 
difference to classical liberal education as “market constructivist” education 
(Zuidhof 2014, 176 f.). According to this last frame, economic education is not 
just meaningful because one can learn who he is, but actually because one can 
become the one she ever was. Although this ‘who’ as well as the production 
process of this ‘who’ is strongly social and standardized in character, the subject 
nevertheless supposes to establish a unique and distinguished identity. Therein 
lays the ambivalence of a life in modern (economic) subjectivity.
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6  Conclusion
Section 5 clearly showed that the frames reconstructed in the course of this 
chapter do actually bare the possibility to tie them together by means of a 
synchronizing story line. The arising bigger picture, the “arrangement of 
interpretation” (Keller 2011a, 243; transl. by the author) of the economics 
textbook discourse could start with the introduction of a non-tangible space 
of economic laws governing individual and social action (frame 1). Students 
then learn that these laws do not only reign outside, but also within themselves 
(frame 3). The content of these laws and thereby of the students themselves 
is a rational, optimizing pattern of behavior. Due to its acclaimed ontological 
character, the realization of the pattern becomes imperative, leading to homog-
enized behavior in the social arena of a competitive market (frames 2 and 3).
Regardless of the question whether this narration or other synthetized nar-
rations promise to be meaningful, here I want to stress upon the fact that to the 
addressed audience the discourse does not offer this possibility to reflect upon the 
possible meaning of economic education. One of the key features of the frames 
reconstructed in sections 4 and 5 is the transfer of a specific content and quality 
of an identity option. The process of this transfer and its possible reactions, at 
least for the readers, remains widely implicit. Students are not being confronted 
with the fact that any classificatory act is a “process of decision-making”, and 
hence, “every verbal expression can be understood as an ‘act of power’ because 
it coins a specific reality, a specific term, thereby excluding other possibili-
ties” (Keller 2011a, 244; transl. by the author). At least the sample consid-
ered here does not univocally shed light on the fact that students might decide 
freely to adopt certain frames and correlating identity offerings or not. In the 
end, one (and only one) decision shall be made: to accept and incorporate the 
‘brutal truths of economics’. In this specific sense, the subjectivational process 
described in section 5 and its specific form (section 3) and content (section 4) 
of knowledge is pervasive in character (see also Graupe/Steffestun 2018). Espe-
cially when taking into account the potential public reach of the economics 
textbook discourse (see section 2), such findings raise serious concerns.
Furthermore, with the ends lying outside the educational sphere and subjects 
as described in sections 4 and 5, its success obviously cannot be evaluated from 
the perspective of this sphere and subjects. It is certainly this alienation of eco-
nomic education from educational purposes that opens way for a loss of mean-
ing for students (and teachers). This is to say that the questions, imaginations 
and expectations of economics students actually do not take part in their study 
experience – or only the one of a disturbing factor (Pühringer/Bäuerle 2019).
In order to overcome this danger of meaninglessness and alienation, poten-
tial reforms of economic education and especially its didactics should once 
again open up the decision for students how to deal with the subject matter in 
question and help them to adequately and responsibly deal with it in scientific 
as well as ordinary ways. It is precisely the gap of control irritating human 
capital theorists – a space of ultimate freedom – that actually constitutes the 
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attempt of education in the former sense. This is what Bildung originally meant 
to establish and foster.
Notes
 1 In my analysis I  also considered Mankiw/Taylor (2014): Economics. Both textbooks 
rarely differ.
 2 By ‘introductory textbooks’ I mean those used in basic modules commonly termed as 
‘Econ 101’.
 3 In 1992 there were 20 active publishers operating in the economics textbooks market 
(Lopus/Paringer 2012, 297 f.). The four remaining are McGraw-Hill Irvin, Pearson 
Education, Cengage Learning and Worth.
 4 Hence, my specific research interest here is not the genealogical or field-sociological 
background of the frames and identity offerings given, but merely the identification and 
typization of these frames and identity offerings themselves. In this sense I did not carry 
out a sociogenetic typification but a sensegenetic typification.
 5 By ‘introductory chapters’ I mean the preface, chapter 1 and – if thematically relevant – 
also chapter 2.
 6 As remains to be shown, Mankiw here ‘in a nutshell’ introduces all of the reconstructed 
frames and identity offerings. See section 6 for possible ways of synthesizing them.
 7 When talking about ‘economic’ or ‘rational’ thought, decision-making or action in the 
following, I always mean Beckers’s narrow definition: the application of a maximizing 
calculus on the basis of ever fixed preferences in a competitive market context (Becker 
1978 [1976], 4 f.).
 8 The term ‘human capital’ arises in the late 1950s in the newly emerging field of ‘eco-
nomics of education’. It was mainly developed by economists from the University of 
Chicago (especially by Jacob Mincer, Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker).
 9 It is commonly referred to in the chapters concerning growth theory (McConnell/
Brue/Flynn 2009, 10; Mankiw 2015, 527 ff.; Frank/Bernanke/Johnston 2013, 509 ff.; 
Gwartney et  al. 2006, 352; Schiller 2008, 339 ff.; Krugman/Wells 2015, chap. 24) 
and wage determination (McConnell/Brue/Flynn 2009, 283 f.; Samuelson/Nordhaus 
2010, 339, 353 f., 361 f.; Mankiw 2015, chap. 19–1b; Frank/Bernanke/Johnston 2013, 
339 ff.; Gwartney et al. 2006, 551 ff.; Schiller 2008, chap. 16; Krugman/Wells 2015, 
544 ff.). McConnell/Brue/Flynn (2009, 451 f.) additionally use the concept in the con-
text of the economics of migration and development (McConnell/Brue/Flynn 2009, 
chap. 39; see also Schiller 2008, 742, 749).
 10 I am aware of only one attempt to apply Foucauldian power analysis in the context of 
economics textbooks (Zuidhof 2014).
 11 Some authors explicitly reflect their textbooks in a political context: “Let those who 
will write the nation’s laws if I can write its textbooks” (Barnett/Samuelson 2007, 143). 
See also Mankiw: “In making these decisions [of selecting textbook contents], I  am 
guided by the fact that, in introductory economics, the typical student is not a future 
economist but is a future voter. I include the topics that I believe are essential to help 
produce well-informed citizens” (Mankiw 2016, 170).
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5  The constitution of 
neoliberal governmentality 
from early neoclassical 




Michel Foucault, a true polymath within the humanities and social sciences, 
provides a fertile and unprecedented ground for a new critical understand-
ing of neoliberal governmentality as the present form of global power in its 
relation to neoclassical economics. Defying the usual academic specializations 
and disciplinary divides, his work opens up new ways of approaching politics 
and economics. Foucault demonstrates how economics played a crucial role 
in the constitution of classical liberal and, in turn, neoliberal governmental-
ity. Foucault’s work also helps us understand how economics in the late 19th 
century became expert knowledge that laid the foundation for neoliberal gov-
ernmentality, a ‘norm imposing’ power modality and ‘normative political rea-
son’ (Brown, 2015; Dardot & Laval, 2013). His analysis of economics as part 
and parcel of the (neo)liberal governmentality rests on the particular concep-
tion of power. Foucault (2007), identifying three forms of power (sovereignty, 
discipline, security management), shows particularly how economics played a 
decisive role in the transition from the disciplinary mode of power regulated 
by police to the security-management modality of power. He also presents a 
rigorous method and analysis as well as a history of government to analyze this 
critical role of economics around its three interrelated dimensions: knowledge, 
power/government, and ethics. In doing so, Foucault presents us with a histor-
ical, methodological, and analytical framework to elaborate on the evolution of 
modern economic analysis in its relation to (neo)liberal power. However, one 
of the missing points in Foucault’s work is the absence of the analysis of public 
choice theory as part of neoliberal governmentality. Another one is a complete 
analysis of the relationship between early neoclassical economics and the subse-
quent neoliberal governmentality, with a focus on the specific power modality 
of security management.
Neoclassical economics was born out of the so-called marginalist revolution 
in economics in the late 19th century and public choice theory developed 
after 1940. Foucault (2008) examines, to a degree, how liberal governmentality 
based on classical political economy underwent a colossal transformation over 
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the late 19th century, but he is much more focused on the role of 20th-century 
neoliberal ideas in this revolution crafting a new political reason against Keynes-
ian politics and economics. Nevertheless, he refers very little to early neoclas-
sical economics, and public choice theory is left completely unnoticed in his 
account. Given that neoclassical economics with its early and late versions (e.g., 
new consensus in macroeconomics, behavioral economics, new institutional 
economics, etc.) and public choice theory are the hegemonic knowledge of 
economic analysis, discourse, and practice that govern and control the teaching 
of economics on a micro level (Zuidhof, 2014) and the administration of the 
state at a macro level, an attempt at incorporating early neoclassical economics 
and public choice theory into Foucault’s history of neoliberal governmental-
ity will be helpful for conceiving the governmental actuality of neoliberalism 
around its current effects and phenomena.
For Foucault, (neo)liberal governmentality is not reducible to economics 
and, no less, economic policies. And yet, economics as “knowledge-power” 
(Foucault, 2008: 19) has always been lateral to (neo)liberal power and govern-
mentality. This being so, neoclassical economics and public choice theory are 
not to be understood simply as scientific knowledge analyzing the functioning 
of the capitalist market economy at micro and macro levels. Given their over-
reach to non-economic relations, spheres, and structures through the applica-
tion of economic knowledge to the social realm, both theoretical bodies build 
up and disseminate a specific normative social and political rationality. Follow-
ing Foucault’s analytics and historical survey into governmentality, the par-
ticular question to be addressed is how the marginalist turn in economics and 
later public choice theory, which takes its starting point from Knut Wicksell’s 
neoclassical economics (Buchanan, 1987; Wicksell, 1958), have reformulated 
the governmental reason of classical political economy by modifying especially 
its moral aspects and its articulation with different forms of power (i.e., sover-
eignty, discipline, and security management). In studies of Foucault’s analytics 
of power and governmentality, the place of early neoclassical economics and 
public choice theory are largely left untouched or underevaluated, except for 
a few studies (Amariglio, 1988, 1990; Birken, 1990; de Lima, 2019; Gürkan, 
2016; Olssen, 2018). The present chapter takes a step towards filling this gap 
and aims at contributing to the studies of Foucault and governmentality. Before 
going into this deeply, the problem and method concerning the power and 
influence of economics over the social and political life will be specified refer-
ring to James Buchanan, the founding father of public choice theory.
2  Problem and method
With the neoliberal revolution throughout the 1980s, Buchanan and public 
choice theory became influential on governments as they started reforming 
their policies, organizations, and administrative and political reason. During the 
post–World War II period, Keynesian theory and policies played an essential 
role in guiding the economy and public policies. This also holds true for its 
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guiding power in governing public reason about socio-economic matters. The 
rise of protest movements in the West during the late 1960s was in some respects 
directed against the disciplinary formation of society under the auspices of 
the bureaucratic control system that the Keynesian central planning economic 
model entailed to achieve the aims of full employment and sustainable mass 
demand that induces investment. This model based on the bureaucratic welfare 
state was, as Richard Sennett (2006: 27–37) defines, a Weberian ‘social capital-
ism’ that created an ‘iron cage’ because of its highly functional and hierarchical 
structure despite its certain democratic and progressive aspects. Alongside the 
new trends in left politics at that time, public choice and monetarism strove 
to increase their intellectual power of influence and significance for guiding 
the struggles of masses for freedom vis-à-vis the increasing comprehensive state 
actions. As Keynesianism was becoming a “common enemy” (Foucault, 2008: 
79) at the diverse poles of the political spectrum, public choice scholars took 
on a political task and action in theory and practice. Public choice theory 
and its supporters set down the essential principals for guiding the public rea-
son through neoliberal economics and provided an operational framework for 
economists and politicians as they sought to make new formulations to conduct 
the social, political, and economic course of movements. Buchanan himself got 
involved in public debates as part of the public choice school’s political mis-
sion for promoting normative political economics to guide political and public 
debates. He occasionally participated in the meetings of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the US Congress founded in 1946 and expressed his thoughts 
on public finance and political issues. Buchanan also took a position against the 
student protests endorsed by left academics and supported tax-protest move-
ments in the 1970s (Brennan & Buchanan, 2000). During the course of social 
movements in the 1960s and 1970s, Buchanan’s approach to politics and eco-
nomics changed from a libertarian attitude against the state towards embracing 
strict regulations by means of state authority (Fleury & Marciano, 2018). His 
aim was to take control of the social unrest against capitalism and reformulate a 
new way of the security of the market, which explains his support of Reagan’s 
conservatism and neoliberal policies.
Buchanan produced considerable volumes of books and articles on pub-
lic choice theory and constitutional political economy. His analysis of mod-
ern society has economic, political, fiscal, and normative-ethical dimensions. 
It is economic because his theory is concerned with overcoming the crisis 
of economics by redirecting it on the theoretical course of subjective choice 
(Buchanan, 1981, 1999) and the will of individualistic freedom. Buchanan’s 
analysis (1964, 1975, 1987) is normative and political because it aims at sharp-
ening the critique of the state/political market and the economic/fiscal course 
of affairs that make a case for the Leviathan form of state. Buchanan’s theory 
deals mainly with fiscal policies because he believes that public finance as a 
science and art of government guides the collective and individual choices of 
public goods in a market environment and as such lies at the center of politics. 
Buchanan assigns a critical and defining role to political economists in guiding 
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the public reason towards an ideal society he imagines. As such, in Buchanan’s 
setup politics and economics have two dimensions: positive and normative. 
On the positive side, he sets out to explain scientifically the actual course of 
economic and political events and developments. On the normative side, from 
a constitutionalist political economy perspective, he aims at guiding the gov-
ernmental reason of state as well as the behavior of individuals as they inveigh 
against the state on the way towards making a new social contract. Finally, 
Buchanan’s public choice theory (1978, 1988) has a strong ethical dimension, 
which has received less attention, because it aims to construct and govern the 
moral attitudes, behaviors, and subjectivities of individuals in accordance with 
the rules of the market that emerge out of the rational expectations of indi-
viduals and set limits to the state. Buchanan (2008: 472–474) in his recent 
work turned to Kant’s moral philosophy and called for a ‘deontological turn’ in 
political economy as a way to govern the conducts and choices of individuals. 
Buchanan’s formulation of internal governmentality of subjects for the consti-
tution of the market society can be best understood within the framework of 
Foucault’s analytics of power and governmentality, which can establish a clear 
link between the inner logic of the theory and its performative power shaping 
the reality around their intersectional ties and disparities.
Within liberalism, government through economy can be carried out by mak-
ing use of economics in two ways: economics as expert knowledge or econom-
ics as a means of strengthening individual empowerment. Buchanan sides with 
the latter and advances an economic and ethical critique of the first model. In 
doing so, his theory becomes committed to building a certain governmental 
reason for the state and the acts of individuals. But the vector of governmental 
relations does not originate from the state, directing itself towards individu-
als; it is quite the reverse due to its comparatively low costs of government 
within society. The liberal model of government of the public and individuals 
has two dimensions. The first includes the interactions between individuals as 
part of the population under the governmental authority informed by market 
rules, and the second is the internal governmentality of morality imposing 
certain restrictions on acts, which means in-depth government through self-
government. Buchanan has developed public choice theory to shape this multi-
layered governmentality through the economics-based intelligibility of politics 
and, no less, ethics thereby laying the foundation for the government of the 
state and individuals without making a break between the two.
Buchanan’s public choice theory is highly interdisciplinary and has several 
aims at micro and macro levels. To bring them together and develop a com-
prehensive analysis of this theory, a unifying analytical framework and method 
are needed. Foucault’s nominalism, discourse analysis, and analytics of power/
government present us with such an analytical and methodological framework. 
Foucault’s overall work sees things and events in their historical course within 
a triangle, the corners of which consist of knowledge, power/government, 
and ethics. Knowledge here does not only stem from the scientific production 
of savants but is something that grows in relation to everyday experiences in 
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micro and macro domains of social life. Knowledge reaches its true meaning 
when constituting the truth and shaping the governmental reason that guides 
power relations all over society. Then knowledge becomes ‘knowledge-power’. 
To see theories not as scientific knowledge but, through Foucault’s prism, as 
part of ‘knowledge-power’ that has a performative, constitutive, and concrete 
practical influence on social reality shows us the relation of knowledge, power, 
and ethics. Foucault, paying attention to the history of economics around these 
three dimensions, identifies the constitutive role of economics in shaping the 
governmental reason of liberalism and neoliberalism. In his words:
Economics is a type of knowledge (savoir), a mode of knowledge (connais-
sance) which those who govern must take into account . . . Economics is a 
science lateral to the art of governing. One must govern with economics, 
one must govern alongside economists, one must govern by listening to 
the economists.
(Foucault, 2008: 286)
Foucault adds, however, that governmental rationality itself is not an entire 
derivative of economics and cannot be reducible to it. Government, an ensem-
ble of rationalities, is much more than what economists say, but it is impos-
sible to govern without economics in (neo)liberalism. Taking inspiration from 
this argument, the following sections characterize economics as public science 
and inextricable part of the art of government, arguing that the governmental 
attribute of economics is congenital (since its birth back in the ancient times 
was seen from the concept of oikonomia – the management of household). 
Therefore, the character of economics as public science and its practical influ-
ence on social life can be put by focusing on the notion of government. It is 
Foucault’s merit that we can take up the history of economics as part of the 
history of government, which allows us to turn this historical account into 
analytics from a socio-economic perspective.
3  Neoclassical economics as the foundation of neoliberal 
governmentality
In their book Economics: Marxian versus Neoclassical (1987), Richard Wolff and 
Stephen Resnick explain that the criticism of neoclassical economics cannot 
be a narrow-scope and finalized critique. According to them, neoclassical eco-
nomics is not simply an economic doctrine about how the capitalist economy 
works. It is connected to a general power scheme that shapes the market mech-
anisms, norms, and rationality in the economic realm as well as culture, habits, 
and patterns of behavior in the non-economic domains. Resnick and Wolff call 
for a new critique of neoclassical economics in the neoliberal era because, in 
Foucauldian terms, they consider neoclassical economics as ‘knowledge-power’ 
that programs the state, society, and the conducts of the individual through 
security management technologies. In this respect, it is necessary to open up 
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another way of criticism beyond the traditional disapproval of neoclassical eco-
nomics based on the critique of its scientific assumptions and method, which 
tries to elicit that neoclassical economics does not explain reality. Considering 
that the neoclassical theory, which presumably does not explain reality, has the 
greatest potential to produce truths to govern and construct reality, a new cri-
tique becomes necessary. This critique should first identify the links between 
neoclassical economics and neoliberal governmentality. As such, a new line of 
criticism is required for the understanding of the dynamism of symbolic tools, 
political reason, and self- and social technologies of neoclassical economics that 
disseminate neoliberal norms and rationality starting from economics educa-
tion. When the problem is described so, Foucault was the first to approach 
neoclassical economics from this line of criticism.
The term neoclassical was coined by Thorstein B. Veblen in his 1900 article 
“The Preconceptions of Economic Science” (Veblen, 1900). Veblen (1898, 
1909) argues that neoclassical economics with its reductionist, teleological, 
non-evolutionary, static, and taxonomic theoretical structure was simply the 
continuation of classical political economy. Thus, he calls it with the term 
‘neo-classical’, which delineates little and simple modification of classical polit-
ical economy. What is more, Veblen argues that neoclassical economics relies 
on the same logic of liberalism, which tries to advance capitalist property rela-
tions by promoting the ‘absentee ownership’ detrimental to the industrial sys-
tem and material production process which secures the welfare of the society 
at large. Thus, for Veblen, both classical political economy and neoclassical 
economics are a kind of ‘sabotage’ (Veblen, 1994) of the industrial system and 
welfare of the society. Although aiming in a similar direction by calling them 
‘knowledge-power’, Foucault would not agree in total with Veblen because 
Foucault recognizes essential differences between the two schools. Foucault 
discusses these differences in terms of liberal governmentality, not economic 
theorizing and its ideological biases. However, as already noted, Foucault did 
not examine and analyze the early neoclassical economics as part of the history 
of liberal governmentality to the full. “So I will skip two centuries,” he writes, 
“because obviously I do not claim to be able to undertake the overall, general, 
and continuous history of liberalism from the eighteenth to the twentieth cen-
tury” (Foucault, 2008: 78). He is mainly concerned with the essentials of the 
path-breaking shift from classical liberalism of the 18th century to 20th-century 
neoliberalism. Be that as it may, Foucault’s rapid move into the 20th century is 
a very quick shift that leads to a huge lacuna in his ‘history of governmentality’ 
between classical liberal and neoliberal governmentality.
Nevertheless, Foucault is certainly aware that the late 19th century should 
be distinguished from its early years in terms of the concrete political and eco-
nomic developments. As the late 19th century witnessed the constitution of 
welfare capitalism under the increasing fiscal, political, and juridical control of 
the state, which was all the more fortified during the world wars in the 20th 
century, the power of laissez-faire economics lost its scientific reliability and 
credence among the public, thereby falling from the grace as an instrument for 
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governmental apparatus and rationality. In effect, the rise of neoclassical eco-
nomics was a response to the then decaying position of economics. Its critique 
of classical political economy also aimed to restore the power of economics 
as expert knowledge against the growing impact of political reason shaped 
by institutionalist, ethical, and legal views. Against the backdrop of increasing 
juridification of liberalism, the rise in bureaucratic power and state interven-
tions, neoclassical economics changed the discipline towards highly deductive 
theorizing through mathematical devices in order to renew the liberal art of 
governing. Despite its mathematical content and facet stripped of political and 
social aspects of economic life, early neoclassical economics took its bearing 
from the search for establishing new liberal governmentality. That is, neoclassi-
cal economics started developing a new political reason by slightly mentioning 
politics and its long-established structural elements and ontological foundations. 
Towards that aim, it sought to remove the elements in economic theorizing 
that moved economics away from becoming governmental expert knowledge. 
As the economics cut off its relationship with the neighboring social science 
disciplines which once formed the indispensable part of economic thinking, 
neoclassical economics and rationality developed a new approach to them by 
either declaring them as representing the non-rational aspect of the social sys-
tem or inventing new problematizations like the ‘Adam Smith problem’, which 
aimed to discard social ethics of sympathy from the liberal art of government 
(Gürkan, 2016: 135).
Foucault is also well aware of the aforementioned developments that changed 
the epistemic conditions of the production of knowledge and how they had a 
bearing on the reshaping of the structure of knowledge. Foucault recognizes 
that there are differences between the early and late 19th century in terms of 
the knowledge structure of human sciences. Psychology increased its epistemic 
power over the social sciences in the wake of Freud’s analysis of the unconscious 
in the last quarter of the century (Foucault, 2011: 27). As a result, psychology 
became the epistemic mainstay of economics with the marginalist revolution. 
It should be recalled that Alfred Marshall (1962) at this time regarded biology 
as having the potential to form a new knowledge system for economics, which 
was the case for Veblen (1898), who called for a Darwinian evolutionary turn 
in economics. Like Veblen, Marshall seems to be hesitant about acknowledg-
ing the supremacy of psychology over biology when he identifies “economic 
biology” as “[t]he Mecca of the economist” (Marshall, 1962: xii) to develop 
a dynamic approach to economics, which refers to the evolutionary thinking 
in economic theorizing. At the back of the changing structure of the human 
sciences under the auspices of biology and psychology, Foucault is also con-
scious of the fact that neoclassical economics made modifications in classical 
governmental reason in The Birth of Biopolitics as well as its epistemic structure in 
The Order of Things and then The Archeology of Knowledge. In comparison, the 
transformation of the governmental reason is clearer than the epistemic modi-
fication in Foucault’s work. Neoclassical economists radically modified clas-
sical liberalism shaped by classical political economy, and what is more, these 
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modifications were essential for the development of neoliberal governmentality 
developed as a ‘thought collective’ (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009) after 1930 and 
a global art of government in practice after 1980.
Therefore, neoclassical economics stands at a very critical position and junc-
ture in the overall history of liberal governmentality as presented by Foucault, 
and it is crucial to understand the specificity, reality, and attributes of neoliberal 
governmentality. Given that marginalist economics in the late 19th century 
carried out very radical modifications of classical liberalism, it is fair to say that 
there are not two types of liberal governmentality as Foucault argues. Three 
stages or types can be distinguished in the history of liberal governmentality: 
classical liberalism, neoclassical liberalism, and neoliberalism. Classical liber-
alism was the early liberalism that was still in the domain of the reason of 
the state configured by police and discipline; neoclassical/neoliberal econom-
ics and governmentality together formed ‘advanced liberalism’ (Rose, 1993). 
However, Foucault, if not totally, seems to be ignorant of the importance of the 
late 19th century in terms of political/economic events and theories. As noted, 
he has a reason for this deliberate neglect. Foucault states that he does not want 
to be engaged in presenting the entire history of liberal governmentality and 
prefers to center his focus on the shift from classical liberalism of the 18th cen-
tury (Smith) and the early 19th century (Ricardo) to neoliberal governmental-
ity of the 20th century. By doing so, Foucault specifies the aspects of neoliberal 
governmentality. Nevertheless, there remains a huge gap in the history of (neo)
liberal governmentality. He little mentions about the first half of the 19th cen-
tury around Ricardo’s political economy, but they are very much rare when it 
comes to the late 19th century.
Foucault’s approach to early neoclassical economics was a matter of debate 
between Lawrence Birken (1990) and Jack Amariglio (1988, 1990) in the late 
1980s. In this debate, the question of marginalism is about its episteme. The 
authors were the first to ask the position of marginalist economics in Fou-
cault’s work. Although their articles are valuable to develop an understanding 
of Foucault’s thoughts on the marginalist turn in economics, this early debate 
remained in the scope of the question of episteme. This is so because Foucault’s 
analytics of government he developed in his lectures 1977–8 Security, Territory, 
Population and 1978–9 The Birth of Biopolitics came to be known fully after 
2000.
Foucault (1989, 2002) used the method of archeology in his early works, 
and he dealt with long-term epistemic structures of knowledge in unity. He 
distinguishes the pre-classical period of episteme based on ‘resemblance’ before 
the 16th century from the classical age, which was based on ‘representation’ 
and lasted until the end of the 18th century/early 19th century. Afterward, the 
modern period develops. The modern era in which Man as a finite being is 
invented is ‘the age of Man’. Over the modern era, man evolved into ‘human 
species’ from ‘mankind’ with the effect of human sciences shaped particularly 
by psychology and biology as well as political economy and historical philol-
ogy (2007: 78). Man becomes a subject having a biological and psychological 
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life (the body, mind, desire), working life, and a historical language. ‘Classical 
political economy’ gives weight to the body (physical effort to be disciplined 
in a panoptical system of control) and (neoclassical) economics to mind and 
desire. The first sees the body as the physical force; the latter conceives it as a 
neurological and, to a greater extent, psychological force and being. What is 
more, Foucault within the scope of the archeological method identifies a criti-
cal moment in Ricardo’s political economy. Ricardo invented ‘finite man’ in 
the modern age of episteme (human sciences) and biopolitics as Kant once did 
in philosophy by bringing the question of the present into philosophy (Fou-
cault, 1988: 87, 89, 95). In his work Foucault (2011: 27) seems that he does 
not recognize a critical moment or an immense epistemological break in mar-
ginalism, but in an interview with Alain Badiou in 1965 he states that Freud’s 
analysis of the unconscious in late 19th century paved the way for a new turn 
in human sciences, a kind of “deep archeological transformation”. Accord-
ingly, psychology started dominating human sciences. This is the very moment 
that neoclassical economics emerged as a new science of political economy 
or economics omitting the political. It is also fair to argue that its rise was the 
emergence of a new governmental reason. In the light of the archeological 
method of Foucault, the continuity and discontinuity between classical politi-
cal economy, particularly Ricardian economics, and neoclassical economics are 
seen around their epistemic structures and position within the wider episteme 
of more or less the same modern age in unity. Within the framework of the 
archeological method, this changing epistemic line between them is less dis-
cernible in comparison to their altering governmental logic. The modification 
of governmental reason is clearer and more severe towards a break.
In terms of the epistemic structure of marginalist economics, it is hard to 
identify another radical ‘epistemic break’. Marginalism was still in continu-
ity with the utilitarian philosophy of classical political economy, but it took a 
huge step, but not the first, to dismantle the classical governmental and politi-
cal rationality and modify the general epistemic structure of classical political 
economy situated in naturalism. The first step was taken by John S. Mill, who 
still regarded the class structure of society and the labor theory of value as the 
unit of analysis in economics but brought forward active homo economicus (the 
rational economic man) as governmental technology that ceases to be part of 
the natural and exchange-based market economy. With Mill, political econ-
omy entered into its age of Man. As Margaret Schabas (2005) shows, marginal-
ism followed and completed Mill’s effort of ‘denaturalization’ of economics by 
shifting the focus of economics from nature and the reason of nature towards 
the calculative reasoning of man within a strict hedonistic conception of the 
existence of human being. The oscillation from nature to the human mentality 
blended with a strong psychological grounding was a great step to modify the 
epistemic structure of classical political economy, which makes economics a 
‘mental science’. As homo economicus in classical political economy is the natural 
limits of the state intervention, in neoclassical economics the hedonistic eco-
nomic man becomes “a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains” as Veblen 
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(1898: 389) sarcastically criticizes. Shortly after Mill, marginalism developed 
further this shift towards a complete ‘mental science’ (Schabas, 2005) in a way 
to make a break with classical naturalism in terms of more or less active gov-
ernmental reason based on the human mind, whether in the form of welfare-
planning bureaucratic mentality as in the British neoclassical economics, single 
political leader as in the Italian neoclassical economics, single super-rational 
homo economicus in the market behaving according to alternative costs as in 
the Austrian neoclassical economics, or rational civil collective action in the 
political market as in the Swedish neoclassical economics, which is close to 
Buchanan’s neoliberal economics (Kayaalp, 2004). So, we observe three types 
of homo economicus in the history of liberal governmentality: first, ‘untouchable’ 
homo economicus in classical political economy who specifies the natural bor-
der of the state under the rule of an ‘invisible hand’; second, the neoclassical 
homo economicus as an absolute mental being who is solely directed by desires 
and self-interests; third, the neoliberal homo economicus as an acting agent who 
responds to the environment which is to be constructed in an economization 
process. Under the present condition of authoritarian neoliberalism, Wendy 
Brown (2015: 213) mentions another type of the neoliberal homo economicus to 
be sacrificed for the market economy, particularly for the sake of the financial 
industry.
As such, the specificity of marginalism in the late 19th century lies in a 
modification of the epistemological structure of classical political economy and 
a radical change close to a break in terms of governmental reason, which laid 
the foundations for neoliberalism. As classical political economy evolved from 
Smith, Ricardo, and Mill towards neoclassical economics, the marginalist turn 
made clearer in-depth modifications of the previous forms and structure of 
knowledge and political reason. Nature/physics and the working man were 
replaced by psychology and the desiring man within the same age of Man. At 
that time, biology was seen by radical and critical evolutionary economists like 
Veblen as the alternative approach against the neoclassical economics, having 
the potential to recast the historical aspect of the former in a dynamic way as 
well as having an alternative governmental reason. However, modern biol-
ogy based on the Darwinian evolutionary theory, then, could not establish 
another successful rupture in epistemic structure and governmentality within 
economics as ‘knowledge-power’, which, however, is crucial today to envisage 
the alternative against the epistemic and governmental matrix of neoclassical/
neoliberal economics.
When Foucault turns to genealogy, power, and government, he details this 
great transformation in the late 19th century more but does not specifically 
make it part of the history of liberal governmentality. And yet, when we look at 
his mentions about marginalism and early neoclassical economists, we see that 
Foucault is well aware of how important it is for neoliberal governmentality 
because marginalism, as noted, carried out radical modifications in the classical 
liberal governmentality. And this is not about the discarding of the labor theory 
of value by the utility theory of value. There are other radical modifications by 
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early neoclassical economics. Accordingly, we are moving away from classical 
naturalism towards the human agency and radical humanism around the ques-
tion of calculative human reason against the reason of nature and reason of the 
state in which classical political economy was placed. Thus it can be argued 
that marginalism and classical political economy were situated in more or less 
the same episteme but produced different governmentalities. The relationship 
between episteme (long-term knowledge structure) and governmentality rea-
son (political power) is another issue to be taken up thoroughly, but it is fair to 
say that the 19th century saw two radically different governmental rationalities.
Foucault (2008: 61–62, 118–121, 219ff) discusses neoclassical modifications 
that laid the foundations of neoliberal governmentality over the period from 
1870 to 1930 in a dispersed manner, but their main context is the shift from clas-
sical liberal governmentality to neoliberal governmentality. He accords critical 
importance to early neoclassical economics in three shifts: the first shift is the 
reconception of homo economicus by neoliberal governmentality as a competitive 
and consumer subject rather than a subject of equal exchange and material pro-
duction. The second shift from classical liberal to neoliberal governmentality 
occurs in the context of the move from the naturalist conception of the market 
to the constructivist and ‘active governmentality’ that considers the market as a 
field of permanent intervention and a field to be constructed around the com-
petition principle, which, in turn, becomes the model and benchmark of all 
governmental reason and practice. The third shift is from the classical concep-
tion of labor around the idea of labor power, which refers to the effort of the 
physical body, to the neoliberal conception of the worker as a self-enterprise or 
entrepreneur. So, the meaning of work, worker, and wage changes, and they 
are not characterized anymore by antagonistic social relations, working time, 
and material conditions. They acquire their meaning through human mental-
ity, subjective point of view, and individuals’ rational choices.
In neoliberal governmentality, a normative political project, we see a con-
structivist and active government that generalizes the economic rationality and 
practices across the society at large in which individuals as competitive self-
enterprises unfold. This entire story and discourse about the economization 
of life, constructivist governmentality, and competitive self-entrepreneurial 
agency began with the marginalist revolution in economics. In this sense, 
although it is still a debatable issue to argue that it was a radical epistemological 
break in the widest sense, one thing is certain – there is a radical transforma-
tion towards a clear-cut rupture materialized by early marginalist economics in 
terms of governmentality, which was later perfected by neoliberalism over time 
up until the present.
To recap, neoclassical economics shifted the field of analysis of economic 
theory from production to consumption. In doing so, neoclassical econom-
ics considers competition, not the equal exchange, as an organizing princi-
ple of the economy and society. It has made human behavior an object of 
economic study. As such, it discovers the entrepreneur as a singular subject. 
But it does not understand the mechanics of the entrepreneur’s movement. 
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Neoclassical economics mostly understands the entrepreneurial subject as a 
natural being within the static relations of material conditions of production 
and consumption. Joseph Schumpeter (1950, 1961) develops this discovery 
in capitalism from a sociological and historical point of view. And Schum-
peter conceptualizes the entrepreneur as an extraordinary subject, almost like 
a hero. Neoliberalism modifies this conception of hero-entrepreneurship into 
mass-entrepreneurship in a way to construct everyone as a single entrepreneur 
and, as such, to form an entrepreneurial society under permanent and active 
governmentality. Thus, there are continuities and discontinuities between neo-
classical economics (early marginalism, the Schumpeterian modification, and 
established orthodoxy in the 1920s) and neoliberal governmentality (ordoliber-
alism, American anarcho-capitalist neoliberalism, and Austrian neoliberalism). 
Public choice theory is another type of neoliberal governmentality that has 
been carved out within these continuities, discontinuities, and modifications, 
which Foucault completely left untouched.
4  From neoclassical to neoliberal governmentality: 
Buchanan and public choice theory
Foucault’s study of neoliberalism is centered on German ordoliberalism and the 
American Chicago School. Foucault was not interested in the theory of public 
choice, just as he kept early neoclassical economics out of the history of liberal 
governmentality. There is no reference to public choice theory in his work 
on neoliberal governmentality. However, if Foucault had seen the economic 
and political situation of neoliberalism today, and looked at how the behaviors 
and subjectivities are shaped in the private and social/political sphere within 
the current neoliberal structure and how the state reason is formed, he would 
have given to public choice theory a certain place in his work on neoliberal 
governmentality.
Public choice theory is in the focus of critical theory today. The main rea-
sons are the following: first of all, this theory is dominant in economic the-
ory and politics. It is the essential inspiration for the new public management 
model and neoliberal governance based on using economics as a business form 
of expert knowledge for constructing the wide-ranging performative indica-
tors, although Buchanan would not agree with the overlap of his theory with 
the model vis-à-vis the expansion of the bureaucracy under the model (Knafo, 
2019: 4–7), which is an interesting case to see the articulation of a theory 
with the reality it is opposed to. Public choice theory opposes representative 
democracy, especially the democratic model of the Keynesian welfare state. It 
sees faulty public policies and democratic mechanisms as the cause of economic 
crises. Collective politics, being inherently evil, creates the conditions for the 
political market of rent-seeking behaviors. The idea of public interest is impos-
sible, and this idea should not be enforced. The idea of public interest and dem-
ocratic collective policy mechanisms should be abandoned. The state should be 
restructured according to the principles of competition and entrepreneurship. 
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But this would not mean to weaken the reduction of the state force. The 
political and economic order should not be left to the idea of spontaneous 
order as Hayek argued. The state, which should be formed in accordance with 
neoliberalism, should construct the market and the appropriate human sub-
jectivity and patterns of behavior (Olssen, 2018). In this respect, the political 
sphere and subjectivity should be constructed according to the economy. In 
other words, homo politicus representing the collective politics around the public 
interest should be eliminated by homo economicus (Brown, 2015). Public choice 
theory is a branch of ‘economic imperialism’ whose core assumptions are ‘self-
interest’, ‘market exchange’, and ‘individualism’ (Udehn, 1996). As such, it is 
an application of economics to non-economic fields through these assump-
tions, in which context it develops normative constructivist policies through 
which the economy is constructed as a ‘game’. It supports both economization 
and constructivism; in this sense public choice theory should be taken into the 
analysis of governmentality to reveal its political rationality and governmental 
technologies of the social and the self.
Based on the elucidations and literature review back in section 2, when it is 
understood as an economic theory, public choice theory is defined as a branch 
of political economy in the form of the economics of politics. When it is seen 
at the level of abstraction around its assumptions, the focus of public choice 
theory is the question of how the content and volume of public services/goods 
in the democratic market society are determined collectively and how they are 
realized simultaneously. But the theory is much more than an economic theory. 
Public choice theory has certain normative aspirations about human subjec-
tivities and deserves attention from a governmental perspective. The theory 
connects the existence, functioning, and critique of public authorities and the 
structure of publicity to radical individualism. What is more, it attributes the 
constitutional construction of the political sphere to the rational choices and 
interests of individuals who produce the rules of economy and the institutions. 
At this point, establishing a legitimate and systematic neoliberal bond between 
the state/politics and the individual, the transformation of rules and institu-
tions in accordance with neoliberal governmentality becomes a task for public 
choice theory.
The political task of the theory is to present an explanation of not only 
the complex political structure that arises from interpersonal interactions but 
also the neoliberal construction of the structure and subject. Normatively, for 
Buchanan, the task of the constitutional political economist is to assist indi-
viduals as citizens who want to control their social order while continuing to 
seek the rules of the political game that will best serve their purposes. The 
transformation of individuals’ behaviors and institutions can be accomplished 
by the existence of a comprehensive new political economy that focuses and 
works on human action, not social engineering as adopted by the Keynesian 
planning model. Public choice theory aims to make the fundamental ideas of 
the market economy operational in practice to maintain the freedom and wel-
fare of autonomous individuals who create the values of the political and social 
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complex, which derives from the interrelation of human actions. According 
to this normative view, it is essential to focus not on single human action but 
instead on behaviors between one another in the political and social struc-
ture, which should be dissociated from representative democracy and collective 
politics.
Since representative democracy does not prevent the expansion of the state 
and does not have a mechanism to regulate personal interests, it encourages the 
reproduction of rent-seeking behaviors in a political structure. Public choice 
theory has two solutions, one being political and the other ethical. Since politics 
is not necessarily concerned with the public in Buchanan’s setup, it can expand 
the state in line with the economic interests realized in the realm of politics 
or the political market. At the constitutional level, it is necessary to formulate 
rules restricting the state, which future governments must obey. These rules 
are designed compliant with the rational expectations of individuals about the 
future. As these rules operate, the mutual play of personal interests can simulta-
neously ensure equilibrium in the market (invisible hand) and the preservation 
of stability and protection of individual freedoms in public and collective life. 
Foucault mentions the rising of “party governmentality” (Foucault, 2008: 191) 
against the state governmentality in the 20th century. In effect, Buchanan’s the-
ory of voting and rules is directed against ‘party governmentality’ that expands 
the scope of the state budget in close relation with the mass and public inter-
est. Buchanan tries to build up strict individualistic governmentality to restrict 
‘party governmentality’, which shifts his focus to ethics. This also demonstrates 
that neoliberal governmentality relies on a highly interdisciplinary economic 
theory in which discipline acquires its true meaning in the sense of the internal 
disciplining of individuals and interrelations.
The second solution is at an ethical and normative level, and this precisely 
defines the internal governmentality of public choice theory that seeks to con-
struct a specific subjectivity. Buchanan’s theory is known for its generalization 
of economics, but its constructivist nature is less emphasized. This is more 
about its normative character that employs external and internal constructivist 
forces. The external force is the small but strong state, the other being what 
Foucault would describe as ‘the technology of the self ’. The latter tries to 
establish disciplinary power in the subjectivity as permanent internal govern-
mentality of individuals in a way to set the limits subjects cannot surpass in their 
civic life. For self-government and internal regulation of individuals according 
to the market rules, Buchanan (2008) in a recent text considers Kant with 
an eye to incorporating the Kantian deontological ethics as a self-technology 
and the way of internal limitations of the self for establishing the disciplinary 
power and morality into the neoliberal governmentality in defense of the mar-
ket economy, as the ordoliberals once did to establish the market economy as 
the sole and true moral way of social and civic life. However, the present mode 
of liberal self-government includes not only the Kantian morality and impera-
tives to ensure “conduct of conducts” (Foucault, 2007: 389) from within for 
the market game to play, but also external imperatives that are seen clearly from 
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the politics of austerity, which turns self-government to self-sacrifice under the 
sway of the populist and authoritarian neoliberalism.
5  Conclusion
Neoclassical economics and the neoclassical-based theory of public choice have 
been reconsidered in the light of Foucault’s analytics and history of govern-
ment through Foucault’s nominalist, archeological, and genealogical method 
that understands the structure and constitution of social life based on the power 
of knowledge and interactions of individuals. By elaborating on early neoclas-
sical economics further in Foucault’s work in its relation to neoliberal govern-
mentality and filling a gap in Foucault’s history of neoliberal governmentality 
through the analysis of public choice theory, the chapter has also provided a 
methodological and analytical framework in a historical context for the ques-
tion of how economics has become the socially diffuse public science of the 
art of government in (neo)liberalism. The foregoing discussion in the context 
of public choice theory with a specific focus on Buchanan has shown that the 
power of economics on public debates relies on its achievement of governmen-
tal power that turns it into a public science by constituting a relation between 
knowledge, power/government, and ethics. Although Buchanan is opposed to 
the type of economics as expert knowledge, he aims to make the constitutional 
political economy the public science that is committed to and geared towards 
developing a constant and daily critique of the state power in the mindset and 
attitudes of individuals in a neoliberal way, as Foucault describes. On the other 
side, Foucault’s critical attitude against neoliberal capitalism, which has been 
and is still supported by public choice, exhibits a contrary and opposed disposi-
tion through the ethical critique of the Kantian deontology as contemplated by 
Buchanan for the purpose of setting the insurmountable limits of the market 
in theory and practice. Foucault’s archeological, political, and ethical analyt-
ics is helpful not only to analyze the neoliberal complex in its actuality and 
entirety but also to invent an alternative governmentality through an active cri-
tique of our historical presence, thereby taking action in the form of “counter-
conducts” (Foucault, 2007: 389) for the alternative present and future.
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6  Competitive power




For Foucault power is practices that deliberately interfere with other subjects’ 
free acts and thoughts. This implies that marketing is an exercise of power, and 
that power is constitutive for competition. As far as economics ignores this role 
of power, its analyses of markets and the tasks of economists are poor.
Generally mainstream economics conceives power as compulsive (hard 
power), implying that competition excludes power:
[C]apitalism is a system of generalized choice in which the extensive 
opportunities to walk away from any transaction preclude the private use 
of sanctions in the absence of collusion.
(Bowles & Gintis, 1998: 11)
It is of course generally true that the buyer’s opportunity to exit an offer 
(Hirschman, 1970: 21–30) means that the market is not compulsive, but it may 
well involve non-compulsive (soft) power.
Conceiving power as compulsive only implies a concentration concept of market 
power where a monopoly reduces freedom and exercises power maximally:
[A] firm exercising monopoly power . . . can raise its price above marginal 
cost without losing all its clients.
(Tirole, 1994: 282)
More generally, market power is an ability associated with few sellers to raise 
prices and still sell the products:
When the number of suppliers declines, the possibility of diminished com-
petition (or collusion) . . . increases, and the ability of individual suppliers 
to raise prices can be increased.
(OECD, 2017: 10)
However, this is a flawed definition of market power because it is immune to 
empirical observations of firms’ actual exercise of (soft) power in the market. In marketing, 
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it is trivial that customers may be influenced by the 4 or 5 Ps (parameters): 
price, product, placement, promotion and PR that each covers a large number 
of elaborate means of soft power. Galbraith suggests this ignorance of power 
has poor scientific reasons:
Nothing is so important in the defense of the modern corporation as the 
argument that its power does not exist, that all power is surrendered to the 
impersonal play of the market.
(Galbraith, 1983: 120)
Even heterodox economics has a strong inclination to consider market power 
as compulsive and an effect of concentration (Moudud, Bina & Mason, 2012).
In section 2, I will outline a power concept that includes non-compulsive 
power, and this is used in section 3 to show how power constitutes competi-
tion. Section 4 will detail how competitive power is practiced, and in section 5 
I will show how competition forms competitive systems and dispositives. Sec-
tion 6 will draw consequences for the market society. I do not treat the works 
on the power of finance, lobbying, bargaining and contracts.
To clarify the analysis, I will use Moss’s work on the junk food market in the 
US from the 1990s to 2013 to illustrate the role of competitive power.
2  Power presupposes freedom
Foucault defines power as acts upon acts (including speech acts) with calculated 
effects, that is, power is practices or technologies of acting on other subjects’ prac-
tices1 (Foucault, 1982: 786). Due to the subjects’ freedom, power also implies 
resistance. In the market this means that competitors have to take customers’ 
exit and voice (protests) in consideration (Hirschman, 1970).
This power concept is at odds with Lukes’s more conventional concept, 
where power affects the subjects contrary to their interests. I  divide Lukes’s 
concepts into hard (compulsive) and soft power (Lukes, 2005: 22, 30, 36):
1 Hard power:
• Coercion threatens the subject with punishment or missed reward.
• Force deprives the subject of opportunities. Manipulation is force which 
the subject does not recognize.
2 Soft power:
• Influence affects the subject without using force or coercion.
• Authority influences the subject by means of reason.
But, Lukes does not consider soft power as power. This discrepancy between Fou-
cault’s and Lukes’s power concepts is not just a disagreement of terms: First, 
hard power consists of using the means of punishment, deprivation and threat to 
control the freedom of the subjects.2 But, the purpose of soft power is control 
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of freedom as well. Therefore it is inappropriate not to consider soft power as 
power. Exercising soft power is also manipulation if drawbacks are kept secret, 
for example the use of scientific results to compose junk food so that it creates 
addictivity. This example also demonstrates how soft and hard power sometimes 
cannot be distinguished: The consumers are simultaneously free and enforced 
to choose addictive junk food. Second, Foucault analyses how hard and soft 
power are combined, e.g. as discipline (Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer & Than-
ing, 2016: 194–96). Therefore, in the first place, it is analytically appropriate 
to merge hard and soft power. Third, according to Foucault, power may or may 
not be exercised in the interests of (a majority of) the subjects, e.g. customers. 
Fourth, as Galbraith explains, competitive societies are particularly depend-
ent on soft power. But Galbraith seems to understand soft power as any social 
forming (social conditioning) (Galbraith, 1983: 34). However, assuming that 
any social determination is exercise of power empties the power concept of its 
distinctive meaning (Taylor, 1984: 173). Power must be defined as intentional, 
e.g. marketing. However, the very existence of non-intentional determination implies 
that it merges with the effects of power.
Using Hirschman’s concepts of exit, voice and loyalty, an overview is sum-
marized in Table 6.1. When soft power is used, loyal subjects accept authority, 
while non-loyal subjects may be influenced, or avoid influence (exit), or protest 
(voice). In case of no loyalty, hard power coerces and forces the subjects; in the 
market this is mainly seen as forced exit or fines. Alternatively, hard power may 
subjugate subjects to loyalty. Except for legal matters, market power is normally 
soft power: influence, authority and soft manipulation.
Foucault summarizes what should be analyzed in a power analysis (Foucault, 
1982: 792):
1 The system of differentiations which are both the results of and the conditions 
that permit actions upon the actions of others: law, status and privilege, 
economic differences, know-how, etc.
2 The types of objectives of exercising power: the maintenance of privileges, 
authority, trades, functions, the accumulation of profits, etc.
3 The means of bringing power relations into being: threats, discourse, economy, 
surveillance, etc.
4 Forms of institutionalization: traditions, apparatuses, systems of apparatuses, etc.
5 The degrees of rationalization: the effectiveness and costs of the applied tech-
nologies of power.
Table 6.1 Forms of power
No loyalty Loyalty
Soft power Influence/exit/voice Authority
Hard power Forced exit/coercion Subjugation
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Even though power presupposes freedom, and the power of institutions is 
acquiesced by the subjects, it offers nevertheless the holders of power oppor-
tunities to exploit advantages and to defend privileges (differences). Thus, a 
circularity is implied because the exercise of power is enabled by differentia-
tions (e.g. accumulation of capital) which it is usually the objective to maintain 
or strengthen, and even institutionalize and rationalize. So, power is among 
the causes in the principle of circular cumulative causation, which to Myrdal 
explained how inequalities are maintained and re-enforced, implying that irre-
versibility and dis-equilibrium are associated with the exercise of market power 
(O’Hara, 2009: 94–96). Similarly, Hannah Arendt rejects power as depending 
on hard power. She founds power on freedom and considers it to be productive 
and constitutive of the individuals (Maze, 2018). Therefore the exercise of power 
is partly indeterminate. This point is elaborated in Table 6.2, where power may 
have expected as well as unpredictable effects. Unintended determinations may be 
known conditions or uncertainty.
Latour observes that the exercise of power is not a diffused and passive deter-
mination of subjects that just results in expected effect, it is rather transformed 
and translated by the subjects in performative practices, entailing that rulers 
have power over the subjects’ conditions (Latour, 1984: 275–277) but also face 
unpredictable reactions and effects. In general, the exercise of power endeav-
ours to reduce non-intended determination and unpredictable effects.
However, Arendt’s understanding of power in terms of concerted actions 
of a group who empowers the ruler to act on behalf of the group (Arendt, 
1970: 24) implies that the technologies of power used inside and outside an 
institution or group differ. To avoid unpredictable and non-intended events, 
performative translations, within a firm are surveyed, evaluated, sanctioned, 
etc. much closer inside than outside.
As rulers depend on the subjects’ subjugation, institutions may always be 
overthrown or deteriorate. Exercise of power may turn into a power struggle or 
even open confrontation. But due to fear of consequences, the parties usu-
ally settle a power struggle by negotiations, agreement or co-operation and end up 
with a degree of domination and institutionalization where one party more or 
less surrenders. So, power relations are reciprocal dependency relations: The rulers 
depend on the subjects’ acquiescence to keep their power and privileges, and 
the subjects depend on the institutionalized power for their means of everyday 
life, e.g. the market.
Foucault has analyzed a number of historical configurations of technologies 
of power (dispositives). Here, I will outline the discipline dispositive, whereas, 
Table 6.2 Determination, knowledge and power
Determination Power Not-intentional
Knowing Expected effects Conditions
Not knowing Unpredictable effects Uncertainty
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in section 4, I will return to the governmentality dispositive. Discipline is a dis-
positive of power and dominance founded on a range of technologies organ-
ized in two dimensions: supervision and self-regulation:
1 Supervision allocates individuals in space and time with specified coordi-
nated functions to perform. Their acts are observed, processed and regu-
lated to maximize or refine output, and they are educated to perform their 
functions.
2 Self-regulation3 Individuals are educated and formed to make them respon-
sible for performing their functions by themselves.
To conclude, power has a hard and a soft aspect that interfere with sub-
jects according to various models (dispositives) and associated technologies 
of power. In section 3, I will explain how soft power and governmentality 
are constitutive for competition. In section  4, I  will expound that while 
discipline dominates inside the firm, competitive power is based on govern-
mentality. That is, the soft power of governmentality includes the economists’ 
exercise of professional technologies aimed at (loyal or non-loyal) subjects in 
the market. This generates circular processes of maintaining and developing 
social differences, not least as to the commitment of capital. In section 5, 
I  will elaborate the concept of the competitive dispositive and associated 
competitive systems, and section 6 will expound the aspects of how competi-
tion forms society.
3  Analyzing competition as exercise of power
Whereas the traditional concentration concept of power ignores how market-
ing practices exercise power, a Foucauldian approach implies that firms’ rela-
tions with their customers are exercise of soft power, and that competition must 
be defined in terms of power.4 The exercise of power within the economy is not a 
deviation or an imperfection, but a ubiquitous aspect of the economy. As Bel-
lofiore puts it:
[E]conomic theory has to put at the heart of its discourse not the ‘imper-
fections’ of the market, but rather the ‘normality’ of power and conflict.
(Bellofiore, 2013: 430)
Power is a constitutive element of the economy: The firms are institutions of 
disciplinary power that produce, develop and sell commodities. Markets are 
arenas for exercise of soft marketing power that is first and foremost a produc-
tive and ordering power (Foucault, 1990, 1994a, 2013).
Moreover, power “is exercised and does not exist except when it is exer-
cised” (Foucault, 1997: 15) “and put into action” (Foucault, 1982: 788). Power 
is not just a maintenance or renewal of economic relations but a continual, 
active constituent of the economic relations. Thus, there is no market if no 
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power is exercised to establish, maintain and develop it and its actors through 
cumulative circular exercise of power (Bourdieu, 2005: 195–196).
3.1  The competitive power principle
Analyzing competition as exercise of soft power facilitates a proper definition 
of competition and collusion.5 Here, the target is the buyers (or sellers) that are 
acted upon, and the market is an institutional setup enabling buyers and sellers 
to communicate and exchange decontextualized things or services (Callon, 
1998: 16–19). Competition or collusion exist when:
1 Two or more actors use technologies of power to influence overlapping 
targets, the field of competition/collusion. The overlap is delimited and defined 
by time, place, distribution channels, contact channels, communication 
media, group of actors,6 etc.
2 The power exercised over the target provides the actors with resources (first 
and foremost profits) for exercise of power – and the target’s members with 
resources for consumption or exercise of power.
3 The power exercised over the target by each actor may change the resources 
of the other actors to exercise power over the target.
4 Actors are destroyed or forced to exit when their status concerning their 
command over resources and means of power are evaluated as being too 
poor.
Altogether, these four points constitute the competitive power principle, which 
means that competitors affect each other’s economic status by exercising power 
over their targets.
Competition and collusion are distinguished by their effect on the other 
actors: When actors, to improve their own status, exercise power over the 
mutual target, and thereby harm each other’s status, the relation is a competition 
relation. When the actors benefit from each other’s power exercise over the 
mutual target, the relation is a collusion relation.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the elementary form of competition/collusion relations. 
Actor 1 and actor 2 have an overlapping (communal) target which constitutes 
the field of competition/collusion. Each actor may to some extent influence 
the other actor’s targets and thereby influence the other actor’s opportunity to 
influence the target.
In general, competing actors have both competition and collusion relations 
to each other, so when competition and competitors are mentioned in the fol-
lowing pages, the collusive aspect is implied.
The competitive power principle was seen in action when the eleven biggest 
US food companies could not collaborate about a health policy after Sanger, 
CEO at General Mills, at a meeting in 1999 rejected a proposal from Mudd, 
vice president at Kraft, for the development of healthier food. Instead, the 
industry continued to collude and compete about manipulating the consumers’ 
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eating habits by utilizing the bliss point, a combination of salt, sugar and fat 
that makes food addictive, stimulates hunger and increases obesity, diabetes, 
etc. Later the companies promoted skipping regular meals to replace them with 
snacks, which promoted further health problems.
The overlapping of the targets varies with the means of power considered 
and with the horizon of time. The relations between competitors’ targets are 
generally complex; the target of one competitor often overlaps a combination 
of targets of other competitors and constitutes competitive networks, e.g. the 
promotion of cola together with salty food boosts both hunger and thirst, thus 
creating a competitive network vis-à-vis other soft drink providers. Moreo-
ver, the more the targets overlap, the higher is the risk of intense competi-
tion. Therefore, reducing the field of competition by means of differentiation 
and segmentation neutralizes and reigns competition and its risks (Alderson, 
2006a: 122–135; Czepiel & Kerin, 2012). On the other hand, the actors within 
the target may also compete and thereby strengthen the power of the main 
competitors.
Exercising power over the target generally affects the competitors whether 
or not they know it. When indirect effects are considered, competition cre-
ates an intentional horizontal power relation: indirect power exercised through 
the mutual target. In order to avoid unpredictable effects, the technologies of 
competitor analysis are used (Czepiel & Kerin, 2012). But otherwise, competi-
tors are just a condition of exercise of market power or a source of uncertainty 
(cf. Table 6.2).
Technologies that calculate the status and possible forced exit of the firm are 
among the constitutive setups of the market. Kurunmäki and Miller explain 
how the calculative infrastructure as well as exit conditions are preconditions 
for the establishment of markets and firms:
[A] process of co-creation, through which a financial and legal entity has 
been formed in tandem with the calculative infrastructure through which 
it is assessed and regulated.





Target 1 Target 2
Field of competition/collusion
Figure 6.1 The competitive power principle
Competitive power 97
But the market not only presupposes legal, accounting and financial practices. 
Callon and Muniesa (2005) emphasize also the role of the technologies and 
procedures (algorithms) that calculate with prices, as well as devices enabling 
buyers and sellers to be identified, and encounter and negotiate. Moreover, 
rules regulating trade and competition must be implemented before a market 
can exist, so that prices may be fixed and amounts of various goods exchanged. 
This entails that goods, to be sold, should be objectively separable and ready 
to be embedded into the customer’s context (singularization). The actors of 
the market, including the consumers, must be like calculating devices that, 
through imagining and estimating courses of action, adjust themselves to the 
singularized goods of the specific market. Thus, assuming an automatic equi-
librium will be attained (for instance with Walras’s tatonnement) is nothing but 
a prejudice without foundation in reality if all these calculations, institutions 
and devices are not sufficiently investigated.
4  Competitive power technologies
It is not only the technologies and devices constituting the market that are 
crucial for the market and its actors. Additional technologies and calculation 
methods “make economic actors think, reckon and behave as competitive, 
profit-seeking actors” (Rose, 1999: 65). Therefore the actors acquire and apply 
knowledge about planning as well as methods of investigating and predicting the 
reactions of the target and competitors. In order to improve their status, the 
actors also rationalize the technologies of the exercise of power.
4.1  Soft power in marketing management
The role of marketing as exercise of soft power may be elucidated by Foucault’s 
concept of governmentality. Governmentality is conduct of conduct, a “more or less 
calculated and rational activity . . . employing a variety of techniques and forms 
of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct” (Dean, 2010: 11). Governmental-
ity implies a relation of self to self where free individuals govern their own and 
others’ mentality (Foucault, 1987: 130–131). Governmentality deals with sub-
jects inside and outside institutions, supplementing or substituting the control 
dimension of discipline (conduct of self-regulation). It operates through prac-
tices of liberty which structure and shape people, making free people more 
predictable (Dean, 2010: 194).
Foucault brings governmentality back to pastoral power, which has four 
main features which here I apply to marketing:
1 The primary target is the flock, i.e. the customers play the major role,
2 Benevolence, i.e. serving the target,
3 Supervision of the flock, i.e. surveying, knowing and servicing the target, 
and
4 Individualisation, i.e. helping each customer getting her particular needs 
satisfied and developed (Foucault, 2004: 128–133, 219).
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Governmentality has spread out into society and been replicated, adapted and 
refined (Foucault, 1982: 784), not least in the marketing. The governmentality 
of marketing was developed during the era of marketing management to influ-
ence the customs and habits of the population (Skålén, Fellesson & Fougère, 
2005), and to this end it analyzes actual and potential customers.7 Part of these 
techniques is disseminating knowledge, but also keeping knowledge secret. For 
instance, junk food is not only developed and promoted to create addiction, 
but information of its harmful effects on our health is also suppressed.
Inside the firm, management has to dominate employees to render the firm 
able to act as a collective actor exercising market power over its targets and 
competitors as well as ensuring development and avoiding deterioration of 
the firm as a collective actor (Cheong & Miller, 2000; Skålén, 2011). That the 
power technologies are adjusted to the exercise of market power is reflected in 
the development of marketing management (Skålén & Fougère, 2007). Skålén, 
Fellesson and Fougère (2005) observe that from the 1950s onward, a com-
bination of discipline and governmentality became increasingly important in 
marketing management – as well as in other fields of management (Le Texier, 
2012: 13).
Thus, competition has enforced modern management to develop organiza-
tions as a refined combination of discipline and governmentality (Fougère & 
Skålén, 2013). Competition benchmarking has, for instance, entailed a disci-
pline which is based on a segmentation of the production process as well as a 
self-regulating and responsible workforce (Miller & O’Leary, 1996).
4.2  The construction of competitive rationality
According to Herbert Simon, rationality is not substantial, but procedural. But, 
instead of assuming like Simon that solving puzzles realizes the universal model 
of human rationality (Newell, Simon & others, 1972), it must be observed that 
techniques of problem solving are learned and therefore must be “analysed in 
the multiple and diverse fields in which they are formulated” (Mennicken & 
Miller, 2014: 18–38). Therefore they are also changing in time, space and social 
context and are even conflictual. Thus, technologies being the tools for making 
rational decisions are not themselves rational, but technologies of rationalization. Thus 
a business economist is not rational per se, but has acquired a rationalizing capability 
of choosing and combining alternative technologies that should produce rational choices.
It is not just marketing and the evaluation of a firm’s status and opportunities 
that are providing rational solutions, other power technologies, such as internal 
auditing, are rationalizing as well:
internal auditing can be conceptualized as providing: ex post assurance 
about the exercise of economic activities within management’s precon-
ceived frameworks and ex ante advisory services that enhance the rational-
ity of economic activities and the accompanying controls of organizations.
(Mihret & Grant, 2017: 699–719)
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This enhancement of economic rationality is effectuated by means of an evalu-
ation and regulation aspects of power technologies. The evaluation aspect has four 
steps that make truth and value (goals, ends, purposes, etc.) emerge and change:
1 Establishing criteria of merit.
2 Constructing standards.
3 Measuring performance and comparing it to standards.
4 Synthesizing and integrating data into judgments of merits (House  & 
Howe, 1999: 17).
On the basis of the evaluations, the regulation aspect of power technologies 
not only forms and accomplishes rational decisions, but it also produces ration-
alization by means of business plans that combine strategic plans (based on 
competitor, SWOT, portfolio, etc. analyses), tactical plans (concerning pro-
duction, marketing, organization, accounting, finance, etc.) and operational 
plans. Competitive rationality is constructed by combining and developing 
rationalizing technologies so that evaluations lead to regulations that aim at 
strengthening predictability of targets, competitors, suppliers, profitability, etc. 
and avoiding uncertainty.
5  The competition dispositive
The principles for how all these rationalizing technologies are integrated con-
stitute the competition dispositive. A dispositive integrates different technologies/
practices regarding things, discourses, power and technologies of the self 
(Deleuze, 1989; Foucault, 1988: 18) according to principles that determine:
1 “a heterogeneous entity consisting of discourses, institutions, architec-
ture plans, statutory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
enouncements, . . . as well as unsaid matters.”
2 “the nature of the link between these heterogeneous elements”
3 “a strategic function”, because the dispositive is “a formation that has as func-
tion to respond to an urgency” (Foucault, 1994b: III.299, my translation).
Starting from these three points, I will next elaborate the model in Figure 6.2. The 
model illustrates how the competition dispositive determines the principles of the 
links within the market system and the system surrounding each competitor, as 
well as the competition spurred by strategical interaction between these systems.
The competitive power principle is the impetus for how the competition 
dispositive incites each competitor to link up with and collaborate with other 
actors (targets, suppliers, consultants, media, industrial organizations, govern-
ment offices, universities, etc.) to form a competitor system. The competitor is 
also integrated with financial, industrial, commercial and property rights insti-
tutions, or involved in multinational corporations (Miller & Rose, 1990; Jes-
sop, Nielsen & Pedersen, 1991). These actors are related to each competitor 
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depending on their importance and on whether they are neutral or helpers or 
adversaries.
It is to strengthen the firm’s competitive power and handle the unpredicta-
bility and uncertainty stemming from competitors, targets, etc., that a competi-
tor system is organized. Since all competitors organize a surrounding system 
afflicted by unpredictability and uncertainty, the competitive power principle 
integrates a market system realizing a non-intended market strategy that link com-
petitor systems together in competitive and collusive relations and actions that 
produce internal unpredictability and uncertainty, and therefore risk.
The non-intentional market strategies become “great anonymous, almost 
unspoken strategies which coordinate the loquacious tactics” (Foucault, 1990: 
95). The unintended market strategy is a more or less unavoidable collective 
principle for applying and developing power and knowledge technologies that 
promise to accumulate advantages and benefits, and which no single com-
petitor or competitive system fully controls or may exit without loss (Fou-
cault, 1980, 1990). A SWOT analysis (which every competitor may perform 
to profit) is, for instance, a technology to elaborate a strategy of a competitor 
system operating within the unintended market strategy.
Since Sanger, CEO of General Mills, in 1999 rejected Mudd’s proposal for 
development of healthier food, the market for junk food has realized an unin-
tended market strategy promoting competitor strategies of still more diversified 
junk food based on scientific investigation of how to make consumers addicted. 
Mudd clarified what happened:
Sanger was trying to say, ‘Look, we’re not going to screw around with the 
company jewels here and change the formulations because a bunch of guys 
in white coats are worried about obesity.’
(Moss, 2013)
Sanger, being concerned with the company’s profitability and risks associ-






Figure 6.2 The competition dispositive
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implementation of a deliberate health-improving market strategy. In this case, 
the unintended market strategy became to avoid any health policy. In other 
cases, the state and its various agencies play an important part in setting rules 
for markets, and firms often struggle for power over relevant parts of the state 
(Bourdieu, 2005: 204).
A corollary of the discrepancy between competitor and market systems and 
strategies is that a dispositive implies a discrepancy between individual expe-
riences and social events. What each interacting actor (e.g. in a firm) expe-
rience may be eliminated at the social level (e.g. the market) where other 
traits of interaction may be accentuated as social events entailing patterns of 
facts beyond aggregated experiences (Raffnsøe, 2002: 1:72). Adam Smith pre-
empted this principle with his concept of the invisible hand that explains how 
experiences and purposes deviate from social events: Every individual strives to 
maximize his revenue without considering the public interest.
[But, the individual] is in this . . . led by an invisible hand to promote an 
end [, the interest of society,] which was no part of his intention.
(Smith, 1776: IV.II.331)
However, prejudice about the competition dispositive on the micro-level 
should not overrule actual investigations of a market as producing social events. 
The junk food industry, for instance, satisfies consumers’ cravings, but regarded 
as social events, it actually also profits from stimulating and manipulating con-
sumers to aggravate their own health (Moss, 2013). In the next section, I dis-
cuss certain social patterns which are generated by the competitive dispositive.
6  The role of competitive power in the market society
Simmel has partially pre-empted the competitive power principle and analyzed 
the consequences of its growing importance. For Simmel, competition is a 
substitute for direct conflict. As conflict implies power struggle, and power 
for Foucault is a substitute for war (Foucault, 1997: 21), Simmel’s concept of 
competition may contribute to detail Foucault’s concept of power, that is, how 
competition contributes to avoid war.
6.1  Competition tends to dominate society
According to Simmel, no society is without conflicts (Streit), but the conflicts 
may take place in the form of competition. Competition is indirect conflict 
dependent on the appreciation of a third party, that is, unlike direct conflict, 
the outcome is not in the hands of any of the combatants. Therefore, it is a mis-
understanding to conceive competition as warfare (as does Shaikh, 2016: 260).
Competition forms the subjectivity of the competitors: Though it is indirect, 
the ferocity of competition is comparable with that of a fight. The negative 
sides of competition are that it contradicts the principle of equality and realizes 
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the brutality of the objective of victory, that is, it is destructive to competitors – 
and their missions. As Davies puts it, “the task of the competitors themselves 
is to maximize inequality in ways that benefit themselves” (Davies, 2014: 63). 
This corresponds with Wroe Alderson’s power principle that describes how the 
market spurs cumulative circular processes of growth and power:8
An individual or an organization, in order to prevail in the struggle for 
survival, must act in such a way as to promote the power to act. The power 
principle is especially important in relation to the expansion of a growing 
system. As a system grows, it is increasing its power or capacity to carry on 
its regular processes on a greater scale. . . . The difficulty is that there is no 
escape from risk because the risks associated with inaction are often more 
severe than the risks of action.
(Alderson, 2006b: 107–108)
Thus, not only do competitors exercise power over their customers, they have 
to do so as efficiently as possible (cf. Hicks’s lazy monopolist) and therefore 
strive to intensify and expand the exercise of power over customers. Competi-
tive markets are vigorously self-promoting and imperialistic and tend to occupy 
and subdue other systems (e.g. the welfare state) and unregulated spheres (e.g. 
the ocean bottom in search of minerals) to itself.
A market system “which makes isolated markets into a market economy, 
regulated markets into a self-regulating market” is the principle of the mod-
ern market economy (Polanyi, 1944: 60). That is, the competitive dispositive has 
become a dominant dispositive that tends to subordinate and absorb other forms or 
power: the legal, disciplinary and governmentality dispositives.
6.2  Growth and differentiation
A consequence of the imperialism of the market system is that competition 
creates a perpetually developing and differentiating society, rather than a single 
firm’s victory. Referring to Chamberlin, Alderson observes that market het-
erogeneity is fundamental. That is, for a firm not to exit the market, it must have 
monopolistic advantages to exercise market power.9
Thus, the circular growth processes not only imply quantitative growth, but 
also increase differentiation and segmentation. The firms utilize that as “eco-
nomic activity expands, opportunity proliferates” (Alderson, 2006a: 128). The 
search for monopolistic advantage then spurs an “unending search for differ-
ential advantage” because the profit incentive “is directed toward differential 
advantage” (Alderson, 2006a: 116). Therefore, besides bankruptcies, mergers, 
take-overs, etc., growth and differentiation are the main way of avoiding failure 
in the competitive power struggle (which is exactly what Moss’s investigation 
of the junk food market exemplifies).
As differentiation is pervasive, it is generally a misunderstanding that competi-
tion equalizes prices within an industry (Shaikh, 2016: 262). Porter elaborates 
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the differentiation process when he outlines the three main generic strate-
gies of an industry: cost leadership, differentiation of products and focus on 
specific customer segments (Porter, 2008: 12–17). The differentiation process 
also contradicts the self-fulfilling non-realism of microeconomics’ equilibrium 
analyses of competition of homogeneous products: Since competitors fight for 
victory, competition in homogeneous markets should dissolve itself by creating 
monopolies. Since most markets are not monopolies, equilibrium analysis – 
instead of reserving homogeneous markets to special cases – invents (empiri-
cally unverified) conditions of equilibrium that should neutralize competition. 
The reality is that growth and differentiation are immanent in the market soci-
ety; it is generally an exception that prices are equalized.
6.3  Generalized competition and risk
Simmel also observes how competition affects society in a more general way: 
Competitors have to do their utmost to subject themselves to the masses, 
but also to lead them. In a competitive society, not only do all fight against all, 
but at the same time all fight for (the appreciation of) all. The market society real-
izes a general competition about attention, legitimacy, prestige, money, time, 
resources, etc. – or of the human soul, as Simmel writes (Werron, 2014: 63). 
All firms tend to compete with each other, and everything tends to compete 
with everything.
But the target is basically not known by the competitors and tends to be a 
fiction (Werron, 2009), implying that the competitive society is always risky. 
However, understanding competition in the light of governmentality clarifies 
that the technologies of market analysis partially compensate for these risks by 
making the target more predictable.10 But analyzing competition for predictive 
and risk-avoiding purposes requires a balance between identifying too few and 
too many competitors (Lehmann & Winer, 2007: 30). That is, the analyses of 
markets and competitors tend to be restricted so that general competition and 
its effects tend to be ignored.
The general competitive environment entails a general risk that also spurs 
the exercise of power for the purpose of growth and differentiation. But, this 
and the cumulative effects hereof tend to be ignored even though they involve 
increasing exercise of power and may effectuate harmful effects. A market soci-
ety is a risk society. As Beck explains:
Therein lies its internal dynamic – not malevolence, but the market, com-
petition, division of labor, all of it just a bit more global today.
(Beck, 1992: 51)
The growing importance of the competitive dispositive implies growing risks, 
which big data seems perfectly suited to remedy so that, in the aftermath of 
the digital revolution, the natural outcome of the market society seems to be 
surveillance capitalism.
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6.4  The rationalizing economist has to exercise power
Business economists apply the power technologies discussed earlier, but they 
have to comply with the power exercised inside the firm: They evaluate and 
regulate, but they are also themselves evaluated and regulated. As Alderson 
explains, competition induces the firm  – and hence forms its employees 
accordingly – to exercise power in order to profit from growth and differentia-
tion. Economists have the primary information of and access to the objects of 
the target, competitors, suppliers, internal matters, etc. and are expected to 
evaluate these according to the competition principle. A rationalizing business 
economist is a subject that by means of acquired calculative and performative 
technologies and skills contributes to the strategic rationalization and prolifera-
tion of the firm so that its competitive status as to profitability, evaluated by 
the accounting technologies, is satisfactory or even improving. To enable the 
economists to perform all this, firms establish regimes of truth, and engage 
both in networks of knowledge creation (Heizmann & Olsson, 2015: 756–769) 
and in practicing and developing disciplines of business economics.
Thus, due to the competitive power principle, the business economist must 
engage in the firm’s use of the power technologies to effectuate an on-going 
rationalization of both internal and external power technologies (Callon, 1998: 
24) as well as continual growth and differentiation. That is, assemblages of 
machines and humans, where humans are more or less enslaved into being a 
functional part (Lazzarato, 2014), tend to be continually developed in order to 
enhance competitiveness. The multiplicity of managerial rationalization tech-
nologies is handled by a multiplicity of rationalization experts that realize the 
productivity of power and are co-ordinated according to the competitive dis-
positive so their power skills rationalize the integration of individuals and things 
into a market that exploits the targets and unfolds the competitor system.
The dominance of the competitive dispositive incites business economists 
to adopt a nearly inescapable cynicism or naivism because they must com-
mit themselves and their creativity to support and exercise competitive market 
power over the targets in order to ensure growth, differentiation and profit. 
The economist is not paid for figuring out whether this effectuates harmful 
social events. For instance, chief operating officer Dunn at Coca-Cola was fired 
for having stopped marketing cola in public schools (Moss, 2013).
7  Conclusion
Economics generally excludes empirical analyses of how the soft market power 
of marketing is exercised. Using Foucault’s concepts of power offers a fruit-
ful way of analyzing marketing as an exercise of power, which implies that 
competition must be defined in terms of power. The competitive power prin-
ciple consists of describing how competition and tacit collusion are indirect 
forces that stem from competitors using power technologies to interfere with a 
mutual target of customers.
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By relating to institutions, each competitor builds a system that develops 
strategies and tactics of power in order to profit from its targets. However, a 
market also constitutes a market system which realizes non-intended and self-
establishing strategies. The competitive power principle is the driving force 
that constitutes the competitive dispositive as the integration principle of com-
petitive systems, market systems and strategies that is the dominant ordering of 
the modern market society.
Because marketing is the exercise of power, there is no guarantee that the 
market develops for the best for its customers. Business economists are ration-
alizing in that they acquire and develop technologies of power and have to 
exercise their rationalizing power skills to promote profitable developments, be 
they sustainable or not.
In markets, power is particularly dynamic and productive, inducing a con-
tinual development of rationalization, differentiation and growth to open new 
profitable opportunities, thus spreading to and taking over more and more parts 
of society, nature and personal experience. Moreover, in the market society 
everyone tends to compete with everyone for power, time, attention, money, 
etc. And all this promotes surveillance capitalism.
Notes
 1 This includes acts upon feelings and thoughts as far as the ways of thinking and feeling 
are founded on the social rules and schemes of language and behavior (Merleau-Ponty, 
2016).
 2 Even the extreme and total terror and torture within the Nazi concentration camps had, 
besides sheer killing and suffering, the purpose of controlling the prisoners’ tiny freedom 
by creating a state of absolute terror, apathy and obedience (Sofsky, 1997: 35, 248).
 3 Concerning self-regulation of firms see (Miller & O’Leary, 1996; Skålén, Fellesson & 
Fougère, 2005; Fougère & Skålén, 2013).
 4 Thus, the concept “vertical competition” is a confused term for the exercise of power 
constitutive of (horizontal) competition.
 5 Here collusion is used mainly in the sense of tacit collusion, not in the sense of agreed or 
arranged collusion.
 6 By ‘actor’ is meant either an individual or a collective actor or a composite assemblage 
of humans, symbols and things, e.g. a firm.
 7 However, there are elements of disciplinary power in marketing as well (Kasabov, 2004).
 8 Cf. (Bourdieu, 2005: 202).
 9 Decreasing returns to scale throughout an industry may perhaps constitute a possible, rare 
exception to the competitive drift towards increasing heterogeneity or concentration.
 10 This is changing with the use of big data and artificial intelligence. The target 
becomes still more known in detail and marketing still more tailored towards single 
individuals.
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7  Feelings in crisis
The emotional and affective 
dimension of neoliberal economics 
in Greek crisis prone society
Elena Psyllakou
1  Introduction: when in crisis
While the outbreak of the long-lasting Greek economic crisis paved the way to 
political projects and techniques of governance inspired by neoliberal doctrine, 
economic experts advocating the primacy of the economy were gaining more 
and more ground in public debate and policy-making, as well as in govern-
mental positions. In the meantime, like-minded politicians, journalists, public 
intellectuals and academics drew more and more on economic discourse to 
ground their arguments in favour of rapidly imposed policies of austerity. This 
orchestrated argumentation constituted a certain type of neoliberal governmen-
tality that has been accurately described as a regime of post-political biopower 
(Kioupkiolis, 2013) and extensively analysed as relying, among others, on 
mediatised practices of emergency, exception, and (re-)inventing identities (e.g. 
Athanasiou, 2012; Butler & Athanasiou, 2013; Mylonas, 2014, 2017; Stavraka-
kis, 2014). In this turmoil, and as several counter-discourses started to emerge, 
emotional and affective failings operated as a key to the imposition of the new 
political project. In their insightful research on the emotional responses of the 
Greek citizens to the financial crisis, Davou and Demertzis (2013) observe that 
media interpretations and representations of crisis have been consistently using 
“negative emotional discourse” that “includes conditions of anger, rage, wrath, 
anxiety, fear, threat, distrust and depression”, linking the crisis to “trauma” 
and “shock”and leading to a sense of “numbness” and “inaction” (2013, 
pp. 93–105). On his part, commenting on discursive repertoires and strategies in 
the Greek crisis, Stavrakakis notices a process “of creating and sustaining shame 
and guilt” that is then used to legitimise austerity as a means of “punishment” 
(2014, p. 35).
However, the encounter of neoliberal economics and mainstream media at 
the time has been triggering more kinds of emotional articulations. Far from a 
structural distress, these discursive encounters have been systematically build-
ing on a new, productive and emotionally fulfilling “normality”. Moving from 
“crisis” to “life goes on”, the turn to entrepreneurship, market and individual 
action, that are the “taken for granted” socio-political and cultural implications 
of the neoliberal doctrine (e.g. Dardot & Naval, 2014; Dean, 2009), is portrayed 
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in familiar emotional and affective practices which, as argued here, are trans-
ferred to the economic field. By bringing such stories to the foreground, this 
chapter is intended to map the emotional and affective articulations of this 
new “normality” in discursive encounters between economics and the media. 
Greek bank advertising is taken as an exemplary source in this respect. The 
analysis takes a comparative conceptual framework that explores the question 
of “emotion” both in the early philosophical background of neoliberalism(s), as 
elaborated mainly by Hayek, and in recent critical work on the emotional and 
affective implications of neoliberal governance. In doing so, it stresses the spe-
cificities of the emotional and affective normality of neoliberal economic dis-
course as constructed against the background of “exception”. It further argues 
that between the philosophical understanding of neoliberal rationality as non-
emotional and the critical dualistic perception of emotional governmentality as 
positive/negative lies a sphere of engaging emotional fluidity that is constitutive 
of “actually existing neoliberalism(s)”.
2  Any room for emotions? On the philosophical 
background of neoliberalism(s)
In the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II and in the wake of 
the Cold War, a group of “individual” scholars defining themselves as “liberals” 
were breaking new ground in an open-ended battle of ideas. After a decade at 
least of publications, meetings, correspondence and discussions, the initiative to 
meet at Mont Pelerine signified the establishment of a liberal thought collective 
that was as much academic as it was political (Bjerre-Poulsen, 2014; Burgin, 
2012; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Peck, 2008; Plehwe & Walpen, 2006). The 
meeting took place in April 1947 and led to the formation of the Mont Pel-
erine Society (MPS), which up until today signifies the ideological core of 
neoliberal policies.
Hayek’s opening address set the frame of the discussion (Hayek, 1947/1967). 
Even though most of the attendees were economists, the aim was to involve 
as widely as possible historians, lawyers, political philosophers and more who 
would share their “individual” knowledge for one purpose: to rediscover the 
basic principles of liberalism, to reconstruct liberal philosophy and lastly to 
formulate a “complete programme of liberal economic policy” that would be 
“generally accepted” (Hayek, 1947/1967, pp. 149–153). Their work would be 
both transnational and interdisciplinary, and their nascent society would be both 
open and closed, made of people who share “certain common convictions” 
(Hayek, 1947/1967, p. 158). A few days later their Statement of Aims marked 
the beginning of an “ideological movement” which would defend a free soci-
ety relying on private property and competitive market (Bjerre-Poulsen, 2014, 
pp. 205–209; Statement of Aims as cited in Montpelerin.org). Vague as it may 
have been, Hayek’s opening address together with the Statement of Aims are 
revealing of an initial effort – yet not necessarily shared by all MPS members 
(e.g. Burgin, 2012, p. 9; Bjerre-Poulsen, 2014, p. 202; Peck, 2008, p. 25) – to 
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contextualise in political and cultural terms a series of economic policies that 
were to be planned and introduced in different political and cultural contexts.
In the following years, “neoliberal” economic theory increasingly shifted 
beyond “technical economics” towards questions of politics and everyday 
life. What is of interest for this analysis is how this brought forward re-
conceptualisations of freedom, knowledge, human action as selfish or altruistic, 
and “unconscious habits”. Therefore, drawing mostly on the work of Hayek, 
Friedman and Becker, “neoliberal” thought suggested an understanding of 
economic freedom as a means to political freedom (Friedman, 1962/2002, 
pp. 7–8; Hayek, 1960/1978, pp. 1–21); decentralised utilisations of knowledge 
“which is not given to anyone in its totality” and the significance of a “man 
on the spot” who is aware of the particular circumstances of time and place 
(Hayek, 1945; Hayek 1960/1978, pp. 22–31); individual responsibility for the 
full use of knowledge to the achievement of certain ends (Hayek, 1960/1978, 
pp. 85–87); practices of selfishness and altruism in families organised around a 
leading figure and their reflection in the market place (Becker, 1974, 1981); 
disengagement of a person’s sex from labour and household activities (Becker, 
1985); allocation of non-working time to the benefit of economic welfare 
(Becker, 1965); the importance of “firmly established habits and traditions” in 
“gradual and experimental change” (Hayek 1960/1978, pp. 62–64); a “com-
mon sense” on progress (Friedman, 1962/2002; Hayek, 1960/1978); and a 
clear distinction between the “irrational” and the “non-rational”, suggesting 
that the latter describes more appropriately the “unconscious features” such 
as “mere habits” or “meaningless institutions” which penetrate the individual’s 
action towards the achievement of his/hers goals (Hayek, 1960/1978, p. 34).
Putting together these “neoliberal” frames of socio-political and cultural 
practices, what is striking – yet not surprising – is the absence of “emotions”, 
“feelings”, “sentiments” or “affects”. It is striking if we consider on the one 
hand that certain perceptions of emotional and/or affective states have been 
granted a significant position in classical liberal ideas (e.g. Mill,1909/2009; 
Smith, 1759/1984) and on the other that in the post-World War II period 
psychological and psychoanalytical discourses proliferated and gradually pen-
etrated different spheres of economic production and labour activities (e.g. 
Hardt, 1999; Illouz, 2007). In the aforementioned theoretical frames, emotions 
are incidentally mentioned by Hayek when he admits the insufficiency of a 
strictly intellectual approach, claiming that the cause of liberty may not prevail 
“unless emotions are aroused”. However, he immediately confines them to 
an “indispensable aid” which is “neither a safe guide nor a certain protection 
against error” (Hayek, 1960/1978, p. 6). He then takes it a step further equating 
emotions with “moral or intellectual weakness”, and most importantly placing 
emotions at the exact opposite of “inner-freedom” (Hayek, 1960/1978, p. 21). 
This more or less brings his discussion to an end. It seems that whatever lies in 
the sphere of the “unconscious”, the “habit”, the “meaningless” or the “non-
rational” could be of some use for the “rational” realisation of the “neoliberal” 
project so long as they stay “non-emotional”.
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If we take Hayek’s perception of emotions as typical of a “neoliberal” approach, 
then the exclusion and negation of emotions as well as the identification of 
feeling with being “unfree”, combined with the persistence on the primacy of 
rationality, safety and certainty and a dualistic “right or wrong”, become crucial 
for understanding neoliberalism as a regime of emotional governance. On the 
other hand, critical academic work on neoliberalism(s) observes that there is a 
growing interest in a so-called emotional and affective performance as a prereq-
uisite for neoliberal policies (Coleman, 2016; Hanley, 2015; Richard & Rud-
nyckyj, 2009). Adding to this, Slobodian debunks many common myths about 
“neoliberal” thought, such as perceiving self-regulating markets as autonomous 
entities, understanding democracy as synonymous to capitalism, pursuing the 
disappearance of the state, supporting the primacy of the individual and eco-
nomic rationality, and even the idea of homo economicus since neoliberal imaginar-
ies seemed more interested in a homo regularis that aims not at maximizing profit 
but the chances of survival (2018, pp. 2, 224–235). Having stressed a significant 
shift in the perception of ‘neoliberalism(s), this chapter will now focus on how 
emotions become after all a constitutive part of neoliberal governmentality.
3  Feeling e(a)ffectively
In recent decades, critical work on localised manifestations of the neoliberal 
doctrine has been growing fast, adding pieces to a theory of neoliberal gov-
ernmentality which is to a large extent inspired by the Foucauldian work on 
power and biopolitics (e.g. Foucault, 1978, 1978–1979/2008). In this frame, 
neoliberal economics cannot be seen independently from re-inventing a certain 
type of subjectivity based on entrepreneurship, free trade and individual action. 
Of course, the story is a bit more complicated. While aiming at the primacy of 
market economy, power apparatuses of neoliberal governmentality are affected 
not only by local conditions but also by individuality itself. Dean’s argument 
is crucial in this respect. In her work on neoliberal fantasies she explores how 
neoliberal ideology does not rely on “symbolically anchored identities” such 
as “worker”, “student” or “housewife”, but on “converged imaginary identi-
ties” that in multiple and variable ways build on personal creative potential and 
individuality (Dean, 2009, pp. 49–73). In this sense, any aspect of human life 
could be engaged in the neoliberal purpose and any individual state works, 
even when emotional or affective (cf. Binkley, 2011; D’Aoust, 2014).
That said, the question of how different emotional and affective strategies 
can become means of neoliberal power should first deal with their modes 
of operation, which are the focus of this section. Even though this chapter 
does not explore the conceptual resources of emotions, feelings and the recent 
“affective turn” in social sciences (e.g. Hoggett & Thompson, 2012; Oatley, 
Keltner,  & Jenkins, 2006; Leys, 2011; Wetherell, 2014; Willis  & Cromby, 
2019), it does recognise that they reflect separate social, material and bodily 
conditions and therefore they should be seen as separate categories of analysis, 
yet not irrelevant to each other. Drawing on Massumi’s perception of affect as 
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“pre-personal intensity” (1987/2005), Shouse in his account suggests a help-
ful theorisation according to which “feelings are personal and biographical, 
emotions are social, and affects are prepersonal” (2005). Moreover, while emo-
tions and feelings are considered as important factors for decision-making by 
triggering certain ideas, modes of cognition as well as perceptions and memo-
ries of what our bodies do or have done during “emoting” (Damasio, 2010; 
Menon, 2014; Payne, Levine, & Crane-Godreau, 2015), affect is “something 
indefinable, something that escapes discourse and conceptualisation” (Avramo-
poulou, 2018).
Interestingly enough, recent approaches, that differentiate between emo-
tions and affects and emphasise the latter’s autonomy, intensity, embodiment, 
and ability to produce meanings, make some room for a perception of affect as 
producing economic effects. In his popular paper “The Autonomy of Affect” 
(1995) Massumi mentions how “faith”, certain “mindsets” and “feelings about 
the future” are considered by economists (in specific by Robert L. Heilbroner 
and Lester Thurow) as capable of changing “real” economic conditions as well 
as economy itself does (1995, p. 106). In this context, he suggests three promi-
nent traits that this chapter takes into consideration when exploring affective 
strategies: they are “transversal”, “meta-factorial” and “ubiquitous” (Massumi, 
1995, pp. 106–107). One more trait could be added here, probably implied in 
Massumi’s approach (see also Massumi, 2010) but clearly articulated in Ahmed’s 
work: affects operate by their effect of circulation “as a form of capital”, as 
“the accumulation of affective value over time” that is attributed to certain 
signs, objects and subjects, while affects are produced by circulating among 
them (2004a, pp. 120–121). Hence feelings appear in objects as they are shaped 
through processes of production, circulation, exchange and so on. Bridging 
the gap between emotions and affects, Ahmed coins also the notion of “affec-
tive economies” to describe how emotions “do things . .  . through the very 
intensity of their attachments”, establishing alignments between individuals and 
communities or bodies and social spaces (2004a, p.  119). Despite their dif-
ferences both Massumi and Ahmed seem to recognise that when it comes to 
affective states, there is always something that escapes, something that cannot 
be articulated, and that places affects on the edge of meaning. This makes the 
question of emotional and affective neoliberal strategies even more intriguing.
Elaborating on the emergence of affective cultural politics, Anderson raises 
the clear-cut question of how affects, in their current perception, can become 
objects of neoliberal power. Attunement and spatiality receive here a prominent 
analytical function. Dealing with this question, Anderson speaks of a “transi-
tive excess of affect” that is “targeted”, “intensified” and finally “attuned” by 
accordingly excessive power apparatuses, constituting a so-called “logistics of 
affect” (2010). These processes develop in an “affective present” that is “mul-
tiple”, “differentially related to and lived” as well as shared through “structures 
of feeling” and “affective atmospheres” (Anderson, 2014, 2015). The former 
implies the existence of collective moods, while the latter comes to unsettle 
the distinction between “emotions” and “affects” by suggesting an attunement 
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of the “pre-prepersonal” to the “transpersonal” and vice versa that operates in 
moments of neoliberal emergence (Anderson, 2009, 2014, 2015).
While dealing with “neoliberal” emotional and affective strategies as highly 
complex, geographically, historically and culturally contextualised and to a cer-
tain extent escaping, we should not ignore approaches that detect a generic 
“emotional logic” of neoliberalism. Binkley’s work makes a contribution in this 
direction, suggesting that this emotional logic relies on reflexivity, instrumen-
tality and the government of intimacy. Drawing on subject constructions of 
late modernity, he examines how encouraging people to talk about their emo-
tions resulted in “re-inventing” the self as an “emotionally enterprising subject” 
(2018, p. 581). He argues that while governing intimate life has increasingly 
been turning “interiority” into a project of self-interested action (Binkley, 
2012, 2018), the organisation of production in neoliberal contexts relies on 
emotionality “through the rendering of emotional life as a medium of self-
reflection and instrumental action” (2018, p. 581). While the former encour-
ages the interpretation of emotional experience, the latter interferes to orientate 
this interpretation towards the “affective assets” of “optimism”, “resolve” and 
“emotional resilience” – especially in contexts of risk and uncertainty (2018, 
p. 585). Paraphrasing Ahmed’s comment on how former hierarchy between 
reason and emotions tends to be displaced by a hierarchy between emotions 
(Ahmed, 2004b, pp. 3–4), we could argue that this pursuit of specific affective 
assets, while others are excluded or thought of as non-instrumental, implies a 
certain kind of “neoliberal cultivation” towards a state of being emotionally 
performative and effective (see also Ahmed, 2010a, 2010b, on the promise of 
happiness and how it offers a “hopeful performative”; Hardt & Negri, 2009, 
pp. 376–383 on the state of happiness).
Contrary to an exclusion or negation of emotions implied in early “neolib-
eral” philosophical thought, these approaches show how neoliberal techniques of 
governance are actually interrelated with emotional and affective strategies. What 
is further argued in this chapter is that these strategies are articulated so much on 
representations of emotional responses as on narrative affective fluidity (see also 
Keen, 2003). Taking bank advertising as economic discourse in media apparatus, 
the next section illustrates such strategies in advertising storytelling, and explores 
how they comprise the affective present of a neoliberal fantasy in the making. 
The emphasis will be on the narrative use of structures of feeling and affective 
atmospheres, emotional and affective assets, emotional and affective charges, as 
well as self-reflexivity, instrumentality and intimacy as they penetrate aspects of 
economics of everyday life through processes of attunement and transference.
4  Structuring feeling: the case of bank advertising
In a media ecosystem that interprets and reconstructs aspects of the economic 
crisis using “negative” emotional discourse, bank advertising, considered as 
a distinct discursive genre of mass communication, is a bright exception. Of 
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course, this is partly explained by the obvious purpose of reaching consumers 
and selling bank services. However, the interesting part for this discussion lies 
in their storytelling and how it specifically rearticulates popular interpreta-
tions of the economic and social effects of the Greek crisis using emotional 
and affective strategies. This case is mostly evident in the advertising cam-
paigns launched by Piraeus Bank, which comprise the material of this analysis. 
Piraeus Bank was not only a leading financial company in the restructuring of 
the Greek banking system during the crisis (e.g. Kyriazopoulos & Logotheti, 
2019) but also a significant source of advertising income for the majority of 
the mainstream media (press, TV, and Internet) (Piraeus Bank Group, 2015, 
2016). Advertising videos that were shown between 2009 and 2016 for TV 
and Internet promotion of the bank’s services and products were analysed 
using a methodological framework of Foucauldian approaches to discourse 
analysis (Foucault, 1969/1982; Keller, 2013) combined with critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 2003; Forchtner & Wodak, 2017; Kress & van 
Leuween, 2001; Wodak, 1989) and the Essex School (see for example, How-
arth, Norval, & Stavrakakis, 2000). This section provides a critical illustration 
and analysis of the main findings against the backdrop of the aforementioned 
conceptual framework on the emotional and affective strategies of neoliberal 
power.
I can!
At a time when Greek society was facing a steep reduction in total income 
per capita of up to 25% and while unemployment and poverty were rising at 
equivalent rates (e.g. Mavridis, 2018), seeking to promote a savings account 
surely sounds out of place and it probably is. But when presented as a self-
reflexive “I can do it” challenge, it acquires an instrumental affective charge 
that is expected to engage and motivate the audience to carry out a certain 
action: check any place possible for forgotten loose coins and use them for a 
savings account. This strategy is employed in an advertisement published in 
around 2011 for the promotion of the bank’s savings account “Boro [I can]” 
(Piraeus Bank, 2011a). Besides the inventive use of the first-person singular that 
identifies the bank’s service with a possible client, the most interesting part is 
how it replaces “affordability” with “consciousness” and “potential”. The sto-
rytelling consists in successive images of everyday life with hints of forgotten or 
misplaced loose coins: in the lining of a bag, between sofa pillows, under the 
car seats, in a jean’s pocket, in a pencil box and so on. At the same time, the 
voice-over performer describes how one, two or five euros “may not make a 
difference for everyday life” – although they did at the time – but they could 
make a difference for a savings account. Calling for an adjustment of economic 
thinking to small amounts of money, this story fosters the confidence of eco-
nomic potential when it was consistently disputed in several other rearticula-
tions of the economic crisis.
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Together with the “I can” challenge, the same advertisement relates a “sav-
ings” activity with a reward – in this case a special interest rate. This moti-
vating notion becomes central in two following advertisements, but with 
intensified emotional and affective charges. The first appears at around the 
same period of time, again for the promotion of a savings account that was 
called “Aksizei [It is worth it]” (Piraeus Bank, 2011b). Reward is perceived 
as the motive to act but also as a response to certain actions. The critical part 
is how this storytelling places the raising of deposits by one euro per month 
for special interest rate in the intimate space of home and the affective atmos-
pheres of companionship, motherhood and caring: a young man anxiously 
makes a surprise cake for his girlfriend; an excited child shows his mother a 
plant in a handmade pot; a dog fetches the newspaper for his/her owner. The 
common ground of these intimate moments is that they portray efforts which, 
irrespective of the outcome, deserve some kind of reward. The rewarding 
response is also performed with affectively charged expressions – a smile, a 
kiss, a hug, a head pat and so on. Moreover, the practical value given again to 
euro coins and the slogan “start with what you can” seems to rebuild a sense of 
“economic potential”, this time attributing to the effort the affective charges 
that flow from intimate moments to bank services consumption. It could be 
argued that if taken together these two advertisements can also be thought of 
as re-conceptualising the value of money and therefore naturalising the effects 
of austerity politics. At the same time, the emphasis on “effort” and “reward” 
builds interdiscursive connections with relatively frequently encountered 
metaphors in media discourse where the acceptance of austerity was articu-
lated as “sacrifice” (Davou & Demertzis, 2013, pp. 114–120; Kountouri & 
Nikolaidou, 2019), raising expectations for a return to economic stability as 
a kind of “reward”.
The second storytelling that revolves around the notion of “reward” is not 
so much encouraging action but rather self-reflexivity and individuality. It 
was 2015, and Piraeus Bank had already launched the slogan “Bank in your 
own sense”, initiating the strategy of individual meaning. In this context, the 
advertisement of a term deposit service builds on individual understandings 
of “reward”. Men and women, most of them between 35 and 45 years old in 
an office dress code, are supposedly asked to explain what “reward” means for 
them, while their smiling, thinking and nostalgic faces succeed one another 
on screen (Piraeus Bank, 2015a). It is observed that all given meanings are sig-
nified by bodily expressions, positive and encouraging words of others as well 
as a feeling of fulfilment in occasions related to companionship, marriage, 
family, work and so on. Then this primacy of individual meaning with all its 
emotional and affective impacts is transferred to the bank as the voice-over 
performer explains that “in Piraeus Bank” reward “takes the form you give 
to it” (Piraeus Bank, 2015a). A  similar strategy employs individual under-
standings of “will” and “freedom” but this time aiming less at instrumental 
action and more at the re-invention of individuality in common structures 
of feeling.
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Your measures, your life
It was in around 2012 that Piraeus Bank’s advertisements started to discursively 
relate economic activities with images of being free. First appears a story of a 
soldier who in a humorous way is acting against all rules and norms when he 
asks for permission to go in and out of the camp at his own will: to do some 
personal chores, then have a coffee and maybe meet a partner later in the even-
ing. Of course, he gets a negative answer from the obviously irritated com-
mander (Piraeus Bank, 2012). Since the military service is mandatory for men 
in Greece, the place and context of the story reflect very common and popular 
storytellings, many of which indeed share elements of bittersweet humour. Yet 
the immediate impact of a mandatory military service is of course confine-
ment and lack of free movement. Taking this confinement as undisputable, 
the advertisement transfers this rule-breaking wish to act “at one’s own will” 
in the economic field and more specifically in one of the bank’s services, using 
the slogan “in some cases you cannot do what you wish to do. In Piraeus Bank’s 
term deposit +Plus −Minus you can” (Piraeus Bank, 2012). Adding to this, 
while the military is a place of collective training that minimises individuality, 
the bank appears as the exact opposite: a place of limitless individuality that is 
united with others by the common wish to act freely.
A similar slightly different storyline of “acting at one’s own will” appears in a 
following advertisement, in 2014, which promoted the term deposit “Tailored 
to you” (Piraeus Bank, 2014a). In this case, restrictions imposed on “one’s will” 
are not institutional as in the military camp case but contingent and they are 
basically everywhere. Using retro-vintage effects, the advertisement tells the 
story of a young man from his childhood until his joining the navy, capturing 
moments when something – a wall, a girl, a bicycle, a sun umbrella, a bedcover, 
a uniform – is well over his size. This size issue seems to be causing different 
kinds of emotional reactions such as frustration, embarrassment or happiness. 
These emotional fragments together with the visual effects and the linearity of 
the narration form a nostalgic biography. Then comes the ascertainment that 
“in life not everything is tailored to you” and therefore the bank emerges again 
as a place of exception where all services can be “tailored” to each individual 
customer.
In the meantime, around 2013, this wish to “act at one’s own will” or meas-
urements is complemented by a wish to be “free”. Promoting the term deposit 
“Return and Freedom” two consecutive advertisements build on the affec-
tive charge of facial expressions and body movements that reflect happiness 
and carelessness: waking up out in nature, stretching bodies somewhere in 
the mountains, doing yoga, hanging from trees, dancing in the house, playing 
games in open spaces, moving playfully, biking in the city, watching the sun-
rise, traveling by car, being by the sea and so on (Piraeus Bank, 2013a, 2013b). 
It may be of some importance to mention that in each of these images there 
is mainly one character/body. The voice-over performer defines these visual 
moments as individual meanings of freedom. However, in this case the bank 
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does not rearticulate itself as a place of exception that secures the customer’s 
freedom but rather, using the voice-over, it presents its service as if it is the 
outcome of the bank’s own perception of freedom – namely, the customers’ 
freedom to use their capital and receive high returns (Piraeus Bank, 2013a, 
2013b). Claiming for the bank a certain individual meaning of freedom, which 
is, however, profitable for the customer, the advertisement aligns the bank with 
the characters shown, and it establishes common structures of feeling free, and 
affective atmospheres related to senses of freedom as the latter are transferred 
from any aspect of life to the economic field.
Even though these advertisements do not relate explicitly with the economic 
crisis context, they do refer to one of its major effects, namely lack of economic 
freedom both in policy-making and everyday life  or in other words lack of possi-
bility to freely determine it (e.g. Kioupkiolis, 2013). If the former advertisements 
deal with the issue of having an economic potential, the latter deal with the ability 
to use this potential in the first place, and more accurately to use it freely. While 
establishing itself as space of economic motivation, reward and freedom of action 
for others, the bank uses advertising to rearticulate its part in the Greek economic 
crisis, claiming for itself practices of contribution, support, community and even 
a driving force to the future. These advertising storytellings could be seen as an 
effort on behalf of the company to regain people’s trust (Davou & Demertzis, 
2013). What is of interest for this discussion is how it also moves from emotional 
and affective strategies of re-inventing individuality to structures of feeling that 
foster collective moods, mostly related to production and consumption.
Living indicators/indicated life
Since 2010, still the early days of economic crisis, at least four advertising vid-
eos present the bank as a key agent of a socially, culturally and environmentally 
informed economic practice, or the other way around. The advertisements 
build on the slogan “we give life to economic indicators” and use the symbol 
of a paper bird made out of a business paper which flies around Greece, show-
ing various aspects of everyday life. In one of these videos, the voice-over 
performer relates “giving life to indicators” with development and progress 
and most of all with the people, since indicators are thus brought “closer” to 
them. Indeed, they seemingly “support start-ups and protect on a daily basis 
thousands of jobs”, they help people consider their “ideas” and “knowledge”, 
and they take initiatives for culture, heritage and the environment (Piraeus 
Bank, 2010a). As the paper bird flies around parks with children playing, con-
struction sites, offices, university sites, museums, wind parks, the sea and so 
on, everything seems to be working or, as argued here, seems to be in a state – 
both physical and emotional – of “functional normality”. However, the paper 
bird is not there only to observe but also to act “supportively” and “helpfully” 
in people’s lives, implying that they are in need. A  following advertisement 
using the same symbol and the same narrative resources portrays a society that 
needs “protection of jobs”, “family aid” for “income” and the “future of the 
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children”, as well as “services in isolated areas” (Piraeus Bank, 2010b). Against 
a strong sense of abandonment that emerged at the time (e.g. Frangos et al., 
2012), people should not feel alone.
Bearing this self-imposed, emotionally charged duty of preserving “nor-
mality” and orchestrating life (see also Piraeus Bank, 2015b), health, jobs and 
production become the main sectors of the bank’s salutary intervention – if 
not intrusion. Around 2009, it launches the deposit account “Health and Fam-
ily”, relating this initiative with a monthly compensation “in case of job loss” 
(Piraeus Bank, 2009a). The advertisement begins with an emotionally ambigu-
ous body position of a married man around 40, closing his eyes with his hands, 
while the voice-over performer, speaking on behalf of the bank, appeals to 
men like him, saying, “In Piraeus Bank we know that when you have a fam-
ily, you may have a lot on your mind. You are more worried. Or maybe not?” 
(Piraeus Bank, 2009a). And then the tones of expressiveness change and it 
is revealed that he is just playing a game with his daughter and wife which 
becomes increasingly fun. More than relating this emotional outcome with 
“buying” this bank service, this storytelling minimises the effects of a job loss 
by placing one’s health in the safe hands of the banking system, which then 
takes all the worries away.
In the same vein, but using unusually dramatic tones, the bank advertises 
“aid and financing programs” for small and medium-sized enterprises, aim-
ing at “the protection of 50,000 jobs” (Piraeus Bank, 2009b). When the 
real effect on employment was just starting to show, this specific storytelling 
consists in signs of a possible loss: empty chair in an office, in a restaurant, 
in a shoe shop and finally an empty sunbed. Unemployment was of course 
a major social problem at the time, and it was articulated in narrations of 
anxiety and suffering. But the story tells us more than a practice of corporeal 
responsibility. Besides relating a job position with a certain lifestyle, this nar-
rative sequence transfers the feeling of a job loss in different aspects of life, 
making the bank’s presence vital for preserving the state of things. With the 
leading slogan “So as no position is left empty” (Piraeus Bank, 2009b), the 
bank services are articulated not only as a guarantee of job positions but of a 
life without losses.
The strategy of “living indicators” as a condition for preserving a worry-
less and loss-less functional normality would be of less interest if it did not 
strengthen people’s attachment to production and consumption. While launch-
ing special services for agriculture and stock-farming as well as business invest-
ment, more storytellings were giving life to the land (Piraeus Bank, 2014b), 
a childhood to production (Piraeus Bank, 2014c), and a voice to business 
(Piraeus Bank, 2016a). The affective and emotional charges of a relationship 
of care, even the intimacies developed between parents and children, are trans-
ferred to a relationship between the producer and the process of production, 
while a company acquires all the traits attributed to its owner: “ideas, vision, 
knowledge and talents, strains and sleepless nights, his/her people that give 
their best, his/her partners and clients, a part of the economy that tries to get 
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back to the forefront, jobs, productivity, innovation, the basis for development” 
(Piraeus Bank, 2016a).
To these engaging stories of how to feel secure, act normally and attach 
to objects of production, stories of consuming come to be added. In 2016, 
a humorous campaign named “budget stories” promoted pre-paid cards for 
“budget control and freedom of movement”. These stories have one thing in 
common: they aim at restoring popular practices of “spending” which were 
affected by the economic crisis  – Christmas presents, marriage ceremony, 
clothes, hobbies, summer vacation, student life, an unexpected second baby 
and so on (Piraeus Bank, 2016b). In teaser videos they are characterised in a 
cinematic mode as “based on true stories . . . life stories . . . dramatically real” 
(Piraeus Bank, 2016b). And in fact they are, but the point lies again in the 
bank’s intervention. Besides taking for granted that the wish to spend exceeds 
one’s economic potential, these stories naturalise a limitless wish to consume, 
where the object of spending is irrelevant and the feelings range between anxi-
ety, shame and acceptance of the fact that some dreams of spending may be 
hard to fulfil. In this interdiscursive framework shared by these stories, the bank 
that promotes the wish to spend also raises the possible risks and appears once 
again as a saviour.
Move on
If the emotional and affective strategies that emerged so far appeal to self-
reflexive instrumental actions, the primacy of individuality, energies that 
are transferred from different aspects of everyday life to economy and also 
structures of “in need/protection” and “precarity/security” that are resolved 
through trust to a leading entity, a sole advertisement that was released in 2013 
sets in motion the affective economic effect of the expectation of the future. 
Launching the main slogan “stable because it moves”, the discursive environ-
ment of the advertisement brings both the bank and the people into a self-
reflexive position that considers the past and leads to an unavoidable “moving 
on”. Using exceptionally two voice-over performers, the first part raises a self-
reflection on time and experience, and how “the future becomes the past”, and 
how “the new becomes old” and “something new takes its place” and how in 
this, if you stop moving, you will miss the future, what comes next which is 
“always more important than what preceded” (Piraeus Bank, 2013c). Leaving 
no room for the present, this narration encourages the audience to follow the 
example of the bank, forget the past and move on to the future. The second 
narrative voice presents how the bank has “taken safe steps forward” in favour 
of business, agricultural economy and so on and therefore how it became a 
leader in the new banking reality. It is “stable” because it “moves”, or to be 
precise it reclaims for itself one of the most intense and influential structural 
lacks caused by any crisis: the lack of stability. Against the background of Greek 
cities and Greek nature, a runner, old couples, babies, shopkeepers, athletes, 
cleaners, farmers and working women become the moving bodies of what is 
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stable. It is worth mentioning that this future is not described as better, but only 
as other and more importantly other than the past. Moving is the only thing 
that takes place in the present.
5  Conclusion: feeling works
While mediatised rearticulations of the economic crisis were aiming at people’s 
numb resilience and acceptance of neoliberal policy-making, these advertise-
ments were aiming at the re-attachment of people to the established economic 
institutions and to economic practices. And to a certain extent they, indeed, 
evoked fragments of early “neoliberal” philosophical thought. The reconfigu-
ration of economic potential, the creation of a space of economic freedom, 
the establishment of instrumental links between the bank and society as well 
as between the individual and his/her means and resources of production, the 
presentation of the bank as a driving force to the future proved to be key strate-
gies of a localised neoliberal economic discourse; one that aims at maximising 
economic activity even when the resources are hardly available; one that advo-
cates the primacy of economy in culture, society and everyday life in a time of 
floating meanings and identities; one that highlights freedom.
However, in these structural contradictions, the use of emotions and affective 
strategies proved to be a meaningful bridge, lying in the emotional engagement 
of affective fluidity and in the attunement of the individual to the collective 
and vice versa. Personal challenge and reward, a strong sense of individual-
ity developed in collective spaces of work and everyday life, a common need 
for security and protection, and the common expectation of something other 
comprise the emotional strategies of a functional normality in the making. At 
the same time, the narrative resources relied to a large extent on the effect of 
circulation of affects and intimacies, together with their intensities and embod-
iments, from different spheres of everyday life to economic activity, multiply-
ing the meanings of the latter. Of course, the exploration of the effects of these 
strategies on the perceptions of everyday people would add significantly to this 
discussion. Even though this lies beyond the range of this approach, it could 
still be assumed that what flows creates space not only for power but also for 
resistance.
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8  Laboratories for economic 
expertise




Economic expertise appears to be one of the most important organizational 
assets in global governance. This idea spreads from wider social public dis-
cussions to the deepest world of academia. While normative and prescriptive 
theoretical productions of global governance have reified forms and content 
of expertise and hypothesized subjects in a set of descriptive and procedural 
rules (Cayarannis et al., 2001), social studies of economics are currently offer-
ing several fundamental analytical starting points to understand the power and 
influence of economics in global political economy (see Maesse’s contribution 
in this volume). This new scientific effort aims to overcome critical political 
economy representations of economic expertise as the mere linguistic appear-
ance of dominant material class interests and hegemonic concepts (Van Apel-
doorn, 2002; Bieler & Morton, 2001). At the same time, newer insights in 
social studies of economics critically reframe visions of politics of expertise 
which implicitly assume economic expertise as a self-referential and autopoi-
etic product of professional experts (Radaelli, 1999).
This chapter draws upon various strands of critical studies to offer a contri-
bution to social studies of economics beyond the subjectivist-objectivist divide. 
The analysis proposes a transnational historical sociology of economics in the 
Italian national-linguistic context centred on a conceptualization of economic 
expertise as a power device. The chapter aims to highlight the contingent, con-
textual and relational dimensions of forms of power of economics, questioning 
the expert-lay relation in economics. I refer to laypeople as all those molecular 
and heterogeneous agencies which contingently and contextually resist, refuse, 
sabotage and threaten dominant socio-technical divisions of labour and rela-
tion of propriety. Accordingly, economist discursive practices are interpreted 
as producers of specialized epistemic fields able to establish the apparent neu-
trality of technologies of government. The argument is sustained by a the-
oretically informed narrative of three particular historical experiences from 
contemporary Italy understood as laboratories for economic expertise. The 
socio-historical narrative documents how transnational networks of econom-
ics, institutions, discourses and practices created discursive mechanisms able to 
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separate socio-political subjectivities from material and organizational issues to 
get them in line within the socio-technical divisions of labour and relations of 
propriety.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the ideas of labora-
tories of economic knowledge, jurisdictions and programmes to underline the 
strengths and limits of social studies on the analysis of the power of econom-
ics. It is argued that, amongst multiple dimensions of expertise, the power of 
economics should be analyzed from the discursive construction of the object 
of its intervention, i.e. laypeople. Section 3 further elaborates these concep-
tual tools in a theoretical discussion focusing on the relationship between eco-
nomic experts and laypeople. The perspective that is presented informs the 
historical narrative of section  4, which is separated into three sub-sections. 
Section 4.1 reconstructs how economist interventions in Italy have produced 
spaces of affirmation for accumulation processes, experimenting with monetar-
ism and developmental programmes. In this laboratory, it is argued, economic 
discursive practices aimed to separate socio-technical issues from social man-
agement and to get populations and territories in line with the Atlantic division 
of labour. Section 4.2 shows how economists have innovated technologies of 
thought to deal with the unmanageable reactions of socio-political subjectivi-
ties. The section highlights how transnational dialogues, systems of inscription, 
discourses and policy practices link together to rearticulate political society and 
state-cadre claims over national regulatory space. Finally, section 4.3 illustrates 
how economists have promoted the European Union (EU) as a new institu-
tional socio-spatial configuration to foster industrial restructuring and financial 
innovations able to sterilize workplace tensions and to separate at the highest 
level of decision-making in economic policy. The section will show how eco-
nomic expertise aimed to transform the Italian context aligning population and 
territories according to transnational preferences. Such attempts clashed with 
silent resistances and explosive insubordinations of its object of intervention: 
laypeople.
2  The power of economics and the laboratory for 
economic expertise
The idea of a laboratory associated with economic discipline is not new. The 
most common example of laboratory for economic expertise is the ‘Chicago 
Boys’, a group of neo-monetarist post-doc students, who experimented with 
neoliberal economic reforms in authoritarian Chile (Foxley, 1983; Klein, 2007; 
Dezalay & Garth, 2011). The case of the Chicago Boys can easily be taken as 
a clear example of how ideas from global economic knowledge and policy 
practices intervene to shape national and local contexts. This idea of a national 
system used as a laboratory for specific policy programmes refers to the more 
general question about how global, domestic and local dimensions interact 
through globally produced knowledge working in specific socio-spatial con-
texts. Liberal constructivist approaches of epistemic community and advocacy 
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coalitions have assumed that institutional learning and knowledge transfer by 
experts occurs due to growing complexity of global governance tools and 
mechanisms (Haas, 1992; Cayarannis et al., 2001). Indeed, if it is true that pro-
fessional formations linked by and for global governance exist, we cannot sim-
ply assume the socio-political foundation of institutional forms within which 
groups of economic experts emerged in a position of power.
Moving beyond the opaque and ambiguous category of experts, inhabiting 
global governance, Fourcade (2006) suggests studying economists as part of 
transnational networks that are constantly redefining their (national) profes-
sional jurisdictions in order to empower their positions, in both global and 
domestic social stratification. Fourcade reminds us how, through the universal-
ism of economic thought, its formal-modelling and abstract method, econom-
ics as a professional jurisdiction is easily applicable everywhere as a technology 
of bureaucratic power, shaping states and societies. The creation of economic 
jurisdiction is made “through its participation in the ongoing economic recon-
struction of societies” (Fourcade, 2006:183), in a way that has allowed econo-
mists to creatively construct nation-state apparatuses in which the profession of 
economics has found its privileged place of professional and social institution-
alization. The international and national diffusion of capital investments is the 
Trojan horse through which professional economists influence societies both 
materially and discursively. Therefore, each corner of the globe can be seen 
as the potential playground in which professional economists apply abstract 
knowledge to control the general conditions of labour activity. This construc-
tion and reconstruction of domains of intervention by economists as agents of 
globalization seem to have an auto-generative principle since it is “largely an 
endogenous process, rather than a result of external forces” (Fourcade, 2006:183; 
emphasis added). In this vision, economists follow the capital expansion and 
support it through the production of knowledge, while local agents, state tech-
nical elites and political society at large are somehow forced to get more and 
more ‘economical’. Even though the subjective creativity of professional econ-
omists would be able to set up laboratories to shape society at large, we have 
to consider that there exist creative and resistive practices adopted by agencies 
on the playground of economic governance. These creative resistances, I will 
argue, force economists to continually redefine their interventions.
Overcoming this subjectivist starting point, Dezalay and Garth (2011) have 
placed economist agencies within a macrostructural sociology enriched by a 
Bourdieusian reflexive and middle-range theory of the field. In their analysis, 
the internationalization of state apparatuses represents a field of power in which 
core countries’ professionals experiment with governmental practices. More 
specifically, the international market of governing expertise, which is mainly 
constituted by complex professional hierarchies of economics and law experts, 
represents a field where different socio-political forces engage to survive within 
imperialistic geopolitical tensions. The internationalization of state apparatuses 
has set a series of specific competitive dynamics in place between national 
technical elites and new professional subjectivities, in a global confrontation for 
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gaining more power on domestic and international levels. In this intra-expert 
dynamic, peripheral countries are used as laboratories for core countries’ juridi-
cal and economic experiments to impact future policy agendas. The exchange 
of theoretical knowledge, operative tools and institutional trust finds its experi-
mental field in places where locals are caged in underdeveloped and subalter-
nate positions. Eventually, the reflexive and structural sociology of expertise 
focuses on structural determinants shaping economists’ power within the limits 
of their semantic and professional universe to improve their capacity to colo-
nize state command hierarchies. The concept of the field, as the crystallization 
of power relations, appears unable to take into account the relational dimension 
that exists outside of pyramidal intra-elite conflicts. State technical elites and 
professionals belong to broader institutional and symbolic fields from which 
political society at large, subaltern groups and social formations are excluded.
Enlarging the analysis to what exists outside of different professional fields, 
Eyal and Bockman (2002) have stressed the role of local receivers of glob-
ally crafted programmes in the reproduction of economic discursive practices. 
Drawing upon Foucauldian framework and its sociological translation operated 
by Latour, they show how Eastern European real socialism was transformed in 
a laboratory for economic knowledge through which transnational networks 
were able to reorient economic debates and policies. According to this analysis, 
changes in economic policy take shape from constant transnational dialogues 
in which the role of translation is crucial, since it means “the ability of net-
work builders to devise an interpretation that aligns their interests with the 
network’s new recruits whose support and resources are crucial for its survival” 
(Eyal & Bockman, 2002:314). The reproduction of economic discursive prac-
tices is thus managed by complex networks of agents, tools, texts, inscriptions 
and discourses, which are strategically mobilized to shape economic knowl-
edge and debates in particular contexts. Indeed, economic experts are merely 
a component of these complex chains of significant inscriptions, contextually 
translating socio-political programmes and inventing new methods and devices 
for economic transactions (Eyal & Bockman, 2002). For this reason, experts 
and expertise must be analyzed as two distinct dimensions, and the recogni-
tion of the role of audiences, receivers and laypeople, who are all involved in 
the formation of expertise (Eyal & Buchholz, 2010), must also be considered. 
The next section proposes a theoretical discussion that focuses on the role of 
this broader field of analysis in the social formation and political intervention 
of economic expertise.
3  The biopolitics of economic expertise
Professional activities, intra-elites’ conflicts over knowledge and symbols, 
organizational dynamics and audience construction are all shaping local and 
national contexts. This section discusses how this ‘outside’ dimension can be 
thought of and integrated into social studies of economics. If, sociologically 
speaking, there is not an expert without its counterpart, the layperson, the 
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expert-lay relationship is anything but given. Instead, it is the result of a complex 
social-historical construction process in which mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion, acts of denomination and technologies of classification mesh with 
material conditions, technical language, gestures and practices giving shape to 
social and political projects. This processuality rests on particular social, politi-
cal and epistemic orders in which representations and calculations are terrains 
through which forms of power operate. Considering these relational dynamics 
can show how globally produced abstract knowledge, institutions, state appa-
ratuses and professional agencies link. For this reason, this section goes back to 
how economics emerged as a disciplinary field and how it structured its epis-
temic field. It will be argued that the discursive formations of economics create 
perceptive and linguistic patterns that shape experiences, practices, gestures and 
discourses of those who are outside its narrow semantic and professional field.
The disciplinary separation of the economic domain from the rest of social 
and political affairs emerged during the 19th century as an intellectual reac-
tion against the First Workers International lay appropriation of the quasi-
transcendental category of labour-value produced by Scottish political economy 
(Foucault, 2013; Van der Pijl, 2011). Starting from a subjectivist reinterpreta-
tion of value by the marginalist revolution and its onto-epistemic corollary, 
economics was academically institutionalized at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury (Van der Pijl, 2011). To this disciplinary enterprise, Anglo-Saxon liberal-
ism and its geopolitics offered the transnational network necessary to spread 
through Europe, where pure economics had to confront older philosophical 
traditions of thinking around material organizations and relations of propriety. 
Despite the fact that economics emerged because of state-phobia (Foucault, 
2004), its epistemic field has played a fundamental role in the construction of 
national regulatory spaces, upon which the same idea of economy emerged. 
Due to the engagement of academic and professional organizations in national 
public institutions and international governance, this form of disciplinary eco-
nomics has discursively reproduced the idea of economy as a given central 
category for framing any kind of political and institutional project: a force that 
political society can only affirm to be independent from social management 
(Mitchell, 2002:245). In confronting different particular normative interpreta-
tions of management, economics has developed its universal language, systems 
of explanation and modes of intervention in the public sphere. Mobilizing 
this apparatus, the economic expert (re)produces its discursive position in the 
socio-technical division of labour. This discursive position is grounded in spe-
cific representations of material and organizational life that deny validity to 
other forms of organizational projects. Separating the capitalist relation of pro-
priety and socio-technical division of labour from social knowledge, econom-
ics’ discursive practice produces its lay counterpart.
The expert-lay distinction operated by disciplinary economics is embedded 
in broader institutionalized discursive practices that establish social measure-
ments, acts of denomination and classification, and exclusion as relations of 
power. Discourses and mundane practices make possible the economy as a 
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socio-technical organization in which several devices of calculation are able 
to organize socio-technical settings (Mitchell, 2002:2). In this sense, the dis-
cursive practices of economics operate through sophisticated technologies of 
thought made by specific procedures of inscription, notation, data collection 
and counting (Miller & Rose, 1990) and are sustained by the production of 
meta-historical narratives as organizing myths (Wallerstein, 2001:51). These 
meta-historical representations are meant to reinterpret retrospectively and 
normatively unknown processualism from the past with economic concep-
tual apparatuses. Both the synchronic and diachronic operativity of economics’ 
epistemic field allow objects of discourse to be rendered in particular con-
ceptual forms in order to be amenable to intervention and regulation. This 
interplay results in discursive mechanisms that define subjects and domains as 
intelligible and manageable, whereby positive knowledge and institutionalized 
practices create new technologies of governmentality to normalize actual or 
potential threats. People who are not participating in the linguistic formaliza-
tion of this process and who are not (yet) consecrated to economics become, in 
this way, the object of economic discursive practices. In this sense, because of 
the separation of individuals, groups and organizations from the management 
of their autonomous (re)production, discursive practices of economists create 
their lay counterparts as subaltern so as to be in line with the dominant socio-
technical division of labour and relations of propriety.
From this point of view, the power of economics is not merely the formal 
linguistic reflection of material structures; neither can it be uniquely defined 
as a set of elite strategies or professional jurisdictions. The power of economics 
is rooted in the dissemination of knowledge devices that are operating locally, 
connecting transnational networks, epistemic apparatuses and technologies of 
bureaucratic power to deal with contingent and contextual situations. In Fou-
cauldian terms, economic expertise is a device that creates and shapes knowl-
edge, connecting heterogeneous elements to generate tactical and strategic 
goals (Foucault, 2013). It is not identifiable with a specific social formation, 
professional field, institution or ideology, but it denotes the contingent and 
strategic relation between groups, ideas and procedures. In this sense, transna-
tional networks of economic experts are an immanent subjectivity of the device 
of economic expertise, mobilizing discourses, resources, media influences and 
academic production to deal with contingent and immediate situations. The 
biopolitics of economic expertise is a social microphysics constructed over a 
collective entity of populations and territories, separating and re-aligning indi-
viduals and organizations within socio-technical divisions of labour.
In the prescriptive definition of fundamental aspects of (re)productive life, 
the device of economic expertise has to repeatedly face different obstacles, 
resistances and hostilities. Economic governmentality is a “politically contested 
terrain” (Sanyal, 2008:255) where those who are governed confront, contest, 
sabotage and negotiate with the agents of governmentality and their neutrally 
presented political practices. In turn, such unpredictable and creative resist-
ances by laypeople force economics to permanently restructure the forms and 
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procedures of its intervention and sterilize potential and/or actual insubordina-
tions against the socio-technical settings and relation of propriety. In this sense, 
reactions and insubordinations profane what economics separates in a sacred 
zone. In Agamben’s (2009) theological interpretation of economy, profanation 
is a set of de-subjectivization practices of giving back to common use what the 
device of oikonomia (management) has separated into a sacred zone. Drawing 
from this suggestion, we consider our perspective to be a lay perspective that 
critically re-appropriates the subalternate position that economic discourses 
produce over people not consecrated to its socio-epistemic order, which ques-
tions and investigates what the disciplinary separation of social sciences sacral-
izes: the socio-technical division of labour and relations of propriety.
From this lay perspective, laboratories for economic expertise are not simply 
the product of symbolic exchanges within professional fields for the conquest 
of commanding state hierarchies, nor are they simply a form of legal jurisdic-
tion through which abstract knowledge defines the general condition of peo-
ple’s forms of life. Rather, laboratories for economic expertise are transnational 
spaces of affirmation socio-historically crafted by and for economists and their 
discursive practices that aim at getting populations and territories in line with 
specific socio-political programmes. Since the ‘living matter’ of these laborato-
ries is not so pliable and often profanes what economics sacralizes, transnational 
networks, institutions, system of inscriptions and modes of intervention all 
connect to innovate technologies of government. These strategic connections 
aim to separate from social management fundamental aspects of (re)produc-
tive life in specific socio-technical settings. Therefore, the lay perspective will 
highlight how economic expertise has separated from social and political sub-
jectivities the design of their (re)productive life while inserting them in the 
needs of accumulation processes. Reactions and insubordination of subjectivi-
ties emerge from economic discursive formations and, in turn, innovate the 
economists’ intervention.
4  Lay perspective on Italian disciplinary economics
Throughout the last thirty years, economists’ discourses have held a privileged 
position in Italian structural reforms, in both the centre-left and centre-right 
government coalitions. The 2010 technical government lead by the ordoliberal 
economist Mario Monti, which surfaced in the midst of the debt sovereignty 
crisis in Europe, is just the latest example of economists’ role in aligning national 
governmental agendas with transnational economic imperatives. This powerful 
position produced and was produced by representations of the economy as a 
zone that is neutral and separate from social claims, to be managed by technical 
measures that are guided by economic experts.
Through our lay perspective, this section proposes a transnational historical 
sociology of the forms of power of economics within the narrative of three 
experiences in contemporary Italy. The research is based on a qualitative biblio-
graphical selection of both primary and secondary sources, which recompose 
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key discursive events within the Italian national-linguistic field. Firstly, the nar-
rative analyzes the economic experiment of monetarism and developmental 
policy. Economists’ discursive interventions are interpreted as an attempt to 
separate the definition of economic order from social pressures to shape rural 
social settings in accordance with the new socio-technical division of labour 
crafted in the US hegemonic ascendancy. Then, it is shown how economists’ 
discursive practices intervened to curb and rearticulate trade unions’ claims, 
practices of insubordination and state-cadre pervasiveness. Finally, it is shown 
economists on the front lines of the construction of the EU as an institutional 
field to constitutionally separate monetary policy from socio-political pressure 
and to experiment with new socio-spatial sites of affirmation.
4.1  The making of the Italian model of development (1922–1950)
A degree of continuity with liberal governmental programmes characterized 
the first years of the fascist regime (Mattei, 2017). Initially, with its strong 
affirmation of the scientific division of labour in factories and its discipline 
enforced on the countryside, the fascist regime represented an armed form of 
liberalism, able to satisfy industrial and agrarian interests, with the compliance 
of the Atlantic powers (Gallo, 2009). However, in the aftermath of the 1929 
crisis, liberal hegemony in the definition of the economic order began to be 
challenged. New economic public institutions intervening in the financial and 
industrial crisis, forged by state-cadres such as the Istituto per la Riscostruzi-
one Industriale (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction) and Instituto Nazion-
ale di Economia Agraria (National Institute of Agrarian Economics), entirely 
overcame traditional liberal practices for governing economic life while fascist 
corporative economics profaned pure economic dogmas. Within these ideo-
logical and organizational dynamics, a new generation of state economic tech-
nicians engaged in measuring activities and mapping the composition of the 
Italian population. Throughout the 1930s, statistical and demographic studies 
increased so much that in 1936 Istitutio Nazionale di Statistica (National Insti-
tute of Statistics) produced its first survey while national development became 
the core of a scientific enterprise within the institutional apparatuses (Patriarca, 
2012).
The research department of the Italian central bank, the Servizio Studi, was 
at the centre of this institutional empowerment process. It represented, at the 
same time, the new-born brain of state financial monopolism and the lead-
ing domestic hub of international intellectual exchanges for young economists 
through fellowship programmes and experiences abroad (Scatamacchia, 2005). 
The link offered by the central bank research department gave institutional 
form to consolidated transatlantic networks and dialogues, enforced by the 
activity of private organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation (Gemelli, 
2005; Attal, 2012). In fact, against the coercive discipline of corporative eco-
nomics imposed by the fascist regime, the intellectual resistance developed in 
transnational spaces of exchanges of ideas, theories, discourses and scientific 
134 Gerardo Costabile Nicoletta
practices. Due to these exchanges, Italian economics remained well connected 
to the Anglo-Saxon world thanks to the role of the Servizio Studi as the head-
quarters in the production of economic data, inscription, documents and anal-
ysis (Scatamacchia, 2005).
In 1943, when it was becoming clear that the fascist regime was collapsing, a 
group of Catholic economists intervened with a programmatic manifesto enti-
tled the Codice Camaldoli. Reverberating ordoliberal principles of social mar-
ket economy and constitutional order, this manifesto expressed the Catholics’ 
biopolitical project founded on social hierarchies, professional authority, family 
and productivity. It was the product of the economization of Catholic public 
discourse, and it saw the integral intervention of state economic institutions as a 
virtuous experience for the construction of a proper Christian socio-economic 
order (Persico, 2014). According to Catholic economists working in emerging 
state institutions, public holdings and state apparatuses could act positively on 
the formation and accumulation of capital (Baietti & Farese, 2010).
In the ideological framework outlined by Catholic economists, the state 
could question the relations of propriety when these appeared to be unwilling 
to create collective wealth (Magliulo, 1999). Moreover, in order to guarantee 
social justice and overcome class conflict, Catholic economists saw it neces-
sary to transform proletarians into proprietors through state interventions in 
the agrarian relations of propriety. For different reasons, the Communist Party 
(PCI) at the time also shared the same productivist appeal, interpreting the fac-
tory system as the natural socio-technical organization (Righi, 2011), on which 
to construct a robust democratic state projected towards a socialist society. Both 
Catholics and Communists worried about the social unrest in the countryside. 
In fact, the end of fascism’s ruralist discipline led to the outbreak of peasant jac-
queries and revolts. Peasants’ insubordinations questioned the socio-technical 
division of labour and relations of propriety. At the same time, they proposed 
alternative socio-political management of (re)productive life through common 
propriety of private estates (Ammendolia, 1990; Renda, 1980).
In 1946, during the discussion about the ratification of the expert statement 
of Bretton Woods that took place in the constituent assembly of the new-
born Republic, the consensus over state interventionism of the anti-fascist alli-
ance was immediately rearticulated. Translating Hayek’s and Robbins’s ideas on 
market federalism, the liberal economist and Rockefeller fellow Luigi Einaudi 
discursively insulated any possible alternative to the integration of state appara-
tuses into higher international political organisms, which was hoped would be 
better than the golden standard that the interwar years had destroyed (Masini, 
2012; Cafaro, 2008). With the discourse of a binding engagement with the 
international community, the years of the constituent assembly became years of 
active austerity measures used as a therapy for guaranteeing monetary stability 
as the fundamental condition for economic development.
From 1945 to 1948, this discourse informed the so-called linea Einaudi. 
As the governor of the central bank and minister of budget, Einaudi applied 
the quantitative monetary theory and liberal governmental practices on the 
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national economy, experimenting with the first set of monetarist policies of 
the postwar era. The tax increase, the abolition of political prices over food 
and the stop on bank credit to new industries intended to discipline any extra-
economic attempts at managing purchasing power. Meanwhile, the reports of 
the Treasury structured a new national economic balance, which was built on 
the accounting of resources of internal production, public expenditures, invest-
ments and family consumption. Since the linking of commercial balance to any 
possible economic-political programmes, innovations in accounting started to 
offer powerful cognitive infrastructure for the discourse on external constraints.
In 1947, US government interventions enforced the new state’s binding 
engagement. The Marshall Plan suspended the activities of the Bretton Woods 
institutions and intervened to financially and scientifically sustain industrial 
and technological development, importing new procedures, inscriptions and 
reports. In order to contain any possible political threats to US geopolitical 
aspirations, American experts pushed for the integration of the country into 
divisions of labour oriented to and guided by the US. The austerity therapy 
of liberal economists created the need for extraordinary interventions to foster 
capital formation and socio-technical developments, even shortly after the end 
of the Marshall Plan aid. It is in this context that the territories of southern 
Italy become the privileged object of economist discursive practices. Already 
since 1946, the Association for the Industry in the South (SVIMEZ), founded 
by Catholic economists, translated the southern question from a socio-political 
issue into a technical and economic object, to be studied, treated and guided 
by economic experts. With the Servizio Studi, the SVIMEZ became the new 
gravitational centre for Anglo-Saxon economists who found Italy an inter-
esting case study for economics (D’Antone, 1995). Overpopulation became 
the common object of intervention for Catholic economists and international 
economic experts. At the centre of its scientific production and in order to 
curb the excess of workforce and limited resources, the economist Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943, 1944) presented the project of integration of underdeveloped 
areas within the global division of labour. In 1948, as the head of International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Rosenstein-Rodan invented the 
impact loan, a plan investment based on an organic programme of long-term 
development. Invited by the Servizio Studi, the economist Vera Lutz (1963) 
later formalized her vision on the export of manpower as the privileged solu-
tion for resolving territorial imbalance. The idea that emerged out of this was 
the total restructuring of agrarian settings to liberate manpower that could fulfil 
export-led industries’ needs.
These discursive formations that emerged in transnational networks of eco-
nomics were practically sedimented in the institution of the Cassa per le opere 
straordinarie per il Mezzogiorno (Fund for the south) founded in 1950. Based on 
a meta-historical representation of economic development, the Cassa’s extraor-
dinary intervention intended to foster the conditions for capital formation and 
accumulation in southern areas through the mobilization of unused manpower 
and the creation of a sound basis for industrialization. It aimed at intervening 
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directly, through an expert-technical and independent guide, in the transfor-
mation of land settlements and in the mechanization of agricultural sectors as 
well as in the construction of communication infrastructures and tourist facili-
ties. Connecting the Catholic biopolitical projects, US geopolitical aspiration 
and the liberal discourse, the economic expertise separated rural social forma-
tions from their own management of (re)productive life and got the population 
and territories in line with the production of the export-oriented industrializa-
tion of the new Atlantic division of labour.
4.2  The crisis as governing expertise (1960–1977)
At the beginning of the 1960s, the geopolitical conditions that guaranteed the 
functioning of industrial development disappeared. New productivity system 
calculations imposed by the General Agreement on Tarif and Trade and Euro-
pean Economic Community international agreements increased the rhythm of 
techno-organizational restructuring. Moreover, the restored convertibility and 
the Eurodollar markets offered investors strategies for escaping from state-cadre 
economic programmes. In this section, I  illustrate how economic expertise 
linked new systems of inscription, new modes of intervention and financial 
innovations to curb and reframe rising claims over the definition of economic 
policy agenda, disciplining both trade unions and state-cadres.
The discursive mechanism crafted over the Italian southern territories and 
populations transformed socio-technical settings and, at the same time, increas-
ingly enforced state-cadre public holding interventions. Throughout the 1950s, 
state-cadres had in fact expanded their influences over central sector industrial 
and service production, controlling 80% of the GDP through a capillary system 
of agencies for the management of public holdings performance and supply-
side policies. In the 1960s a new phase of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno engaged 
in direct public industrial investments in the southern regions as well as in 
the functional control of the mobility of the southern population in order to 
feed northern industrial accumulation needs (Ferrari-Bravo & Serafini, 1973). 
Crafted as subjectivity in the exodus from the countryside to the industrial 
triangle (Milan, Turin, Genoa), the populations started to radicalize. In 1962, a 
general strike of metalworkers, the manpower on which the export-led indus-
try depended, enormously empowered the bargaining power of trade unions 
and obtained a substantial increase in wages. Since then, trade unions began to 
ask to sit at the table of economic programming opened by centre-left coali-
tions, aiming to change the direction of the model of development beyond low 
wages and low consumption (Lama, 1976).
This reformist appeal was immediately curbed by the management of the 
currency crisis, which was characterized by a new deflationary therapy. With 
the help of a new US loan, the central bank could face monetary instabil-
ity through restrictions and avoid devaluation. This anti-inflationary policy 
imposed a violent restructuring of industrial sectors, provoking a crisis in full 
employment policies and political party machinery pervasiveness. With the 
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return of deflationary therapy following the financial instability in 1963, the 
Servizio Studi engaged in knowledge production aimed at forecasting the eco-
nomic behaviour of families, firms and public agencies. The interests of the 
economists of the Servizio Studi start to focus on the impact that central bank 
monetary policies had over people’s expectations and activities. The renova-
tion of the Servizio was promoted by the neo-governor Guido Carli, a highly 
reputable economist, who emerged out of corporativist economics and later 
affirmed himself in international economic institutions. Carli framed the cen-
tral bank discourse around the idea of profit as the engine of development and 
credit as a fundamental element in investments. To guarantee the profits, it was 
necessary to link wage and productivity and enhance financial markets. In this 
discourse, the instrumental (i.e. political) use of the credit system by state-cadre 
elites and their political parties represented the main obstacle for an efficient 
economic system.
In 1962, financed by the Ford Foundation, the American economist Ack-
ley (1962) published an econometric representation of the model of develop-
ment for SVIMEZ. In the same years, an econometric model started to be 
experimented by the Servizio Studi, accompanied by short-term and long- to 
middle-term macroeconomic analyses. Its chief consultant was the US-based 
economist Franco Modigliani, who remained particularly active in public 
interventions on national media, as well as in the economic-academic pro-
duction in specialized journals (Asso, 2010). Transposed by the Servizio Studi, 
the econometric model posed the balance of payment as the only independ-
ent variable in the economic system, namely a mathematical model which 
provided codified accounting practices to forecast the national economy as 
integrated into a highly competitive and unstable context. With the increasing 
social pressures and political conflicts over monetary management, the central 
bank economists adopted the econometric model to insulate calculations from 
the national government and political pressures (Peluffo, 2000).
Economists’ innovations perform linguistic asymmetry in the knowledge of 
the economy in order to experiment with spaces of independence from socio-
political pressures of the central bank. This system of inscription (re)produced 
by economic expertise caged trade unions and centre-left reformism in a lay 
position. New calculation technologies offered the discursive terrain where 
the wage increases of 1962 began to be depicted by economists as an internal 
shock. The innovation that emerged in the transnational symbolic exchange 
of economists did not stop the increasing pressure over financial management 
and industrial productivity. Public sectors continued to grow, especially in 
southern regions as indirect and politically mediated income redistribution. 
More importantly, the uprising of the political society of the 1970s forced the 
implementation of organic social legislations such as the Statuto dei lavoratori 
(1970). Workplaces became the terrain upon which radical fractions of trade 
union movement theorized the autonomy of the working class as the engine of 
technological development (Tronti, 2006). From 1969 the increasing tensions 
for the diffusion of extra-economic practices in workplaces and industrial cities 
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became a serious problem for the economic governmentality. Sabotage and 
insubordination created an unmanageable incognito for economic programmes 
(Wright, 2002; Negri, 2012).
In 1974, the oil shock, capital outflows and increasing inflation led to a crisis 
of balance of payments. The central bank imposed a new austerity therapy to 
curb imports and consumption. In this context, experts of the International 
Monetary Fund experimented with massive loans conditioned to policy meas-
ures to stop the financial crisis. The econometric model of the Servizio Studi 
inspected the IMF ‘letter of intention’ and accepted the conditional loan. This 
emergency offered the terrain to rearticulate the increasing power of trade 
unions with the new context. Already in 1972, the economist Sylos Labini 
(1972) called for a new role of responsibility for trade unions in the context of 
growing global competition. In the same years, public interventions concern-
ing the insertion of consumption in wage index, known as the ‘Modigliani 
Controversy’, opened a new discursive field which was successful in getting 
trade unions to accept low wages as a condition for rescuing productivity and 
avoid inflation (Masini, 2004). In 1976, Modigliani was invited by the PCI 
political and economic research centre to share his idea that inflation and bal-
ance of payments were the main interests of workers (Cattabrini, 2012). Simul-
taneously, the PCI then supported the cut of salaries and a new deflationary 
therapy. Hoping to obtain a seat in government, the PCI adhered to the aus-
terity programme interpreted as anti-consumeristic policy. According to the 
general secretary of PCI, austerity could have been an occasion to transform 
the country (Berlinguer, 1977). In 1977, the EUR congress of Confederazione 
Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian General Confederation of Labour) marked 
up the end of wage growth as an independent variable. After being separated 
from claims over monetary policy, trade unions entered in the economic dis-
cursive field, accepting productivity and international competition as neutral 
domains.
4.3  Economic experts as an EU constitutional force (1979–1993)
The reactions, resistances and insubordinations by socio-political subjectivi-
ties forced economists to innovate technologies of government experimented 
with during industrial development. In this section, I conclude by narrating 
the active role taken by economists in accommodating industrial restructuring 
and financial innovations as technologies of government in order to sterilize 
conflicts in workplaces and in the management of public finance by political 
parties. Since the Piano Pandolfi (1979), the European monetary coordination 
became the new terrain on which to construct knowledge hierarchies to dis-
cursively separate socio-political pressure from economic agenda.
In 1981, the economic expert of the different governments of the late 
1970s, Beniamino Andreatta, together with the neo-governor of the central 
bank Ciampi, organized an open conspiracy to end the central bank’s coverage 
of unsold state bonds. Conceived in the professional exchange between the 
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Servizio Studi and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the Lon-
don School of Economics (LSE) and Chicago University (Quaglia, 2005), the 
‘divorce’ became the metaphor expressing the separation of decisional centres 
of state expenditure and the institute issuing money. With this decision, the 
Ministry of Treasury policies were judged by the markets (Andreatta, 1991), 
thus linking the financial resources of economic policy to investor preferences. 
The privatization of public debt was ratified without parliamentary discussion, 
and the undemocratic nature of this fundamental decision over state financing 
brought an end to the executive in 1982.
In 1983, the vice president of the European Commission, Étienne Davi-
gnon, pushed for the creation of an expert group that would be able to rep-
resent European industries and construct a permanent dialogue with them 
(Van Apeldoorn, 2002:85). The European Round Table of Industrialists was 
constituted as the organic intellectual group of European industry for the set-
ting up of policy agendas and the relaunching of continental profitability. The 
discourses of euro-pessimism and euro-sclerosis pointed to a new social and 
political composition of valorization processes, which were forged on the abso-
lute impossibility of returning to wage-driven policies. Labour-market rigidity 
became the leitmotif describing the source of stagflation. In the same year, a 
consultative scientific committee composed of economic experts was founded 
to study public debt management. The group of experts intended to guide 
the Ministry of Treasury towards the liberalization of financial sectors. For 
economic experts, 1992 represented a unique occasion to transform Europe 
as an economic and juridical space. According to the Italian economist Mario 
Monti, Europe offered a further step towards opening the door to the financial 
innovation that was needed to impose a competitive regime to credit institutes 
and force public administrations to engage in international competition (Cas-
tiglioni, 2013).
In its survey of Italy 1984–85, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) suggested that national government strongly 
implement reforms for overcoming political obstacles (Fouskas, 1998:83), such 
as the unwillingness of the political party machine to privatize public hold-
ings and renounce their income (political) redistribution. In 1986, the mac-
roeconomic policy group issued a report focusing on the role of capital in 
unemployment reduction. The report, presented by Modigliani, sustained that, 
in order to solve unemployment, a new wave of economic growth could be 
achieved through a series of fiscal and monetarily adequate policies (Castiglioni, 
2013:35). Rescuing productivity and profitability became urgent for improving 
internationally linked financial services, for liberalizing financial sectors and for 
fostering industrial restructuring. Socialist neo-reformism resisted representing 
the national economy as a new economic growth locomotive supported by a 
modification of GDP calculation rules (Graziano, 2007:279) while workplace 
conflicts were sterilized by industrial restructuring.
In 1986, the European Single Act constrained monetary policy and liberali-
zation directives and finally integrated them within the international financial 
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system. With the institutional automatism launched by ESA, negative integra-
tion and deregulation were implemented in the midst of highly unstable political 
consensus. The construction of a scaffolding for European economic governance 
became the centre of economist discursive practices devising new economic 
methods able to confine economic reforms to technical and neutral domains. In 
1992, during the intra-governmental arrangement of the Maastricht treaty, the 
juridical inquisition against extra-market practices of the governing class, known 
as Tangentopoli, offered the political vacuum for extra-parliamentary guidance 
by the Servizio Studi economists. In the definition of Maastricht parameters, 
the technocratic management of public finance through economist practices 
enforced economist positions and achieved what was not possible to achieve 
through parliamentary channels (Carli, 1993; Dyson & Featherston 1996). The 
privatization of public holdings, the abolition of wage indexation and the lib-
eralization of financial sectors began in 1993 with the technical government 
guided by the former governor of the central bank Ciampi.
The Italian neoliberal experiment has been forged by economists in order 
to discipline the political class and get workers’ institutions in line with the 
restructuring era of the 80s. The dismissal and definitive end of the Cassa per 
il Mezzogiorno in 1992 reframed the socio-spatial configuration objectivating 
territories as collective economic actors facing off in international competition 
(Salento, 2014) and thus re-territorialized sites of affirmation for economic 
expertise to more local contexts. While decision-making is moved to a higher 
level of governance designated to lessening “short-run political pressures on 
the formulation of economic policy” (Gill, 1998), a new developmental frame-
work, with its highly technical language, redefines territories through forms of 
bureaucratic power, economic discourses and policy practices, crafting subjec-
tivities in line with the new European socio-technical division of labour.
5  Conclusion
This chapter has investigated forms of power of economics, focusing on con-
textual reactions and contingent resistances of the object of economic interven-
tion: laypeople. From this lay perspective, economic expertise is not a neutral 
organizational asset. It does not represent an autopoietic force producing self-
referential knowledge in order to let particular fractions survive in social stratifi-
cation; neither is it a mere battlefield for national and international professional 
vocation. Instead, economic expertise is the relationship between professionals, 
theories, data, operative epistemologies, institutions, public interventions, and 
social and geopolitical tensions. This concatenation of heterogeneous elements 
is produced within the tension between transnational networks and institutions 
facing contingent situations. As the historical narrative has shown, the connec-
tion of Catholic biopolitical project, US geopolitical aspirations and (neo)liberal 
programmes created new strategical fields of knowledge to reframe potential 
threats over postwar order. The discursive mechanisms produced by economic 
interventions objectivized southern territories and population, representing 
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the economy as an independent and separated domain from social conflicts and 
political management. In doing so, economic expertise subjectivized south-
ern peasantry as exportable manpower got in line within the Atlantic division 
of labour. Through knowledge devices operating locally, economic expertise 
shaped socio-political subjectivities consecrated to economic epistemic fields. 
In this way, lay subjectivities were caged in a subaltern position, misrecognizing 
the arbitrariness and the socio-political foundation of economics.
The economists’ discursive position in defining way of life enjoyed power 
and authority as long as those subjectivities did not reclaim the power of defi-
nition of government agenda. As I have shown, during the 1970s unforeseen 
and unmanageable reactions of lay subjectivities overthrew the effectiveness of 
economic discursive practices. Due to these reactions, transnational networks 
of economists had to contextually innovate representations, calculations and 
interventions. The European neo-constitutional initiative represents an insti-
tutionalized site of affirmation for economic expertise to foster accumulation 
processes and innovate technologies of government. In this way, economic 
expertise has forged its lay population integrated within the permanent restruc-
turing of socio-technical divisions of labour but immanently ready to explode 
to lay bare the arbitrariness of the epistemic field of economics.
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Economists in networks    

9  Who are the economists 
Germany listens to?
The social structure of influential 
German economists
Stephan Pühringer and Karl M. Beyer
1  Introduction: power and economics
During the last decades there was a long-lasting debate among economists and 
other social scientists on the question to what extent economic thought has an 
impact on the course of (economic) policy-making as well as on the society 
in general (Christensen, 2017; Fourcade, 2009; Hall, 1989; Hirschman & Ber-
man, 2014). Hence, particularly economists active in policy advice and public 
discourses stress the (long-term) influence of economic thought and thus partly 
even develop strategies to maximize their impact. As early as in 1936, Keynes 
in the “General Theory” famously stressed the importance of economic ideas, 
at least in the long run: “The ideas of economists and political philosophers . . . 
are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by 
little else” (Keynes, 1936, p. 383). And yet in the beginning of the 21st century 
Larry Summers (2000, p. 1), due to his roles as U.S. Secretary of Treasury under 
Clinton and later as director of the National Economic Council under Obama, 
arguably one of the politically most influential economists during the last dec-
ades, stresses, “(W)hat economists think, say, and do has profound implications 
for the lives of literally billions of their fellow citizens”.
In contrast to these considerations, within the German economic debate, 
around the year 2000 several economists bemoaned a decline of political and 
societal influence of academic economics, partly due to ignorant politicians 
and public authorities, partly also due to an alleged problematic development 
of the economics discipline, that is, a sole focus on methodological rigor to 
the disadvantage of political relevance (Franz, 2000; Frey, 2000b). One pos-
sible solution to overcome the perceived impotence of economic advisors was 
brought forward by the then president of the German Institute for Economic 
Research (DIW Berlin) Klaus Zimmermann. Zimmermann (2004, p.  401) 
remarked, “Given that European and German policy-makers are hesitant to 
proactively seek advice, the media channel is of central importance. In my view 
it is the silver bullet of policy advice”. He further argued that he requests the 
DIW department heads to participate actively in public debates and the media.
The question whether and to what extent economics as a scientific disci-
pline as well as distinct economists have a political and societal impact is still 
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a highly contested issue among economists. However, during the last decades 
and particularly after the recent global financial crisis, there was a lively debate 
on the relationship between economics and politics. Some empirical evidence 
indicates that in spite of the critique on the state of economics in the aftermath 
of the crisis, economists and economic experts continue to be fairly present in 
public debates. Haucap, Thomas, and Wagner (2014) for instance examined 
the media presence of German (social) scientists from summer 2013 to sum-
mer 2014 and found that economists are by far the most cited scientists in 
public debates. In fact, eight out of the ten scientists with the highest number 
of media appearances and overall about two thirds of the scientists quoted in 
opinion-forming German newspapers are economists. Haucap et  al. (2014) 
conclude that no other science receives by far the same amount of attention 
of German policy-makers and the German media. Hence, economists seem to 
have a specific access to power over the channel of public debate.
Against this backdrop, there is growing interest in the scientific discipline 
of economics in other social sciences as well (see e.g. Fourcade, 2009; Leb-
aron, 2001; Maesse, 2015, 2018; Rossier et al., 2017, or Rossier & Benz in 
this volume). In this context, economics is not only analyzed as the dominant 
discipline within the social sciences but also often understood as a “discipline 
of power” in modern societies, which produces political and economic elites 
and thus has a considerable societal impact. In this vein Hirschman and Berman 
(2014) stress the heterogeneous devices by which economists influence the 
political process and thus policy-making. The authors differentiate between the 
professional authority of economics, the institutional positions of economists 
and the establishment of a specific economic style of reasoning in political dis-
course. For them, the latter aspect especially points to the increased importance 
of economic knowledge in the governance of capitalist economic systems after 
World War II. In this respect Fourcade (2006, p. 162) concludes, “economics 
has become more central to the nation . . . because the nation itself has become 
more economic”.
In the literature on the role of economists in public debates, several authors 
stress the specific role of highly visible “public economists” in the sense of 
“public intellectuals”, who are capable to “make a public intervention” (Eyal & 
Buchholz, 2010, p. 210), because they are very active and influential in political 
and public debates. Lebaron (2006) as well as Maesse (2015) thus introduce a 
Bourdieusian approach, which stresses the compound role of economic experts 
within a trans-epistemic field of academia, media, politics and business. Thus, 
the insignia of symbolic capital for being an economist, for instance the desig-
nation “Professor of Economics”, confers power on academic economists and 
therefore increases their potential impact in political and public debates. The 
authors thus conclude that “economists are the producers of economic beliefs” 
(Lebaron, 2001, p. 91) and that “economic knowledge . . . has a special status 
as a cultural resource for discursive interventions into the political and the eco-
nomic world” (Maesse, 2015, p. 286).
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Against the backdrop of recent work on the political and societal impact of 
economics and distinct economists, respectively, this chapter aims to examine 
individual, research and institutional characteristics as well as established pro-
fessional networks of what are considered to be “influential economists” in 
Germany. In providing an actor-based empirical analysis, we contribute to the 
current debate on the political and societal influence of economists by elabo-
rating on the significance of biographical features and professional networks 
as conditions for becoming an influential economist. In doing so, we further 
elaborate on channels of influence or potential power devices, which structure 
the trans-epistemic field of economic expertise in Germany.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: In section 2 we relate 
our work to current debates on the state of and recent trends within Ger-
man economics, and on existing power devices concerning economic policy-
making. Section 3 introduces our methodological approach, which is based 
on biographical and bibliometric research as well as social network analysis. In 
section 4 we provide our main empirical results. At first, we describe common 
individual, research and institutional patterns of influential economists in Ger-
many. After that we then dive deeper into their institutional and co-authorship 
networks in order to examine the significance of existing power structures 
within German economics. In the final section we sum up our main contribu-
tion and offer some concluding remarks.
2  On the current state of economics in Germany
2.1  The special role of ordoliberalism in German economic  
policy-making
In the European and particularly German context, which is of interest in this 
chapter, there is a long tradition of politically influential and thus powerful 
economists and professional networks dating back to the immediate postwar 
period. In the German Federal Republic in the first decades after World War 
II, economists played crucial roles in policy-making at several levels. First, pro-
fessors of economics held powerful political positions; for instance, Ludwig 
Erhard as chancellor and Alfred Müller-Armack and also Karl Schiller as influ-
ential ministers.1 Second, economic advisors, mainly from the ordoliberal or 
German neoliberal school of economic thought,2 were directly involved in the 
foundation of the German Federal Republic (e.g. the currency reform of 1949). 
Third, a network of ordoliberal economists in close collaboration with employ-
ers’ associations served as promoter of the formative vision of “Soziale Mark-
twirtschaft” (social market economy) in the years of the “German economic 
miracle” (Ötsch, Pühringer, & Hirte, 2017; Ptak, 2004). Against this backdrop, 
many scholars stress the formative impact of ordoliberalism on German and 
partly also European economic policy-making (Biebricher, 2018; Campbell & 
Pedersen, 2014; Lechevalier, 2015). Other scholars show the strong dominance 
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of German neoliberal networks among economists with significant influence 
on media and policy advice in postwar Germany and highlight trajectories of 
their persistence up to today (Ptak, 2009; Pühringer, 2018).
Particularly in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and during the 
debates on European crisis policies ordoliberalism re-entered public as well as 
academic debates, when the German economics discipline was heavily criti-
cized for its alleged conservatism and its support for austerity policies. Stiglitz, 
for instance, stressed the extraordinary position of German economics as 
follows:
What is very clearly true . . . is that German economics is different from 
economics everywhere else in the world. They still believe in austerity 
even though the IMF, which is not a left-wing organization, has said aus-
terity doesn’t work.
(Joseph E. Stiglitz, cited in: Phillips, 2016)
In a similar vein, several scholars stressed idiosyncrasies of “German eco-
nomics” such as (i) a traditional conservative approach concerning economic 
policy-making (Münchau, 2014; Phillips, 2016), (ii) the central role of institu-
tionalized economic policy advice (Campbell & Pedersen, 2014; Pühringer & 
Griesser, 2020) as well as (iii) the existence of an ordoliberal power structure 
organized around think tanks supported by German employer associations 
(Flickenschild & Afonso, 2018; Ötsch et al., 2017). In the course of the debate 
on German economics induced by criticism mainly from U.S. and U.K. econ-
omists, for instance Burda, then president of the Verein für Socialpolitik (German 
Economic Association), defended German economists and in particular the 
members of the German Council of Economic Experts, the main economic 
policy advice body in Germany, publicly also referred to as “economic wise 
men”. In doing so, Burda explicitly stressed the international orientation of this 
important policy advisers and even “vouch(es) for their mainstream academic 
views” (Burda, 2015). Indeed, recent surveys among German economists 
report a rising trend of internationalization and Americanization of German 
economics (Fricke, 2015) similar to other countries and disciplines (Fourcade, 
2006; Rossier & Bühlmann, 2018).
Hence, in regard to the European debt crisis the majority of German econo-
mists were against stark austerity measures imposed on Southern European 
countries and thus were opposing the position of the German government 
as well as of leading (and publicly influential) orthodox economists (Fricke, 
2015). In general, however, there seems to be a remarkable difference between 
the majority of comparably younger, internationally oriented economists and 
older, politically and publicly influential ordoliberals (see also Grimm et  al., 
2018, on this issue).
A similar example of such a tension among German economists also became 
obvious during what was later called the Cologne dispute over method (Kölner 
Methodenstreit) in 2009 (Caspari & Schefold, 2011). The conflict emerged after 
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the University of Cologne decided to change the denomination of professo-
rial chairs from “economic policy” to “modern macroeconomics”, which also 
marked a shift from traditional ordoliberal policy-orientation to quantitative 
formal mathematical methods. Therefore, the dispute was again between older 
economists supporting a petition entitled “Save economic policy at the uni-
versities” and younger, internationally oriented supporters of a petition named 
“Rebuild economics according to international standards”.
2.2  Top-level research vs. policy advice?
A further debate among economists revolves around the question whether 
there is a cleavage within the German economics profession between top-
level research and policy advice. Haucap and Mödl (2013) argue that there 
exists a pronounced division of labor between economists focusing on top-level 
research on the one hand and economists engaging in policy advice on the 
other hand. Furthermore, they suggest that the nature of this division of labor is 
rather substitutive than complementary as economists normally do not engage 
in both activities during the same period of time. Furthermore, the authors 
indicate that the view of a temporal division of labor by individual economists, 
which means focusing at first on top-level research and afterwards on policy 
advice, is also misleading. There is not sufficient evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. Schmidt (2013), president of the Leibniz Institute for Economic 
Research and chairman of the German Council of Economic Experts, in con-
trast, opposes this cleavage view. He indicates that leading public economists 
in Germany usually are not only excellently qualified, but a majority also pub-
lishes in top-tier economic journals. Hence, it is somehow misleading to focus 
solely on research rankings to evaluate economists’ research skills.
3  Data and methodological approach
On a methodological level, we combine biographical and bibliometric research 
with social network analysis. We make use of the impact ranking of the Ger-
man newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) published yearly since 
2013, which consists of an integrated overall ranking and three sub-rankings, 
each of which represents one essential pillar of economists’ “influence”: (i) a 
research ranking reflecting the impact of economists on the scientific commu-
nity, (ii) a media ranking capturing the presence of distinct economists in news-
papers, magazines and television, and (iii) a political impact ranking, which 
represents the direct channel of influence of economists on policy-makers.3 
The ranking is very popular in Germany and thus symbolically reflects the 
state of economics as a powerful academic discipline. Hence, the FAZ entitles 
its ranking with the statement, “The economists, the country listens to” (“Auf 
diese Ökonomen hört das Land”). Against this backdrop, we first compiled a 
dataset, which includes the 50 most influential economists for each category 
of the FAZ ranking from the years 2015–2018.4 In doing so, in a first step 
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computed an average weighted impact over the years 2015–2018, which then 
served as our indicator for an economist’s impact in the respective categories 
(see appendix for a list of the 20 most influential economists in each category). 
As a result, because a number of economists appear in more than one sub-
ranking, our overall dataset comprises 122 economists.
In a further step between March and July 2019, we then collected a broad 
spectrum of biographical information for each economist. Our dataset contains 
a broad range of individual, research and institutional data, which we extracted 
from CVs and biographical notes, publication records and bibliographic data-
bases as well as websites of institutions and governmental authorities.5 Table 9.1 
presents the variables collected.
In a third step, we collected bibliometric information on the co-authors for 
each economist6 between August and September 2019. Since there is no sin-
gle source which meets all our requirements, we combined the data extracted 
from the following different sources: co-authors from Web of Science (two and 
more joined publications), Google Scholar profiles (all co-authors mentioned), 
ResearchGate (four and more) and EconLit (two and more).7 As a result, we 
did collect at least one co-author for 96 economists of our dataset.
In a final step, we employed a social network analysis using the standard 
software Pajek (Mrvar & Batagelj, 2016; Nooy et al., 2018) to unveil the pro-
fessional networks amongst influential economists. In doing so, we made use of 
both our data on personal-institutional relations to compute a two-mode net-
work of economists and their connections to institutions, and further exploited 
our bibliometric information on co-authorships to show networks of co-
authorships among influential economists in Germany.
4  The profile of economists Germany listens to
We started our evaluation with checking for overlaps between the different 
rankings. First of all, rather surprising, there is no overlap between the top 50 
economists who are part of the research and the media ranking. Consequently, 
the economists, who are influential in research, differ without exception from 
Table 9.1 Variables
Individual Research Institutional
Gender Research field Research institutes & academic 
Current primary affiliation Ordoliberal reference think tanks
Place of primary affiliation Ideological & advocatory 
Nationality institutions
Year of birth Public governance bodies
Place of PhD German public policy petitions
Note: The first three institutional variables contain both current and former connections.
we calculated the relative share of citations (academic ranking), quotes (public 
ranking) and mentions (politics ranking) for each year. In a second step, we 
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those who are influential in the media. On the other hand, there is a rather 
strong overlap between the politics ranking and the media ranking (21 econo-
mists, including the top three of both rankings), and a rather minor overlap 
between the research ranking and politics ranking (seven economists, only two 
in the top 20 of the research ranking and all of them beyond the top 30 of 
the politics ranking). Thus, the research ranking unsurprisingly differs funda-
mentally from the other two “public rankings”, which in turn provides some 
evidence for the argument that there seems to be a division of labor between 
top-level research economists and those economists more strongly involved 
in the public and political arena. By contrast, the strong overlap between the 
politics and media ranking suggests that these channels of political and societal 
influence are somehow connected. We assume that especially strong media 
presence fosters the diffusion of one’s individual economic expertise to policy-
makers. From this perspective, the media strategy of Zimmermann mentioned 
in the introduction seems to be quite successful.
4.1  Personal details
An evaluation of our group of economists by gender exhibits that there exists 
a massive gender bias. The overwhelming share of the economists is male with 
only a few female exceptions (Table 9.2). Compared to the already substantial 
overall gender bias within German economics with only 26% of all researchers 
at German institutions being female (Friebel & Wilhelm, 2019), the male bias 
within the FAZ ranking is still extraordinarily distinct.
Analyzing the primary affiliations (Table  9.3)8 indicates that almost all 
research economists (48 out of 50 or 96%) have a primary university affiliation, 
34% of them also having a primary affiliation with an – mostly economic – 
research institute. Media economists and policy advice economists, on the con-
trary, have fewer primary affiliations with a university (61.2% and 79.2%), but 
slightly higher affiliations with an (economic) research institutes (38.8% and 
50%). A unique feature of the media ranking is that financial sector econo-
mists (18.4%, four of them among the top 11 economists of the ranking) and 
to a lesser degree think tank economists (8.2%, two of them among the top 
ten economists) play a substantial role within the German public economic 
discourse. But think tank economists also have some influence on the political 
level (8.3%).
Most economists, who publicly declare their nationality, are German citi-
zens (Table 9.4; 70.3%, 73.2% and 90.9%). The reasons for the lower shares 
Table 9.2 Gender ratio
Gender Research Media Politics All
Female 2% 6% 10% 4.9%
Male 98% 94% 90% 95.1%
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Table 9.3 Primary affiliations
Category of primary affiliationa Research Media Politics All
University 96% 61.2% 79.2% 79%
(Economic) research institute 34% 38.8% 50% 37%
Financial sector - 18.4% - 7.6%
Think tank - 8.2%  8.3% 4.2%
Central bank  2% 2.1% - 1.7%
International organization - 2.1% - 0.8%
Other  4% 2.1%  4.1% 3.4%
Note: a multiple primary affiliations are possible.
Table 9.4 Nationality
Nationality Researcha Mediab Politicsc Alld
German 70.3% 73.2% 90.9% 76.6%
Austrian 10.8% 2.4% 2.3% 5.3%
Swiss 13.5% 2.4% 2.3% 6.4%
British 2.7% 2.4% - 2.1%
U.S.-American - 19.5%  6.8% 9.6%
Italian 2.7% - - 1.1%
Belgian 2.7% 2.4% - 2.1%
French 2.7% 2.4%  2.3% 2.1%
Greek 2.7% - - 1.1%
Notes: a 37 economists declared their citizenship, three of them with a dual citizenship; b 41 economists, 
two with a dual citizenship; c 44 economists, two with a dual citizenship; d 94 economists, six with a 
dual citizenship.
of German research and media economists relative to policy economists are 
different. In case of the research ranking, economists with Austrian or Swiss 
citizenship are also quite important. This is partly due to the methodology 
behind the ranking, as economists located not only at German institutions 
were considered, but also at Austrian and Swiss institutions. In case of the 
media ranking, a fifth of the economists has a U.S. citizenship (19.5%). That is 
because “star economists” from the U.S. (e.g. Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman or 
Maurice Obstfeld) have a remarkable impact on the public economic discourse 
in Germany.
Inspecting the average age of the economists per ranking indicates that research 
economists (57.1 years) are significantly younger than media (60.4 years) and, 
to a lesser degree, policy advice economists (59.3 years). This outcome is driven 
again by the methodology behind the research ranking which is focusing only 
on the research impact of the last five years. Therefore, it is easier for younger 
economists to become part of the research ranking.
Examining the place of PhD (Table 9.5) reveals a remarkable variety espe-
cially within the leading research economists, as 33 different universities con-
ferred a PhD to 47 economists, who declared their place of PhD, with the 
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British elite university. Contrary to research economists, the media and politics 
rankings exhibit a slightly lesser variety with 43 PhDs respective to 44 PhDs 
obtained from 25 respective to 28 different universities. A particularly striking 
feature in contrast to the research ranking is that 13 media economists and 12 
policy advice economists received their PhD from an U.S. or British elite uni-
versity. The fact that some foreign star economists appear in these rankings can 
only partly explain this result, as after neglecting them nevertheless five or ten 
economists are graduates of U.S. or British elite universities.
4.2  Research profile
A deeper look into the research profiles of the ranked economists (Table 9.6) 
reveals remarkable differences regarding the academic field of work. In case of 
research economists less than half (48%) are located in the narrower field of 
economics, followed by business (34%), environmental science (8%), and math-
ematics and statistics (6%). In contrast to this distribution the overwhelming 
majority of media economists and, to a lesser extent, policy advice economists 
are located in the field of economics (94.9% respective to 74.1%). Regard-
ing the former, the fields of finance (7.7%) and business (5.1%) are of some 
importance, and regarding the latter besides business and finance (both 6.1%), 
agricultural science (8.2%) also becomes relevant.
The reasons for this varying distribution within the research ranking as well 
as for its differences to the media and politics rankings can be found in the con-
struction of the original dataset by the FAZ. In case of the research ranking, the 
Web of Science database was used and obviously a rather generous definition 
of economist was deployed. In contrast to that the media ranking is based on a 
quite narrow definition, as the FAZ only looked for the catch phrases econo-
mist (Ökonom*) and economic researcher (Wirtschaftsforscher*) within the 
media discourse. As a consequence, e.g. business economists (Betriebswirt*) 
were ignored by definition.
Table 9.5 Place of PhD
Researcha Mediab Politicsc Alld
U. of Vienna 4 MIT 6 MIT 4 MIT 8
TU Berlin 3 U. of Cologne 5 U. of Cologne 4 U. of Cologne 7
U. of Bonn 3 Princeton U. 3 Princeton U. 3 U. of Kiel 7
U. of Kiel 3 U. of Kiel 3 U. of Mannheim 3 U. of Mannheim 5
U. of Zurich 3 U. of Mannheim 3
Notes: a 47 economists; b 43 economists; c 44 economists; d 109 economists.
University of Vienna at the top with four PhDs. This indicates that, in contrast 
to Britain and the U.S., the research landscape is far less hierarchical (Aistleitner 
et al., 2018; Fourcade, 2009) and thus a PhD from a rather small group of top-
tier universities is not mandatory to become a successful researcher. Even more 
remarkable is that only one research economist got his PhD from a U.S. or 
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4.3  Non-university activities
In a third field of analysis we ask for the non-university activities of our ranked 
economists, including potential ideological orientations and political involve-
ments. Looking at their broad non-university spectrum of activity we differ-
entiate between current and former linkages to politico-economic and public 
governance institutions. In doing so, we report connections to (economic) 
research institutes, think tanks and foundations on the one hand, and policy 
advice and other governmental bodies, central banks and international organi-
zations on the other hand. Finally, we also screen the economists for petition-
signing activities.
Table 9.7 illustrates the connections to (economic) research institutes and 
academic think tanks. Our data exhibits that a great majority of the economists 
within all rankings have or had an affiliation with economic research institutes 
from the German-speaking countries. Especially the CESifo network (34), fol-
lowed by the IZA (25), and the DIW (23) are to be highlighted. In addition, 
also the British CEPR with 24 current or past connections is relevant for 
economists across the rankings. Other foreign research institutes and academic 
think tanks of some relevance, by contrast, are mainly linked to media and 
policy advice economists. From this, we conclude that especially the leading 
German economic research institutes and their networks10 are essential bio-
graphical pillars for becoming an influential economist. Our data shows that 
Table 9.6 Field of research
Research fielda Research Media Politics All
Economics 48% 92.3% 81.6% 68.2%
Business 34% 5.1% 6.1% 18.2%
Finance 4% 7.7% 6.1% 5.5%
Agricultural science 2% - 8.2% 4.5%
Environmental science 8% 2.6% 4.1% 4.5%
Mathematics and statistics 6% - - 2.7%
Health science 4% - 4.1% 2.7%
Others 6% - 4.1% 3.6%
Notes: a multiple fields of research are possible. “Others” include gerontology, psychology, social policy 
and physics.
Furthermore, we also dived deeper into the publication records of the ranked 
economists to look for possible ordoliberal references in the form of at least 
three publications in ordoliberal journals.9 We find that 8% of the research 
economists have an ordoliberal reference in their publication record, whereas 
20.8% of the media economists and 24.5% of the policy advice economists 
show an ordoliberal reference. Neglecting financial sector and foreign star 
economists within the media ranking, even 32.3% of media economists have a 
connection to the ordoliberal research program.
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72.9% and 81.6%.
The data on the linkages to ideological or advocatory think tanks, founda-
tions and institutions (Table 9.8) reveals a somewhat different picture. While 
research economists are hardly connected to these kinds of entities, media and 
policy advice economists are considerably linked to ideologically driven insti-
tutions. A closer look exhibits that institutions of the conservative, ordo- and 
neoliberal spectrum are much more popular than progressive and union-linked 
institutions. While on the individual level one research economist, three media 
economists and 11 policy advice economists have a connection to the progres-
sive, union-linked camp, four research economists, 13 media economists and 
14 policy advice economists have linkages to the conservative, neo- and ordo-
liberal camp. Hence, it is striking that especially in the media there exists an 
enormous ordo- and neoliberal bias.
Our dataset exhibits that there also exist substantial connections to public 
governance bodies on the (inter)national level, although unequally distributed 
Table 9.7 Research institutes and academic think tanksa
  Research Media Politics All
German (economic) research institutes
CESifo 16 12 20 34
IZA 14 7 12 25
DIW 9 9 13 23
IfW 4 8 5 13
ZEW 3 4 10 11
CFS Frankfurt 2 8 2 10
MPI for research on collective goods 6 2 3 8
ARGE-Instituteb - 7 7 7
RWI 3 4 6 7
IAB 2 2 2 6
MPI of economics 5 - 1 5
Reinhard Selten Institute 3 1 2 4
WZB 3 - 2 4
Foreign institutes and academic think tanks
CEPR 11 10 13 24
NBER 1 8 5 12
INET 2 5 6 8
PIIE - 5 2 5
CREMA 3 1 1 4
WIFO 2 2 2 4
Brookings Institution - 4 1 4
Hoover Institution 2 2 - 4
Notes: a at least four connections. b ARGE-Institute is not an economic research institute but serves as 
a networking platform of German economic research institutes.
52% of all research economists, 60.4% of all media economists and 77.6% of 
all policy advice economists have or had an affiliation with them. Considering 
also important foreign economic research institutes11 the share rises to 56%, 
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Table 9.8 Ideological or advocatory think tanks, foundations and institutionsa
  Research Media Politics All
Conservative, ordo- and neoliberal
IW Köln - 6 4 7
INSM - 4 5 6
Erhard Foundation - 5 4 5
Hayek Society - 5 3 5
Herzog Institute 1 3 4 5
Kronberger Kreis - 5 4 5
Economic Council CDU - 4 5 5
Eucken Institute - 3 2 3
Naumann Foundation 1 2 2 3
NOUS - 3 2 3
Prometheus - 3 2 3
Progressive, union-linked
Böckler Foundation - 3 6 6
Ebert Foundation 1 2 5 5
Keynes Society 1 2 5 5
Non-partisan
Plenum of Economists 6 8 10 17
Denkraum Für Soziale Marktwirtschaft - 3 3 3
INET Council on the Euro Zone Crisis - 3 3 3
Group of Thirty - 3 1 3
Note: a at least three connections.
between the rankings, as illustrated in Table 9.9. An institutional breakdown 
exhibits, first, that regarding German governmental bodies the German Bun-
destag has with 47 by far the most individual connections, followed by the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy with 21 connections. The 
reason for this remarkable number of connections to the Bundestag is that 
committees of the Bundestag regularly invite economists to hearings as experts. 
What our data also reveals is that in addition advisory councils play an important 
role as mediating institutions or interfaces between the German governmental 
system and the economics profession. On the international level, second, the 
ranked economists are often linked to the European Commission (19) as well 
as to the World Bank (18) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (17). 
Finally, also central banks play a noteworthy but minor role. A  breakdown 
by ranking reveals that with 48 out of 49 or 98% of almost all policy advice 
economists have linkages to (inter)national public governance bodies, followed 
by media economists with 85.4%. Considering only German governmental 
bodies (without Austria and Switzerland), a nevertheless impressive 89.8% of 
all policy advice economists are connected to them. In contrast to that, due to 
numerous international star economists being part of the ranking, with 41.7% 
much fewer media economists are linked to the latter. Research economists, in 
turn, have with 42% or 26% considerably less connections. These results, again, 
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Table 9.9 Governmental bodies, international organizations and central banksa
Research Media Politics All
German governmental bodies
German Bundestag 6 25 37 47
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 6 16 16 21
of which: Board of Economic Advisorsb 5 6 9 12
German Federal Government 2 5 12 13
German Council of Economic Expertsb - 9 9 12
Federal Ministry of Finance - 4 9 10
of which: Board of Economic Advisorsb - 2 4 4
Federal Ministry of Education and Research 2 2 7 8
German Data Forum (RatSWD)b 2 1 3 4
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 1 1 4 4
of which: Rürup Commissionb 1 1 4 4
Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture 1 - 3 4
Foreign and supranational governmental bodies
European Commission 6 8 13 19
European Parliament - 2 4 5
French Government - 3 3 5
Council of Economic Advisers (United States)b - 4 1 4
International organizations
World Bank 5 10 10 18
IMF 3 12 8 17
OECD 6 4 8 13
United Nations 1 4 5 7
IPCC 3 2 3 5
WEF - 3 4 5
Central banks
German Bundesbank 4 3 6 10
European Central Bank 2 5 5 9
Federal Reserve Bank of New York - 3 2 4
Notes: a at least four connections; b advisory council. Note: Only the current ministries are listed, and 
individual connections to former ministries with different titles are assigned accordingly.
are in line with the view of a division of labor between top-level research and 
policy advice within the economics profession, although indicating that the 
division of labor is somewhat limited.
Finally, we review a further channel of active public policy involvement 
with respect to our ranked economists. For this, we evaluate a collection of 
15 German public policy petitions by economists from 1992 to 2018. Our 
results show that research economists are comparatively cautious when signing 
economist petitions. Twelve or 24% of them have signed at least one out of 
eight public policy petitions, resulting in 20 signatures in total. In contrast to 
that, media economists are more active as 17 or 35.4% have signed at least one 
out of 14 petitions, 39 signatures in total. Most active by far are policy advice 
economists: 27 or 55.1% have at least signed one out of 15 economist petitions, 
66 signatures in total.
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4.4  Professional networks among influential economists
In the previous three sections we have described existing patterns and fre-
quently occurring features for our ranked economists regarding personal 
details, research profiles and connections to non-university institutions and 
(inter)national public governance bodies. In a subsequent step we explicitly 
intend to examine the professional networks among these economists. In a 
first step, we analyze the networks on the institutional level by focusing on 
connections to politico-economic think tanks, foundations and other similar 
institutions as well as on signed public policy petitions. In doing so, we do not 
differentiate between the rankings. In a second step, we investigate professional 
linkages by means of co-authorship data.
The whole network consists of 177 nodes, among them 78 economists and 
99 institutions/petitions. The average degree is 5.3 and the overall density of 
the network is 0.06. For our analysis of social structures of the institutional 
networks among influential economists in Germany we applied the commu-
nity detecting algorithm Louvain Method to highlight distinct communities 
in this two-mode institutional-personal network. Overall, the clustering algo-
rithm yields six clusters. Among them, as Figure 9.1 illustrates, there are four 
partly intertwined main clusters with a degree centrality of 57 (the “ordo-/
neoliberal cluster” A, light gray on the bottom right), 59 (the “mainstream 
cluster” B, black, at the center), 22 (the “transnational economics cluster” C, 
gray at the bottom left) and 25 (the “progressive cluster” D, dark gray, at the 
top) connected nodes, respectively. The “progressive cluster” D is organized 
around the Böckler Foundation, the Ebert Foundation and two petitions in 
favor of a European Banking Union and against the German debt-brake and 
thus reflects a rather progressive, Keynesian-oriented positioning. Cluster C 
is organized around international institutions, encompassing international 
economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman or Thomas Piketty, well-
known for their rather critical stance on German economic crisis policies (see 
e.g. Rieder & Theine, 2019 for further details). The second largest cluster B 
represents the German economic mainstream and is mainly organized around 
the leading German economic research institutes such as the CESifo or the 
IZA. The largest cluster A, in turn, represents a rather conservative, ordo- 
and neoliberal economic policy orientation. This cluster is organized around 
the INSM, the Erhard Foundation and the neoliberal public policy petition 
“Hamburger Appell” (Funke et al., 2005), and is quite tightly connected to the 
German economic mainstream (cluster B). In contrast to that, the international 
cluster C and the progressive cluster D are connected to other clusters to a 
much lesser extent. Hence, the network graph in Figure 9.1 indicates, in line 
with recent studies on German economics (see section 2.1), that ordoliberal 
power structures are still relevant today. First, many influential economists, who 
successfully engage in public and political debates, are connected to ordo- and 
neoliberal networks. Second, these economists are also tightly connected to the 
German economic mainstream.
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For analyzing the professional linkages among our sample by means of co-
authorships we compiled a one-mode network of personal relations. Applying 
the same clustering methodology as for the institutional network analysis we 
found two quite different results. Whereas the extent of professional networks 
among media and policy advice economists are comparably low, the analysis 
of co-authorship networks among research economists yields some interesting 
results.
The overall co-authorship network of our sample of influential economists 
consists of 299 economists, among them 64 listed in the FAZ ranking. Over-
all, our analysis reports eight clusters with at least one common co-authorship. 
As already indicated, the clustering structure of the overall co-authorship net-
work among our sample of influential German economists is strongly driven 
by leading research economists. For instance, the black cluster A at the center 
in Figure 9.2 connects 12 of the 64 influential economists with at least one 
common co-authorship, among them ten of the top 50 research economists, 
while the sum of co-authors connected in this cluster is 49. This cluster 
is organized around the ETH Zurich and furthermore comprises the two 
economists (Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher) leading the research ranking. 
Another densely connected cluster is the agrarian economists cluster B at the 
top left and institutionally based at the Thünen Institute and the University of 
Göttingen. Although this cluster only comprises four influential economists 
(of which only one is part of the research ranking, the other three of the poli-
tics ranking), it connects 29 co-authors, which points to a very close collabo-
ration inside the cluster. In a similar vein, the dark gray cluster C at the top 
right also represents a densely connected research network at the Viennese 
University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences with even 39 co-authors. 
The light gray cluster D at the bottom represents another research cluster in 
the field of business studies. In contrast to the densely connected research 
groups in the aforementioned clusters, influential economists in the catego-
ries media and politics are mostly rather loosely connected. However, as the 
clustering shows particularly, politically influential economists are either con-
nected by their cooperation through economic research institutes or by joint 
expert opinions and policy briefs, such as the annual report of the GCEE. To 
sum up, our co-authorship network provides some empirical evidence that 
there exist close professional collaborations in form of research clusters among 
our sample of influential economists in Germany, especially among research 
economists. Of course, these clusters are often organized around institutions 
in German-speaking countries. Other ranked economists, however, are only 
loosely or not at all connected to these “German” research clusters. There-
fore, we cautiously conclude that on the one hand professional collaborations 
represented by common co-authorships are probably quite helpful for becom-
ing an influential research economist in Germany. On the other hand, this 
factor seems to be of rather limited importance for economists with public 
and political influence.
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5  Concluding remarks
In this contribution, we employed social network analytical methods on a 
unique dataset comprising biographical and bibliometric information of the 
most influential economists in Germany with the aim to explore common 
biographic, institutional and research patterns as well as professional networks 
and thus to unveil power structures within the German economics profession. 
In doing so, we made use of the FAZ ranking of economists, where influence 
is separated in the fields of research, media and politics and therefore is designed 
to highlight the elite segment of the economics profession in Germany.
Against this backdrop, we can draw the following main conclusions: First of 
all, the segment of influential economists in Germany is almost exclusively male 
and thus even more gender biased than the overall German economics profes-
sion. Second, a breakdown by ranking reveals some interesting differences: 
(i) while research economists cover a broad range of research fields, media and 
policy advice economists are predominantly located in the (narrower) field 
of economics; (ii) the media ranking exclusively contains a substantial num-
ber of financial sector economists as well as international “star economists”. 
Third, the division of labor between top-tier research and policy advice within 
the German economics profession is to some extend also reflected within the 
group of influential economists. There are (i) hardly or no individual overlaps 
between the research ranking and the other two rankings and (ii) while a strik-
ing majority of media and policy advice economists have connections to (inter)
national public governance bodies, only a minority of research economists are 
linked to them. Fourth, although our biographical analysis is limited in scope,12 
we find also some indications for internationalization within our sample. On a 
personal level, 28.4% of the economists in our sample received their PhD from 
a university outside the German-speaking area. Furthermore, the international 
orientation is also reflected in the rather high number of connections (66 out of 
119 economists or 55.5%) to research institutes, think tanks and public govern-
ance bodies located at the international (non-German-speaking) level. Fifth, 
the ordoliberal bias within the German economics profession also appears in 
our group of influential economists. This bias, however, is restricted to media 
and policy advice economists. A considerable number of them are connected 
to the ordoliberal research program and/or have connections to the German 
conservative, ordo- and neoliberal institutional network, which, in turn, is 
closely connected to the German economic mainstream. In contrast to that, 
progressive economists are far less represented in our sample, and their linkages 
to the German economic mainstream are limited.
Overall, for becoming an influential economist in Germany it seems to be 
helpful to be professionally associated with the leading German economic 
research institutes and their networks. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that 
due to the obviously less hierarchical nature of the German-speaking econom-
ics profession when compared to the U.S., a successful research economist does 
not need to have a PhD from or work at a small range of top-tier universities. 
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Rather it seems much more effective to collaborate with other influential 
research economists from the German-speaking countries. For becoming an 
influential media and policy advice economist, in turn, research collaborations 
seem to be less crucial. For these economists it is probably just as important to 
be connected to politico-economic networks in Germany, whether they are 
partisan or not. Of course, having visible linkages to governmental institutions, 
especially institutionalized policy advice bodies, will in turn increase an econo-
mist’s impact on politics and the media.
To sum up, our analysis provides some evidence of common patterns and 
similarities among the population of influential German economists. While we 
made use of social network analysis to detect communities among our sample, 
our analyses could open up a venue for further research employing quantitative 
approaches such as multi-correspondence analyses (MCA) from a field theo-
retical background (see for instance Rossier & Benz in this volume).
Notes
 1 For a detailed list of economic professors in political positions in Germany see Frey 
(2000a).
 2 To put it short, ordoliberal scholars distinguish between the ordo principle, also referred 
to as an “economic constitution”, and the field of economic policy. Whereas the gov-
ernment is responsible for the overall economic order, it should at the same time avoid 
intervening in the economic process itself, thereby historically opposing Keynesian-
oriented economic planning. Hence ordoliberal policies range from anti-trust legisla-
tion to austerity-oriented fiscal policies.
 3 The overall ranking contains the top 100 economists, whereas each sub-ranking roughly 
comprises the top 50 economists.
 4 Due to a change in its ranking methodology before 2014 and as the following ranking 
for 2014 is not fully publicly accessible, we start with the ranking for 2015.
 5 We did not collect biographical information for three historical economists (Milton 
Friedman, Friedrich A. Hayek and John M. Keynes) out of the 122 economists since 
we are mainly interested in contemporary economists.
 6 In doing so, we furthermore did not consider nine bank economists (Stefan Bielmeier, 
Carsten Brzeski, David Folkerts-Landau, Michael Heise, Ulrich Kater, Jörg Krämer, 
Holger Schmieding, Gertrud Traud and Jörg Zeuner), as they mostly have not authored 
scientific publications. Furthermore, we excluded eight foreign economists mostly from 
U.S. institutions (Angus Deaton, Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, Thomas Piketty, 
Kenneth Rogoff, Robert Shiller, Joseph Stiglitz and Lawrence Summers), as we are 
mainly interested in the co-authorship networks of the economists of the German-
speaking countries.
 7 Although Web of Science does contain all academic fields, it is restricted to a range of 
mostly international academic journals. As a consequence, various economists especially 
of the media and politics ranking are only covered insufficiently due to a low number of 
publications in these journals. Hence, we have supplemented the Web of Science data 
on co-authors with data from other databases.
 8 In all following tables and figures, the three historical economists are not considered.
 9 These journals are ORDO – Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft and 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik as well as Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik. Whereas the 
first two are traditional ordoliberal journals, the latter is a prominent platform for the 
promotion of ordoliberal ideas to policy-makers.
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 10 Our sample includes CESifo, DIW, HWWI, IAB, IfW, IMK, IWH, IZA, RWI, MPI, 
SAFE, WZB and ZEW.
 11 Our sample includes Brookings Institution, Bruegel, CEPII, CEPR, CNRS, Hoover 
Institution, IFS, IIES, INET, IHS, KOF, NBER, PIIE, WIFO and WIIW.
 12 We did not gather data on their whole academic career paths. Therefore, our analysis of 
internationalization is quite limited.
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Appendix
Table 9.10A Average weighted impact over the years 2015–2018
FAZ media impact 2015-18 FAZ political impact 2015-18 FAZ research impact 2015-18
Rank Name Quotes* Rank Name Mentions* Rank Name Citations*
1 Hans-Werner 6.46% 1 Hans-Werner 12.00% 1 Ernst Fehr 10.77%
Sinn Sinn
2 Clemens 6.27% 2 Clemens 10.12% 2 Urs Fischbacher 5.38%
Fuest Fuest
3 Marcel 6.25% 3 Peter 5.63% 3 Didier Sornette 3.74%
Fratzscher Bofinger
4 JÖrg Krämer 4.50% 4 Marcel 5.22% 4 Bruno S. Frey 3.74%
Fratzscher
5 Michael 3.60% 5 Lars Feld 4.32% 5 Michael Frese 3.56%
Hüther
6 Carsten 2.22% 6 Gustav Horn 4.14% 6 Christian Ringle 3.15%
Brzeski
7 Thomas 2.11% 7 Michael 3.58% 7 Adamantios 2.98%
Mayer Hüther Diamantopoulos
8 Thomas 1.95% 8 Rudolf 2.01% 8 Christian 2.78%
Piketty Hickel Homburg
9 Holger 1.90% 9 Folkhard 1.99% 9 Armin Falk 2.58%
Schmieding Isermeyer
10 Jörg Zeuner 1.82% 10 Justus Haucap 1.95% 10 Helmut Haberl 2.09%
11 Lars Feld 1.70% 11 Christoph 1.88% 11 Marko Sarstedt 2.05%
Schmidt
12 Peter Bofinger 1.69% 12 Thomas 1.59% 12 Fridolin 2.03%
Straubhaar Krausmann
13 Christoph 1.61% 13 Claudia 1.57% 13 Thorsten 2.01%
Schmidt Kemfert Hennig- 
Thurau
14 Paul Krugman 1.52% 14 Paul 1.47% 14 Oliver Gassmann 1.89%
Krugman
15 Ferdinand 1.42% 15 Bert Rürup 1.35% 15 Reinhard Busse 1.88%
DudenhÖffer
16 Joseph Stiglitz 1.34% 16 Martin 1.34% 16 Klaus M. 1.85%
Hellwig Schmidt
17 Stefan 1.32% 17 Achim 1.16% 17 Karl Heinz Erb 1.79%
Bielmeier Wambach
18 Ulrich Kater 1.23% 18 Thomas 1.14% 18 Axel Dreher 1.66%
Mayer
19 Gustav Horn 1.21% 19 Axel Börsch- 1.14% 19 Werner Reinartz 1.62%
Supan
20 Bert Rürup 1.12% 20 Heiner 1.06% 20 Alois Stutzer 1.59%
Flassbeck
Source: FAZ-impact rankings and own calculations
* The percentages indicate the annually weighted averages from the FAZ-rakings from 2015-2018
10  Global production and 
circulation of dominant 
ideologies
Mexico from the default debt crisis 
to the Brady Plan (1982–1989)
Johanna Gautier Morin
1  Introduction
Since the 1990s with the Argentinian collapse, the Russian fiasco, and the Greek 
scandal, the legitimacy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank seems prejudiced in the eyes of world public opinion. Long sub-
ject to criticism from left-wing activists and “Third World” advocates during 
the 1980s–1990s, these organizations became the target of authorized voices 
(Williamson, 1998; The Economist, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002). The Latin Ameri-
can stagnation exacerbated this negative image in the 1980s (Easterly, 2000). 
It went wrong in 1982 when Mexico was on the verge of bankruptcy and 
declared a moratorium on its debt to negotiate an emergency rescue plan with 
the IMF, the U.S. Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury, and multiple interna-
tional investment banks. This episode marked a turning point in the history 
of the IMF (McKinnon, 1993; Boughton, 2000), as well as in transnational 
banking business and regulation. For the following decade, the Fund repeatedly 
imposed structural adjustments that did not achieve the expected outcomes 
and inaugurated a ten-year external debt crisis that spread to Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Uruguay, and the Philippines (Heyde, 1987; Masson, 2007). Bradlow 
(2000) and Marangos (2004) accused the Fund of imposing a top-down view 
of economic policies, which set aside the social dimension of these reforms and 
neglected human rights issues. From Lindholm (1977) to Klein (2007), many 
authors and official reports have blamed the Fund for its ill-adapted experimen-
tal methods and considered the terms of conditionality of its loans to be respon-
sible for the macroeconomic catastrophe (UNDP, 2003; SAPRIN, 2004). The 
resulting recession aggravated the “legitimation crisis” of these “money doc-
tors” (Habermas, 1973; Drake, 1994; Woods, 2006: 84–103). Since then, the 
IMF itself has contributed to understanding the causes and culprits of the crisis 
by engaging in self-criticism (Rogoff, 2003; Sgard, 2005; Martinez-Vazquez 
et al., 2001; Dreher et al., 2015).
However, this vision has overshadowed the role and agency of the Mexican 
government in the negotiations leading to liberalization reforms and the crucial 
role played by the international investment banks and banking associations that 
cooperated as soon as the risk of default became an imminent threat. Indeed, 
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inflows of foreign capital had increased in Mexico after the oil shocks (López 
Herrera et al., 2015). In this context, the Mexican crisis marked a turning point 
in the history of global financialization.
The massive bailout orchestrated by the IMF to avoid a systemic and global 
banking crisis was a success. A common language shared by institutions and 
individuals from distinct socio-political contexts emerged at the heart of the 
negotiations. The long process of circulation and institutionalization of the 
dominant “general inventory” of economic ideas favored the presence of econ-
omists in the Mexican government (Colander & Coats, 1989). The renewal 
of political elites in a country where neoliberalism had a specific national 
development turned Mexico into a key actor in the game played by interna-
tional organizations, foreign investment banks, and the U.S. Treasury, despite 
the revolutionary tradition of the single-party system (Babb, 2001; Romero 
Sotelo, 2016).1 This chapter aims at understanding how negotiations have been 
conducted in a context of financial dependence and proposes a renewed inter-
pretation of international financial cooperation and the role of economists in 
the ideological convergence that went along with the circulation of capital 
flows.
The section 2 presents the data, methods, and theoretical framework adopted 
in this chapter. The section 3 explores the links between the renewal of the 
elites and the production of the dominant ideology in the 1980s. The section 4 
exposes the terms of the crisis and analyzes it as a proxy to understand the 
structural mechanisms of Mexican economic policies. The section 5 examines 
the global convergence in economic rationale at the heart of the negotiations 
between the Mexican government, the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, and investment 
banks involved in the defaulted loans. The section 6 highlights the failures of 
the reforms and adjustment programs.
2  Data and method
We consider that the application of economic thoughts and doctrines in Latin 
America has shaped multilateral institutions and financial practices globally, 
contrary to the dominant view of the history of liberal imperialism, which saw 
the sub-continent as an under-integrated periphery (Rostow, 1960). Follow-
ing the subaltern studies’ approach (Appadurai, 1986), we examine how lib-
eral thoughts and theories have been integrated into Mexican political culture 
to inform the circulation of economic beliefs and practices on a global scale 
(Hauswedell et al., 2019).
Theoretically, we investigate the programmatic work of Pierre Bourdieu 
and Luc Boltanski on the “production of the dominant ideology” (Boltan-
ski & Bourdieu, 1976). The literature has not yet fully exploited the theoretical 
potential of this text. It has never been translated and still seems confusing for 
many readers, since it adopted the form of its topic and commingled stereo-
types, commonplaces, inconsistencies, and discrepancies. Imitating Flaubert’s 
Dictionary of Received Ideas (Flaubert, 1881), the authors compiled a broad series 
of sources illustrating the dominant ideology shared by economic elites and the 
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media, through published texts, public statements, filmed debates, bibliogra-
phies, graphs, figures, definitions, and images. Heir to a long tradition in the 
sociology of knowledge (Durkheim, 1912; Parsons, 1951) and perpetuating the 
legacy of Marx and Engels’s critical analysis of the dominant ideology (Marx & 
Engels, 1932), this unique work was embedded in French political life. How-
ever, we can carefully transpose this theoretical approach to the transnational 
network of investment bankers, financial experts, and government officials 
who helped resolve the Mexican default debt crisis.
In order to do so, we use quantitative and qualitative data from IMF con-
fidential documents, staff reports, and secretariat’s circulars (Washington); 
U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve documents (Washington and New York); 
OECD economic surveys (Paris); Bank of International Settlements’ docu-
ments (Basel); press articles from Mexico, the United States, the United King-
dom, and France; investment banks’ private archives (Midland Bank, Société 
Générale, Crédit Lyonnais); decrees and declarations by the Mexican Presi-
dent and members of government; and correspondence between all the par-
ties held in the U.K. National Archives in Kew. Paul A. Volcker’s papers held 
at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library in Princeton, NJ, contributed to 
the understanding of the bailout negotiations. We also interviewed former 
IMF President Jacques de Larosière, who was supervising the negotiations, and 
exploited Larosière’s and his successor Camdessus’s memoirs (Camdessus, 1995; 
Larosière, 2016). This data allows us to evaluate the spillover effect of the Mexi-
can episode on international governance and private capital distribution.
3  Production of the dominant ideology: from political 
strategy to cultural change
During the 1970s and 1980s, the transnational neoliberal shift has rooted inter-
national expertise in a social philosophy that transcended economic policies 
(Brint, 1996). The energy crisis, the financialization of the global economy, 
and the information technology revolution have disrupted the power game by 
providing opportunities for emerging fractions and challenged the position of 
old-established social groups. National elites were neither homogeneous nor 
static, and the dominant emerging economic ideologies served the interests of a 
“nebula” of dominant groups, sharing converging interests despite the diversity 
of their social and cultural origins (Khan, 2012).2
Bourdieu and Boltanski showed how rhetoric and symbolic discourses sup-
ported similar transformations through an “optimistic evolutionism” and popu-
larized a new classification system. They referred to this evolution as “converted 
conservatism” aimed at excluding both the conservative rear-guard and the 
progressive vanguard doomed to remain confined to the margins. Political 
and economic advisers, business leaders, mainstream media, and institutional 
experts promoted this “converted conservatism” as inevitable. This rhetoric 
undermined any political culture that would contradict it and embraced the 
theory of historical evolutionism by positioning the elite beyond political con-
flicts. The ideology of the death of ideologies imposed the idea of the finiteness 
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of all political options, confirmed by the “lessons of history,” which showed the 
shortcomings of past political regimes. In that respect, the famous Mexican art-
ist Cantinflas mocked President Echeverría Alvarez: “We are neither of the left, 
nor of the right, but entirely the opposite” (Calomiris & Haber, 2015: 366). 
The “converted conservatism” imposed a new vision and division of social 
values based on the opposition of two polarized registries:
Table 10.1 The affirmation of neoliberal values and new socio-cultural perspectives1











Note: 1 This table synthesizes the keywords’ polarizing discourses, as Bourdieu and Boltanski identified 
them in a scattered way throughout their analysis (Boltanski & Bourdieu, 1976: 45–65).
The “optimistic evolutionism” was authorized and reinforced by the intel-
lectual and scientific support of institutions “at the intersection of the academic 
field and the field of power” (Boltanski & Bourdieu, 1976: 67).3 In this regard, 
professional economists were particularly exposed to this ambiguity between 
the fields, at the crossroads of academia, political expertise, consulting, busi-
ness and media (Abbott, 1988; Maesse, 2015; Schmidt-Wellenburg & Lebaron, 
2018). Their growing importance inspired Markoff and Montecinos to talk 
about the “ubiquitous rise of economists” in all sectors, even beyond their ini-
tial training (Markoff & Montecinos, 1993).
The redefinition of social positions was not limited to the elite of devel-
oped and democratic countries, contrary to the impression most Western 
literature might give. In some “developing” countries, according to the tri-
partition of the time, non-democratic political regimes and planned econo-
mies experienced the same social changes during the 1980s (San Miguel, 
2004; Kothari, 2005). Rising fractions influenced by monetarist and public 
choice theories aimed their criticisms at the Keynesian interventionism of 
former regimes (Centeno & Silva, 1998; Heredia, 2018).4 Among the groups 
jockeying for power in the Mexican regime, the supporters of this new doxa 
used their expertise as leverage to influence decision-makers and the public 
(Fourcade, 2009).
The Mexican crisis revealed the ideological struggles between experts within 
the single party. Economists inspired by developmentalism and dependency 
theory, and trained at Cambridge University,5 fought against the growing 
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influence of orthodox economists educated at Yale, such as Jesús Silva Her-
zog Flores and Miguel Mancera, who finally came to power when President 
Miguel de la Madrid was elected in 1982 (Babb, 2001: 171–198). Elite groups 
thus opposed each other within an institutional frame that circumscribed the 
field of power between those governing the state and those representing private 
power. The 1980s witnessed the rise, within the government, of economic 
experts who would have remained outsiders a few decades earlier (Dezalay & 
Garth, 2002).
The transnational dimension of their trajectory reinforced their posi-
tion (Seabrooke & Henriksen, 2017). The renewal of the political elite cor-
responded to the liberalization of the state-controlled economy initiated to 
cope with the external pressure of international competition and the internal 
social and economic crisis (Rodríguez & Ward, 1994). Their legitimacy was 
anchored in their proclaimed scientific neutrality (Fourcade, 2006). In that 
sense, Mexico was not an isolated case.6 There was a structural function in the 
expansion of the dominant ideology. The discourse of power is not strictly 
meant to convince:
Its primary function is to direct action or to maintain the cohesion among 
executives by reinforcing, through ritual reassertion, the group’s belief in 
the necessity and the legitimacy of his action. Converts preaching con-
verts, those believers educated in the same dogma and endowed with the 
same thinking and action patterns, the same ethical and political disposi-
tions, can forgo the proof, the wholeness and the logical control, agreeing 
only to explain the few elements about which their action is criticized or 
rejected. Their disjoint discourse occults the essential points, which are 
exactly everything that goes without saying, everything that is self-evident 
as long as it is tacitly understood between the self, anything that cannot be 
revealed without betraying the official intention of the discourse.
(Boltanski & Bourdieu, 1976: 6)
The Mexican crisis presented an excellent opportunity for industrialized 
countries to reinvent their hegemony “by transitioning from the post-war 
‘embedded liberal’ world order to the Reagan-Thatcher model of neoliberal-
ism and global capitalism.” Multilateral institutions transformed “their man-
dates to accommodate these ideological changes” (Chorev & Babb, 2009: 461). 
The circulation of ideas unfolded in a multidimensional configuration. In a 
regime born of a revolution and led by an authoritarian ruling elite (Garrido, 
2005; Langston, 2017), the logic of self-preservation of the dominant group 
compelled the Mexican apparatchiki to appoint a new political staff with a pro-
file consistent with the standards of multilateral institutions. The evolution of 
the standards of governance in the 1980s–1990s led to the emergence of the 
infamous “Washington consensus.” The end of the Bretton Woods system in 
1971–73 left its institutions in desperate need of defining a new legitimate raison 
d’être (George, 1992; Chorev & Babb, 2009). They seized the fight against infla-
tion and over-indebtedness as a new battle horse (Wolf, 1965; Bradlow, 2000).
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Contrary to the experiences of the Chilean Chicago Boys under the Pino-
chet regime (Silva, 2009; Gautier Morin & Rossier, 2021). Mexico’s bailout 
plans of the 1980s were systematically mediated by the international financial 
community and justified by developmentalist rhetoric and free-market experi-
ments (Gunder Frank, 1984; Jorge & Salazar-Carrillo, 1988; Woods, 2006). 
Indeed, according to the IMF’s original articles, its responsibility to “promote” 
liberalization was limited to “current account transaction (i.e., goods and ser-
vices) but not capital account (i.e., debt, portfolio equity and direct and real 
estate investment)” (Moschella, 2009: 858). Theoretically, member countries 
had the right to control capital movements until the 1995 amendment of IMF 
statutes, which gave the Fund full authority over transnational capital flows. 
The case of Mexico shows that such a modification of the institutional design 
was already embedded in the 1980s programs (Goldman, 1982).
4  The crisis: a proxy to unveil information mechanisms
In February 1982, the constant decline in Mexican international reserves com-
pelled the government to devaluate the peso.7 From 1954 to 1976, Mexico had a 
fixed exchange rate regime, and its external debt was denominated in U.S. dollars. 
In 1980–81, the U.S. Federal Reserve raised its interest rates.8 As a result, Mexi-
can debt increased sharply, while devaluation did not seem to stop the outflow 
of international reserves. The problem was not new to the government: since 
independence, Mexico had to deal with an external debt that made the country 
structurally vulnerable (Marichal, 1989; Costeloe, 2003). Similarly, in a remark-
able transnational comparative study on the stability of banking systems, Charles 
Calomiris and Stephen Haber demonstrated how banking crises and credit scar-
city were embedded in the political history of Mexico, where authoritarian polit-
ical leaders, bank insiders, and minority shareholders formed coalitions of interest 
groups that determined access and distribution of capital. The expropriations 
perpetrated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) worried most bankers 
who rarely engaged in investments (Calomiris & Haber, 2015: 331–389).
Between 1824 and 2001, Mexico spent more than 45% of the time in a 
state of default or restructuring (Oosterlinck, 2013: 700). After the first oil 
crisis, the country faced drastic currency devaluations. The oil manna allowed 
an unprecedented rise in world oil prices until 1979–80 and urged Mexico to 
invest heavily to meet international demand. The country became the sixth-
largest producer in the world in 1980. The government accumulated external 
debts with international private banks to make such investments, and the IMF 
acted as a guarantor on behalf of Mexico, which gave the organization author-
ity over the country’s economic policies (Salas-Porras, 2014). However, when 
international oil prices fell abidingly, Mexico faced the worst liquidity crisis 
since the revolution. Severe devaluations were not sufficient to solve the prob-
lem (Gracida, 2007; Ángel Mobarak, 2010; Bruner & Simms, 1987).
On August 12, 1982, Jesús Silva Herzog, Mexican Secretary of Finance and 
Public Credit, informed U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, and IMF Managing Director Jacques de 
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Larosière “that Mexico would be unable to meet its August 16 obligation to 
service an $80  billion debt” (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1997: 
192). According to American journalist Joseph Kraft, Herzog landed in Wash-
ington on August 13 to negotiate a moratorium on commercial bank debt. “In 
retrospect, after similar moves by many other countries, Silva Herzog’s action 
hardly seems singular. At the time, in fact, it was a bombshell that shook an 
entire universe” (Kraft, 1984: 2–4).
What was fundamentally new, according to José Ángel Gurría, current 
secretary-general of the OECD and former director of the Public Credit 
Department of Mexico under Herzog, was that they did not
crawl to the international financial community as debtors seeking relief 
through some minor adjustment that could be made backstage. We walked 
in through the front door. We said we had a major problem with a capital 
P. We did not say the problem was a particular debt. We said the problem 
was the whole international financial structure. We said it was everybody’s 
problem.
(quoted in Kraft, 1984: 3)
Indeed, the Mexican crisis posed a threat to the international banking system. 
Among the U.S. banks exposed to the Mexican default risk, the ratio of credit 
outstood to more than 30% of their capital funds for 54 establishments and 
up to 48% for Bank of America, 73% for Manufacturers Hanover, 81% for 
the European American Bank, and 115% for the Allied Bank International.9 
David Knox, World Bank Vice President for Latin America, urged commercial 
banks to increase their lending and encourage the recovery of growth in the 
region, or, at least, to establish provisions for the potential losses since interna-
tional creditors were so deeply involved in the Mexican debt.10 Creditor banks 
finally agreed, at a meeting held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
on August 19–20, to extend the loan to Mexico to $1.5 billion through the 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The U.S. government committed to 
lending $2 billion. The IMF designed these “bridging” loans to gain time to 
develop its support program, which would reach $4 billion over the next three 
years (BIS, 1984). This episode can thus be understood as the bailout of inter-
national banks, more than the rescue of Mexico.
5  Global convergence in economic rationale
When granted, the extension of the loan guaranteed by the IMF and the BIS 
was conditional on a set of “arrangements,” according to IMF terminology 
(Eckaus, 1986; Khan & Sharma, 2003; Babb & Carruthers, 2008). The bor-
rowing country ought to
adopt comprehensive programs worked out in close consultation with 
the Fund and calculated to restore satisfactory payments positions over a 
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period of time. These arrangements are intended to provide assurance . . . 
of sufficient inflows of credit to permit orderly and gradual adjustment.
(IMF, 1983: 19)
Close cooperation was needed between international bodies, private financial 
institutions, and the national government to “attain the goals of sustainable 
debt-servicing and viable balance of payments positions” (IMF, 1983: 79).
The press referred to the Mexican tragedy as a deus ex machina, but the IMF 
adjustment program had been discussed for two years before the liquidity crisis 
hit the country. According to the IMF staff report for the 1982 consultation 
with Mexico, the Fund had been discussing with representatives of the Mexi-
can government since November 1981 (IMF, 1982c). However, coordination 
failed at finding a solution. On September 1, 1982, the Mexican government 
nationalized the private banking system, imposed comprehensive exchange 
controls, and suspended all private sector debt payments and most public sec-
tor principal debt payments. The Bank of Mexico devalued the peso several 
times before the end of the year. Inflation rates reached 100% in December 
and brought the country into a severe recession. Per capita GDP declined by 
11% over the next five years. During the same period, wages fell by about 
30%, unemployment increased, and investment and consumption contractions 
slowed down economic growth (Buffie & Krause, 1989: 153–154).
The IMF and the Mexican government finally reached an agreement after 
the election of President Miguel de la Madrid in 1982. Former negotiators Jésus 
Silva Herzog became Secretary of Finance and Public Credit, Miguel Mancera 
Aguayo, Director General of the Bank of Mexico, and Héctor Hernández Cer-
vantes, Secretary of Commerce. IMF staff representatives began working with 
Ariel Buira, Executive Director for Mexico. These men represented a new 
guarantee for the IMF, and the organization warmly welcomed their appoint-
ments. De la Madrid had voiced support for the stabilization program during 
his campaign, which was considered a “break in tradition” that made the Fund 
staff optimistic about future outcomes (Maroni, 1982). Relationships between 
the IMF and Mexican officials had been tense until then. The Fund reproached 
the Mexican to keep the organization “in the dark”: the Mexicans declined 
to respond to the questionnaire the IMF had sent them and indicated that 
they did not want another visit from a Fund team (Truman, 1982). After the 
elections, it was thus in the Mexican government’s interest to send “a team of 
English-fluent, foreign-trained technocrats whose close personal connections 
within international financial circles were an important asset” to negotiate the 
fate of the country with international banks, the IMF, and the U.S. government 
(Babb, 2001: 177).
Changes in political and administrative staff led to a shift in public policy 
towards development and liberalization. Nearly 25% of the officials had studied 
in U.S. universities (Centeno, 1994: 117). Herzog, Aguayo, Cervantes, and 
Buira were all economists, graduating from Yale, Melbourne, and Manchester, 
respectively. These institutions were not the temple of neoliberalism, as were 
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the University of Chicago and Columbia in the 1960s.11 Nevertheless, they 
were a place of design and standardization of economic expertise and political 
advice. Moreover, the political legitimacy of these new ministers and secretar-
ies was based mainly on Western expertise. Mancera and Silva had studied with 
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker when he taught at Yale.
Beyond transnational circulation, a dissenting Mexican intellectual current, 
supported since the interwar period by a class of entrepreneurs and business-
men, had developed a strong lineage in the Austrian tradition of Hayek and 
Mises. The banker and intellectual Luis Montes de Oca, founder of the Banco 
Internacional and member of the Mises’s Society for the Renewal of Liberal-
ism, had introduced the Mont Pelerin Society to Mexico (Merchant, 2002; 
Denord, 2002; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Romero Sotelo, 2016). The more 
the single-party regime fell into crisis, the more influential this trend became 
in the Mexican upper class (Romero Sotelo et al., 2014). Although the new 
generation of policymakers was not associated with neoliberal think tanks, 
their training, and knowledge of English, facilitated their communication and 
understanding with international experts.
A new generation of “technopols” combined economic-oriented techni-
cal expertise taught abroad (mainly in the U.S.) with local political involve-
ment. “Cosmopolitan ideas, understood, applied, and developed according to 
universalistic professional standards, became part of their selves” (Dominguez, 
1997: 16). This set of intellectual tools was all the more critical for the suc-
cess of negotiations with multilateral organizations and foreign administrations 
since IMF-supported programs were not preconceived. They were to be con-
sidered as a process that evolved along with a “multiplicity of potential path-
ways, driven by exogenous economic events, by policy actions of the national 
authorities” (Mussa & Savastano, 1999: 84–85).
As a result, the more national staff shared the economic principles and 
worldviews of IMF staff, the more quickly the program could be implemented. 
Finally, the March agreement was adopted
at the behest of the new financial authorities, aimed at re-establishing a 
better balance between aggregate demand and supply as a means of curbing 
inflation and strengthening the balance of payment. The key element of 
this program [was] a reduction in the overall financial deficit of the public 
sector by the equivalent of 3% of GDP.
(IMF, 1982d: 3)
The program also encouraged “the depreciation of the peso and substantial 
increases in prices and tariffs of basic goods and services” (IMF, 1982d: 7).
6  Failures and experimentations
In December  1982, the IMF Extended Arrangement finally approved a 
three-year loan of $3.8 billion to the Mexican government. The government 
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committed to engaging free-market reforms regarding fiscal austerity, reduc-
tion of public expenditures, privatization of state-owned enterprises, lowering 
of trade barriers, deregulation of the national industry, and liberalization of 
foreign investment. The contract stipulated,
during the period of the extended arrangement, Mexico shall remain in 
close consultation with the Fund. These consultations may include cor-
respondence and visits of officials of the Fund to Mexico or of repre-
sentatives of Mexico to the Fund. Mexico shall provide the Fund, through 
reports at intervals or dates requested by the Fund, with such information 
as the Fund requests in connection with the progress of Mexico in achiev-
ing the objectives and policies set forth.
(IMF, 1982a)
In other words, Mexico remained under the IMF trusteeship for almost a dec-
ade. Other programs were adopted in 1986 and 1989, lasting until 1993, before 
the peso crisis in 1994–95 (Barkbu et al., 2012).
IMF’s conditionalities imposed the restructuration of every aspect of the 
national economy. The semantic field used in the reports is enlightening: 
restructuring was associated with ideas of “satisfactory maturity,” “progress,” or 
“relevance” (IMF, 1982b: 12–13). During this decade of continuous restruc-
turing, no IMF report assessed the efficiency and accuracy of the programs 
implemented. The report on the renegotiation of Mexico’s External Debt of 
October 2, 1986, praised the attachment of the representatives of the govern-
ments of Mexico and the 14 creditor countries “to the successful implementa-
tion of the program, in particular, the revitalization of the productive sector of 
the economy, the liberalization of the trade system, and the improvement of 
public finances” (IMF, 1986).
The absence of evaluation and self-criticism revealed a lack of practical anal-
ysis. Michel Camdessus, managing director of the Fund from 1987 to 2000, 
was convinced that the problems Mexico was facing came from the govern-
ment’s inability or unwillingness to implement IMF requirements properly 
(Camdessus, 1995). He supported the idea shared by most orthodox econo-
mists that “government policy is the primary cause of economic depressions” 
(Bergoeing et al., 2002: 16). Camdessus welcomed the “outstanding results” 
of stabilization program during his first mandate: the deficit aggregate balance 
in public finances (more than 15% of the GDP in 1987) moved into surplus 
during the 1990s, and inflation eased from 160% to 8% (Camdessus, 1995: 36). 
However, these parameters were not neutral since economic indicators did not 
take into account sustainable development, living standards, and development 
indices (Berthélemy & Lensink, 1995).
The Mexican crisis marked a turning point in the history of sovereign 
debt. International creditors’ financing and adjustment strategies of the 1970s 
showed its limits. The first solutions adopted focused on short-term “damage-
containment” policies (Griffith-Jones, 1989: 3). However, the Mexican crisis 
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affected the majority of emerging markets and Latin American economies. 
In the 1980s, bank loans and foreign private capital declined sharply. Until 
the 1982 crisis, Mexico depended on governmental loans from commercial 
banks, multilateral financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, and Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank), and foreign governments (mainly the United States) 
to finance its external deficit (Jorge & Salazar-Carrillo, 1988). By the end of 
the decade, Mexico had radically changed the way it attracted foreign capital 
(see Table  10.2). The domestic economy was opening up to international 
capital flows, lowered its barriers for foreign investment, privatized state cor-
porations, and extended stock exchange operations to private companies in 
the Bolsa de Valores de México, as well as in foreign exchanges, especially 
New York.12
In September  1983, the Organization of American States (OAS) held a 
conference in Caracas, Venezuela, on the problem of external debt in Latin 
American and Caribbean States. The idea emerged that countries should col-
laborate to exert collective pressure on the international financial commu-
nity to establish different operating conditions: payment moratoriums would 
become habits rather than exceptions. Many observers have interpreted the 
Caracas consensus as an attempt to form a debtor cartel, and collectively sus-
pend debt service payments, which would have threatened the entire global 
financial market (Anguiano Roch, 2000: 235).13 It became clear that the global 
financial community could no longer negotiate loan conditionality without 
debtor countries. Since international creditors were so involved in Latin 
American external debts, David Knox, World Bank Vice President for Latin 
America, evoked earlier, advised commercial banks to establish provisions for 
their potential losses. However, nothing came out of the Caracas meeting 
because each government preferred to negotiate individually with the IMF 
and private banks.14
In 1989, the new president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the “first economist 
to achieve the presidency, and the first with a Ph.D. (from Harvard)” (Ai Camp, 
2017: 3–4), launched a new phase in the external debt restructuring, with the 
implementation of the Brady Plan (after Nicholas Brady, U.S. Treasury secre-
tary). The debt relief plan implicitly recognized the evidence at the end of the 
Table 10.2 The financing of the Brady Agreement (US$ million)
Total IMF IBRD Other Own Ratio1
Costa Rica 216 51 35 102 28 0.87
Mexico 7000 1697 2010 2050 1243 0.82
Philippines 670 170 150 107 243 0.64
Uruguay 463 34 65 38 326 0.30
Venezuela 2380 880 500 600 400 0.83
Source: (OECD, 1992: 16; World Bank, 1990, 1991; IMF, 1991: 77). 1 The ratio refers to the foreign 
contribution to the financing of the Brady deal.
Global production of dominant ideologies 181
“lost decade” that many countries would not be able to repay their debts even 
if payment deadlines were further stretched (Sachs, 1989). The Plan called on 
commercial banks to step up lending to developing countries. This multilateral 
consensus induced a financial innovation with the creation of a secondary mar-
ket that allowed debtors to trade their debt.15 The IMF and the World Bank 
played a key role in facilitating the lending and liquidity for Latin American 
governments. The area of application of their prescriptions soon exceeded Latin 
American or Western countries to reach Pakistan (Butt & Jamal, 1988), India 
(Sau, 1983), Nigeria (Alawode, 1992), and Namibia (Morrell, 1983).
7  Conclusion
The implementation of the economic policy reforms resulting from the nego-
tiations between the transnational networks of foreign banks, multilateral 
organizations, and sovereign governments must be understood at the heart of 
the production and circulation of the dominant ideologies that flourished in 
the 1970s–80s. The agency of the Mexican government, although limited by 
financial dependency, was not null, and the appointment of economists who 
graduated in U.S. and U.K. top universities as ministers and secretaries high-
lighted the country’s degree of integration into financial globalization. Long 
considered a periphery of economic modernity, Mexico was, in fact, a central 
actor in the culture of the new capitalism. On the one hand, Mexican entrepre-
neurs and thinkers had contributed since the 1930s to the global development 
of neoliberal thinking. On the other hand, the IMF and commercial invest-
ment banks did not strictly design their arrangements during the debt crisis to 
save Mexico from bankruptcy but to avoid a systemic and global banking crisis.
The ad hoc structural adjustment plans and experimental reforms trans-
formed Mexico and many other Latin American countries into the laboratory 
of economic policy experimentations that found their institutional legitimacy 
in the affirmation of the “Washington consensus” during the 1990s. Mexico 
contributed to the emergence of transnational technocratic expertise, both as 
a field for financial innovation and a proactive agent for economic integration. 
In that respect, the global tripartition of the 20th century between advanced, 
developing, and underdeveloped countries, according to the classic scheme 
of historical evolution, was the fruit of the dominant vision and division of 
the world whose legacy must be challenged and questioned by contemporary 
literature.
Notes
 1 From the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) created in the aftermath of the revolu-
tion to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in power until 2000, Mexico had no 
experience of a democratic regime all along the 20th century.
 2 The term “nebula” captures the potential divergence between the economic interests 
of designated social groups but highlights how their beliefs and value system converged 
towards the same political agenda (Topalov, 1999).
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 3 The identification of these institutions has been a work in progress worldwide for more 
than a decade, and the coverage of the international database is not yet complete (this 
includes data collection by the EurElite Project, the EASE-Project, the Swiss Elite 
Observatory, PELA-USAL in Latin America, etc.).
 4 Economics as an academic field went through an existential crisis in the 1970s, espe-
cially in the United Kingdom and the United States. For the first time in economic 
history, with the global recession of 1973–75, inflation and unemployment rates 
exploded at the same time, while the Keynesian doxa had naturalized the idea that they 
were inversely proportional. Public sector borrowing increased and became an obsession 
in public debates. Since Keynesian theories proved incapable of addressing stagflation, 
the monetarist school and its quantity theory of money appeared as the only answer 
capable of solving the mystery of inflation (Jones, 2012; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; 
Burgin, 2012).
 5 Namely, socialist-oriented economists like Carlos Tello Macías, former Secretary of 
Budget and Planning, and José Andrés de Oteyza, Minister of Commerce and Industrial 
Development, in the cabinet of José López Portillo.
 6 We can draw a parallel with Algeria, which has experienced a similar transition within 
its single-party system. This oil-producing country also had to borrow from the IMF 
and implemented its structural adjustment plan in the 1980s (Yefsah, 1992; Entelis, 
2016).
 7 Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ, Paul Volcker’s Papers (MC279), 
Box 24. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Incoming telegram from 
Mexico (02508) on February 3, 1982.
 8 See Federal Funds Rate Historical Charts online: www.macrotrends.net/2015/
fed-funds-rate-historical-chart.
 9 Paul Volcker’s Papers (MC279), Box 24, Restricted-controlled documents.
 10 Crédit Lyonnais Archives, M. A. David Knox to the Agence France Presse (AFP), Febru-
ary 25, 1986, SEF0305 4 F 0247 FRA/AFP-AP23, Int.-Eco.-Dette flt1, AFP 252116 
FEV 86.
 11 See the influence of Chicagoan theories in Latin America (Guillén Romo, 1994; 
Biglaiser, 2002).
 12 Especially banks that had been nationalized in 1982, and the company Teléfonos de 
México.
 13 Crédit Lyonnais Archives, Latin American Debt Folder (1985–1988), Box 91AH115.
 14 M. A. David Knox to the Agence France Presse (AFP), February 25, 1986.
 15 Banks could swap their loan portfolios against shares and better-quality obligations.
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11  Economists in public 
discourses
The case of wealth and inheritance 
taxation in the German press
Hendrik Theine
1  Introduction
In this chapter, I  investigate the role of economists in public discourses on 
wealth and inheritance taxation in the German press. I do so by drawing on the 
recent “cultural turns” in regulation theory and post-Marxist thinking, in dis-
cussing economists as organic intellectuals – a term coined by Antonio Gramsci 
to describe the class-related nature of thinkers – and their role in society. In 
particular, economists are perceived to either shape the political and economic 
agendas in favour of the capitalist classes (“hegemonic organic intellectuals”) or 
call into question current policy regimes that favour dominant accumulation 
regimes (“counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals”).
To that end, text-mining methods are used to identify economists in the 
newspaper articles on wealth and inheritance taxation in seven German print 
outlets between 2000 and 2018. Media economists – the subset of economists 
that is present in media debates – are investigated regarding their quantitative 
appearance in the different newspapers and over time, their paradigmatic ori-
entation as well as their political affinities.
This chapter shows that well-known economists frequently occur in the 
newspaper coverage, which is no surprise given their position as directors of 
influential research institutes or experts in this particular field of economic 
research. Over time, varying levels of occurrences are identified which can 
be partly explained by the publication of books on wealth taxation and the 
broader issue of economic inequality. Considering paradigmatic orientations, 
this chapter indicates a stark dominance of economists associated with main-
stream economics and ordoliberalism, who are closely associated to market-
liberal organisations. Much less frequently occurring are post-Keynesian 
economists and other heterodox economists with ties to social-democratic and 
left-winged organisations. This pattern is reinforced by the political orienta-
tion of the newspapers. Given the role of economists as organic intellectuals 
in the political economy, such results point to a continuing legitimation and 
normalisation of the structural power of the capital class to assert their interests 
regarding low wealth and inheritance taxation.
As said, the role of economists in public discourses is investigated drawing 
on the example of wealth and inheritance taxation in Germany. The German 
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case is an illustrative example, because wealth inequality is particularly strik-
ing in Germany, which is one of the most unequal countries in the Eurozone 
area in terms of the wealth distribution (Bach et al., 2018; Leitner, 2016). One 
major reason for the persistence of wealth inequality is the transfer of wealth 
over generations in the form of gifts and inheritances, which leads to about 25 
to 40 per cent of overall wealth in Germany being inherited (Fessler & Schürz, 
2018; Leitner, 2016). Simulations indicate that the overall value of bequests and 
gifts has increased sharply in recent years, reaching annual amounts of around 
200 to 300 billion euros per year, which is equivalent to about 10 per cent of 
national income (Bach & Thiemann, 2016).
Yet, the different forms of wealth taxation (net wealth taxes, taxation of 
income generated from wealth such as capital income or rents, or the taxation 
of inheritance) play a very limited role in the German tax system. In sum, the 
different forms of wealth taxation result in approximately 1 per cent of GDP 
since the mid-1990s (Bach, 2018, 2014).1 A major reason is the expiration of 
the wealth tax in 1997 and rather low levels of revenue generated from the 
inheritance taxation due to extensive tax exemptions on business assets and on 
transfers to family members (Theine, 2019; Scheve & Stasavage, 2012; Hou-
ben & Maiterth, 2011).2
From a (post-)Marxist perspective, specific state policies such as the design of 
the tax system are the terrain of political struggles and historical contestations 
between different classes, class fractions and groups in society.3 Taxes can tell 
much about the dominance of certain classes and class fractions as well as the 
influence of other social forces (Jessop, 2016). In this account, the minor role 
of wealth taxation vis-à-vis other forms of taxation (taxes on consumption and 
labour income) can be regarded as the result of structural power of the capital 
class that is able to assert their interests. And indeed, detailed investigations of 
interest group influence on wealth and inheritance taxation signify the inten-
sive lobbying by business and wealthy interest groups for continuing low level 
of inheritance and wealth taxation or even the abolishment thereof (Theine, 
2020; Butterwegge, 2018; Hartmann, 2018).
This contribution is structured in the following way: section 2 discusses the 
“cultural turns” in regulation theory and post-Marxist thinking with a particu-
lar focus on the role of economists as organic intellectuals, section 3 introduces 
the methodological considerations of the empirical investigation, section 4 pre-
sents the main results and section 5 concludes.
2  The regulation approach, its cultural turns and 
economists as organic intellectuals
This chapter is situated in the recent ‘cultural turns’ in regulation theory and 
post-Marxist thinking that highlight the role of linguistic and semiotic ele-
ments, discourses and language in capitalist trajectories at large and the regu-
lation of specific accumulation regimes more specifically (e.g. Angermuller, 
2018; Jessop  & Sum, 2018; Maesse, 2018; Sum  & Jessop, 2013). A  prime 
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example of taking cultural turns seriously is the post-disciplinary approach 
“cultural political economy” (CPE) mainly developed by Sum and Jessop 
(2013). They emphasise the foundational nature of semiosis (any process of 
sense- and meaning-making) in social relations. Semiotic features play a fun-
damental role in interpreting and understanding actual events and processes as 
well as in reducing their complexity. At the same time, CPE remains rooted in 
the regulation approach as it emphasises the embeddedness of semiotic features 
in the broader sets of capitalist social relations.
Moving from rather general remarks to more specific investigations of eco-
nomic practices, and in particular, of economic policies, Jessop (2010) high-
lights the role of discursively selective economic “imaginaries” that, vis-à-vis 
structurally selective institutions, frame individual subjects’ lived experience of 
the inordinately complex world. In stabilising and prioritising some economic 
activities, they justify certain social positions over others, and, by and by, nor-
malise the legitimacy of some economic activities from a broad set of possible 
activities while at the same time disqualifying other (alternative) activities (Jes-
sop, 2010). Economic imaginaries are selectively defined due to the discursive 
and material biases of specific economic paradigms.
Among the main forces involved in the (re)definition and articulation of 
specific economic imaginaries at the micro-, meso- or macro-level are various 
actors in the civil society such as think tanks, intellectuals, international bod-
ies, organised interests and social movements. Furthermore, the mass media are 
also crucial intermediaries in mobilising elite and/or popular support behind 
competing imaginaries (Jessop, 2010).
In this chapter, I focus on the role of economists who, due to their expert 
status, play a key role in defining, articulating and normalising specific eco-
nomic imaginaries. It is Antonio Gramsci (1971/2003) who was among the 
first concerned with the role of intellectuals from a Marxist perspective. For 
him, intellectuals play a decisive role in the political economy as they have the 
time, material resources and outstanding public standing which enable them to 
shape and influence public debates on contested issues and to define the valid-
ity of diverse knowledge claims.4 In particular, he coined the term “organic 
intellectual” to stress that even though intellectuals typically perceive them-
selves as neutral and autonomous from class-based interests, they actually are 
not. In contrast, for Gramsci organic intellectuals are closely connected to dif-
ferent social classes as they promote and consolidate a specific conception of 
the world that provides awareness and (internal) coherence of classes in their 
economic, political and social fields. Thus, by promoting and consolidating 
specific conceptions of the world, they play an active part in privileging certain 
class positions and their interests over others.
O’Neill and Wayne (2018) go on to subdivide organic intellectuals into 
hegemonic organic intellectuals and counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals. 
Hegemonic organic intellectuals work on behalf of the capitalist class to help 
shape the broader political moral, social and cultural agenda and, thus, act as 
“the dominant group’s ‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions of social 
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hegemony and political government” (Gramsci, 1971/2003, p. 118). In con-
trast, counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals call into question the dominant 
frames of reference, assumptions and policy trends that favour specific accumu-
lation regimes and capitalism more generally (O’Neill & Wayne, 2018).
Specifying the different roles of economists, Maesse (2015, 2017) suggests 
that they often act as authoritative and legitimising actors in societal discourse 
due to the prestige inscribed in their academic positions and their educational 
credentials. Economists and knowledge from economics has a distinct status as 
a cultural resource for discursive interventions in the political and economic 
realm and in public debates.5
In the context of media debates, the so-called media economists (the sub-
set of economists that is present in such debates) typically use a specific set 
of discursive strategies, but are at the same time required to “convert” their 
specialised knowledge into more accessible language. Media statements need 
to be grounded in scientific expertise, otherwise media economists risk their 
reputation within the academic community, on which their prestige actually 
depends. It is crucial to note that media statements from economists trigger 
debate and dissent by fellow scientists, for instance, by calling into question the 
specific argument or invoking alternative empirical studies. Yet, the scientific 
standing of fellow economists with a similar paradigmatic orientation (see later) 
is typically not questioned, which leads Maesse (2017) to argue that, in such a 
case, media statements by economists unfold their actual efficacy.6
Finally, economists tend to hide or even deny their political affinity and 
ideological convictions in public discourse and portray themselves as “the voice 
of science,” i.e. they only convey subject-related facts and no personal positions 
(Maesse, 2015; Dow, 2015). Yet, all social science (thus, economic) theorising 
inevitably incorporates values and ideologies at various stages of research: be 
it on the level of theory selection and ontological assumptions, the empirical 
case selection or the specific methods used (Heise, 2019; Dow, 2015; Harvey, 
2015; Stretton, 1969). Above that, research has been documenting the affili-
ation of many economists to political parties, think tanks and organisations, 
which actively pursue political projects of various kinds (e.g. Salas-Porras, 
2018; Schmidt-Wellenburg, 2018; Pühringer, 2017; Plehwe & Walpen, 2006). 
For instance, Ötsch et al. (2018) show for the case of Germany that there is a 
long-standing practice of economists being active in the socio-political realm 
in various ways: as members of political parties, think tanks and foundations 
or by offering economic advice in expert committees, councils and regulatory 
bodies.
In summary, it can be drawn from this literature that media economists play 
an important role as organic intellectuals in media debates to justify and nor-
malise the legitimacy of some economic activities from a broad set of possi-
ble activities and, thereby, to defend certain social positions over others. This 
chapter considers media economists in the debate over wealth and inheritance 
taxation with a specific focus on their role as (counter) hegemonic organic 
intellectuals. It does so by making the ideological convictions and political 
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affiliations of economists explicit, thereby dismantling the myth of value- and 
position-free economics.
3  Methodology
In order to analyse the role of (media) economists in the media debates on 
wealth and inheritance taxation, this study employs text-mining methods in 
the framework of critical discourse studies (Subtirelu & Baker, 2017; Mautner, 
1995). This section explains and discusses the data collected for and used in this 
study and the text-mining methods.
The corpus of print media articles between 2000 and 2018 contains seven 
daily and weekly newspapers (see Table  11.1 for details). The newspapers 
were selected because they are considered to be the most influential and most 
read quality newspapers in Germany; several of them being listed as Leitme-
dium (“newspaper of record”), which fuel and influence social, political and 
economic debates on current affairs (Röper, 2018, 2014, 2008, 2004, 2000; 
Presserelations, 2017; Pfanner, 2011; Weischenberg et al., 2005).7
Concerning ownership, several newspapers belong to the ten largest media 
corporations in Germany. Among them are well-known multi-generational 
family businesses (Gruner+Jahr, Verlagsgruppe von Holtzbrinck and Axel 
Springer SE), where not only the ownership of the corporation but also con-
siderable wealth is passed on from one generation to another (see Ferschli et al., 
2019, for details). This ownership might imply that the aforementioned corpo-
rations have a vested interest in hostile media coverage of wealth and inherit-
ance taxation. Two newspapers have a distinctly different legal structure: taz 
Table 11.1 Number of articles per newspaper
Newspaper Type of newspaper Ownership No. of Share of total 
articles articles (in %)
Welt am Sonntag Weekly Axel Springer SE 703 7
Die Zeit Weekly, Verlagsgruppe von Holtzbrinck 644 7
Leitmedium
Der Spiegel Weekly, Gruner+Jahr, Spiegel- 431 4
Mitarbeiter KG, Rudolf 
Augstein heirs
Die Welt Daily Axel Springer SE 2332 24
Frankfurter Allg. Daily, Fazit-foundation 1077 11
Zeitung Leitmedium
Süddeutsche Daily, Südwestdeutsche Medien 2944 30
Zeitung Leitmedium Holding
taz Daily tageszeitung 1580 16
Verlagsgenossenschaft eG
Total 9711 100
Sources: Newspaper ownership is based on Ferschli et  al. (2019), kek (2019), Bergmann and Novy 
(2012), and Groll (2012).
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and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung belong to a cooperative and a non-profit 
foundation (Bergmann & Novy, 2012; Groll, 2012).
The editorial stance of the seven newspapers is for sure not clear cut and 
might have also evolved over time, yet past literature has identified certain ten-
dencies. Welt am Sonntag and Die Welt are rather bourgeois-conservative outlets 
with a distinctively market liberal stance towards economic policy issues (Sasse, 
2012; Pointner, 2010). Die Zeit enjoys a high reputation as a weekly newspa-
per with high-quality journalism. Its political and economic orientation falls 
mainly between the centre and left-liberal positions. Der Spiegel used to be an 
outspokenly liberal newspaper, yet gradually leaned towards more conserva-
tive positions, which was largely influenced by Stefan Aust, the editor-in-chief 
from 1994 to 2008 (Wolter, 2016; Burkhardt, 2012). Founded by a group of 
influential German industrials, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s tone since 
its early years oscillates between liberal and conservative positions (Burkhardt, 
2012). Current research endorses this long-standing impression that FAZ is 
rather neoliberal in framing as particularly staff journalists are advocating mini-
mal state intervention and market liberalism (Wolter, 2016; Pointner, 2010; 
Volkmann, 2006). Süddeutsche Zeitung is leaning towards a left-liberal orienta-
tion, although media scholars like Wolter (2016) show for the topic of current 
economic affairs in 1982 and 2003 that most articles were following neoliberal 
arguments and assessments. taz, founded as a self-organised, direct democratic 
newspaper, takes a rather left-wing, green-alternative stance (Groll, 2012).
The newspaper articles for the final corpus were obtained from several data-
bases (Lexis Nexis, factiva, and WISO) using appropriate keywords8 and with 
kind support from Alexander Leipold (forthcoming). After deleting unsuit-
able articles from the sample,9 the final corpus consisted of 9711 articles (see 
Table 11.1). Apart from the articles’ headlines, lead paragraphs and main con-
tent, the corpus entails information on the authors, publication date and length 
of the articles.
In order to analyse media economists as organic intellectuals, a comprehen-
sive list was compiled. The initial data was provided by Stephan Pühringer and 
consisted of all economists holding a professorship at a university in Germany 
in the 21st century (see Grimm et al., 2018 for details). In order to obtain a 
larger sample of economists beyond economic professors, this data was updated 
and extended from various sources: member lists of various academic associa-
tions in Germany (such as Keynes Gesellschaft and Verein für Socialpolitik), 
economists who are listed in rankings by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2018, 
2015, 2013) and Handelsblatt (2010), as well as a comprehensive list of German 
economists active on Twitter compiled by Makronom (Odendahl & Stachelsky, 
2019). Finally, well-known international economists were added to the sample 
based on their own previous research. In total, this resulted in a list of 1422 
economists.
As noted earlier, economists tend to make no reference to their ideological 
convictions, yet, at the same time, they are building their arguments on moral 
beliefs and political opinions – in particular when it comes to public debates on 
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socio-political matters (Dow, 2015; Harvey, 2015). To capture this aspect, this 
chapter builds on from previous research which regards economics being com-
prised of different schools of thought or paradigms (for details see Dobusch & 
Kapeller, 2012; Lee, 2012; Dequech, 2007). More specifically, economics can 
be differentiated between schools of thought being part of the mainstream, 
which is made up of the “neoclassical economics” as the dominant core theory 
with its central assumptions of rationality, ergodicity and equilibrium states as 
well as characterised by the exclusive acceptance of mathematical-deductive 
models and positivism as scientific rationales (Heise & Thieme, 2016; Lawson, 
2013; Dobusch & Kapeller, 2012; Dequech, 2007). At the same time, several 
economic schools of thought deviate partly from some of the core neoclassi-
cal assumptions but tend to remain in the scientific rationales of mainstream 
economics (mathematical-deductive models and positivism) – what Colander 
et  al. (2004) call the “edge of the mainstream” (see also Heise  & Thieme, 
2016; Dequech, 2007). Furthermore, “ordoliberalism” is a specifically German 
school of thought based around the central tenet of a competitive, market-
based society which is ensured by the policy of order (“Ordnungspolitik”) of 
the state (Frey et al., 2010; Ptak, 2009).
Heterodox economic approaches, on the other hand, reject the central 
axioms of neoclassical economics and are characterised by a methodological 
openness to less formally mathematical methods of scientific inquiry (Heise & 
Thieme, 2016). Furthermore, heterodox economic approaches aim at explain-
ing economics as a social provisioning process, which, according to Lee (2012, 
p.  340), directs the attention of economic analysis towards “human agency 
embedded in a cultural context and social processes in historical time affecting 
resources, consumption patterns, production and reproduction, and the mean-
ing (or ideology) of market, state and non-market/state activities engaged in 
social provisioning.” In Germany, heterodox economic approaches play a fairly 
small role. Given this, post-Keynesian economics is the most frequent hetero-
dox school of thought in Germany (Heise & Thieme, 2016; Frey et al., 2010).
Reflecting this state of affairs in economics, economists are classified as the 
following according to the paradigmatic orientations: ordoliberal economists, 
plural mainstream economists and other mainstream economists as the three 
variations of mainstream economics, as well as post-Keynesians and other het-
erodox economists as the two variations of heterodox economics. This cat-
egorisation was derived from previous research and is based on professional 
websites and publicly available CVs of the economists in question (Grimm 
et al., 2018; Ötsch et al., 2018; Heise et al., 2016; Heise & Thieme, 2016).
The conjunction between paradigmatic orientations and stance towards 
wealth and inheritance taxation is quite straightforward for the most part. Ordo-
liberal and other mainstream economists tend to be rather hostile towards the 
reintroduction of wealth taxation and/or a more progressive approach towards 
inheritance taxation. In terms of political affinities, recent research (Botzem & 
Hesselmann, 2018; Ötsch et al., 2018; Pühringer, 2017) is able trace close con-
nections of both group of economists to the network of German neoliberalism 
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(e.g. the Kronberger Kreis, Stiftung Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft or the 
Hayek Gesellschaft) – all of them being highly critical of higher taxation of 
inheritance and wealth (Lobbypedia, 2019a, 2019b; Ptak, 2007). Based on the 
aforementioned terminology, ordoliberal and other mainstream economists can 
be regarded as hegemonic organic intellectuals shaping the political and eco-
nomic agenda in favour of the capitalist class.
In contrast, many of the post-Keynesian and other heterodox economists 
tend to be in favour of higher inheritance taxation and/or a reintroduction 
of wealth taxation. In terms of political affinities, post-Keynesian economists 
are closely linked to the Böckler Stiftung or the Keynes Gesellschaft, both 
part of the “Keynesian-alternative thought collective” (Pühringer, 2017, p. 19). 
Hence, post-Keynesian and other heterodox economists can be considered 
counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals as they call into question current pol-
icy regimes that favour dominant accumulation regimes.
The plural mainstream economists are a rather heterogeneous group when 
it comes to their stance towards wealth and inheritance taxation. To be sure, 
economists such as Thomas Piketty or Paul Krugman have been arguing for 
a higher taxation of wealth, yet, for others in this group, the position is rather 
unclear.
4  Results
This section discusses the role of economists in newspaper coverage on wealth 
and inheritance taxation. It does so by assessing the quantitative appearance of 
economists in the different newspapers and over time. Then, it focuses on the 
paradigmatic orientations and political affinities of the economists in order to 
discuss their role as organic intellectuals in the political economy.
Regarding the quantitative appearance of economists, Table  11.2 displays 
the 30 most frequently mentioned economists in the newspaper coverage – all 
male. At first glance, it shows that Thomas Piketty is the most cited economist 
over the whole period. Likewise, several other international experts are among 
the 20 most mentioned economists, such as Joseph E. Stiglitz, Paul Krugman 
and Kenneth Rogoff. Moreover, several well-known German economists show 
up in the list. Among them are, for instance, Clemens Fuest – president of the 
Ifo Institute for Economic Research since 2016, as well as his long-standing 
predecessor Hans-Werner Sinn. Several current and former members of the 
German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung 
der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung) are on the list, such as Peter Bofin-
ger, Lars Feld, Wolfgang Franz and Christoph M. Schmidt. In total, the list of 
economists cited in the newspaper coverage on wealth and inheritance taxation 
comprises 226 names, most of them mentioned only once or twice.
This result is well in line with previous research that also identified many 
of the economists listed here as important sources in media debates on eco-
nomic issues; thus, as media economists. For instance, Clemens Fuest, Hans-
Werner Sinn, Michael Hüther and Marcel Fratzscher who are high up on the 
196 Hendrik Theine
Table 11.2 30 most frequently mentioned economists
Name Welt am Die Welt Frankfurter Die Zeit DER Süddeutsche taz sum
Sonntag Allg. Zeitung SPIEGEL Zeitung
Thomas Piketty 6 5 16 14 7 21 14 83
Bert Rürup 4 10 6 6 10 12 1 49
Clemens Fuest 5 8 11 8 3 7 1 43
Hans-Werner Sinn 3 8 8 4 5 11 3 42
Stefan Bach 1 4 5 2 0 16 13 41
Peter Bofinger 2 4 3 4 4 9 8 34
Rudolf Hickel 1 0 4 0 2 7 15 29
Michael Hüther 6 11 5 1 0 4 0 27
Marcel Fratzscher 2 4 4 4 1 4 5 24
Joseph E. Stiglitz 1 2 2 3 2 6 6 22
Markus Grabka 1 3 2 2 3 5 6 22
Paul Krugman 1 0 2 6 3 7 3 22
Lars Feld 2 3 5 2 1 4 1 18
Thomas 5 4 0 2 1 3 1 16
Straubhaar
Gert Wagner 1 3 3 1 0 5 2 15
Christoph 2 1 2 2 0 3 4 14
Schmidt
Friedrich 1 2 2 2 0 7 0 14
Heinemann
Gustav Horn 1 2 1 5 0 3 2 14
Klaus 3 3 2 2 0 1 3 14
Zimmermann
Bernd Lucke 2 1 2 5 1 1 1 13
Dierk Hirschel 0 0 0 3 0 4 6 13
Kenneth Rogoff 0 3 2 1 3 3 1 13
Wolfgang Franz 1 4 1 0 0 5 2 13
Stefan Homburg 2 2 4 0 1 2 0 11
Wolfgang Wiegard 0 3 0 2 1 3 1 10
Achim Truger 0 0 3 2 0 1 3 9
Lawrence 0 0 1 5 2 0 1 9
Summers
Giacomo Corneo 1 0 3 0 3 1 0 8
Ben Bernanke 1 3 0 1 0 2 0 7
other 28 56 77 55 36 100 47 399
SUM 83 149 176 144 89 280 150 1071
list (Table 11.2) also play a dominant role in the media debates on the financial 
crisis and are in a leading position in the FAZ ranking of the most influential 
economists (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2018, 2015; Pühringer & Hirte, 
2015). Yet there are also striking differences. Most notably, Stefan Bach, econ-
omist at the DIW, is the fifth most cited economist in the coverage on wealth 
and inheritance taxation, but not listed in the FAZ rankings. In a similar vein, 
Andreas Hoffmann and Markus Grabka are typically also not that high up on 
the lists.
Table 11.2 also signifies important differences among the newspapers. Note 
that the quantitative occurrences of the economists in the different newspaper 
outlets need to be considered against the background of the number of articles 
in such newspapers (see Table 11.1). Taking the varying number of newspaper 
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articles into account, a striking pattern emerges that corresponds to political 
orientation of the newspapers. For instance, Die Welt and Welt am Sonntag, 
which are typically regarded as conservative and market-liberal newspapers (see 
section 3), refer frequently to Clemens Fuest, Hans-Werner Sinn and Michael 
Hüther, all of them rather market-liberal, conservative economists. In con-
trast, more progressive or even explicitly left-wing economists are less likely 
to be referred to: Die Welt is not citing Paul Krugman or Rudolf Hickel at 
all. Likewise, Welt am Sonntag rather infrequently refers to those economists. 
taz – a rather progressive newspaper outlet, on the other hand, refers to econo-
mists such as Dierk Hirschel, Christoph Butterwegge and Rudolf Hickel (all 
rather progressive) relatively more than to market-liberal ones, such as Michael 
Hüther, Clemens Fuest and Stefan Homburg.
Finally, Table  11.2 (last row) indicates that the reference to economic 
experts is not equally distributed among the seven newspapers (here again, one 
needs to take the varying number of articles per newspaper into account; see 
Table 11.1). Doing so, Die Zeit, Der Spiegel and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
refer to economists more frequently, in comparison to Die Welt, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung and taz.
Considering the appearance of economists over time, Figure  11.1 shows 
varying levels of occurrences over the years. At the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, but also at the end of the period of investigation, there is a scarce appear-
ance of economists in the different newspapers. In contrast, a few years stand 
out: 2005, 2012–2014 and 2016. A possible explanation for the peak in the 
latter two years (2014 and 2016) is the publication of the books Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century (2014) by Thomas Piketty and Verteilungskampf (2016) by 











2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Figure 11.1 Occurrence of economists over time
198 Hendrik Theine
issue of wealth and inheritance taxation (see Grisold & Theine, forthcoming; 
Theine & Rieder, 2019a, 2019b for in-depth analysis of the newspaper debate 
after the publication of Piketty’s book).
I now turn to the paradigmatic orientation of the economists (see section 3 
for details on the methodology). Table 11.3 shows that economists associated 
with mainstream economics are by far the largest group in the newspaper cov-
erage, followed by pluralist mainstream economists and ordoliberalists. Much 
less frequently occurring are post-Keynesian economists and other heterodox 
economists. A closer look into the categories reveals that many of the most-
cited pluralist mainstream economists are in fact Thomas Piketty and his col-
leagues and co-authors (for instance Emanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman). 
When only German and German-based economists are considered, ordoliber-
alists make up a large majority of economists in the media coverage.
Here again, Table 11.3 indicates varying extents to which economists are 
mentioned in the seven newspapers. Die Zeit, Der Spiegel, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung and Welt am Sonntag mention mainstream and ordoliberal economists 
the most. In contrast, both groups of economists are least picked up by taz 
and Süddeutsche Zeitung. Plural mainstream economists are mentioned most 
frequently in Die Zeit, Der Spiegel and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. In con-
trast, Die Welt and Welt am Sonntag almost make no reference at all to plural 
mainstream economists. Turning to post-Keynesian economists, they are most 
frequently mentioned in Die Zeit and taz. The other newspaper outlets only 
seldom refer to post-Keynesian economists; in particular, Die Welt and Welt am 
Sonntag make almost no reference at all. Heterodox economists, finally, are – if 
at all – mentioned by Der Spiegel and taz.
In order to consider political affinities, I now draw on several examples of 
conjunctions between media economists active in the debate on wealth and 
inheritance taxation and political organisations. Regarding ordoliberal and 
mainstream economists, several of the frequently occurring media economists 
are well connected to market-liberal organisations. For instance, Clemens 
Table 11.3  Number of economists occurring in newspaper articles according to paradig-
matic orientation
Paradigmatic orientation Welt am Die Frankfurter Die DER Süddeutsche taz sum
Sonntag Welt Allg. Zeitung Zeit SPIEGEL Zeitung
Mainstream 34 59 53 48 35 78 30 337
Economists
Plural Mainstream 12 16 42 38 22 99 47 276
Econ.
Ordoliberal 23 48 60 31 15 42 7 226
Economists
Postkeynesian 3 8 11 16 4 20 32 94
Economists
Heterodox Economists 2 3 6 2 7 12 24 56
NA 9 15 4 9 6 29 10 82
Economists in public discourses 199
Fuest and Lars Feld, both strong advocates of low wealth taxation, are part of 
the Kronberger Kreis, the academic advisory council of the Market Economy 
Foundation (Stiftung Marktwirtschaft). The foundation strives for a “renais-
sance of market oriented policies” which is led by the conviction that “the 
market offers more freedom and prosperity to society than can statism and 
government intervention” (Market Economy Foundation 2019). Regarding 
wealth and inheritance taxation, the foundation opposes a reintroduction of 
wealth taxation and is rather sceptical when comes to a progressive reform of 
the inheritance taxation (Lobbypedia, 2019c; Kronberger Kreis, 2015; Bült-
mann, 2013).
In a similar vein, Michael Hüther, just like Clemens Fuest and Lars Feld, 
are academic advisors to the Economic Council of the Christian Democratic 
Union (Wirtschaftsrat der CDU e.V.) (Lobbypedia, 2019d; Wirtschaftsrat der 
CDU, 2019). The council advocates for economic policies that “best reflect 
the principles of a social market economy” and represents the interests of 
small and medium-sized firms as well as multinational companies in Germany 
(Wirtschaftsrat der CDU, 2019). The council is highly critical of wealth and 
inheritance taxation as both supposedly jeopardise the innovation capacity and 
equity basis of German companies (Wirtschaftsrat der CDU, 2018).
As said, post-Keynesian and heterodox economists are less frequently occur-
ring in comparison to ordoliberal and other mainstream economists. For three 
post-Keynesian and heterodox media economists, Rudolf Hickel, Gustav 
Horn and Peter Bofinger, political affinities to social-democratic and left-wing 
organisations can be found. For instance, all three have signed an open letter 
against the German debt brake and tax cuts in 2009 which were issued by the 
Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK) linked to the German Confederation 
of Trade Unions (DGB) (Bofinger & Horn, 2009; for details on the debate of 
the German debt brake see Pühringer, 2014).
Likewise, Rudolf Hickel and Gustav Horn are academic advisors to the 
Arbeitskreis Steuermythen  – a working group with close ties to the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) that aims to dismantle “misperceptions and myths” 
in the German debate over taxation and public finances (Arbeitskreis Steuer-
mythen, 2019). Gustav Horn, finally, was the academic director of the IMK 
from 2005 until 2019 and has been recently elected as a member of the board 
of the SPD (Horn, 2019; Social Democratic Party, 2019).
Recalling the aforementioned discussion of economists as organic intel-
lectuals, the imbalance between ordoliberal and other mainstream economists 
(hegemonic organic intellectuals) on the one hand, and post-Keynesian and 
other heterodox economists (counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals) on the 
other hand, signifies a dominance of market liberal positions over intervention-
ist agendas.
5  Conclusion
This chapter investigates the role of economists as organic intellectuals in public 
discourses drawing on the example of wealth and inheritance taxation in the 
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German press. In particular, economists are conceptualised to either shape the 
political and economic agendas in favour of the capitalist classes (“hegemonic 
organic intellectuals”) or call into question current policy regimes that favour 
dominant accumulation regimes (“counter-hegemonic organic intellectuals”).
Regarding their quantitative appearance, this chapter shows that well-known 
economists frequently occur in newspaper coverage, which is no surprise given 
their position as directors of influential research institutes or experts in this par-
ticular field of economic research. Over time, varying levels of occurrences are 
detected which can be partly explained by the publication of books on wealth 
taxation and the broader issue of economic inequality.
Considering paradigmatic orientations and political affinities of economists, 
this chapter indicates a stark dominance of economists associated with main-
stream economics and ordoliberalism who are closely connected to market-
liberal organisations. Much less frequently occurring are post-Keynesian 
economists and other heterodox economists linked to social-democratic and 
left-wing organisations. Given the role of economists as organic intellectuals 
in the political economy, the imbalance between hegemonic organic intellec-
tuals (ordoliberal and other mainstream economists) and counter-hegemonic 
organic intellectuals (post-Keynesian and other heterodox economists) points 
to a continuing legitimation and normalisation of the structural power of the 
capital classes to assert their interests regarding low wealth and inheritance 
taxation.
Notes
 1 Note that wealth taxation used to play a more substantial role in the overall state revenue. 
Just after the Second World War, taxes on the different forms of wealth taxation have been 
much higher with around 3 per cent of GDP. Even further in the past, taxes on wealth 
have been above 5 per cent of GDP in the Weimarer Republic (Bach, 2018). Seelkopf 
et  al. (2019) suggest that inheritance taxation is one of the early forms of taxation in 
Germany established on the national level in 1906, but with antecedents on the regional 
level in various parts of Germany dating back to the 17th century in the city of Hamburg 
and the principality of Brunswick-Lüneburg. Yet, since the 1990s, taxation of wealth has 
been reduced substantially.
 2 The inheritance taxation could have been strengthened quite “easily” in the 21st century, 
as it was subject to two constitutional court rulings in 2006 and 2014 which required a 
reform of the existing tax law. In both incidents, the legislature was given around two 
years to reform the tax act (see Theine, 2019, table A.1, for details). The subsequent tax 
reforms showed little to no progress regarding a higher taxation of inheritances. In con-
trast, several scholars have suggested new exemptions were being introduced into the law, 
decreasing the taxation of inheritance even further (see for instance Butterwegge, 2018; 
Horn et al., 2017; Bach, 2016).
 3 Poulantzas (1978), for instance, argues that the state is a complex “relationship of forces, 
or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class 
fractions” (cited in Jessop, 2019, p. 5); hence, it is an explanandum, not an explanatory 
principle (Jessop, 2016).
 4 To be more precise, for Gramsci everyone engages in intellectual reasoning to certain 
degrees, as people usually have a specific conception of the world – a “worldview” – 
which they have forged out of their experience, circumstance and through (mediated) 
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communication. But, “not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci, 
1971/2003, p. 9). This function of being an intellectual is reserved only for a specific 
group.
 5 Maesse (2015) actually suggests that economists not only talk about “economic issues” but 
that their public interventions stretch far into general political and societal questions. In 
this sense, they present themselves as “universal intellectuals” in a society that is affected 
more and more by economic globalisation and the structuring of social and political issues 
along economic rationales.
 6 The appointment of Achim Truger as a member of the German Council of Economic 
Experts may serve as an illustrative example of critique against economists with diverging 
paradigmatic orientations. The appointment of Truger, a post-Keynesian economist, by 
the German trade unions has been heavily criticised in the German media and, among 
others, by economists with a mainstream economic background. In particular, he was 
criticised for his perceived lack of scientific standing; his expert status as an economist was 
called into question (see for an overview: Oxi Redaktion, 2018; D’Ippoliti & Flechner, 
2018).
 7 Due to database restrictions, Bild Zeitung is unfortunately not part of the sample.
 8 The keywords used to identify the relevant newspaper articles for this study were wealth 
taxation and inheritance taxation (and variations thereof in order to capture different ways 
to refer to such forms of taxation in the German language).
 9 A combination of automatic and manual text cleaning methods were used to remove 
duplicate, corrected and very short articles. Further, internal memos (“Hausmitteilun-
gen”), letters from readers, tables of content, advertisement, book suggestions and event 
recommendations were excluded from the corpus.
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12  Are there institutionalized 
pathways to the Nobel Prize 
in economics?1
Philipp Korom
1  Academic excellence and “power through ideas”
Throughout most of the 19th century, the academy had been a parochial world 
subordinated to the will of locally established churches and politicians. Profes-
sors did not aim to produce new knowledge but rather to bring forth men who 
were sociable and cultivated (McClelland, 1980). What Jencks and Riesman 
(1968) termed an “academic revolution” – by which they meant the triumph 
of professors and their norms of meritocracy over boards of trustees composed 
of non-academics and special interest groups  – is essentially a recent devel-
opment. Publications and recognition from those who are qualified to judge 
slowly emerged as the prime indicator of scholarly achievement in a growing 
type of academic institution, the “research university” (Menand et al., 2017), 
in which the professionalization of scholars takes place.2
Today all academic disciplines, including economics, have an elaborate sys-
tem of awards to recognize academic excellence, mostly with a single ne plus 
ultra award. The best-known awards are the Field Medal in mathematics and 
the Nobel Prize. Because the Nobel Prize is regarded by laypeople and scien-
tists alike as the acme of scientific achievement, the award gives economists the 
authority to speak on behalf of science (Lebaron, 2006). However, Laureates 
themselves have criticized the special standing of the Nobel Prize. Friedrich 
Hayek, the 1974 Nobel Laureate in economics, feared that the prize could 
create an aura of hard science certainty around the decidedly social science of 
economics.3 Milton Friedman, the 1976 Nobel Laureate, was skeptical about 
the assumed universality of Laureates’ elite expertise: “I myself have been asked 
my opinion on everything from a cure for the common cold to the market 
value of a letter signed by John F. Kennedy.”4
Outside the field of economics, fervent critiques of the prize have charged 
that the Nobel Prize system does not recognize the unity of the social sciences 
in theory and in application (Horowitz, 1983). Given research that consistently 
demonstrates that economists are less likely to contribute to the public good, 
others argue that the prize stands in direct contradiction to the founder’s will, 
which stipulated that awards should be given to those who have “conferred the 
greatest benefit on mankind” (Rothstein, 2015).
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However, despite all these reservations, the Nobel Prize in economics has 
lost neither its extraordinary visibility nor its prestige. The prize continuously 
gives discursive power to Nobel Laureates to effectively advance ideas in aca-
demics, politics, economics and the media (Maesse, 2015). To give just a few 
illustrations of the Laureates’ impact on the circulation of powerful ideas: Gary 
S. Becker popularized the notion of “human capital”; Chile implemented an 
economic recovery plan based on Milton Friedman’s policy recommendations 
in the 1970s; Daniel Kahneman (along with Amos Tversky) changed the way 
the world thinks about economics, upending the notion that human beings are 
rational decision-makers; Paul Krugman has become one of the most influen-
tial public intellectuals in the social sciences, reaching a wide audience through 
his columns in the New York Times.
The Nobel Prize does not guarantee lasting esteem by fellow scientists, as 
“the scientific community is acutely sensitive to signs of its members being 
‘over the hill’ ” (Zuckerman, 1977, pp. 238–239). With the emphasis on mov-
ing ahead, the prestige of Laureates may turn out to be short-lived as their 
research is superseded by newer contributions. Yet there seems to be little ebb 
and flow regarding the scientific legitimacy of Nobel Laureates as public intel-
lectuals. This might also be one of many reasons why key ideas of Laureates 
easily turn into “public ideas” (Hallett, Stapleton, & Sauder, 2019) circulat-
ing in the news and being used by different mediators (e.g. journalists) for 
making sense of current events. Examples of such “public ideas” are nudging 
(R. Thaler), the prize of inequality (J. Stiglitz), the human development index 
(A. Sen), economic freedom (M. Friedman), and the tragedy of the commons 
(E. Ostrom).
Given this power of Nobel Laureates in economics to influence the public 
(“power through ideas,” c.f. Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016), it appears worth-
while to investigate in depth who these scholars actually are. Previous research 
has categorized Laureates according to their theoretical approaches (Boettke, 
Fink, & Smith, 2012; Offer & Söderberg, 2016, p. 150f.), identified predictors 
of the Nobel Prize winners in economics (Chan & Torgler, 2012), analyzed 
citation trajectories (Bjork, Offer,  & Söderberg, 2014), reconstructed intel-
lectual trajectories through oral history interviews (e.g. Samuelson & Barnett, 
2007), or analyzed the life cycle of scholarly creativity (Weinberg & Galen-
son, 2019). What makes this chapter’s contribution distinct is its focus on the 
nexus between academic institutions5 and (individual) pathways to achieving 
the highest level of eminence.
My main argument is that publications in the most prestigious journals, 
socialization in the top departments of the discipline, and receiving the Nobel 
Prize produce a circle of interdependencies: Publications in top journals such as 
the American Economic Review are a precondition for tenure at top departments 
such as Harvard University (Heckman & Moktan, 2018). Tenure at prestigious 
departments then set economists on a trajectory to reach the apex of eminence 
represented by the Nobel Prize. Finally, Laureates may succeed in further pub-
lishing in leading journals, partly because of their reputation. The postulated 
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nexus, I will argue, holds true for most but not all cases. The general conclusion 
is that pathways to eminence in economics are institutionalized and limited.
2  The prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred 
Nobel – a celebration of the power of mind and a 
political enterprise
The Nobel Prize is the prize of prizes; no other award carries comparable 
prestige. The “Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of 
Alfred Nobel” was not mentioned in Alfred Nobel’s original testament of 1895 
(Nobelstiften, 1972), as were all other Nobel Prizes, but is based on a donation 
received by the Nobel Foundation in 1968 from Sweden’s Central Bank. Its 
selection procedures were described by Assar Lindbeck, who dominated the 
prize committee until recently, as follows:
Every October a form, to be filled in which suggested candidates, is sent 
to professors at about 75 departments of economics all over the world [as 
well as to previous Laureates] . . . About 150 to 200 proposals are regu-
larly received for the economics prize, usually covering some 75 to 125 
nominees . . . After receiving the various proposals, the prize committee 
commissions expert studies of the most prominent candidates, sometimes 
by Swedish experts but usually by foreigners . . . The “stock” of candidates 
that is considered annually hovers around 20–30 persons, though usually 
only a handful of these are regarded as “hot” names each year  .  .  . The 
prize is finally decided by simple majority in a secret ballot in this plenary 
session, where all Swedish members of the [Royal Swedish] Academy [of 
Sciences] (260 persons) have the right to vote if they participate in the 
meeting.
(Lindbeck, 1985, pp. 46–47)
Regarding the question of what is considered a prize-worthy contribution, “it 
is probably correct to say that the selection committee has looked, in particular, 
Tenure in top 5 
departments
Nobel Prize
Publications  in top 
5 journals
Figure 12.1 Circle of interdependencies
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at the originality of the contribution, its scientific and practical importance, 
and its impact on scientific work” (Lindbeck, 2001, p. 212). With hindsight, it 
also becomes apparent that the prize has been awarded for one or several spe-
cific contributions (such as the prize for R. C. Merton or M. Friedman) as well 
as for lifetime contributions (such as the prize for P. Samuelson or S. Kuznets). 
Between 1969 and 2018, the prize has been awarded 50 times to 81 Laureates.
Despite the rigorous selection procedures and strong links between the award 
and other indicators of excellence such as citations (Bjork et al., 2014), there 
is a political undertone to the prize. Offer and Söderberg (2016) argue, based 
on extensive archival research, that the prize has never escaped the tenuousness 
of its founding moment. The conflict over “sound money” and government 
intervention had reached its pinnacle in Sweden. The Central Bank of Sweden 
attempted to establish its autonomy from politics, which was dominated by 
Social Democrats, by seizing control over the interest rate (“Åsbrink’s interest 
coup”). The government responded by limiting the degrees of freedom of the 
bank’s governor, Per Åsbrink. To regain credibility, Åsbrink in turn decided 
to launch a Nobel Prize in economics that could potentially function as a PR 
campaign for a “market turn” and a change in fundamental attitudes, in which 
buying and selling between individuals replace social democratic obligations to 
different social groups.
Empirically, however, Offer and Söderberg find that the award is split roughly 
evenly between market liberals and economists whose ideas support the prin-
ciples of social democracy, suggesting that the prize committee is consistently 
engaged in a delicate balancing act in order to avoid excessive controversy 
(Offer & Söderberg, 2016, p. 107f.).
3  Academic institutions and elite formation
The prosopographical approach (Charle, 2015) that I adopt here is interested in 
what people have in common, rather than in how they stand out as individuals. 
The method allows to gain insight into a group of individuals as a collective by 
bringing together relevant biographical data. The portrait of the individual is 
the intermediate aim of prosopographical research while the ultimate purpose 
is to collect and analyze data on phenomena, such as career line trajectories, 
that transcend individual lives. In our case study, the descriptive analysis of the 
sum of biographical data aims at bringing forth communalities between the 
professional lives of elite economists, which allows insights into how this group 
of individuals typically navigates professional careers in institutional contexts.
In this chapter, I will specifically investigate whether Nobel Laureates in 
economics unfold their careers in similar ways by focusing on two types of 
academic institutions: departments and journals.
Elite departments: Higher education institutions differ in various structural 
characteristics (e.g. faculty size, admissions selectivity, level of external support) 
but also regarding the key criteria by which faculty are selected (Musselin, 
2010, p. 94f.). Hermanowicz (2005) argues that what sets apart top-tier from 
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middle- or low-tier departments is that they place the highest premium on 
research and recruit only colleagues that aspire to be among the best. Given the 
widespread obsession in economics with hierarchies of excellence (Fourcade, 
Ollion, & Algan, 2015), economists regularly publish rankings of departments. 
In a recent worldwide ranking of economics departments, Ph.D. education 
emerges as a highly concentrated activity with the top few departments scor-
ing substantially higher than all others (Amir & Knauff, 2008). It turns out 
that the top five (T5) departments are all located in the United States: Harvard 
University, MIT, Stanford University, Princeton University, and University of 
Chicago.
Elite journals: Publications in journals are a powerful determinant of emi-
nence in economics (Card & DellaVigna, 2013). In general, there seems to be 
a consensus about the so-called top five (T5) journals that can be traced back 
to an early contribution by Pieters and Baumgartner (2002). If finance journals 
are set aside, then the T5 economics journals that publish articles receiving 
the bulk of attention by the profession are American Economic Review (AER), 
Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy (JPE), Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(QJE), and Review of Economic Studies.6 Recent research has begun to study the 
relationship between publications in T5 journals and tenure prospects. Using 
econometric models, James Heckman and Sidharth Moktan calculated “incest 
coefficients” indicating the relationship strength between publications in the 
T5 journals and (tenure-track) employment in the T5 departments of the dis-
cipline. Their main finding is that
the JPE has a high incest coefficient – 14.3% for Chicago affiliates; the 
non-house-affiliated AER has a relatively high incest coefficient for Har-
vard faculty who account for 11.9% of its publication. Most conspicuous is 
the QJE with a 24.7% incest coefficient for Harvard affiliates and a 13.9% 
coefficient for MIT affiliates.
(Heckman & Moktan, 2018, pp. 49–50)
Given this cohesive intellectual macrostructure of the discipline, which is 
clearly dominated by few departments, few journals, and their various inter-
linkages, it is likely that there are only few elite channels to reach eminence. To 
probe whether there are few institutionalized pathways7 for Nobel Laureates, 
the following sections will systematically analyze information on the careers 
and publication behavior of 81 Laureates.
4  A prosopographical database
This study is based on a comprehensive biographical database created by the 
author. Biographical data on 81 Laureates who received the Nobel Prize in 
economics between 1969 and 2018 were gathered from diverse sources, includ-
ing official biographies from www.nobelprize.org. However, these biographies 
rarely contain detailed information on the scholars’ time spent in different 
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employment positions (or visiting professorships). I  have thus relied on the 
economists’ official CVs that are mostly available from their personal webpages. 
Various editions of the Who’s Who in Economics and biographical dictionaries 
have proved invaluable as well (Blaug, 1999; Breit & Hirsch, 2009; Vane & 
Mulhearn, 2005).
To analyze major career pathways, I  use sequence analysis (SA). SA refers 
to a group of approaches to process longitudinal data representing series of 
states or events in the life trajectories of individuals. SA includes tools to format 
sequences, to cluster them, or to represent them in graphical forms (Gauthier, 
Bühlmann, & Blanchard, 2014). The SA data file of this case study uses the so-
called vertical “time-stamped-event” (TSE) representation that lists the “events” 
experienced by each scholar along with the time at which the events occurred. 
Sequences of events can easily be constructed from this representation. As can be 
seen in Table 12.1, the “events” of interest are full professorships and the “time” 
is the age at appointment. Additionally, the table lists the name of the depart-
ment and its prestige rank. Prestige ranks for economics department are taken 
from Amir and Knauff (2008). The central methodological idea of this ranking is 
that the “value” of a department is the sum of the “values” of its Ph.D. graduates, 
as reflected in the “values” of their current employing departments. As depart-
mental prestige may fluctuate over decades, we would ideally like to draw on 
longitudinal data, which is not available. I will therefore resort to prestige groups 
(i.e. rank 1–5), thereby treating department ranks simply as orders of magnitude.
An analysis of extended career pathways takes as well into consideration that 
scholars might leave their home institution temporarily for appointments as 
a “visiting fellow,” or “visiting professor” at another research institution, such 
as a university or an Institute of Advanced Study (e.g. the CASBS at Stan-
ford University). I decided to consider only stays that lasted at least one full 
academic semester (4–5 months).8 Registering all documented stays for each 
scholar allows me to construct a dataset with the format outlined in Table 12.2.
Finally, to reconstruct the publication behavior, I used the JSTOR not-for-
profit digital library not only to search for publications in journals of a given 
author, but also to systematically export meta-data of all articles identified. 
JSTOR assigns research articles to different subjects such as sociology, econom-
ics, finance and computer science. I limited the search to the subject category 
“economics,” which includes 181 different journals.
Table 12.1 Snapshot from the sequence data set
Timestamp Prestige rank Event Age ID Scholar
1978 rank 11–20 LSE 38 1 Akerlof
1980 rank 6–10 UC-Berkeley 40 1 Akerlof
2014 rank 21 or lower U of Georgetown 74 1 Akerlof
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5  Career pathways: Ph.D.-granting departments, 
professorships, and visiting professorships
To study the career trajectories of all Nobel Laureates, I build partly on a three-
strand model as introduced by Light, Marsden, and Corl (1973, p. 9). These 
strands are the disciplinary, the institutional, and the external career of faculty, 
with activities in one strand having implications and consequences for all the 
other strands.
Disciplinary strand: The first career decision is made within the discipline. 
Students select their field of study before they choose teaching as a career. It is 
reasonable to assume that students with a strong research orientation opt for a 
distinguished Ph.D. program. Besides the doctoral degree, further advancement 
in the disciplinary strand such memberships in academies are mostly dependent 
on publication success.
Institutional strand: The primary link between the disciplinary and institu-
tional aspects of faculty careers is the prestige of the Ph.D.-granting depart-
ment, which is found to be more relevant for obtaining a top position than is 
the level of productivity during the Ph.D. training (Han, 2003; Long, 1978). 
I will consider only full professorships, thereby neglecting other stages of a 
typical institutional career such as chairmanship or early career steps (e.g. asso-
ciate prof.).
External strand: Finally, academic careers involve many activities outside the 
major appointment. I will focus on visiting fellowships and professorships of a 
minimum length of one semester after the Ph.D.
5.1  Shifts in the geography of obtaining a Ph.D.
When we look at the Ph.D. institutions of the Nobel Laureates in econom-
ics, MIT, Harvard, and U Chicago have clear leading positions (“disciplinary 
strand”). Altogether, 36 of the 81 Nobel Laureates (44.4%) obtained a doctor-
ate from a T5 department. If we focus on scholars born in the USA only, then 
the percentage rises from 44.4% to 76.6%. This high proportion of American-
born Laureates with doctorates from T5 universities suggests that scholars such 
as Richard H. Thaler, an American Nobel Prize winner who received his 
Ph.D. from the University of Rochester, are the strict exception.
A network perspective that considers professor-student connections offers a 
more revealing picture. Tol (2018) reconstructs the (global) professor-student 
Table 12.2 Snapshot from the social network dataset
Home institution Host institution Year ID Scholar
UC-Berkeley IAS 1967 1 Akerlof
UC-Berkeley Indian Statistical Institute 1983 1 Akerlof
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
216 Philipp Korom
network in economics using mostly (but not only) the Academic Family Tree 
(David & Hayden, 2012), a collaborative online tool for building an academic 
genealogy for different disciplines. In the network, which spans five genera-
tions with 350 men and 4 women, 72 Nobel Prize winners belong to one 
single family tree. Instead of studying the entire network, I will focus only on 
the largest network subcomponent identified by Tol (2018), which starts with 
one of the leading German economists of the historical school of economics, 
Karl Gustav A. Knies (1821–1898).
Figure 12.2 shows a directed acyclic graph because in most cases students 
learn more from their professors than the other way around. The figure reveals, 
among other things, that George Stigler, James M. Buchanan, and Ronald 
Coase were students of Frank Knight, and that Robert Lucas was a great-great-
grandstudent of Richard T. Ely. “Master-apprentice relationships” (Heinze, 
Jappe, & Pithan, 2019) between two Laureates appear as well frequently in 
this network (Samuelson-Merton junior, Modigliani-Shiller, Tobin-Phelps). In 
some cases, the relations identified in Figure 12.2 hint to “schools of thought”, 
which developed around at least one key scholar associated with a paradigm 
and regarded as a model by several pupils. There exists, for example, a network 
closeness between the various representatives of the first (e.g. F. Knight) and 
the second generation (e.g. G. Stigler) of the “Chicago School” (Booth, 1982).
The main insight that can be gained from the subgraph (as from the whole 
network) is that a Ph.D. from one of the T5 departments was rare in the not-
so-distant past. Karl Gustav A. Knies and Eugen Böhm von Bawerk (1851–
1914) studied in Germany and Austria. Many of their students (e.g. Joseph 
Schumpeter, Richard T. Elly), grandstudents (e.g. Allyn A. Young) and great-
grandstudents (e.g. Frank Knight) were academically socialized in the USA but 
did not receive their Ph.D. from any of the T5 departments. The network per-
spective thus reveals that while the key place of training for leading economists 
today are concentrated in T5 departments, they have been far more variable 
over time than commonly assumed.
5.2  Main career pathways
To depict the diversity of career trajectories (“institutional strand”) and track 
each individual pattern, I will use a decorated parallel coordinate plot as intro-
duced by Bürgin and Ritschard (2014). Such a plot enables us to identify the 
most typical career patterns while also revealing the diversity within the entire 
set of observed career trajectories at the same time. Such a visualization further 
helps us to understand how professorships throughout a scholar’s career relate 
to the prestige ranks of departments.
In Figure 12.3, each line represents a unique, observed order pattern, and the 
line width reflects the frequency of the pattern. The lines are jittered to avoid 
overlapping and to help identify typical patterns; only patterns which make up 
at least 3% of all 80 considered cases are highlighted in dark grey.9 To facili-
tate the tracking of distinct patterns, there are gray arrangement zones at the 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































intersection of the x coordinate (stage in a scholar’s career) and the y coordinate 
(rank of the department).
Looking at the colored lines in Figure 12.3, we learn that three of the six 
most frequent patterns lead to T5 departments. We can, for example, derive 
that a more commonly experienced pattern is to hold at the career beginning 
two consecutive professorships at departments with ranks below 20 and then be 
appointed professor at a department with the highest prestige (rank 1–5). The 
careers of Ronald H. Coase, Arthur W. Lewis, William F. Sharpe, and Alvin 
E. Roth are marked by such a specific career trajectory, which is highlighted 
in orange in Figure 12.3. In-house careers are quite widespread as well. Peter 
A. Diamond, Eugene F. Fama, Milton Friedman, Lars P. Hansen, Merton H. 
Miller, Paul Samuelson, and Robert M. Solow were all appointed as full pro-
fessors at one of the T5 departments and did not switch departments. Another 
striking feature of the most common career paths is that there are very few 
moves to lower-ranked departments, which are in general rare and only char-
acteristic of the final career steps in the trajectories (professorships 4–6).
Out of the 186 different full professorships considered in the biographical 
database, 33.9% were held at T5 departments. Out of the 81 Nobel Laureates 
considered, 42 held at least one full professorship at one of the T5 departments. 










Figure 12.3  Career trajectories clustered by departmental prestige rank groups (Amir  & 
Knauff, 2008)
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Many of those who never made it into these elite departments pursued most 
of their careers outside the USA (e.g. James A. Mirrless, Bertil G. Ohlin, and 
Reinhard Selten). Combining this aggregate information with the sequential 
patterns presented in Figure 12.3 allows me to conclude that most Nobel Lau-
reates follow a standardized career path that leads them to the very top in the 
departmental hierarchy.
5.3  Visiting networks
Elite careers are shaped by two distinct forces: hierarchies and networks. Uni-
versities are hierarchical structures in which elites quickly move through lower 
positions (assistant prof., associate prof.) to reach the final career plateau, from 
which there is nowhere to go professionally within the very same institution. 
Elites, however, can also entertain multiple affiliations by visiting other research 
institutions (“external strand”). By doing so, they establish networks between 
the home institution and other visiting institutions. To obtain a global view of 
the relatively large visiting network, I decided to shrink all vertices (i.e. home/
visiting institutions) belonging to a certain (prestige) class to one single vertex. 
For example, I  shrank all US departments belonging to the top five ranked 
departments to a new vertex labeled “USA {rank 1–5}.” The arcs in Figure 12.4 
are unidirectional, indicating the number of scholars moving temporarily from 


































USA {rank 1-5} CASBS
Cambridge U
Figure 12.4 Visiting relationships between different types of institutions (N = 130)
Note: Arcs indicate the direction of the relationship. Considered are only multiple relationships equal 
to or greater than three. IAS stands for all Institutes of Advanced Studies (except for the Center for 
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, CASBS).
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In the “shrunken network,” most scholars leave second-tier US departments 
(rank 6–20) to either visit US top-tier departments (rank 1–5) or to conduct 
studies at European departments. Moreover, there is a significant inflow from 
Europe to the top US departments as well as a high circulation between depart-
ments belonging to the top five. The overall network structure also suggests 
that the “big five” are the main magnet in the visiting network, which is con-
firmed by the “indegree distribution.” Although the category “USA (rank 
1–5)” encompasses only five institutions, it has an indegree of 65, while a 
category such as “USA (rank 6–20)” with 11 departments is marked by a com-
paratively low indegree of 48.11
6  Publication in top five journals
In the last step of the analysis, I will investigate whether Nobel Laureates strive 
not only to work at top departments but also to publish in top journals. There 
are at least two reasons why we should expect to find Nobel Laureates’ publica-
tions concentrated in the five leading journals: First, publications in top-notch 
journals are not only an important measure of visibility but also, at least partly, a 
rough proxy of the (recognized) excellence of a scholar. Second, and more spe-
cifically, there is evidence that publishing in T5 journals has an inbred nature: 
Editors are likely to select papers of those they know mostly through joint 
departmental affiliations (Colussi, 2018; Heckman & Moktan, 2018). That edi-
tors of theT5 journals and Nobel Laureates are both likely to be associated with 
a T5 department should therefore positively affect the chances of publication in 
T5 journals. Moreover, Heckman and Moktan have found evidence that publi-
cations in T5 journals are in general a strong predictor of tenure in T5 depart-
ments. It is very likely that this institutional link is also important to understand 
the careers of Nobel Laureates.
In what follows, I  aim to establish empirically whether there is indeed a 
strong connection between publications in top journals and winning the Nobel 
Prize. Further, I want to know whether the link grew stronger as the discipline 
matured. To these ends, Figure 12.5 depicts the number of publications in elite 
and non-elite journals separately for Laureates belonging to four different age 
groups.
The major insight gained from Figure  12.5 is that Laureates publish on 
average every second paper in a T5 journal. In general, T5 publications fig-
ure high if one considers that JSTOR allows one to search 181(!) economics 
journals. Scholars such as Herbert Simon, Kenneth Arrow, and Robert J. 
Aumann have published nearly exclusively in T5 journals. There are only a 
few scholars with no publications at all in T5 journals. These scholars have in 
common that they mostly work in research areas that do not represent main-
stream economics.12
Further, it becomes apparent that the general pattern does not vary much 
across age groups, which suggests that the link between publishing in T5 jour-
nals and receiving the Nobel Prize is not a recent phenomenon at all.
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Nobel Laureates thus appear – much like their fellow economists – to be 
hyperaware of the top five’s ability to make or break their career. To receive a 
Nobel Prize in economics without any T5 publications is not an unseen phe-
nomenon (see the case of Soviet mathematician and economist Leonid V. Kan-
torovich), but the dominant route to tenure at a leading economics department 
or to the Nobel Prize in economics is clearly via publications in T5 journals.
7  Economics: a hierarchical discipline with homogenous 
elite careers
This contribution tried to shed some light on a group of Nobel Laureates in 
economics whose ideas have significant repercussion in the academic world, 
and in some cases, outside of it. Kenneth Arrow, for example, helped transform 
economic theory into a mathematical science, created modern social choice 
theory, and established most of the major findings in general equilibrium the-
ory (Maskin, 2019). While highly influential in the discipline, the Nobel Lau-
reate Arrow reached less recognition outside the discipline than, for example, 
Amartya Sen or Paul Krugman (Prinz, 2017). Flip through the past year’s issues 
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Figure 12.5 Publications in elite and non-elite journals
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of the New Republic, the New York Review of Books, or the New York Times and 
you will find many references to these two economists. Others, like Milton 
Friedman, provided the intellectual foundation for public policies. Friedman’s 
influence on the anti-inflation, tax-cutting, and antigovernment policies of 
Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher is difficult to overstate (Forder, 2019).
Using prosopographical tools, I  have shown that the academic careers of 
Nobel Laureates in economics have enough in common for connections to be 
uncovered. More specifically, I have laid bare institutionalized pathways to the 
Nobel Prize, implying that individuals follow similar routes shaped by the over-
all intellectual structure of the discipline. This macrostructure is hierarchically 
organized with five top departments and (their in-house) journals dominating 
the discipline. While my analysis cannot reveal whether economists pursue some 
rational “master plan” to win the Nobel Prize,13 it becomes apparent that most 
of them pursue their careers through the same “institutional elite channels”: 
Nobel Laureates in economics are either hired by one of the top five depart-
ments, and/or they work towards a visiting professorship at MIT, Harvard, 
Stanford, Princeton, or University of Chicago. To enter these elite circles, they 
regularly publish in the T5 journals whose editors are mostly affiliated with 
one of the T5 departments. Furthermore, I can empirically show that in many 
cases there exist master-apprentice relationships between Nobel Laureates (that 
were formed at one of the T5 departments). A prominent example is Ken-
neth Arrow, who taught at Harvard and Stanford and mentored graduates who 
became Nobel Laureates themselves: John C. Harsanyi, Eric S. Maskin, Roger 
B. Myerson, A. Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz.
These results point to a relatively homogenous elite that is shaped by an elite 
subset of American institutions rather than by departments across the United 
States or the world. The dominance of few departments goes hand in hand 
with a unitary disciplinary structure. While other social science disciplines like 
sociology are fractious with many specialties and few interlinkages between 
them, economics is found to have a “sizeable [intellectual] core that incor-
porates a number of major subfields” (Crane & Small, 1992). Mathematical 
models  – commonly recognized as the “golden standard” (Rodrik, 2016) – 
build bridges between specialties and hold economics as a discipline together.
Now, consensus implies control as well. The relationship between discipli-
nary consensus (of what constitutes good science) and control is, as Fourcade 
et al. (2015, p. 96) argue, an intricate one:
there might be more consensus because there is more control (for instance 
if a consistent view of what constitutes quality research is promoted by 
those who control the top journals); conversely, control might be more 
effective and enforceable because there is more consensus.
Whatever the case, in the end the unitary and hierarchical structure leads to 
few pathways to the uppermost levels of prestige in economics, with powerful 
gatekeepers affiliated with the T5 departments of the discipline. As the Nobel 
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committee decided not to stray too far away from the discipline’s internal pres-
tige rankings (Offer & Söderberg, 2016), the majority of all Nobel Laureates 
reveal similar pathways connected with top departments and top journals.
Finally, it should be noted that my findings – that there are institutionalized 
pathways to the Nobel Prize in economics – do not allow me to explain why 
some who were at the pinnacle of economics, such Joan Robinson or John K. 
Galbraith, did not receive the prize, nor to make reasonable predictions of who 
will join the group of Laureates in the future. However, the conceptual model 
for analyzing typical career pathways put forward in this contribution can be 
put to use in a different way. What can be “tested” is whether a new Laureate 
fits or deviates from the picture presented in this chapter. Recurrent “fits” tell 
us that economics has not changed, while recurrent “misfits” hint, most likely, 
to a de-institutionalization of elite careers that stem from major changes from 
within the discipline.
Notes
 1 Acknowledgement: This study was financially supported by the Austrian Science Fund 
(FWF, project number: P29211).
 2 Research became the preeminent marker of academic prestige around the end of the 
19th century, as reflected in psychologist James McKeen Cattell’s (1860–1944) early 
endeavors to measure scientific eminence. Cattell asked leading representatives of 12 
disciplines (e.g. anatomy) to rank the most eminent scientists (e.g. anatomists) in their 
respective background disciplines by giving priority to the scientists’ contributions to 
research (Cattell, 1906).
 3 Friedrich August von Hayek’s speech at the Nobel Banquet, December 10, 1974. (www.
nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1974/hayek/speech/, 5th of July, 2019).
 4 Milton Friedman’s speech at the Nobel Banquet, December 10, 1976 (www.nobelprize.
org/prizes/economic-sciences/1976/friedman/speech/, 5th of July, 2019).
 5 Institutions are here understood to be the building blocks of social order representing 
“collectively enforced expectations with respect to the behavior of specific categories of 
actors or to the performance of certain activities” (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 9). In this 
sense, chairs of elite departments (e.g. Harvard University) must recruit strong faculty 
members, and editors of top journals (e.g. American Economic Review) are expected to 
publish cutting-edge research. It is these social pressures that organize the behavior of 
actors in academia into rather predictable patterns.
 6 Editors of all five journals are usually associated with one of the T5 departments. Cur-
rently, Esther Duflo (MIT) is the editor of the AER, Joel Sobel (UC San Diego) of 
Econometrica, Harald Uhlig (University of Chicago) of the JPE, Andrei Shleifer (Harvard 
University) et al. of the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Jerome Adda (Bocconi University) 
et al. of the Review of Economic Studies.
 7 This compound term is inspired by the concept of the “institutionalized life course” that 
was first coined by Kohli (1985). It presupposes an institutional pattern that shapes lives 
both in terms of movement through positions and of biographical plans. The concept 
is frequently used in the social sciences, as there is an abundance of evidence that indi-
vidual trajectories are shaped by meso- and macro-level institutional conditions.
 8 In some cases, however, it is impossible to know the exact length of stay. The curricu-
lum vitae of Christopher A. Sims, for example, reveals that he was a visiting professor at 
Yale University in 1974. I can only assume that such information implies that Sims spent 
at least one semester at Yale (and not less time).
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 9 Please note that John Nash could not be included because he is the only Laureate with 
no full professorship.
 10 A visit to a host institution was only counted once per scholar. To give an example: The 
economist Peter A. Diamond was a visiting fellow at Harvard University twice through-
out his career. In the analysis, however, I  establish only a single link between MIT 
(home institution) and Harvard University (host institution) based on this information.
 11 In social network analysis the term “indegree” stands for the number of arcs coming into 
a vertex.
 12 Friedrich Hayek, for example, is mostly known for his contributions to the philoso-
phy of science, and Reinhard Selten is considered one of the fathers of experimental 
economics.
 13 The chosen research design does not allow me to investigate scholars’ intentions and 
motives. To understand the “internal mechanism” of the detected institutionalized path-
ways, qualitative in-depth studies are warranted (see also Becker (2017) on evidence in 
the social sciences). To most economists the Nobel Prize comes, at least partly, as a sur-
prise (see, for example, Alvin E. Roth’s reactions to the prize on YouTube. The YouTube 
video was uploaded by Stanford University on October 15, 2012, with the title “Stan-
ford Visiting Professor Al Roth Reacts to Winning the 2012 Nobel for Economics”).
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13  Forms of social capital  
in economics
The importance of heteronomous 
networks in the Swiss field  
of economists (1980–2000)
Thierry Rossier and Pierre Benz
1  Introduction1
In June 2017, Marion Fourcade gave a keynote lecture at the annual congress 
of the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics in Lausanne, insisting in par-
ticular on the importance of ideological and political issues in guiding research 
in economics. During the time dedicated to questions, someone in the audi-
ence argued against Fourcade’s statements:
I think there is a lot of heterogeneity in economics, and much of what 
you’ve said would maybe apply to some subfields of economics, but not so 
much to others. Think of pure series with equilibrium refinements, there 
is not much ideology there. Or also . . . if you think of the resource curse 
and conflict[s], and development, and these kinds of things, there are very 
few people holding ideological views on whether oil is good, or bad. . . . 
It’s more like a technical question that you try to analyse with statistical 
methods. Or also the randomised control trials, for example. Very often, 
actually, the margin of manoeuvre . . . where ideology comes in, in some 
fields, it’s relatively small.2
This professional economist was arguing for economics to be of a “pure” nature. 
Economists often believe in the autonomy of the discipline, especially toward 
political issues.3 However, some scholars have stressed the importance of ideol-
ogy and political orientation in guiding economists’ preferences for research 
specialisations and methodologies, and being related to their departmental affil-
iation (Beyer & Pühringer 2019; Horowitz & Hughes 2017; Fourcade 2018). 
This denegation of politics and, more generally, of “power” (Lebaron 2000: 
243) has been identified as a specific feature of the discipline. Being much more 
heteronomous than economists would often state, economics is in fact strongly 
embedded in the field of power (i.e. the field4 of the dominant of all the other 
fields; Bourdieu 1996a, 2005). Consequently, controversies at stake are not 
solved like in the most autonomous sciences, such as natural and life sciences 
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(Benz 2019), but rather depend on recognition and consecration tied to the 
field of power (Lebaron 2018: 217). As a “trans-epistemic” field, economics 
has roots in academia, politics, business and the media, and economists located 
at different intersections of these fields often diverge in their accounts of what 
is good economics (Maesse 2015). In a more historical perspective, economics 
has been close to political and economic decision-makers for a long time (Four-
cade 2009), but its autonomy might have increased in the more recent period 
due to the professionalisation and the internationalisation of the discipline, and 
the related dissociation from the nationally anchored public administration and 
political class (Schmidt-Wellenburg & Lebaron 2018: 17–18; Fourcade 2006).
Economists differ regarding their internal (e.g. ties to other academic econo-
mists) and external (e.g. ties to actors in the political and private sectors) networks. 
The type, form and size of these networks are constitutive of a specific hierarchy 
between individuals and participate to structure the discipline. This perspective 
has only received little attention until now and only a few studies (Denord et al. 
2011; Eloire 2014; Godechot & Mariot 2004; Serino et al. 2017; Lunding et al. 
2020) have focused on the power provided through network relations or, said oth-
erwise, on social capital within fields. To our knowledge, except Klüger (2018; and 
in this volume), no research has systematically investigated the role of social capital 
in the economics profession and its effects on the relative autonomy of the field.
This chapter aims to investigate the structure and evolution of social capital 
within the field of economists in Switzerland, where the discipline is particu-
larly internationalised (Rossier & Bühlmann 2018) and where different elite 
groups are particularly close, cohesive and connected (Bühlmann et al. 2012). 
It relies on an original prosopographical database of all professors of econom-
ics at Swiss universities between 1980 and 2000 (n = 200), who constitute the 
dominant agents in the discipline and concentrate the most dominant resources 
in the field (Rossier 2017). In a first empirical part, we focus on the distinction 
and hierarchy between autonomous (i.e. internal) and heteronomous (external) 
forms of social capital. By means of multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), 
we identify two main oppositions of resources and profiles among economists. 
The principal opposition is based on the volume of extra-disciplinary net-
work resources, and the secondary opposition is related to the volume of intra-
disciplinary configurations of social capital. In a second part, we centre on the 
evolution in the structure of the field from 1980 to 2000. Through class-spe-
cific MCA, we show that, despite the fact that intra-disciplinary social capital 
gains in importance in the recent period, extra-disciplinary social capital decid-
edly constitutes the key structuring logic along time. The chapter is organised 
as follows. First, we develop the notions of scientific field and social capital. 
Second, we present our sample and data, our methodology and our indicators 
of social capital. Third, in an empirical part, we focus on the structure of the 
field according to social capital logics and on the historical evolution of these 
dynamics. Finally, we summarise our main findings and open on new research 
perspectives.
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2  Internal and external forms of social capital in the field 
of economists
A scientific (or disciplinary) field such as economics is very often structured 
around an opposition between a scientific pole, linked to scientific capital5 – a 
symbolic capital associated with internal scientific prestige and recognition – 
and a society (or worldly) pole, related to external – academic (i.e. at the uni-
versity level), political and economic – capitals. The overall volume of capitals 
detained also matters in these fields (Bourdieu 2004). Insights on economics 
show that this discipline often follows these two modes of structuration (Leb-
aron 2001; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2018). In scientific fields, the role of social 
capital must not be underestimated (Gingras 2012; Bühlmann et al. 2017), but, 
until now, this particular resource has been given little attention.
Bourdieu (1986: 248–249) defines social capital as follows:
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, 
to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the 
backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a “credential” which entitles 
them to credit, in the various senses of the word.
Bourdieu considers social capital as the most important resource in any social 
space together with economic and cultural capitals. From a quantitative perspec-
tive, social capital depends on the size of the network of an individual and on the 
volume of capitals detained by other members of the network, understood as 
their more or less important integration to the field of power (Bourdieu 1996a). 
From a qualitative perspective, social capital is characterised by the nature of the 
capitals detained by the linked individuals. A high volume of social capital puts 
individuals in a rather favourable position within a given field since it tends to 
multiply the other detained capitals (Eloire 2018). While reflecting the impor-
tance of maintaining connections between members of certain fractions of the 
dominant class (Lenoir 2015), social capital can be considered as a resource 
that may generate symbolic capital within a field (De Nooy 2003), including a 
scientific field such as economics as a scientific discipline. In order to provide a 
better understanding of the structure of social capital in economics, this chapter 
differentiates between intra- and extra-disciplinary forms of social capital.
Intra-disciplinary social capital can be obtained through networks within 
the disciplinary field of economics. At the institutional level, social capital can be 
acquired through positions occupied at the top of powerful institutions, where 
individuals are linked to other powerful individuals. In scientific fields, it cor-
responds to the executive committee of disciplinary institutions or deanship in 
disciplinary departments (Bourdieu 2004). At the inter-personal level, social capi-
tal can be acquired through more or less intricate and institutionally formalised 
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relations with other individuals engaged in the field of economists. These rela-
tions can be developed over a longer period of time and allow individuals 
to mobilise strong ties. Two types are of particular concern to us: relations 
developed through doctoral supervision of future economics professors (Büh-
lmann et al. 2018) and through research collaborations (Larivière et al. 2010; 
Gingras 2012). At the departmental level, social capital can be acquired through 
institutional affiliations during the career. Since, as stated before, international 
experiences seem to situate an individual closer to the autonomous pole of 
the scientific field, having been related to researchers in other countries also 
constitutes a form of intra-disciplinary social capital and a sign of belonging 
to a transnational scientific community (Bühlmann et al. 2013). In particular, 
stays at US departments lead to a large volume of important scientific resources 
in economics (Fourcade 2006). Finally, at the scientific production level, citations 
create a (more or less loose) directed tie between researchers (Kaplan 1965). If a 
scientist’s work is cited, it denotes some sort of recognition among peers which 
can be activated and facilitates the creation of a more bonding connection (or 
not). Moreover, the works cited are published in a certain type of medium 
(i.e. scientific reviews, book collections, etc.). Being published in an “interna-
tional” journal, for example, denotes the belonging to particular invisible col-
leges (Crane 1969), where one is able to gain certain scientific dispositions (i.e. 
scientific practices and know-how), which allowed this type of publication.
Extra-disciplinary social capital can be acquired through similar channels 
outside the disciplinary field of economics. At the institutional level, it can be obtained 
by sitting on more or less powerful boards and being tied to elites from different 
sectors of society (Mills 1956). In academia, social capital relates to executive boards 
of important (transdisciplinary) academic organisations or universities (Bourdieu 
1988). Outside academia, positions occupied in the higher state administration, 
the parliament or the board of large companies allow individuals to develop strong 
ties to political and economic powers (Rossier et al. 2017; Larsen & Ellersgaard 
2018). At the inter-personal level, the supervision of the doctorate of future admin-
istrative, political and economic elites is another very strong tie to groups coming 
from outside the discipline and to the field of power. At the departmental level, hav-
ing links to the same (Swiss) department, where some individuals have remained 
for most of their career, favours the insertion within a local community, which 
is often related to external logics (Wagner 2010). Consequently, individuals with 
local profile will tend to own extra-disciplinary forms of social capital.
In this chapter, we investigate the structure of social capital within the field 
of economists and its historical and institutional dynamics, paying particular 
attention to the relative importance of intra- and extra-disciplinary networks.
3  Research strategy and methods
3.1 Data
Our data stem from a historical database on Swiss elites6 and were collected 
as part of the research project “Academic Elites in Switzerland 1910–2000: 
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Between Autonomy and Power”.7 Our empirical analyses rely upon all the 
associate and full professors in economics (including financial economics) at all 
the ten Swiss universities and the two federal institutes of technology between 
the dates of 1980 and 2000 (n = 200). The choice of these dates allows us to 
study our object historically, but without focusing on a too-long time period 
which would prevent us from having comparable indicators. We stop at the 
date of 2000 in order to have rather complete biographical information on 
these professors’ careers (the youngest professor of the group was 50 years old 
when data were collected in 2015). The names of the professors were collected 
using Swiss university directories (Annuaires des universités suisses) published 
yearly, which contain the complete list of the Swiss academic personnel at that 
time, as well as activity reports from the 12 universities. We then collected bio-
graphical information on these professors on the basis of diverse sources, such 
as the Swiss Historical Dictionary, the Who’s Who in Switzerland, several university 
anniversary monographs, databases and other material provided by university 
archives, university activity reports, newspaper archives, online curricula, doc-
toral dissertations, the website moneyhouse.ch for the commerce register of 
Swiss companies and the “P3” database of the Swiss National Science Founda-
tion for the funding of research from this institution.
3.2  Methods: MCA and CSA
In a first step, to visualise how forms of social capital vary between the 200 eco-
nomics professors, we conduct a multiple correspondence analysis. MCA is a mul-
tivariate geometrical method aiming at reducing the complexity among a large 
set of categorical variables. It allows us to visualise this information based on the 
logic of several dimensions (or axes) of opposition between active (in the sense 
that they construct “actively” the space) variables. The first axis represents the 
most dominant opposition of resources and profiles, the second axis the second 
most dominant, etc. The closer individuals are in the space, the more they tend 
to share a common profile. Conversely, the closer the modalities of variables 
(i.e. resources) are situated in the space, the larger is the group of individuals 
who tend to share them. A set of illustrative variables, which do not contribute 
to construct the space, can be projected. Modalities and variables with a contri-
bution above the average contribution are emphasised in the interpretation of 
the axes. Various measures of the part of the explained variance (“inertia”) are 
projected onto an axis. Since these rates are usually low, they are recalculated 
in modified rates to better appreciate the importance of the first axes. Generally, 
we retain the number of axes, which represent at least 80% of the cumulated 
modified rates (Hjellbrekke 2018; Le Roux & Rouanet 2010).
In a second empirical step, to grasp the historical evolution of the capitals 
among the field, we propose to use class specific MCA (CSA). After having 
separated the space among a certain number of sub-clouds based on illustra-
tive variables (here, each year of professorship between 1980 and 2000), CSA 
searches for new axes within the given sub-clouds, while keeping the distances 
between individuals from the initial space. Thanks to that technique, we are 
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able to measure the degree of similarity between individuals in every sub-cloud 
and in the whole space. The principal axes of the sub-clouds of individuals 
are compared to the initial axes. To assess their association, the cosines of the 
angle between the “old” and the “new” axes are recalculated in a standardised 
correlation coefficient between −1 and 1 (Hjellbrekke & Korsnes 2016). By 
comparing the axes of each year to the axes of the whole space, we are able 
to assess historical evolutions within the field of economists. Our analyses are 
realised through the R package soc.ca (Larsen et al. 2016).
3.3  Indicators of social capital
In this part, we specify the indicators we use as active variables in our MCA in 
order to focus on the forms of social capital described earlier. We also specify 
our illustrative variables.8
We measure intra-disciplinary social capital with the following indicators:
• Scientific institutional positions, through executive affiliations within 
scientific and disciplinary hierarchies, are considered by being a mem-
ber of the executive board of the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, the 
main disciplinary association in Switzerland, and through department dean 
positions.
• Scientific inter-personal networks are twofold. First, to study the par-
ticular ties of professors to other (economics) university professors, which 
can be considered as the “elites” of the academic field, we investigate 
social capital through PhD supervision, by the number of PhD student mem-
bers of the Swiss academic elites (university professors) and the number of PhD 
“brother”/“sister”9 members of the academic elites. Second, we focus on links 
through research projects funded by the Swiss National Science Founda-
tion (SNSF), the main public provider of scientific funding. Researchers 
can apply (as sole applicant or as co-applicants) for funding and receive 
money to conduct research during a given period of time (usually between 
one and four years). We are interested in their degree in scientific collabora-
tions, i.e. their total number of co-applicants, and the number of years of 
scientific collaborations, i.e. the total number of years they have been involved 
in a project with at least one co-applicant.10
• For international departmental networks, we indicate if they have 
been involved, first, in an at least one-year stay outside Switzerland, and, sec-
ond, in the US.
• Finally, to consider social capital through scientific production, we focus 
on the number of citations of the 10 most cited publications in the Web of Science. 
The Web of Science, run by Clarivate Analytics, compiles the citations 
since the year 1900 of around 12 000 (mostly English-speaking) journals 
considered as the most “important” for each discipline. This indicator con-
stitutes a good measure for prestige and recognition at the international 
(or at least Anglo-American) level, and for involvement in transnational 
scientific networks.
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We focus on extra-disciplinary social capital with the following indicators:
• Academic institutional positions are measured through membership 
in boards of important academic organisations (i.e. science “mandarins”), which 
encompass several disciplines, i.e. the social sciences and humanities and all 
the disciplines. We retain the following positions: member of the two lead-
ing organs of the Swiss National Science Foundation, the executive com-
mittee of the University Teachers Association, the Academy of Humanities 
and Social Sciences, the Commission for Technology and Innovation, and 
the Swiss Science Council. We also retain university vice-chancellors.
• Economic institutional positions are measured by three indicators: 
through economic elite positions, defined as CEOs or non-executive board 
members of the 110 largest Swiss companies, or executive committee 
member of the major business interest groups; through membership in the 
executive board of a firm; and in the non-executive board of a firm (no matter the 
size, total turnover, or the market capitalisation).
• State institutional positions relate to political or administrative elite posi-
tions. Political elites are members of the federal government and the federal 
parliament. Administrative elites are the governing board members of the 
Swiss central bank or heads of a federal office. Aside from these influential 
political positions, we also take into account members of federal expert commit-
tees, which are institutionalised expert groups whose main task is to advise 
the federal government and administration.
• Administrative, political and economic inter-personal networks, 
i.e. their links to economic, political and administrative elites, are again 
measured through PhD supervision: number of PhD student members of the 
Swiss extra-academic elites (according to the same definition as before) and 
number of PhD “brother”/“sister” members of the extra-academic elites.
• Finally, local departmental networks are measured through a process of 
local reproduction, by linking the university where professors obtained their 
doctorate and the university where they were appointed professors. If a 
professor teaches in the same university where he or she obtained his/her 
PhD, it shows a particular local involvement.
Aside from these diverse forms of social capital, in order to work on subgroups 
based on time-periods, we project variables regarding the 21 years between 1980 
and 2000 as illustrative variables to have each time a subgroup of people who 
were professors during a particular year.11
4  The structure of social capital in economics
We proceed to the analysis of the structure of social capital in the Swiss field 
of economists. In a first empirical part, we uncover the overall structure of the 
diverse forms of social capital by identifying dimensions of opposition among 
resources through MCA. In a second part, we test the evolution of this struc-
ture between 1980 and 2000 through CSA.
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4.1  External and internal social capitals
In this part, we proceed to a multiple correspondence analysis to highlight 
the principal oppositions within the structure of social capital of economics 
professors between 1980 and 2000 (n = 200). The analysis relies on 19 active 
variables (47 active modalities), which measure different forms of social capital 
(see Table 13.1 for the contributions and frequencies of the active variables and 
modalities; the ones contributing to each axis above the average contribution 
are highlighted in grey). The first two axes account for 81% of the cumulated 
Table 13.1 Contributions and frequencies of the active variables and modalities






Board member of Swiss 
Society of Economics and 
Statistics
No 0.6 2.2 158
Yes 2.2 8.1 42
Total 2.8 10.3 200
Department dean No 0.9 1.4 124
Yes 1.4 2.2 76




PhD student member of 
academic elites
0 1.2 1.0 123
1–2 0.7 0.0 58
3+ 1.7 5.1 19
Total 3.6 6.1 200
PhD “brother”/“sister” 
member of academic elites
0 6.2 1.6 93
1–3 2.6 1.8 88
4+ 4.0 0.0 19
Total 12.8 3.4 200
Degree in scientific 
collaboration (SNSF)
0 1.6 5.0 79
1–5 0.0 0.1 78
6–10 2.2 9.3 29
11+ 0.2 2.8 14
Total 4.0 17.2 200
Years of research 
collaboration (SNSF)
0 1.7 4.6 104
1–5 0.0 0.3 46
6–10 1.8 2.6 36
11+ 1.1 5.5 14




Stay in other country No 4.1 10.3 47
Yes 1.3 3.2 153
Total 5.4 13.5 200
Stay in the US No 0.1 3.9 118
Yes 0.2 5.7 82
Total 0.3 9.6 200
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Form of social capital Dimension Variable Modality Dim.1 Dim.2 Freq.
Scientific 
production
Number of citations in Web 
of Science (10 most cited 
publications)
0 1.6 6.9 66
1–200 0.0 0.3 91
201–500 0.9 2.2 28
501+ 0.7 4.1 15






Academic organisation board 
(science “mandarins”)
No 0.3 0.1 184
Yes 3.7 1.4 16
Total 4.0 1.5 200
University vice-chancellor No 0.3 0.1 187
Yes 4.6 0.9 13




Economic elite members No 0.4 0.0 186
Yes 4.7 0.1 14
Total 5.1 0.1 200
Executive board of company No 0.2 0.1 172
Yes 1.2 0.3 28
Total 1.4 0.4 200
Non-executive board of 
company
No 1.5 0.4 141
Yes 3.6 0.9 59




Political or administrative 
elite members
No 0.1 0.0 191
Yes 2.2 0.0 9
Total 2.3 0.0 200
Expert committee member No 3.0 0.0 137
Yes 6.6 0.1 63






PhD student member of 
extra-academic elites
0 1.2 0.0 169
1+ 6.3 0.0 31
Total 7.5 0.0 200
PhD “brother”/“sister” 
member of extra-academic 
elites
0 3.2 0.2 142
1–3 4.6 0.3 42
4+ 3.3 0.1 16




Local reproduction (professor 
in university of PhD)
No 3.8 1.9 121
Yes 5.9 3.0 79
Total 9.7 4.9 200
modified rates (Table 13.2), therefore we only retain those for our analyses. 
Figure 13.1 displays the cloud of modalities and Figure 13.2 the cloud of indi-
viduals. We see a concentration of individuals on the lower and left parts, 
while the cloud is sparser in its upper and right parts. This less dense zone 
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Table 13.2 Inertia rates of the 11 first axes of the MCA
Axis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Eigenvalue 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
Variance (%) 12.4 8.2 6.5 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.7 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.7
Modified 63.3 17.7 7.2 5.0 3.2 1.6 1.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0
rates (%)
Cumulated 63.3 81.0 88.2 93.2 96.4 98.0 99.1 99.6 99.9 100.0 100.0
modified 
rates (%)
Figure 13.1 Axes 1 and 2. Cloud of modalities
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corresponds to a small group of individuals with powerful resources situated 
on the right pole of Axis 1 and the upper pole of Axis 2, while the majority of 
individuals detains less important resources in the space.
Axis 1 represents 63.3% of the adjusted inertia rates. Six variables contrib-
ute to this factor above the contributions average (i.e. 5.3%), for a total of 
56.1%: PhD “brother”/“sister” members of the academic elites (12.8%), PhD 
“brother”/“sister” members of the extra-academic elites (11.1%), local repro-
duction (9.7%), expert committee (9.6%), PhD students members of extra-
academic elites (7.5%) and stay in other country (5.4%). Nineteen modalities 
contribute to this axis above the contributions average (i.e. 2.1%), for a total 
of 76.8%. On the negative coordinates (west of the graph), we find PhD 
“brother”/“sister” members of the academic elites: 0 (6.2%), local reproduc-
tion: no (3.8%), PhD “brother”/“sister” members of the extra-academic elites: 
0 (3.2%) and expert committee: no (3.0%). On the positive coordinates (east of 
Figure 13.2 Axes 1 and 2. Cloud of individuals
238 Thierry Rossier and Pierre Benz
the graph), we find expert committee: yes (6.6%), PhD students members of 
the extra-academic elites: 1+ (6.3%), local reproduction: yes (5.9%), economic 
elite: yes (4.7%), vice-chancellor: yes (4.6%), PhD “brother”/“sister” members 
of the extra-academic elites: 1–3 (4.6%), stay in other country: no (4.1%), 
PhD “brother”/“sister” members of the academic elites: 4+ (4.0%), academic 
organisation: yes (3.7%), non-executive board of company: yes (3.6%), PhD 
“brother”/“sister” members of the extra-academic elites: 4+ (3.3%), PhD 
“brother”/“sister” members of the academic elites: 1–3 (2.6%), political or 
administrative elite: yes (2.2%), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics: yes 
(2.2%) and degree in scientific collaborations: 6–10 (2.2%).
The first axis is structured by the volume of social capital, but of a particu-
lar kind. On the one hand, we see economists with extra-academic affiliations 
(members of an expert committee for the Swiss federal administration, member 
of the Swiss political and economic elites, member of the non-executive board of 
a company) and large external networks (they have the same supervisor as a large 
number of other political, administrative and economic elites, and have themselves 
supervised the doctorate of such elite members). At the same time, they have an 
important influence in the higher circles of academia outside their discipline (they 
have occupied the position of vice-chancellor of a university and have been a 
member of the directing board of important interdisciplinary academic organisa-
tions, such as the SNSF) and have a certain amount of academic networks, having 
the same supervisor as a large number of other university professors (but they have 
not supervised the PhD of future professors themselves).12 Finally, they are involved 
in local circles (having obtained their PhD in the same university in which they 
are teaching) and detain no tie outside Switzerland. Opposed to these individuals 
who are endowed with a large amount of mundane networks, largely outside their 
discipline,13 we see, on the other hand, professors of economics without academic 
and extra-academic networks in the form of having the same supervisor of other 
elite members, without local social capital, and without political affiliations, in the 
form of membership in an expert committee. In summary, this factor, which is 
by far the most important in the space, corresponds to an axis of volume of extra- 
disciplinary social capital (in its academic, political and economic forms, mostly 
organised at the local level, and without international ties), divided between those 
who own this form of capital and those who do not.
Powerful individuals detaining very important external social capital are situ-
ated on the right pole of this first axis (see Figure 13.3), such as Joseph Deiss 
(professor of economic policy in Fribourg), a member of the federal parliament 
who became part of the Federal Council (the federal government) between 
1999 and 2006. We can also mention Niklaus Blattner (professor of labour 
market and economic industry in Basel) who was the executive secretary of the 
Swiss Bankers Association, one the most important business interest groups, 
and member of the governing board of the Swiss central bank, and Gaston 
Gaudard (professor of international and regional economics in Fribourg and 
Lausanne) who was vice-chancellor of the University of Fribourg, member 
of one of the two leading boards of the SNSF and member of the board of 
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the Société de banque suisse, one of the country’s three major banks at the time. 
On the other pole (left side of the axis), we see individuals with few network 
resources in Switzerland, such as the Belgian and French professor Christian 
Comeliau who taught economic development in Geneva, after having occu-
pied teaching positions in Louvain, Kinshasa and Paris. Comeliau detained no 
important resources in Swiss extra-academic circles whatsoever.
Axis 2 only accounts for 17.7% of the cumulated modified rates. The opposi-
tion represented through Axis 1 is therefore 3.5 times more important than the 
one through Axis 2. Seven variables contribute to this axis above average (for a 
total of 83.2%): degree in scientific collaborations (17.2%), citations in Web of 
Science (13.5%), stay in other country (13.5%), years of research collaborations 
(13.0%), board of Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (10.3%), stay in 
the US (9.6%), and PhD students members of academic elites (6.1%). Eighteen 
modalities contribute to this factor above average (for a total of 86.7%). On the 
negative coordinates (south of the graph), we find stay in other country: no 
(10.3%), citations in Web of Science: 0 (6.9%), degree in scientific collabora-
tions: 0 (5.0%), years of research collaborations: 0 (4.6%), stay in the US: no 
(3.9%), local reproduction: yes (3.0%) and Swiss Society of Economics and 
Figure 13.3 Axes 1 and 2. Illustrative individuals.
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Statistics: no (2.2%). On the positive coordinates (north of the graph), we find: 
degree in scientific collaborations: 6–10 (9.3%), Swiss Society of Economics 
and Statistics: yes (8.1%), stay in the US: yes (5.7%), years of research collabora-
tions: 11+ (5.5%), PhD students members of academic elites: 3+ (5.1%), cita-
tions in Web of Science: 501+ (4.1%), stay in other country: yes (3.2%), degree 
in scientific collaborations: 11+ (2.8%), years of research collaborations: 6–10 
(2.6%), dean: yes (2.2%) and citations in Web of Science: 201–500 (2.2%).
This second axis displays another opposition. It shows, on one side, eco-
nomics professors owning a large amount of intra-disciplinary social capital: 
members of the board of the disciplinary association, university department 
deans, a great number of co-applicants in the SNSF network, a large number 
of collaboration years and a lot of citations in the Web of Science. These net-
works are organised at the national (SNSF) and international (Web of Science) 
levels at the same time. They also own international social capital, having stayed 
for scientific research for at least one year outside Switzerland, in particular in 
the USA. They detain a large share of academic networks, having supervised 
the doctorate of future Swiss economics professors. Regarding “elite” PhD 
networks, the division is clear and the powers associated with both dimensions 
of opposition in the space have to be differentiated: Individuals with a large 
amount of capitals associated with Axis 1 have the same supervisor as other 
academic and extra-academic elite members and have supervised extra-academic 
elites only, meanwhile individuals with a lot of resources coming from the sec-
ond dimension of the space solely supervise the PhD of academic elites. On the 
other side, we see economics professors without scientific networks (no cita-
tions, no collaborations, no positions in the board of the association), without 
international networks, but in the process of local power reproduction (doc-
torate in the teaching university). This dimension summarises then a volume of 
intra-disciplinary social capital (organised at the national and international levels), 
divided again between those who detain it and those who do not (but do own 
local social capital).
On the upper pole of Axis 2, we see individuals with powerful scientific and 
international networks such as the “superstar” Bruno S. Frey (professor of theo-
retical and practical economics in Basel, Konstanz, Zurich and Warwick) who 
is one of the most cited European economists (more than 5000 citations of his 
ten most cited publications in Web of Science) and collaborated in numerous 
research projects; or Michael Lechner (professor of econometrics in St. Gallen, 
after occupying positions in Harvard and Mannheim), member of the board 
of the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics and dean in St. Gallen, with a 
fair record of citations (more than 200) and numerous research collaborations. 
On the lower pole, we observe individuals with a more local profile and no 
scientific network resources whatsoever, such as Martin Janssen, who did his 
PhD in Zurich before becoming professor of financial economics in the same 
university and sat in numerous company boards, but with no insertion in intra-
disciplinary networks whatsoever.
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In summary, our results show how the space is structured according to two 
dimensions: the first displays the volume of extra-disciplinary social capital and 
the second of intra-disciplinary social capital. Both those dimensions are struc-
tured according to the overall volume of resources, dividing the dominant, 
who detain a large amount of social capital, and the dominated, who do not. 
Particularly dominant economists are to be found in the north-east quadrant 
of the space where the volume of both forms of social capital is high, such as 
Silvio Borner (professor of economic policy in St. Gallen and Basel), a well-
known expert for the federal administration, dean in both universities, mem-
ber of the board of the disciplinary association and of the insurance company 
Helvetia (one of the most important in the country). Borner, who is one of 
the most influential actors in the field, became in the 1990s very active within 
the so-called neoliberal coalition (Mach 2002), which advocated drastic policy 
reforms that would eventually lead to the liberalisation of the Swiss economy.
It is to be noted that the first opposition has much more weight in the space 
than the second (63.3% of the inertia rates against 17.7%). Economics is thus a 
much more heteronomous discipline than economists would say it is. Indeed, 
our results show the importance of external logics, whether in the form of 
political, economic or (transdisciplinary) academic networks. Nonetheless, we 
can still wonder if, despite this overall trend, there has been some historical 
changes regarding the importance of these two dimensions. Some could even 
hypothesise a reversing movement in the importance of both these logics dur-
ing the very recent period. We investigate the historical evolution of this struc-
ture between 1980 and 2000.
4.2  Importance of heteronomous networks during the 1980–2000 period
In this second part, we assess the importance of the two main dimensions of 
social capital (and thus the robustness of our analyses) during the historical 
period on which we focus. To do so, we proceed to a class-specific MCA 
(CSA) on each group of professors separated by year (i.e. whether they occupy 
a professor position at a Swiss university in each given year). Figure 13.3 shows 
the association (calculated by standardising the cosine) between the first axis 
of the MCA for the entire group, and the first axis of the CSA for each year 
between 1980 and 2000 (i.e. “Dimension 1”), and between the second axis 
of the MCA and the second axis of the CSA for each group respectively (i.e. 
“Dimension 2”). By doing so, we are able to see whether there are variations 
across time in the intensity of both dimensions identified in the previous part, 
or if the structure stays stable during the whole period, and thus social capital 
reproduces itself across time.
We observe that for the first axis, the association between Axis 1 of the 
MCA and of the CSAs by year is very high and does not vary a lot (correla-
tion coefficients: μ = 0.97, sd = 0.01). Therefore, the first dimension, related 
to the volume of extra-disciplinary social capital, remains particularly stable. 
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Heteronomous networks are, for the whole period, the most important source 
of distinction in the field of economists. For the associations between Axis 
2 of the MCA and of the CSAs, a larger variance of the correlation coeffi-
cients can be observed (μ = 0.85, sd = 0.09). By calculating the slope of the 
line which represents the evolution of the association among these axes, we 
observe, despite some variations, a relative (but significant) increase in impor-
tance of the association between the second axis of the MCA and of the CSAs 
for each year between 1980 and 2000.14 Intra-disciplinary social capital has 
more weight in the recent period. This increase could explain, to some extent, 
the belief in the autonomy of the field. However, this process cannot hide the 
fact that the structure of social capital remains very stable during the whole 
period, and, consequently, the main logics of structuration of the field do not 
lose in importance. Extra-disciplinary social capital (such as sitting in academic, 
expert or company boards) has proven to be of an important value in econom-
ics for the whole period.15
5  Conclusions
The main aim of this chapter was to focus on the structure of social capital 
within the Swiss field of economists by relying on the sociological profile of 
200 economics professors between 1980 and 2000. In a first part, we showed 
that the space was structured according to two dimensions. The main one 
was organised around the volume of extra-disciplinary social capital through 










Dimension 1 Dimension 2
Figure 13.4  Correlation coefficients (absolute values) between axes of the MCA and the 
CSA by year
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local networks. The secondary opposition was organised around the volume 
of intra-disciplinary social capital: scientific affiliations, personal scientific and 
international ties, and networks of citations. In economics heteronomous log-
ics are the most prevalent in order to detain power defined as the ability to 
use one’s own personal network composed of the collective resources owned 
by all the other individuals a professor is directly connected to. This type of 
power mostly consists in being able to influence the outcome of public and 
academic policy or the economy, therefore primarily outside the discipline. 
Nonetheless, a secondary type of power can be identified, consisting in being 
able to influence other economists with one’s own writings and research, thus 
within the discipline. In a second part, we showed that the importance of extra-
disciplinary social capital remained stable across the whole period. At the same 
time, intra-disciplinary social capital varied more and experienced a slight, but 
significant, increase in importance between 1980 and 2000. Despite this evolu-
tion, mundane networks constitute the main form of opposition for the whole 
period, which stresses the porosity of the field to external logics.
These network affiliations and resources configurations also have reper-
cussions outside of the positional structure of the field. They influence 
position-takings in economics, measured through theoretical and methodo-
logical preferences, as well as research domains. Based on qualitative insights 
we have developed in the previous parts through illustrative profiles of pro-
fessors, we have observed different teaching and research specialisation. On 
the first axis, economic, political and administrative elites as well as academic 
“mandarins” (right of the axis) teach very “practical” topics, such as economic, 
industry or labour market policy, while on the pole of the have-nots (left side 
of the axis), research domains are less close to the state and economic pow-
ers (Christian Comeliau for example is a “heterodox” economist working on 
economic development). On the second axis, renowned scientists (top of the 
axis) use mathematical models and experimental and statistical methods, linked 
to “autonomous” practices in economics, and work on a variety of scientific 
objects (in his own words, Bruno S. Frey applies economics in “non-economic 
fields”16). On the bottom of the axis, the “scientific” have-nots work on more 
applied topics, such as finance. Network and capital configurations are critical 
in influencing how economics is defined and how scientific practice is done.
In this chapter, we have focused on structural, institutional and historical 
processes related to the forms of social capital in the field of economists. These 
networks of economists have to be situated in a wider context. Scholars have 
noted important transformations since Bourdieu’s seminal work on the field of 
power in the 1970s–1980s (1996a). First, the boundaries among economic and 
cultural capital are much blurrier than before, because cultural capital accumu-
lation is increasing at the economic pole of the field, and, second, neoliberal-
ism has renewed oppositions by submitting politics and the higher civil service 
to the aims of the private companies (Denord & Lagneau-Ymonet 2016: 46). 
The historical role of economists in this process must not be underestimated, 
since their scientific apparel and tools are particularly efficient in spreading the 
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“economic belief ” within the whole society (Lebaron 2000; Denord 2016). It 
is thus needed to explore the modalities and forms of networks of the econo-
mists in the field of power in order to unveil their role in the recent process 
of concentration of (economic and cultural) power within the hands of the 
economic fraction of the dominant class.
Notes
 1 We would like to thank Philip Korom and Stephan Pühringer for their very relevant 
comments and their deep reading of a former version of this chapter, which greatly 
contributed to improve it.
 2 “SSES Annual Congress 2017 – Marion Fourcade”, www.youtube.com/watch?v=yR-
9Fe3cW9E (58:16–59:08).
 3 We can find similar statements regarding the objectivity of economics at the very top of 
the discipline. Nobel Prize laureate Robert Schiller stated in an interview, “The Nobel 
Prize is designed to reward those who do not play tricks for [public and media] atten-
tion, and who, in their sincere pursuit of the truth, might otherwise be slighted”, cited 
in Ötsch et al. (2018: 37).
 4 A field is a more or less autonomous space, where individuals struggle for its specific 
capital, which enables them to occupy dominant positions (Bourdieu 1996b).
 5 A capital is a form of powerful resources involved in systemic processes allowing their 
garnering (Savage et al. 2005; Bourdieu 1986).
 6 The “Swiss Elite Database”, developed by the Swiss Elite Observatory (www.unil.ch/
obelis/en/home.html), where elites are defined according to their position (Mills 1956). 
Elite members are the individuals occupying executive or top positions within the hier-
archies of power institutions in several Swiss fields.
 7 This project (100017_143202) was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation 
and was supervised by Felix Bühlmann, André Mach and Thomas David.
 8 To look all those variables summarised in a table (as well as their contributions to the 
first two axes of the MCA), see Table 13.1.
 9 We name that way individuals with the same Doktorvater (i.e. Ph.D. supervisor) to mark 
the analogy with family ties.
 10 To have comparable data among all the professors, we decided to measure this num-
ber of years before the age of 51, since the youngest professor was 50 during our data 
collection.
 11 We will not address gendered considerations in this chapter because of lack of space. 
Women are under-represented within this group of professors: only eight women out 
of 200 professors. However, given the variety of profiles of these eight women, we were 
not able to observe a gendered differentiation between their social capital configurations 
and male professors’ profile. A deeper research on women professors in economics is 
currently ongoing. Preliminary results can be found in Rossier (2019).
 12 Given our empirical findings, it seems quite unexpectedly that having the same supervi-
sors as other university professors belongs more to external logics rather than internal 
ones.
 13 Two other modalities, which contribute above average to Axis 1, correspond more 
to disciplinary scientific networks and powers rather than to extra-disciplinary social 
capital: member of the board of the disciplinary Swiss Society of Economics and Sta-
tistics: yes, and number (degree) of collaborations in the scientific network funded by 
the SNSF: 6–10. To a certain extent, they are related to academic and external pow-
ers. Indeed, the disciplinary association is at the same time the scientific centre of the 
discipline, and the interface between economics and political powers (Jost 2016). The 
SNSF collaboration network mostly corresponds to a network motivated by scientific 
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logics, but at the same time some “big” projects with a large amount of funding and co-
applicants can follow a public agenda and be intricately related to political powers (Ben-
ninghoff & Leresche 2003). Nonetheless, these modalities contribute both to the axis 
just above average (= 2.2%), contrary to their contribution to the second axis, which is 
very important.
 14 The equation y = a * x + b, where a corresponds to the slope: y = 0.0066x + 12.308 
(R2 = 0.23).
 15 It is to be noted that we do not have comparable data for the more recent period 
(2001–2020) on social capital, since economics professors appointed after that tend to 
have experienced shorter academic careers (and their Ph.D. students have not already 
had the time to be part of the elite). One could hypothesise that the importance of those 
two dimensions has reversed during the very recent period. However, given the histori-
cal stability of the prevalence of heteronomous networks in the field of economists, we 
can suppose that the structure of the field has not moved quickly in this direction since 
2001.
 16 Such as “happiness, politics. . . , environment, family, conflict, history and art” (Bruno 
S. Frey’s CV: www.bsfrey.ch/cv/EN_2019_CV_Bruno_Frey_Long.pdf).
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14  Paths of international 
circulation




This chapter draws upon the Brazilian case and weaves a narrative about the 
patterns and effects of international circulation of economists, economic 
knowledge and expertise. The text is divided into two sections preceded by 
methodological considerations. The first section examines how economists and 
economic ideas flow. It shows how the structure of the Brazilian space of econo-
mists was articulated historically and highlights the establishment of connec-
tions with foreign experts and institutions. The second section focuses on 
the patterns of knowledge transposition in order to discuss how dissimilar ideas 
spread and (re)shape a structured space of economists. The conclusion underlines 
how internationalization, besides being a source of cosmopolitan capitals for 
peripheral elites, works as a conduit for ideas and expertise that impact their 
economies and societies.
Elites2 from peripheral countries3 have widely relied on internationalization 
as a strategy to accumulate cosmopolitan assets, which are highly valued in 
struggles to occupy the dominant positions in local fields of power (Dezalay 
and Garth, 2002). Cosmopolitan assets are credentials and dispositions result-
ing from international socialization. To become cosmopolitan, peripheral elites 
import goods from overseas; mimic manners and fashions; are educated accord-
ing to foreign standards; and translate and incorporate specialized knowledge, 
ideas and ideals coming from abroad. Above all, they keep moving around the 
world. Besides gaining familiarization with foreign landscapes, languages, hab-
its and ideas, international circulation fosters the creation and reinforcement 
of ties between economic, political and cultural elites from different countries, 
enlarging the surface of their influence and power (Wagner, 2007).
Contemporaneously, among the most prestigious cosmopolitan qualifica-
tions are international academic and professional experiences. The process of 
modernization of the bureaucracies of peripheral states was accompanied by a 
strong search for technical credentials, which enhanced the hunt for imported 
knowledge and expertise. The circulation of knowledge operated both ways: 
professionals from the center were sent by their governments, universities and 
philanthropic foundations to peripheral countries while specialists from these 
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nations went abroad to receive advanced training. Economics was among the 
core fields of expertise which benefitted from these circulations, being strategic 
for those exporting as well as those importing, in a progressively intertwined 
world economy (Montecinos and Markoff, 2009).
Early in the 20th century, economic experts from the center traveled around, 
offering formulas aiming at making peripheral economies open and solvent 
for their creditors. From the 1940s onwards, the United States consolidated 
its position as the leading source of economic experts and expertise. The dis-
semination of economic knowledge led by the US operated differently: they 
provided technical and financial aid as counterparts to political and military 
alignments, diffusing, withal, their perspectives on the economy and society. 
From a peripheral perspective, these ties with foreign experts and the expe-
riences abroad were major sources of technical legitimacy and social status 
(Drake, 1994; Malan et al., 1980).
General statements about the foreign influence over the constitution of the 
peripheral fields of economics, nonetheless, cannot account for important 
variations. First, the circulation through different countries fosters diverse per-
spectives on the economy and streams of economics. Second, each country 
exporting economic knowledge is permeated by internal struggles, with mul-
tiple orientations competing for prestige and international diffusion. Third, 
political preferences and intellectual configurations in peripheral countries 
influence how welcomed imported ideas will be. Fourth, the social character-
istics of the agents and social networks shape how economic ideas will spread 
over each space of economists. Focusing on Brazil allows illustrating these vari-
ations in a context where international entanglements were decisive since the 
constitution of its space of economists.
2  Data and methods
This chapter is based on a historical reconstruction of the establishment of 
international bridges through which economists and economic knowledge 
circulate. These are represented in a network displaying Brazilian economists 
and liberal professionals who occupied prestigious functions within the public 
economic administration and in the academic field of economics. It depicts the 
connections established with foreign agents and institutions, illustrating pat-
terns of internationalization and displaying how these ties are distributed in the 
Brazilian space4 of economists.
The data used to build the network was collected in biographical diction-
aries, biographies, CVs, newspapers, pre-existing interviews and interviews 
conducted by me, between 2012 and 2018, for two different projects: “Meri-
tocracy of Ties: Genesis and Reconfigurations of the Space of Economists 
in Brazil” and “Theoretical, Political and Social Influences from Exile: The 
Case of Brazilian Intellectuals in Chile from 1964 to 1973”. These research 
projects are prosopographic and aim at building a social portrait of several gen-
erations of Brazilian economists. The individuals and institutions that integrate 
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the network were selected through a “historical” snowball sampling, that is, a 
qualitative and non-probabilistic technique in which agents and their connec-
tions become part of the database when mentioned in interviews, documents 
and narratives about the Brazilian space of economists.
This network is formed by 440 agents, including individuals, universities, 
governmental institutions and governments. The ties in the network are bidi-
rectional and non-weighted and indicate connections between agents and insti-
tutions or between agents. These are of multiple natures, such as friendship, 
marriage, professional interactions, political affiliations and association with 
schools, research centers, governmental bodies or governments. The represen-
tation of a wide variety of ties and the simultaneous inclusion of every link that 
an agent has or had in his or her trajectory derives from the premise that every 
one of these bonds helps to shape their worldview, practices and position tak-
ing and, thus, the institutions they are associated with. Moreover, the number 
of ties and the social surface reached by an agent are indicators of its volume of 
social capital, an asset that enhances the ability of an agent to connect agents 
and groups, currently employed in struggles for influence, power and prestige.
The distances between agents and institutions in the network express the 
totality of their affiliations, which are the structuring forces of the space and of 
its polarities. Network analysis is a relational technique that allows representing 
geometric distances between agents and institutions resulting precisely from the 
outline of their connections. The network displayed in this chapter was gener-
ated using the software Gephi and the distribution of agents and institutions in 
a bi-dimensional space results from the use of the Force Atlas 2 algorithm. The 
network is produced by “nodes [that] repulse each other like charged particles, 
while edges attract their nodes, like springs. These forces create a movement 
that converges to a balanced state. This final configuration is expected to help 
the interpretation of the data” (Jacomy et al., 2014, p. 2). This method is rela-
tional since the positions of the nodes only acquire meaning in their relation to 
all others, and its goal is to turn “structural proximities into visual proximities” 
(idem, p. 2).
Even if space and fields, as conceived by Pierre Bourdieu, and networks 
are associated with divergent theoretical traditions (Bourdieu, 2000; Becker 
and Pessin, 2006), current research combines these two frameworks following 
their common goal of producing spatial representations in which the distances 
between the unities are relationally defined (Nooy, 2003; Denord, 2003; Serino 
et al., 2017; Klüger, 2017b). I argue here that the distances in networks – as 
well as distances in fields – allow representing polarized structures in which the 
relative position of agents depends on how they are situated vis-à-vis each other 
in what Bourdieu defines as struggles for determining the dominant principles 
of domination. Here, however, structural proximity and polarizations are not 
a direct expression of similarity of habitus and capital composition5 of agents 
that do not necessarily meet – as in a Bourdieusian social space – but are altered 
repeatedly by their interactions. Therefore, the network has the advantage of 
displaying concrete ties that can be mobilized at the daily operation of the 
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space, “unraveling the processes in which a field is being restructured and sym-
bolic values are (re)produced” (Nooy, 2003, p. 325).
3  How do economists and economic ideas flow? Learning 
from the Brazilian case
The Brazilian space of economists relied on international cooperation since its 
establishment in the 1940s. The patterns of collaboration with foreign experts 
and institutions varied according to geopolitical interests and engagement of 
agents and universities in foreign exchanges. This section illustrates how inter-
nationalization influenced the constitution of a Brazilian space of economists 
and its transformations over time.
3.1  International cooperation at the genesis of the space of economists – 
1940s and 1950s
The first Brazilians who acquired specialized credentials in economics were, 
in general, diplomats who studied abroad and public administrators trained 
in Europe and the United States. By the 1940s, the Brazilian state started to 
deem economic skills as essential for modernizing and rationalizing economic 
management. Soon the first departments of economics – which were created 
by lawyers and engineers – began to recruit foreign professors and establish 
agreements with universities abroad in order to transfer specialized knowledge 
on the subject (Loureiro, 1997).
Eugênio Gudin, an engineer with an elite background and vast cosmopol-
itan capitals, was the main person responsible for the creation, in 1946, of 
the two major schools of economics in Rio de Janeiro: the National Faculty 
of Economics (FNCE6 later renamed Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, 
UFRJ – E27) and the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV – B2). After taking 
part at the Bretton Woods conference, in 1944, Gudin visited Harvard accom-
panied by Octavio de Bulhões, a lawyer with a specialization in economics and 
also a member of the elites. Subsequently, they wrote a report to the Minis-
ter of Education stating that the teaching of economics in Brazil should fol-
low Harvard’s model – which separated economics from administration and 
accounting – and recommending hiring North American professors (Gudin, 
1979; Silveira 2009).
Gudin managed to recruit some foreign specialists who fled Europe dur-
ing the World Wars, such as the Czech Alexandre Kafka, the Polish Richard 
Lewinson and some temporary French, South African, Belgian, Dutch and 
German professors, causing the FGV to look like a “tower of Babel”. Gudin 
also fostered international connections by inviting foreign professors to give 
short courses and lectures on contemporary topics and techniques. Among 
them were the well-known economists Lionel Robbins, from the London 
School of Economics, Gottfried Haberler, from Harvard, Ragnar Nurkse, from 
Columbia/Princeton, and Jacob Viner, from Chicago (D’Araújo, 1999).
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Simultaneously, North American specialists were sent to Brazil as part of 
governmental agreements for economic cooperation. The tonality of the 
Brazil-US economic diplomacy changed several times during the second half 
of the 20th century, influencing the rhythm and intensity of the establishment 
of these connections. Closer interactions and cooperation increased every time 
that proximity with Latin America became politically strategic, either follow-
ing the need for supplies and military support during wars or as a strategy 
for combating the spread of communist ideas within the subcontinent (Malan 
et al., 1980).
In the 1950s, the outbreak of the Korean War was followed by the promulga-
tion of the Act of International Development, which voiced the intention of 
making available scientific innovations and technical-industrial progress to the 
Third World. Based on this act, the Mixed Commission Brazil-US was created 
(CMBEU – B1). This mission engaged Brazilian and American specialists in 
preparing projects of infrastructure – mostly energy and transportation – to 
be financed jointly. The Commission also gave birth to the National Bank of 
Economic Development (BNDE, later National Bank of Economic and Social 
Development BNDES – E2), which would be responsible for managing the 
funding. They recruited qualified personnel and incorporated the knowledge 
and techniques bequeathed by the CMBEU, becoming the epicenter of devel-
opment planning in Brazil (Campos, 1994; Sola, 1998).
The CMBEU agreement was terminated in 1953, and a period of diplo-
matic negligence followed. As the US withdrew from its position of knowl-
edge provider, Brazil went looking for different sources of expertise and sought 
help from the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America 
(CEPAL – F3). Following up on the great repercussion of Raul Prebisch’s 
manifesto, El desarrollo económico de América Latina y sus principales problemas 
(1949), CEPAL and its thesis about the necessity of planning and governmen-
tal guided industrialization were put on the spot (Garcia, 2005). The BNDE, 
willing to engage in broader economic planning, convenes with CEPAL to 
receive a team led by the Sorbonne (F2) trained economist Celso Furtado, the 
only Brazilian at the Commission. Furtado worked at the BNDE, from 1953 
to 1955, to prepare a diagnostic of the productive sector in Brazil for subsidiz-
ing an integrated planning of the economy. Furtado’s analysis was an important 
source for Juscelino Kubitschek’s Plano de Metas, Brazil’s largest experience of 
state-led economic planning, which focused on the energy, transportation and 
transformation industry sectors (Furtado, 2014).
This first cooperation led to a follow-up agreement, for the import of 
CEPAL’s “Intensive Training in Problems of Economic Development”. The 
first edition of this course happened in Rio de Janeiro, in 1956, and was inau-
gurated by President Kubitscheck himself. This course offered a specialization 
in planning, aiming to prepare bureaucrats and intellectuals for understanding 
economic activity within a geographical and historical frame and to intervene 
accordingly to local specificities. The course had 21 editions, in 12 differ-
ent cities, and lasted until 1967, spreading economic knowledge to regional 
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bureaucracies and universities all over the country. In 1960, CEPAL inaugu-
rated an office in Rio de Janeiro, in cooperation with the BNDE, assum-
ing the direction of the courses and centralizing research on Brazil’s economy. 
The CEPAL-BNDE office incorporated young Brazilian economists, notably 
Maria da Conceição Tavares, Carlos Lessa and Antonio Barros de Castro and 
influenced a generation of specialists in economics (Klüger et al., 2019, under 
review).
3.2  The export of US’s economic expertise during the Cold War – 1960s 
and 1970s
While the CEPAL became a leading influence in the formation of public admin-
istrators, North American-based mainstream economic knowledge reached 
the universities. At the beginning of the 1960s, troubled by an increasing anti-
Americanism in the region and the proximity between Cubans and Soviets, Ken-
nedy’s administration reclaimed a cooperative attitude towards the subcontinent. 
The rationality subjacent to his “Alliance for Progress” was that the best way 
to avoid the spread of communism would be to enhance social and economic 
development, ameliorating well-being. The Alliance promised to foster direct 
economic investments, transfer modern industrial techniques and agricultural 
equipment, as well as send experts to areas with a scarcity of qualified profession-
als to participate in the development of local scientific communities. The United 
States Agency for International Development, which coordinated these invest-
ments, and some non-governmental foundations, such as the Ford Foundation 
and the Rockefeller Foundation, engaged especially in strengthening scientific 
fields seen as strategic, including economics (Ribeiro, 2006; Miceli, 1993).
The scientific cooperation comprised investments in university infrastruc-
tures, funding of visiting professors and invitations to train local academics, as 
well as the granting of scholarships to Brazilians who would study economics 
in the US. These initiatives organized and intensified an international flow of 
scientists that until this point was unsystematic. Aiming to facilitate these circu-
lations, the Brazilian schools of economics established partnerships and started 
to prepare the students to apply for positions abroad.
In the 1950s, the School of Administration of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation 
(EAESP – E5), located in São Paulo, established an exchange program with the 
Michigan State University (D5) to qualify recently hired professors, like Luiz 
Carlos Bresser Pereira, who would lead the creation of a school of economics 
in close connection with studies of public administration (D’Araújo, 1999). In 
1960, the FGV-RJ created a Center for Advancement of Economists, which 
offered supplementary training in mathematics and macro- and microeconom-
ics, as well as three weekly hours of English lessons, preparing their students to 
pursue graduate courses in the US. They managed to send 16 students over-
seas until 1964, mostly funded by Rockefeller Foundation scholarships, with 
their main destinations being Yale (B4), Vanderbilt (B4), and Berkeley (C3) 
(D’Araújo, 1999; Simonsen, 1966).
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In the mid-1960s, Vanderbilt and Yale established direct agreements with 
the largest Brazilian schools of economics: FGV and the Faculty of Economics 
and Administration of the University of São Paulo (FEA-USP – D4). These 
were intermediated by Alexandre Kafka, who worked at FGV before moving 
to the International Monetary Fund, and by Werner Baer, a specialist in Latin 
American Development who had taught at Yale and Vanderbilt and worked 
as a visiting professor at FGV and USP (Baer, 1998; Kafka, 1998). At that 
time, Yale’s Economic Growth Center master’s and Ph.D. programs had a quota 
for international students. Simultaneously, the USAID financed a cooperation 
between the FGV and the USP with Vanderbilt’s graduate program in eco-
nomic development, encompassing circulations in both directions. Vanderbilt 
sent teachers to coach the local professors and offered scholarships for newly 
graduated Brazilians to pursue their masters and Ph.Ds. in Nashville. Besides, 
the Ford Foundation provided additional funding for both FGV and USP, fos-
tering a quick professionalization of the graduate training in economics in 
Brazil (Rocca et al., 1984).
The University of California at Berkeley, in its turn, took part in a different 
sort of agreement. In 1965, the USAID sent to Rio de Janeiro a technical mis-
sion integrated by Berkeley professors and young doctors in economics. Their 
goal was to help establish the Office for Applied Economic Research (EPEA, 
later IPEA – C3), a state institution created a year before and directed by João 
Paulo dos Reis Velloso – who studied at the CAE and was returning from his 
master’s at Yale. Coordinated initially by Howard Ellis and later by Albert Fish-
low, the California Mission carried studies of the Brazilian economy and con-
ceived a decennial plan for Brazil’s industry, agriculture, infrastructure, as well 
as education and health. Fishlow simultaneously taught an economic devel-
opment course at the FGV, sewing ties with the academy. The mission was 
terminated in 1968 because of political disagreements with the Brazilian gov-
ernment, motivated by the promulgation of the dictatorship’s Institutional Act 
5 (AI-5), which suspended human rights and deepened censorship and political 
repression. Fishlow argued that UC Berkeley’s progressive political orientation 
was incompatible with state violence and the suspensions of civil rights, ending 
the agreement. Nevertheless, the links between Brazil and Berkeley persisted 
since he took in several Brazilian students, starting with his former assistants at 
IPEA: Pedro Malan and Regis Bonelli (D’Araújo et al., 2005).
3.3  The circulations of exiled economic experts – 1960s and 1970s
The AI-5 also increased the volume of forced international circulation of left-
ist economists, which were happening since the military takeover of 1964. 
The exile differed from other circulations of intellectuals given that the accu-
mulation of cosmopolitan dispositions, international credentials and foreign 
knowledge was an unintended consequence. After the coup, some economists 
managed to get scholarships in North American universities willing to shel-
ter those facing dangerous situations in Brazil, for instance, Cornell (E5). In 
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Europe, the heart of the exile of intellectuals was France, but there were far 
more social scientists than economists, with very weak links to the Sorbonne 
(F2) and Nanterre (F3). Some other economists, among which was Celso Fur-
tado, ended up in England, working in Cambridge (F3) and/or Oxford (D3) 
(Klüger, 2017a).
However, until the mid-1970s, the main destination of the exiled 
economists was neither Europe nor the US, but Latin America, which led to 
the establishment of a path for intra-periphery circulations. A large group of 
intellectuals went to Uruguay right after the military coup, others to Mexico. 
The epicenter of this reallocation was, nonetheless, Chile. There were political 
affinities between segments of the exiled community and the Chilean Cristian 
Democrat administration of Eduardo Frei Montalva and/or the Socialist 
government of Salvador Allende. These affinities led to the incorporation of 
Brazilians in both administrations, where they took part in the elaboration 
of plans for land reform, alphabetization, and economic planning. Finally, 
Santiago was populated by a dense network of international organizations 
(including the CEPAL as well as UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization 
and the International Labor Organization) and quartered graduate programs 
oriented towards the study of Latin American economy and society (Klüger, 
2017c).
CEPAL incorporated many of the exiled economists, not only those previ-
ously working in its Brazilian office, but also a large share of employees of the 
Superintendence for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE – F2), 
an organization created and coordinated by Celso Furtado, which was under 
severe surveillance by the military (Furtado, 2014). The graduate programs 
of the Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO) and of the Latin 
American School of Economics (ESCOLATINA – G3) received dozens of 
Brazilian students. ESCOLATINA, during those years, was fairly aligned 
with CEPAL’s economic perspective, as many of the Commission’s researchers 
taught at the school. Both graduate programs were built with North American 
funds, recruited foreign professors at the beginning and prioritized the build-
ing of quantitative analysis skills until the end of the 60s. Following the politi-
cal radicalization and polarization during Salvador Allende’s government, the 
programs moved towards qualitative frameworks of analysis and became highly 
politicized. The school of economics advocated for a modern political econ-
omy,8 with its professors and students engaging in struggles for economic trans-
formations leading to more inclusive and egalitarian societies (Beigel, 2009, 
Montecinos and Markoff, 2009; Valdés, 1995).
ESCOLATINA, FLACSO and CEPAL were highly affected by the military 
coup that took place in Chile in 1973. Many among their researchers and pro-
fessors were dismissed and the critical perspectives that prevailed in the 1960s 
and early 1970s replaced by highly quantitative models of economics and social 
sciences that claimed to be universal and politically neutral. The dominant 
force at the Chilean space of economists were, henceforth, the so-called Chi-
cago Boys, who implemented policies deeply inspired by Milton Friedman’s 
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neoliberal ideas. In the following years, Chicago’s school of economics’ (A3) 
influence spread all over the subcontinent. Even if Brazil had no direct coop-
eration with Chicago (as was the case for Chile, Argentina and Colombia), 
professors from Chicago visited Brazil, and students, such as Carlos Geraldo 
Langoni, were sent to Illinois for their PhDs. They obtained Ford Foundation 
or USAID scholarships, after attending, at the end of the 1960s, courses offered 
by IPEA’s Center of Training in Economic and Social Development (CEN-
DEC). Headed by an economist with a master’s diploma from Chicago, Og 
Francisco Leme, CEDEC sent students to several universities abroad, notably 
Chicago, John Hopkins (B3) and Stanford (B5) (Valdés, 1995; Biglaiser, 2002; 
D’Araújo et al., 2005; Friedman, 2012).
By the end of the 1960s, the exclusive agreements with Vanderbilt, Yale and 
Berkeley gave place to diversified circulations, with students pursuing their 
international paths individually. Besides the already mentioned universities of 
Cornell, Chicago, John Hopkins and Stanford, young Brazilian economists 
were to be found at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (C2), Harvard 
(B2), Princeton (C2) and New York University (D1), among other US univer-
sities. The frequency of exchanges with British institutions also rose, including 
connections with the University of London (C3) and Sussex (G2).
According to Maria Rita Loureiro and Gilberto Tadeu Lima (1994), in 
1991, 60% of the Brazilian professors in economics obtained a PhD abroad, 
46% in North American universities, 7.5% in France and 5.5% in England. 
The universities with a larger number of graduates were, in order, Vander-
bilt, Chicago, Berkeley, Harvard, Michigan and Illinois (Loureiro and Lima, 
1994, p. 38). These numbers are a partial expression of the patterns of interna-
tional circulation, including only those who stayed at the universities and not 
those who worked in the government and private sector. Regarding the strong 
connection with Chile, absent of the data, it should be indicated that those 
who attended ESCOLATINA obtained only their master’s degrees in Chile. 
Besides, many abandoned the program after the rise of Pinochet’s dictatorship. 
Finally, CEPAL’s influence has no expression in PhD diplomas, with stronger 
effects on the public administration, given that state bureaucrats were the larg-
est group among those attending the Commission’s training program and the 
exiled working at CEPAL.
4  How do dissimilar ideas spread and (re)shape a 
structured space of economists?
The first step in discussing how international circulation impacted the constitu-
tion of the Brazilian space of economists is to map the space and represent the 
connections between Brazilian and foreign agents and institutions. To do so, 
I built a synthetic network based on a historical reconstruction of the space of 
economists in Brazil from the 1940s to the first decade of the 2000s (Klüger, 
2017a). The network is inserted into a grid that allows locating and comparing 
agents’ and institutions’ positions, and the size of the nodes increases with the 
number of connections shared by an agent.
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Figure 14.1 The Brazilian space of economists from the 1940s to the 2000s
Triangle: Latin American connections. Circle: European connections. Square: North-American con-
nections. Diamond: governmental economic institutions. Hexagon: presidential administrations from 
1964 to 2010. Grey color and no frame: Brazilian schools of economics.
In the network, the horizontal division mirrors regional partitions. Zones 1 
and 2 include mostly economists from Rio de Janeiro and institutions located 
in Rio, as well as several specialists from the northeast of the country and 
Minas-Gerais. Zones 4 and 5 are mainly populated by economists from the 
state of São Paulo and institutions located in São Paulo, while the central zone 
3 has a more balanced regional composition. The distribution also expresses 
age divisions, with the elderly usually located at the margins of the network, 
that is zones 1 and 5, and connected with peers from the same regions.
Along the vertical axis are displayed the patterns of international circulation 
of economists and economic knowledge. Sectors A, B and C form the zone 
of North American influence. The European connections spread from C to G, 
but are concentrated in area F. Latin American affiliations figure at the sectors 
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F and G. The center of the network is mostly restricted to national connec-
tions. To understand the impact of different circulations on the configuration 
of space, it is important to look at the degree of connectivity, represented by 
the size of the nodes. The average number of connections of a node in the 
network is 8.26. There are 17 US institutions represented, averaging 8,235 
connections (140 total). Among these, Harvard and Yale have almost twice the 
average of connections. The European institutions are less amalgamated, with 
eight institutions averaging 5,875 in degree (47 total). Latin America has only 
two institutions present in the network, but their connectivity is rather strong, 
averaging 34 in degree (68 total). Even if Latin American links have an average 
impact of four times the mean weight of US institutions, the sum of the ties 
with the US is twice the amount of bonds with other Latin American coun-
tries. Furthermore, US institutions are more spread over the network, reaching 
from sectors A to E, while Latin Americans are limited to sectors F and G.
The path that goes from A to G can be read as a gradient that starts with the 
most orthodox versions of economics and goes up to the most heterodox ones. 
Orthodox or monetarist versions of economics can be characterized by their 
opposition to state interventionism, assuming that the free market would nec-
essarily lead to growth and an optimal distribution of resources. In this view, 
fiscal austerity, economic stability, openness to foreign trade and no external 
control were conditions for respecting the market and letting it work at its best 
(Campos, 1996). This approach usually relies on formalized economic models 
that taint, with attempts of scientific objectivity and neutrality, the behavioral 
and ideological fundaments of its analysis (Lebaron, 2000).
Latin American heterodoxy, at the other end of the network F and G, com-
bines several streams of the modern political economy, including Karl Marx, 
John M. Keynes, Michal Kalecki, CEPAL’s ideas and dependency theory. Against 
the highly mathematized models of the orthodoxy, they mix economics with 
historical and sociological analysis, arguing that the historical inequalities that 
shaped the international division of labor block the economic development of 
peripheral areas. Therefore, they recommended active economic planning and 
state-guided industrialization to ensure coordinated efforts of development and 
reduction of international disparities.
There is a large spectrum of positions between these two extremes. Sec-
tors B and C are under the influence of North American mathematized and 
pro-market economics. The schools represented at these sectors incorporate, 
nevertheless, critiques of the natural aptitude of the markets, trying to seize its 
imperfections (as the limited distribution of information, shared externalities, 
free-riding). Contrary to orthodoxy, they sustain the importance of govern-
ment intervention to correct some biases, to administrate the offer of public 
goods and even to invest in strategic sectors that are unattractive to the private 
market, such as infrastructure and scientific/technologic development.9
Sectors D and E are predominantly national, and sectors E and F are under 
some European influence, including institutionalist versions of economics, 
Keynesian economics, studies of industrial organization and of innovation and 
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technologic policies. The Brazilian economists studying in Europe between 
the 1960s and the 1980s were mostly engaged in economic history, history of 
economic thought or economic and technological development, and many of 
them were also exiled intellectuals.
Once the gradient of positions is described, the next step is to look at the 
international connections prevailing in each sector of the Brazilian space of 
economists.
4.1  The north of the network – Sectors A and B
The University of Chicago is represented at the peak of sector A, along-
side Virginia and John Hopkins. The Brazilian economists trained in Chi-
cago worked mainly at the FGV and Brazil’s Central Bank (SUMOC, later 
BACEN – B3), both located in B sector. FGV was slightly pluralist at the 
beginning, including some professors with nationalist and heterodox perspec-
tives, even though led by liberals like Gudin and Bulhões. After the constitu-
tion of its graduate school, the mainstream and mathematized perspectives 
prevailed and were radicalized when its director, Mario Henrique Simonsen, 
joined the military administration in the 1970s, being replaced by the Chicago 
PhD Carlos Langoni. He invited several monetarists, such as Edy Kogut, José 
Luiz Carvalho, Antonio Lemgruber and José J. Senna, to join him at FGV, and 
they also attained leadership positions at the Central Bank in the early 1980s 
(D’Araújo, 1999).
The BACEN is located in the middle of sector B, recruiting directors from 
all regions of the country. Regarding the Central Banker’s highest diploma, 
only eight of 34 specialists got their diploma in Brazil, three of them at the 
FGV. Among the others, there are two from British and 24 from North Ameri-
can universities, including four from Harvard, three from MIT, three from Chi-
cago, three from Berkeley, and three from Princeton. The BACEN oscillates, 
thus, between orthodoxy and some softer versions of mainstream economics.
The National University of Brasília (UNB – B2) is also at sector B, between 
the FGV and the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the Federal University of 
Minas Gerais (FACE-UFMG – C2). A  recurrent educational trajectory was 
to be an undergraduate at FACE and a master’s student at FGV, and then to 
pursue a PhD abroad before teaching at the UNB. The UNB recruited most 
of its economists when they were returning from PhD programs at Berkeley, 
Vanderbilt, Yale, MIT and Harvard, universities which are located near the net-
work. Their goal was to establish a mainstream economics department, regard-
ing theory and methods, while being politically critical towards the military 
and FGVs monetarism (Cunha et al., 2014).
4.2  The center of the network – Sectors C, D and E
Sector C is also under the influence of North American mainstream econom-
ics. The IPEA is next to Berkeley, as a result of the circulation promoted by the 
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California Mission. The IPEA recruited specialists from diverse backgrounds 
and different regions of Brazil, spreading its influence widely. Regarding its 
international connections, the PUC-RJ (D2) is quite similar to the UNB, 
since many of its professors  – Pedro Malan, Chico Lopes, Edmar Bacha  – 
previously taught in Brasília. The PUC-RJ hired doctors trained in the US and 
eventually in Europe. At this school predominated a market-oriented perspec-
tive, however critical of the notion of a self-regulating market. For instance, 
concerning inflation, even if they agreed that fiscal control was important to 
reach a monetary equilibrium, they perceived behavioral trends that pushed 
people to inflate prices while assuming that everyone else would do the same. 
In this case, no monetarist solution could coordinate expectations and settle 
prices (Bacha, 2012).
The agency for Funding of Studies and Projects (FINEP – D2), located in 
Rio, designs policies for science/technology and innovation and welcomed 
several specialists returning from England with expertise on the economic 
effects of science, technology, and innovation. The University of São Paulo 
(D4) is situated on the São Paulo side of sector D, at the middle point of 
the gradient since embracing professors with diversified views of economics. 
Alongside Delfim Netto and his Delfim Boys, who led the economic admin-
istration during the dictatorship, there were younger economists trained in 
moderate mainstream schools  – notably Vanderbilt, Yale and Cornell  – and 
some graduates who identified with Keynesian and/or Marxist ideas.
The EAESP appears close to USP in zone 5, both recruiting most of its 
professors in the state of São Paulo. As its location on sector E reveals, EAESP 
economics differed from that of its Rio alma mater, drawing inspiration from 
Keynesian and developmentalist ideas. The main international connections of 
the EAESP are with Michigan and Cornell, located in sector D and E respec-
tively. On the Rio de Janeiro side of sector E, there are two large institutions, 
the FNCE-UFRJ and the BNDES, both inspired by developmentalist perspec-
tives. Many of the Bank cadres and directors have connections with UFRJ, 
enhancing their proximity in the network. UFRJ has also several ties with 
institutions located at the south of the network, exchanging several professors 
with the University of Campinas (UNICAMP).
4.3  The south of the network – Sectors F and G
The CEPAL (F3) is a major influence for UFRJ, BNDES and UNICAMP. 
The BNDE and the CEPAL had a joint office for several years, many of the 
Banks’ bureaucrats attended CEPAL’s courses and CEPAL’s economists such 
as Castro, Lessa, and Conceição worked at the Bank. These three senior 
economists and other experts trained by CEPAL participated in the creation 
of UNICAMP’s economics department, alongside with graduates from the 
ESCOLATINA who moved to the Campinas after Chile’s 1973 military coup 
(Klüger, 2017c). UNICAMP became the anti-mainstream school of the Bra-
zilian space of economists, combining Marxism, Keynesianism, CEPAL’s ideas 
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and some conceptions derived from Soviet planning. When UNICAMP’s pro-
fessors pleaded to join the Economics Graduate Association, FGV denied them 
access, saying that their approach to economics was not “scientific”. This bat-
tle ended with the FGV leaving the Association, in 1974, because all others 
backed the UNICAMP’s admission (Haddad, 1997).
The UNICAMP was one of the main sources of professors for the Catho-
lic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP – G4) and shared researchers with the 
Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP – G4). The CEBRAP 
also welcomed researchers returning from exile, some who had worked at the 
CEPAL or studied at the ESCOLATINA. Professors from Campinas often 
published in CEBRAP’s journal and attended conferences and debates at the 
Research Center (Belluzzo, 2011). The proximity between CEBRAP, UNI-
CAMP and PUC-SP is based not only on shared personnel but also on compat-
ible ideas. Their economics is open to interdisciplinarity, considering historical, 
social and geopolitical specificities (Borges et al., 1998).
4.4  The governments and their economists
The gradient of positions in the network expresses, thus, the main oppo-
sition within the Brazilian space of economists and allows one to observe 
how diverse sources of foreign economic knowledge spread over the space. 
Correlations between positions in the space and political position taking, in 
its turn, can be spotted through the locations of the dots representing the 
governments from 1964 to 2010. The distances between these reveal how 
divergent political orientations led to the recruitment of economists with 
different perspectives.
The military governments appear at the north of the network (B3), recruit-
ing from the conservative segments of USP, represented by the Delfim Netto 
and his students, and from FGV, including several of the Chicago-trained econ-
omists. All the democratic governments from 1985 until 2002 are located in 
the center of the network. José Sarney’s government (D4) shifted its economic 
orientation several times. In the beginning, it counted mostly on economists 
from the FGV, but unsatisfied with their results, recruited an economic team 
encompassing economists from UNICAMP, USP and PUC-RJ. Fernando 
Collor de Mello’s administration (D3) relied mostly on economists from USP, 
combined with some professionals from the PUC-RJ, PUC-SP and UFRJ. If 
Sarney’s and Collor’s administrations leaned towards São Paulo, their successor, 
Itamar Franco, was slightly closer to Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais (D2). 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso was Itamar’s Minister of Finance, and the anti-
inflationary plan he launched was key for his victory at the following presiden-
tial elections. Once elected (D3), Cardoso kept most of his former economic 
team, integrated by economists from the PUC-RJ and the USP. Finally, Lula’s 
administration (G3) opposed the military governments diametrically, having 
assembled heterodox economists from UNICAMP and neighboring schools 
with strong Latin American connections.
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5  Conclusion
This chapter focused on the Brazilian case in order to analyze the international 
flow of economists and economic ideas, and how they (re)shape a structured 
space of economists. The historical reconstruction of its international con-
nections cast light on strategies of technical legitimation of local elites and the 
effects of their international engagements over the national struggles for pres-
tige and political/administrative power. From the discussion, it is possible to 
say that there are correspondences between the structure of polarities observed 
at the national and international levels. As Dezalay and Garth (2002) indicate, 
these affinities result from a double movement: on the one side, the local elite 
looks abroad for legitimated sources of knowledge, cosmopolitan capitals and 
strategic connections; on the other side, internationally dominant forces rein-
force their positions geopolitically when sending their experts abroad, export-
ing ideas and setting a favorable economic agenda worldwide.
The structure of the space expresses an opposition between dominant North 
American schools of economics and a strong Latin American influence at a 
scattered heterodox position. The degrees of connections indicate that even if 
the US has the most extensive influence over the Brazilian space of economists, 
the connections with CEPAL and ESCOLATINA are the single largest sources 
of economic knowledge. Between these extremities, there is a myriad of inter-
mediate positions in which mainstream ideas and oppositions to it coexist and 
recombine. Most of the governments also appear in the center of the network, 
mixing expertise from several schools.
Further investigation could address the spillover effect of the internationali-
zation of Brazilian economists on the regions where they circulate, inquiring if 
the ideas emanating from peripheral areas also impact the center. Supplemen-
tary research should be conducted to evaluate if those who circulate between 
the center and the periphery; those who circulate between peripheries and 
those who do not circulate have different social profiles and compositions of 
economic, cultural and cosmopolitan capitals. Thus, it will become possible 
to observe if international circulation led to changes in the social profiles of 
the elites or if it reinforces inequalities, offering additional cultural, social and 
symbolic resources to those already affluent.
Notes
 1 This chapter combines results from two research projects: a Ph.D. thesis, funded by 
CNPQ and CAPES-PSDE grants, conducted at the Department of Sociology of the 
University of São Paulo, and as visiting researcher at the Université de Picardie Jules 
Verne and University of California – Berkeley and a postdoc at the Brazilian Center for 
Analysis and Planning and Princeton University, supported by São Paulo Research Foun-
dation (FAPESP) grants: 2017/13937–1 e 2018/09487–7. I wish to thank the editors for 
all the helpful remarks and Johanna Gautier, Pierre Benz and Thierry Rossier for their 
detailed comments and recommendations.
 2 Economists were able to make of their expertise a source of prestige that surpassed the 
academic field, becoming a key to access positions of decision and influence at the state 
and private sector.
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 3 In this chapter, the division between center and periphery is not restricted to the eco-
nomic aspects that distinguish industrialized countries and those relying on the export 
of primary goods (Prebisch, 1949). Economic domination is frequently combined with 
broader cultural dependency, including reliance on foreign technology, knowledge and 
expertise. Therefore, in this chapter the term periphery indicates dependency on both 
material and immaterial resources.
 4 The use of Bourdieu’s amplified notion of space, instead of his concept of field, allows 
comprising not only the relatively autonomous field of economics but also the govern-
mental institutions responsible for the economic administration and agents that circulate 
between the academic, public and private sectors.
 5 Even though Bourdieu didn’t operationalize the links between social affinity and social 
connections, he and Monique Saint-Martin make clear that the orchestration of habitus 
and similarity of lifestyles are at the base of the establishment of all kinds of ties, and all 
achievements in a field that depend on the existence of personal relations (1978, p. 37). 
Thus, it can be inferred that according to this logic the ties at a network express social 
similarities/differences.
 6 For all institutions, the name has been translated but the acronym will be kept in 
Portuguese.
 7 When a new institution is mentioned, a code indicating its position at the network is 
added.
 8 Modern political economy can be differentiated from mainstream economics based on its 
interdisciplinary attitude; its critics “against the extensive use of methodological individual-
ism, of equilibrium and harmony concepts, of marginalism, against the exogenous and static 
character of psychological and sociological assumptions, and against the neglect of historical 
and dynamic factors”; and its focus on the historical and geographically specific aspects of the 
economies. It considers that economic outcomes vary accordingly to different cultures and 
political priorities, which requires studies to be localized and empirical, instead of general mod-
els based on predetermined assumptions about the human behavior (Rotschield, 1989, p. 4).
 9 David Colander and Arjo Klamer conducted a survey at the graduate schools in eco-
nomics at the beginning of the 1980s, which helps to differentiate the schools located 
at points A and B. The results show that MIT and Harvard students are usually in strict 
opposition to Chicago. Yale appears in the middle, usually closer to MIT/Harvard. For 
instance, 70% of Chicago graduates believed that minimum wage increased unemploy-
ment of young and unqualified workers, while only 24% of the MIT students and 15% 
of Harvard graduates agreed. No one from Chicago disagreed with the idea that inflation 
was purely a monetary phenomenon, 84% of them agreeing strongly. On the other hand, 
only 7% of MIT students and 15% of Harvard’s agreed strongly with that. Finally, only 
6% of Chicago’s graduates agreed strongly that “The distribution of income in developed 
nations should be more equal”, against more than 50% of MIT, Harvard and Yale students 
(Colander and Klamer, 1987, pp. 103–104).
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